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The Sixteenth Quarter saw the Allies win fresh and heartening successes on both the Eastern and Southern European fronts. The tremendous counter-offensive of the Russians carried their victorious armies up to the Dnieper and threatened the enemy strongholds in the Crimea. In the Mediterranean, the Sicilian expedition brought about the collapse of the Fascist regime, quickly followed by the surrender of Italy. By air and sea, the Anglo-American striking power gained terrifying proportions, while in the Far East the Japanese lost more Pacific outposts.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Watteville's chapter is brilliantly written and is a really authoritative account of Russian methods, tactics and strategy. It also contains the first thorough and penetrating explanation of the defeat of the German 'blitz tactics' during 1942-3.

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THREE SERVICE MINISTERS

A Record of the War

THE
SIXTEENTH QUARTER

July 1, 1943—September 30, 1943

PHILIP GRAVES

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P R E F A C E

The Sixteenth Quarter saw the Allies win fresh and heartening successes on the Eastern and Southern European fronts. The defeat of the German offensive in the Kursk salient was the signal for a tremendous Russian counter-offensive which carried the Russian armies to the Dnieper, on a wide front, reduced the enemy's Caucasian bridgehead to something little better than a beach-head and threatened his strongholds in the Crimea. In the Mediterranean the Sicilian expedition brought about the collapse of the Fascist regime, which was followed by the surrender of Italy; and though the Germans, by bold and ruthless action, escaped the worst consequences of this disaster, seized Rome and overpowered ill-planned and feeble attempts at resistance in Northern Italy, the end of September found the Anglo-Americans at the gates of Naples after the hard-fought victory of Salerno and the Provisional Government of Italy seeking some means of associating their country with the Allies. The Anglo-American air attack on Germany assumed ever more terrifying proportions; at sea the U-boats, though they returned to the attack, were more than held; in the Far East the Japanese lost more Pacific outposts and the Quebec Conference marked the decision of the English-speaking Powers to hasten their offensive against the Japanese. On the political side, the anxiety caused by the Russo-Polish breach and, more generally, by the hostility of the U.S.S.R. to any proposal for federation, or even for a common economic policy among the neighbour states of Eastern Europe, still persisted; but it was somewhat allayed by the knowledge that the American and British Governments were arranging meetings with the Russian Government and its Chief, where some of the difficult territorial questions of the future would be discussed by the principals of the major Allied Powers.

In compiling this record the writer has been greatly

assisted by several collaborators. He wishes to express his indebtedness to Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. de Watterville who has described the Russian campaign with characteristic fire and lucidity ; to Mr. S. W. Mason, who, as before, has written of our King, Ministers and Parliament; to Mr. C. R. Lumby, sometime Correspondent of *The Times* in Rome, who has narrated the circumstances of the Italian surrender, to Sir Frank Brown and Mr. S. L. Righyni who have dealt respectively with Indian and United States affairs, and to Mr. J. H. Freeman of *The Times*, who has described the plight of Germany in Chapter VII. I would also thank the Naval, Military and Aeronautical Correspondents of *The Times* for their advice and renew my thanks to its Map Department.

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CHAPTER I

THE MEDITERRANEAN WAR

I : THE CONQUEST OF SICILY

During the first nine days of July the Allied Air Forces struck blow after blow at Southern Italy, Sardinia and, most of all, at Sicily. On the night of July 1-2, bombers of the Strategic Air Force attacked Palermo and Cagliari. Next day heavy bombers of the 9th U.S.A.A.F. made a heavy daylight attack on the aerodrome at Lecce, in Southern Italy. Over 40 enemy fighters which intervened lost 12 of their number. Other bombers raided Grotteglie aerodrome. The Sicilian airfield of Castelvetro was heavily bombed by Mitchells of the Tactical Air Force, and that night bombers from North-West Africa attacked Trapani (Sicily) and Olbia in Sardinia. On July 3 four airfields in Sardinia were raided by Allied heavy and medium bombers escorted by Lightnings and Warhawks, and Mitchells, Bostons and Baltimores of the Tactical Air Force did damage at the Sicilian aerodromes of Comiso, Milo and Sciacca. Sicily was the chief target for the night of July 3-4 on which some of our bombers attacked coastal targets near Rome, and on July 4 enemy aerodromes in that island, Catania, Comiso, Gerbini, Milo and Sciacca among them, were heavily punished. The enemy made a determined resistance. Their aircraft came up in strength to meet our bombers and 43 were destroyed in a series of fierce air battles for but 13 of our machines. The hostile machines used aerial incendiary bombs dropped from above in attempts to break up the formation of the Fortresses attacking Catania. The fights over the satellite aerodromes of Gerbini were described by the crews of the Mitchells and Marauders and of the escorting Lightnings as among the hottest which they had experienced. Comiso which the R.A.F.

had raided during the previous night was repeatedly attacked during the day and the oil storage tanks and workshop areas were hit.

Next—on July 5—came fresh attacks on Gerbini and other airfields. At Gerbini less than 30 Fortresses beat off over 100 Axis fighters and claimed to have destroyed 30 of them for the loss of but three of their own number. On the same day our Malta aircraft disposed of five enemy fighters and 60 Liberators of the Middle-East-based American heavy squadrons gave Messina a battering in which nearly 170 tons weight of bombs was used. On July 6 the dose was repeated both at Gerbini, where 50 Liberators dropped over 125 tons of splinter and H.E. bombs and 85 more Liberators dropped 225 tons, a record total in Sicily thus far on Messina. And so the attack went on. The Germans were known to be reinforcing their air squadrons in Italy and Sicily. Field-Marshal von Richthofen, who had been in command of the 4th German Air Fleet (*Luftflotte*) on the South Russian front, had been transferred to Italy, but after July 5 the enemy's attempts at interception slackened, while the attack from Malta, North-West Africa and the Middle East redoubled in violence. On July 9 the special correspondent of *The Times* telegraphed from Algiers :

"Once more Gerbini and its satellite airfields were the principal target of the Strategic Air Force yesterday. Flying Fortress crews speak of excellent camouflage of airfields and of weak flak. Some enemy fighters were up against the first formation, but they were warded off by the R.A.F. Spitfire cover ; later formations were unopposed. The raid was followed up by Mitchells and Marauders escorted by Lightnings. . . .

"Tactical Air Force Mitchells made their sixth raid in six days on Comiso, dropping a heavy load on the dispersal area. South African A.F. Bostons and Baltimores in an earlier raid had started nine fires and exploded an ammunition dump. Other U.S.A.A.F. Mitchells laid patterns of bombs across Biscari airfield. . . . Other Tactical Air Force bombers and fighter-bombers went roving over Sicily, strafing a train near Licata and another near Boga Norro ; elsewhere eight out of a convoy of 20 lorries were burned up. . . . Lightnings from the Strategic Air Force swept low over southern Sicily, strafing the wireless stations at Catania and Cape Passaro." After a reference to night attacks by bombers of the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces on Sicilian airfields the Correspondent of *The Times* continued : "Enemy fighter opposition to all these raids was on a reduced scale. In addition to a formation of a score or so fighters over Gerbini, some 40 fighters tried to intercept the Bostons over Sciacca. They were beaten off like the others."

By now the enemy's air strength in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy had been greatly reduced. He had lost a great number of machines in air combat or on the ground. Much damage had been done to his hangars, petrol, ammunition and other dumps, to his transport, railways, ports and telegraphic communications. The time had come when invasion could be attempted without undue risk. The necessary hosts of transports and of smaller landing craft had been accumulated in the ports of Algeria and Tunisia. The naval strength required for their protection had been concentrated in the Mediterranean. Early in the morning of July 10 the blow fell. Before midnight on July 9 detachments of paratroops, British and American, had been dropped at several points in the south and south-east of Sicily to attack the enemy's communications. At 4.45 a.m. the Press was informed that the landing had begun¹; by 6 a.m. the landing forces, British, Canadian and American, had established themselves at so many points on the beaches that their success was assured; by 7.30 a.m. they were beginning to advance inland and artillery, tanks and supplies of every description were being put ashore. The landings had been made on about 100 miles of coast from a point between Gela and Licata to the west, to the eastern side of Cape Passaro at the south-eastern corner of Sicily. The Americans were on the left; a Canadian Division, in action for the first time, came next and formed a link between them and the British troops of the Eighth Army on the right who encountered the strongest opposition of the day near Cape Passaro. Covered by the Royal Navy and an American squadron on the water, protected in the air by sweep after sweep of Allied fighters and heavy bombing raids on the enemy's airfields, the multitude of ships, great and small,² landed men, guns, tanks, transport and stores with astonishing rapidity. Within a few hours the skies over Sicily seemed altogether in our hands. Meanwhile, the co-operation between Army and Navy had given admirable results. To take one important

¹ It actually began about 3 a.m.

² About 2,500 vessels of all types took part in the first landing.

instance, the systems of gunnery employed by the Army and Navy differ vastly. The Army fires from a temporarily fixed platform at targets which are generally stationary and frequently invisible, and uses the map to supplement or on occasion to take the place of visual observation, whether from the air or from the ground. The Navy is trained primarily to attack moving targets from moving platforms and must therefore depend enormously on spotting. The method devised to bring about a synthesis between these two different systems was to attach an Army gunner officer as F.O.O. (Forward Observing Officer) to each warship engaged in covering operations. He went ashore and reported the result of his observations by wireless to a colleague who acted as a liaison officer between him and the ship's Fire Control Officer or directly to the Fire Control. In the organization of the beach-heads the Navy also played an important part and the Royal Marines did superlatively good work under fire in most difficult conditions.

The first long official *communiqué* on the invasion was issued late on July 11. It ran :

"With all the beaches firmly held, and all the troops advancing, the Allied Navies' most important task during the day was landing further troops with their vehicles, guns, fuel, equipment and stores. This important work proceeded satisfactorily in spite of the heaving swell on some of the beaches and some of the exits being heavily mined. Warships were also engaged in silencing enemy batteries and gun positions whenever necessary, and in providing defence against occasional attacks by enemy fighter-bombers. Minesweepers were employed sweeping the various anchorages. Naval units supporting the landing in the neighbourhood of Gela successfully engaged tank reinforcements coming from inland. The Navies' primary duty of getting the Army safely on shore continues without intermission.

"Although few details have yet come in, it is clear that our operations against Sicily continue to go according to plan. During the course of the day's fighting good progress has been made and the advance continues. Information with regard to casualties is not yet available, but it is believed that they have been light."

Far the hardest fighting had been near Gela. There part of the reconstituted Hermann Göring Division, with some 45 tanks, delivered a heavy counter-attack on the Americans. There was not quite enough backing behind the blow. The American warships intervened effectively at a critical moment ; the American infantry,

fighting "with magnificent determination and resource,"¹ stopped the German armour almost on the beaches ; the presence of light howitzers of an air-borne combat team at one point turned the scale, and by midday on July 12 the attack had been broken with heavy losses of men and machines. Elsewhere the resistance was unexpectedly weak. Some Italian units fought for a short time and then surrendered. Others fought not at all. Important towns were taken almost bloodlessly ; Licata, for example, cost the American Seventh Army four casualties. On their right the 1st Canadian Division had a little trouble with a battery behind Maucini, but from their landing on the Costa dell'Ambra beach on the heels of the Royal Marine Commandos to their junction with the British across the base of the Cape Passaro peninsula, their losses were almost absurdly small. The British troops on the Canadian right also found the resistance patchy, though Italian-manned French tanks made several thrusts at the 5th and 51st Divisions. A statement issued by A.F.H.Q. on July 12 said, among other things, that seven enemy counter-attacks had been repulsed and at least 2,000 prisoners taken. Good progress had been made during the day, although enemy interference from the air had slightly increased. The statement concluded :

"It can now be stated that the following major ports and towns have been captured by our forces : Syracuse, Avola, Pachino, Pozzallo, Scoglitti, Gela, Ispica, Licata, Rosolini, and Noto. The advance continues." It also became known that Syracuse had been defended mainly by Germans, that General Eisenhower had visited the front, and that though some of the paratroops and glider-borne units had been overpowered after a bold fight, several which had surrendered after exhausting their ammunition had been released by the troops advancing inland from the beaches, and that one American airborne unit had had the unusual experience of being charged by an Italian cavalry squadron, which was speedily routed. The Italian official news announced the death in action of Lieutenant-General Francisci, the Commander of the Sicilian Fascist Militia. The German High Command prematurely and erroneously recorded that a counter-attack near Gela had "cut the only road between the American and British

¹ *The Times*, August 25. Particularly good work was done on this occasion by Major-General Swing's air-borne troops. Young infantrymen crept out on the tanks and fired their anti-tank rifles through the gun-ports. In one case a sergeant and gun-crew of a 75 mm. howitzer were twice knocked off their feet by the fire of a Tiger tank, but they stood and finally knocked it out for good.

armies," and made extensive and mendacious claims of sinkings of transports and the destruction of nearly 40 Allied aircraft. In fact the Allies destroyed 45 Axis aircraft on July 12 for the loss of only nine machines.

The capture of Syracuse had given the Eighth Army a useful port which was immediately used by British transports and landing craft, which found it in unexpectedly good order. The advance continued all along the front. Augusta, the port lying 11 miles north of Syracuse, was bombarded by Allied warships on July 12 and mine-sweepers then cleared the sea approaches. The number of Italian prisoners increased hourly and they already included the commander of the 206th (Coastal) Division. Early in the afternoon of July 13 the invading vanguards were at some points 20 miles inland. Palozzolo had fallen and Americans and Canadians were in touch near Ragusa, which fell on July 14. On that day A.F.H.Q. announced the capture of Augusta by a British and a Greek destroyer on July 12, the destruction of 42 enemy aircraft, 11 by our nightfighters on July 12 and 13, against, an Allied loss of seven machines, and operations by warships and aircraft against the enemy's remaining airfields. Meanwhile, the R.A.F. in Britain had intervened indirectly in the Sicilian campaign by sending a strong force of Bomber Command against Turin on the night of July 12-13. It found the defences weak and did much damage to the Fiat Motor Works. In this operation¹ the R.A.F. lost 13 bombers.

July 14, the French National Holiday, was marked by the news given by General Giraud to cadets of the Military Academy in New York that French Moroccan troops were now engaged in Sicily. The light vessels of the Allied navies continued to patrol off the southern entrance to the Straits of Messina, where they had already sunk two E-boats (July 12), and our aircraft raided Messina with success, harassed the enemy's communications in Central Sicily and attacked his shipping in the Tyrrhenian Sea. By the afternoon of July 15 seven airfields were in

¹ Intruder patrols were also engaged in France and the Low Countries that night, but no bombers, only fighter-bombers were engaged in these, and the loss of bombers must therefore have been incurred in the Turin raid. Two with all their crews crashed and were destroyed in Switzerland.

Allied hands ; the Eighth Army had pushed past Augusta ; the American Seventh Army continued to gain ground and over 12,000 prisoners were in their hands, including the General commanding the 54th (Naples) Division. That night Lancasters bombed electrical transformers and switching stations in Northern Italy. Thirteen more towns had fallen into Allied hands that day. The work of disembarking stores and reinforcements continued satisfactorily. Enemy submarine activity, though it had caused some loss of shipping, was being actively countered by Allied navies, and the Italian Fleet, but for a few sorties by E-boats, remained quiescent. Between Augusta and Catania the advancing Eighth Army presently encountered strong resistance from well-entrenched German troops, but elsewhere the rapid advance of the Americans dispelled any lingering fear of a dangerous counter-attack.

By July 18 at least a third of Sicily was in Allied hands. Naples had been heavily attacked by Liberators of the 9th U.S.A.A.F., its marshallings yards, arsenal, and torpedo factory greatly damaged and 21 intercepting fighters shot down for one Allied machine. A third divisional commander and the entire Headquarters of the 207th (Coastal) Division were prisoners. Agrigento had fallen almost bloodlessly to the Americans. Next day, although the Germans held up the Eighth Army south of Catania, the Americans were in Caltanissetta and were fanning out to the west, while they and the Canadians were nearing Enna. Everywhere in the non-German sectors of the defence resistance was collapsing and the Sicilians were greeting the invaders with effusion.

On July 19 A.F.H.Q., Algiers, issued the following announcement :

"Military objectives in Rome and its vicinity have been bombed to-day by heavy bombers and medium bombers of the Mediterranean Air Command. The marshallings yard was the principal target. It is of great importance to the Axis war effort and in particular for the movement of German troops. Warning leaflets were also dropped over the city before the raid. Pilots and bomb-aimers employed in this mission were particularly instructed to avoid damaging religious and cultural monuments."

The aircraft employed were American, Liberators and Flying Fortresses, with Marauders and Mitchells, the

medium bombers escorted by Lightnings. The attack began at 11.13 a.m. when the first wave bombed the San Lorenzo marshalling yards, where a number of railway lines converge near the main railway station. While the heavies attacked this important target and the Littorio marshalling yards north of the city, the medium bombers attacked the Ciampino aerodrome 10 miles south of the city. The whole operation lasted about two and a half hours. Great damage was done to the railways and also to the aerodrome. From the military standpoint the operation was entirely justifiable. No doubt believing that Rome would be immune, Mussolini had been moving war factories into the suburbs during the past two years, while the railway junctions and yards constituted a most important military objective, especially at the time when they formed an important link in the military chain from the Brenner Pass to Sicily. At the same time it was arguable that the danger to the Vatican City and to the monuments "which are the glory not only of Rome but of the civilized world,"¹ made such an enterprise politically perilous at a time when Italian morale could not be revived by the rantings of the Fascists, but might conceivably be rallied by damage to Vatican or Capitol. As it was the famous Basilica of San Lorenzo Without the Walls was much damaged. Next day the Pope wrote to his Vicar-General in Rome deploring the bombing and appealing in language marked by great dignity and restraint to Christian charity against its recurrence. In his letter he stated that he had asked both sides to ensure the safety of the city, but without success. It should be added that the British and American Governments had long since made it clear that so long as Rome contained military objectives it was liable to attack. Spokesmen of the British Government had pointed out in Parliament and elsewhere that if Mussolini wished to avert the bombing of Rome he could withdraw all military and industrial installations and declare it an open city.

On the same day Hitler and Mussolini met at Feltre, in northern Italy. A brief *communiqué* after announcing

¹ From the leaflet dropped before the raid.

their meeting merely added the words "Military questions were discussed," and German-inspired comment was far from enlightening.¹ Meanwhile, although the Eighth Army encountered most obstinate German resistance which finally brought its advance to a standstill along the southern edge of the Plain of Catania, and Canadians and Americans had a hard struggle with units of the 15th Panzer Division before seizing the road junction of Enna in mid-Sicily on July 20, the American Seventh Army was carrying all before it in Western Sicily. Such Italian opposition as it encountered was less than half-hearted. It took Castelvetro on July 21. Next day its columns pushing boldly across the island from the south forced the surrender of Palermo, where the invaders were received by the populace with an enthusiasm which might have been expected at Oslo or Athens, but was surprising, to say the least, in a great Italian city. The blow isolated the ports of Marsala, which had suffered much from air raids and lost many citizens, and Trapani, and both were occupied on July 23. By this time the Seventh Army had taken some 50,000 prisoners, had destroyed or disabled nearly 100 tanks and over 200 guns and had captured many intact. Nearly two-thirds of Sicily was now in Allied hands. The Italian Army in the island had ceased to count, and with the fall of Palermo the curtain fell on the first act of the campaign.

Before describing the later stages of the conquest something must be said of the work of the Allied Air Forces, of the dispositions of the enemy and of the causes of his rapid overthrow in the south and west of the island. By July 23 the Strategic Air Force had inflicted such losses on the enemy's squadrons in Sicily that it could safely leave the remnants to be dealt with, and hostile troops, transport and communications to be harassed by the Tactical Air Force and the Malta Command. Its efforts were now to be directed against the railways of Southern Italy, the airfields there and near Naples and

¹ The truth about the meeting will be found later in this chapter.

in Sardinia. It had made an immense contribution to the successful opening of the invasion. During its first week "the N.W.A.A.F. dropped more than 4000 tons of bombs, of which all but 600 were dropped on the island. The only places outside Sicily to be raided had an intimate connexion with it; they raided Naples, San Giovanni, and two airfields in southern Italy. Messina alone received 500 tons; Gerbini had the next heaviest tonnage. . . . After the concentrated raid on Messina by Fortresses on July 12 two large craters were made in the main railway line to Catania which effectively blocked the traffic. A few hundred yards north of the junction of the Catania-Palermo line sidings were blocked by debris and a mangled mass of rolling stock which burned for several days.

One hundred and seventy-five enemy aircraft were shot down in combat during the first week of the invasion by aircraft operating from North Africa, Malta, Pantelleria and Sicily; many others were probably destroyed or damaged. . . . Three enemy ships totalling 10,000 tons were definitely sunk, two probably sunk, and seven damaged, the over-all tonnage of sunk and damaged being more than 50,000."¹

One raid was carried out on the night of July 24 by home-based bombers of the R.A.F. which had been flown to North Africa after attacking transformer stations in northern Italy on the night of July 15-18. On their return journey these Lancasters bombed Livorno (Leghorn), doing considerable damage to docks and industrial plants, and reached England without loss. Excellent work was also done by the Coastal Air Force from North Africa. Torpedo-carrying Beaufighters of this force caught a convoy off the Tiber mouth on July 23 and destroyed at least one merchantman besides blowing the stern off a destroyer, killing a flying-boat and leaving two ships ablaze. Another escorted ship was torpedoed off Elba. Barges by which the enemy was endeavouring to supply and reinforce his troops in Sicily were frequently attacked in the Straits of Messina and many were disabled or destroyed.

While the Allied Air Fleets had played a great part in ensuring the success of the invasion, the speed with which the initial lodgment on the island was effected was also due to the tactical deception of the enemy. In the days preceding the landing Allied naval and aerial operations had been designed to give the Axis Command the impression that we should attack the western end of Sicily. The attack was actually made on the south and south-eastern coasts. Another circumstance which paradoxically assisted the landing was bad weather. During the previous night the sea had grown so rough as to cause the officers in charge of the landing operations no small anxiety. Fortunately the wind and the swell which it had caused abated somewhat while the first landings were being made and thereafter the weather improved.

¹ *The Times*, Algiers message, published July 24.

It was even more fortunate that many of the Italian Coast Defence troops, encouraged by the rising wind and sea, had gone home to sleep that night instead of manning their gun positions and trenches, which they could not reach in time next morning.

The Axis defensive dispositions were based on the belief that the Italian forces holding the coastal fortifications would delay the invaders long enough for the German and Italian mobile reserves to intervene with every hope of success at vital points. On paper the enemy was strong, as the following list of his available forces shows.

Five Coastal Divisions, numbered 202, 206, 207, 208, and 213, with several independent regiments, held the shore defences from Syracuse to Palermo. They had little or no transport but they manned strong defences which they should have been able to hold for some hours. Behind these troops were the field forces, the most important units of which were the German Hermann Göring and 15th Panzer Divisions, both of which had been reconstituted after the capture of the parent units in Africa, but probably did not contain more than a small percentage—recovered wounded and men absent on leave when the original units were captured—of Tunisian and Libyan veterans. None the less they were good divisions. They were distributed in four "battle groups along the south-eastern axis of the island ready to move in any direction."¹ There were also four Italian field divisions, the 4th (Livorno), 26th (Assietta), 28th (Aosta), and 54th (Naples), and several independent units, the strength of which approximated to that of a division. These were numerically weaker and less well armed than the German divisions, but they should have been able to intervene before the invading forces had solidified their positions.

Unfortunately for the enemy's plans all the Italian troops proved broken reeds. Few of the Coast Defence units fought even passably and most melted away into the landscape with unanimous alacrity. Officers ordered to press inland as fast as possible were at first embarrassed by the number of offers to surrender until they discovered that their captives required next to no escorts to the beaches, where they sat resignedly waiting for a passage to Africa. The field divisions were little better. Most put up a brief and formal resistance, if that, and after a few days "it was not thought worth while to mark their location on General Montgomery's map. They did not even explode their prepared demolition charges, and after a time the Germans gave orders that all remaining demolitions in the area still unoccupied by us were to be taken over from the Italians by Germans" (*The Times*, *loc. cit.* August 25). The civil population welcomed the invaders with every manifestation of joy, pressing wine and fruit on them, warning them of the proximity of Germans or the mining of roads and bridges and assisting them in every possible way. The Fascist minority fled.

"One can only explain the almost complete absence of Italian fighting

¹ From the first of three admirable articles published in *The Times* (August 25, 26 and 27) describing the principal stages of the Sicilian campaign and enumerating its lessons. The author has made much use of them in his chronicle of the conquest of Sicily.

spirit here as the result of utter disillusion, the conviction of coming defeat, dissatisfaction with Mussolini and his regime, and ever-growing hatred of the Germans. In addition the Sicilians in the Italian army had little interest in fighting for Italy. Their political interest was in Sicilian independence which seemed to them much more likely to result from an Allied than from an Axis victory" (*The Times, loc. cit.*). Sicily had been neglected by a succession of Italian Governments since the unification of Italy. The Fascists, for all their promises, had been no exception to the rule. They had, it is true, abolished the Mafia, a powerful Sicilian "racket" which terrorized its critics and those unwilling to pay for its "protection." But after a while the Sicilians had discovered that many of the Mafisti had been released on condition of joining the party, and that the "racket" continued, the principal changes being in the ranks of the higher "racketeers."

But though the Italians were generally useless, the German troops fought with great courage and vigour. They had been reinforced by several excellent parachute battalions who preserved the Nazi fanaticism and the national military efficiency of the armies of 1940-41, and by the 29th (Motorized) Division which, like the Hermann Göring Division, was a revival of a lost unit, the division bearing the same serial number which had come to grief at Stalingrad. All these troops fought well, the parachute battalions superlatively well. But their four battle groups had never been able to concentrate a strong enough force at any one point, after the repulse of the attack at Gela, to endanger the Allied advance.

"Nor, in spite of the energy with which they brought in reinforcements by air and sea, were they able to form a mobile reserve. By co-ordinated pressure along a wide front we kept them stretched to the limit."¹ So when our Eighth Army was making dangerous progress in the direction of Catania and the Italians were proving hourly more unreliable, the Germans decided to abandon western Sicily and hold the north-eastern corner of the island as a bridgehead to prevent the Eighth Army from cutting off their retreat and to delay our conquest of the island as long as possible.

The next stage of the campaign was marked by the vigorous defence of Catania by the Germans and a "left wheel" of the left wing of the Eighth Army and of the American Seventh Army, who after overrunning western and central Sicily, swung eastwards from Palermo and Enna (Castrogiovanni) in the general direction of Messina. On the Allied right the Eighth Army were faced by a most difficult task. The plain of Catania is crossed by three rivers, the Dittaino, in the centre, and its

¹ *The Times loc. cit.*

affluents, the Simeto which joins it on the north some ten miles south-east of Gerbini, and the Garnalunga to the south which meets it a few miles from the sea after following a more or less parallel course across the plain.

The Simeto gives its name to the combined stream. Watercourses used for irrigation cross the plain and the British advance besides being impeded by these obstacles



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SICILY, NEARING THE END

was rendered still more difficult by the fact that the ground of the rivers which they had to cross is open cornland, while that to the north of them is mainly orchard and somewhat higher than the southern portion of the plain of Catania. The Germans, who had expected to fight here, had established many strong points commanding the bridges over or the fords through the rivers, and although their air power was almost entirely subdued their artillery was still able to make our advance a costly one. They were fighting to gain time and to inflict casualties, and they were well handled.

"Their luck came at the Primasola bridge in the Catanian plain. Some parachutists whom we sent to seize and hold the bridge until our infantry came up were dropped inaccurately, and only part of them were able to reach and occupy the bridge. They could not hold it quite long enough, and the result was that it cost us more lives and several days and nights of exhausting effort to gain our bridgehead across the Simeto. By the time we had secured it the Germans were firmly installed in strong defences. . . .

"Our 50th and 5th Divisions were therefore brought to a standstill. Meanwhile, the 51st Division on their left was pushing on against stiff German resistance, but after gaining a bridgehead across the Dittaino River at Sfero it, too, was halted."

The Canadians and the Malta Force, composed of battalions drawn from the garrison of that gallant island, were still advancing on the extreme left of the Eighth Army. They took the small towns of Leonforte and Agira after hard fighting on July 28 and 29, but they were then held up before the strong position of Regalbuto.

Meanwhile, the Seventh Army, wheeling right from Palermo with Enna as pivot of the wheel, was making good progress eastwards. It captured Termini on July 25. On that day Mussolini fell, and this event, the causes of which are set forth in the next section of this chapter, reduced to zero whatever Italian will to resist may have survived. Cafalu was captured on July 27, and on July 29 the Americans took Nicosia, thus depriving the enemy of one of the two chief roads from western Sicily to its north-eastern extremity. The other road along the sea coast from Palermo through Milazzo to Messina was now exposed to naval attack by the American warships which had entered the Tyrrhenian Sea. By the end of July the Americans were prolonging the Eighth Army's line right across Sicily to its northern shore, and General Montgomery's artillery were bombarding the German positions along the whole of the Eighth Army front in preparation for the attack on Catania.

The attack began all along the line on August 1 and made satisfactory, if at first slow, progress. Meanwhile, strong reinforcements had reached the Eighth Army and were coming into action with decisive results.

"For some days the 78th Division, formerly the mainstay of the First Army in Tunisia, and the most experienced mountain fighters in the Mediterranean, had been landing and moving up to the battle area. Now they were sent in fresh and confident to crack the German defence by capturing

its chief bastion, Centuripe, a mountain position of immense natural strength. They did it in little over three days ; on the morning of August 3 Centuripe was in our hands ; Adrano and the inland road westwards from Catania lay before us ; and the first phase of the campaign was over."

The capture of Centuripe determined the fall of Catania. The Germans, still fighting obstinately, still counter-attacking whenever an opportunity presented itself, gradually "pulled out" of Catania, which was occupied by the Eighth Army on August 5. Meanwhile, the Americans had been pressing forward in very difficult country among mountains which they and the British found even more difficult than the Tunisian "Jebels." The Italians continued to fight quarter-heartedly, but the Germans put up a stout resistance, delaying every advance with mines and demolitions. They made a particularly stubborn defence of Troina, a strong position naturally, skilfully fortified and defended, and it was not until August 6 that the Americans, after several days of obstinate fighting, drove them from their position. Meanwhile, the Eighth Army had taken Adrano, Belpasso and Biancavilla, and the capture of Bronte on the morning of August 8 brought its left wing within ten miles of Randazzo, a point of great strategic importance on the circular road and railway around Mount Etna.

It was now clear that the Germans were preparing to leave Sicily with such Italians as they deemed worth preserving. But hopes of cutting off their retreat were small. The heavy concentration of A.A. and other artillery on the Italian side of the Straits of Messina made it difficult for aircraft to bomb the ferry-boats and barges crossing and recrossing the Straits from a low level, and with the Italian Fleet still "in being," it would have been unwise to risk Allied ships. So the enemy fell back slowly, laying countless mines, and protected by these, by his demolitions and by the nature of the ground from pursuit by tanks. These frequently rendered great service during the Sicilian campaign, but they could only be used in small numbers at a time, and along the roads, and the large numbers lost by both sides bore witness to the difficulties which they encountered.

So the Germans retreated, followed by the 50th



LIEUT.-GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON,
U.S. ARMY

(Northumbrian) Division along the eastern coastal road through Acireale and Taormina, by the 78th Division on the western semicircle of the road round Mount Etna, and by the Americans advancing eastwards along the Nicosia-Randazzo road and along the coastal road from Palermo to Messina. British warships gave the 50th Division useful support as they advanced and the American left was also assisted by United States cruisers and destroyers. The following were the stages in the final phase of the campaign as recorded by the *communiqués* of the Allied Command :

On August 8 the Eighth Army took Acireale, and the Seventh Army, finding Sant' Agata stoutly defended, landed troops in its rear, who took 300 prisoners from a German column advancing westward and linked up with the main body next day. On August 11 Eighth Army advanced troops linked up with the Seventh Army north and west of Bronte, while American troops successfully landed on the previous night at the mouth of the Naso River, east of Cape Orlando, beat off repeated counter-attacks and established a bridgehead. On August 12 and 13 the British forces on the east coast could make but slow progress and there was "bitter fighting" north of Bronte. The success of the American "assault-landing" east of Cape Orlando was fully exploited, the main body joined the landing force on August 13, and Naso and the coast town of Brolo were captured. On the night of August 12 the pressure of British and American troops forced the Germans to evacuate Randazzo, which air-bombing and German demolitions had left in ruins. The position had been fiercely defended but its fall expedited the advance. Riposto and Giarre fell to the Eighth Army on August 14 and next day the Seventh Army captured Oliveri. On August 16 the Eighth Army were in Taormina and a rapid American thrust brought the left of the Seventh Army to a point near Milazzo which commanded the beaches which the enemy might have used for the evacuation of his troops. Further landings on the north and east coasts hastened the enemy's retreat.

At 9 p.m. on August 17 Allied Headquarters at Algiers announced : "American troops captured Messina early this morning. Some artillery fire is being directed on the city from the mainland." It was announced later that all organized resistance in Sicily had ceased.

The enemy had contrived to withdraw the majority of his Germans across the Straits in spite of long-range gun-fire from British and U.S. warships and almost continuous attacks by Allied aircraft, by day and night. The small craft which the enemy used to ferry his troops across the Straits, a distance of three and a half miles, were not easy targets for the Allied airmen, but road and railway communications and traffic on the Italian side were hard hit and large numbers of lorries were destroyed.

So ended the Sicilian campaign. It had lasted 38 days. Of the garrison of the island, perhaps 45,000 of the 70,000 Germans got away with whole skins. The Italian losses in killed and wounded had been light, 7,000 or 8,000 perhaps, but few of the 200,000 Italians in the island reached the mainland, 130,000 were made prisoners and the rest, mostly Sicilians, simply put on civilian clothes and went home. The Axis aircraft lost during the campaign from first to last totalled 591 destroyed and over 1,100 captured, some in good order, others not. The Allies lost 274 aircraft. Of the enemy's heavy weapons 260 tanks and 502 guns were destroyed or captured. The Allied losses were 103 tanks and 251 guns, including those lost at sea through submarine or air attack during the landings. The Allied loss of merchant shipping amounted to 85,000 tons. Over 300 Axis vessels, mostly small craft, were sunk or damaged around the island, especially during the evacuation. The British naval losses were two submarines, H.M.S. *Saracen*, most of the crew of which were rescued by the Italians, and H.M.S. *Parthian*, three motor-torpedo-boats and a motor-gunboat. The U.S. destroyer *Maddox* was sunk off Sicily by air attack on July 10 and the U.S. minesweeper *Sentinel* was lost on July 11. Casualties among the British and American Armies were surprisingly light. Those of the Eighth Army totalled 11,835, those of the Seventh Army 7,400.¹

Addressing war correspondents on August 20, General Alexander paid a high tribute to the work of the Allied Air Forces and the Allied engineers.

He described the help given by the bombers during the campaign as "terrific"; it had disrupted communications and supplies of all kinds, and prisoners had described it as intolerable. The Germans had nevertheless fought bravely under the handicap of our air superiority and superior numbers. He particularly praised the work of the engineers in repairing demolition and building by-passes. In this connexion the special correspondent of *The Times* wrote (*loc. cit.* August 27): "One might without exaggeration call this a sappers' war. The skill and, even more, the courage and endurance which they showed in doing all this were beyond praise. General Alexander has described the work of the American sappers as the finest military engineering he ever saw, and ours were little behind

¹ Until August 4, when they were rested, the Canadian Division of the Eighth Army had lost 135 officers and 1,760 other ranks, killed, wounded and missing.

them, except in equipment. But they were much overworked and it would be a good thing if the infantry could relieve them of some of their work."

The campaign had also proved beyond all doubt the quality of the American Army. It had learnt much in Tunisia. It learnt still more in Sicily; in General Patton the Seventh Army had a leader of high ability and his men fought and marched admirably.

"No army, even the German, has ever been better equipped, and, in addition to their sappers, their artillery work is magnificent. Our own gunners are as good as the next man, but they are glad to go to the Americans for tips just as the American infantry are glad to come to ours." (*The Times, loc. cit.*)

A campaign which might have lasted three months had thus been concluded in less than half that time. Although the Germans might console themselves by describing the unquestionably skilful evacuation of the island by their own troops as "a feat which will rank in the history of war on the same level as a victorious offensive battle," the fact remained that one of the principal outworks of the European Fortress had fallen and that sea-borne invasion of the Continent from a hazardous speculation had become an imminent and serious threat to the latest and worst of the German Empires.

NOTE.—For air operations over Italy during the later stages of this campaign see Section 3 of this chapter. A reference to "Amgot," the inter-Allied administration set up in Sicily, will be found in Chap. IX, Section 2. In this connexion General Alexander spoke highly of the efficiency of the Italian Carabinieri in keeping order in the island during the invasion.

2 : THE ITALIAN SURRENDER

The third quarter of 1943 was to see the consummation of the nemesis which had been steadily overtaking Italy ever since Mussolini's ill-fated decision to enter the war. Her army had met disaster in every theatre in which it had fought. Her navy had been reduced to impotence. Her much-vaunted air force had almost ceased to exist. The whole nation knew at heart that further resistance was useless unless Germany herself undertook the defence of the country; and it was becoming clear that there

was little chance of that. The German reinforcement camps which had been established in Italy to supply drafts for the African campaign still held the equivalent of three or four divisions, but no new units were being sent to strengthen them. The bulk of what remained of the Italian army, after its losses in the African, Albanian and Russian campaigns, was in the Balkans, being used to keep the Yugoslav and Greek guerilla bands in check, and suffering heavy casualties month by month in doing so. Italy's ports and railways were being steadily pounded to bits by British and American bombers. Invasion was known to be imminent. Few Italians but longed for some release from their plight. The anti-Fascist groups were mobilizing their forces in secret and had banded themselves together in a common front to overthrow the régime and set up a republic.

Even Mussolini himself was bitten by the general pessimism. This was shown by an address, delivered *in camera* to the Directorate of the Fascist Party in June, which he decided after a fortnight's hesitation to make public. It was in substance a *post mortem* of the weaknesses which the war had revealed in the nation and the Fascist Party. Mussolini dealt with them in sober language which might have been impressive in another man, but which to a people accustomed to his usual bombast revealed with horrifying clarity the depth to which his spirit had fallen. The conclusion to which his argument led was that the Italians could expect nothing from surrender. "The enemy will leave us our eyes to weep with," he said. The only course was to fight on. The speech contained no other spur to resolution than this counsel of despair and one may ask what it was that determined its belated publication.

Six days later the blow fell, and the British and American landing barges emptied their freight on to the Sicilian beaches. The prompt success of the invasion was followed by an appeal from the Allies for unconditional surrender. It took the form of a joint message from President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, warning the Italian people not to tolerate any longer "the Fascist régime which serves the

evil power of the Nazis." Besides being broadcast on the air, the text was dropped in thousands of copies from Allied aircraft all over Italy.

The Italian Government affected an attitude of defiance which there was little to justify by having the message printed in all the newspapers as though the morale of the nation was proof against such temptation. Scorza, the secretary-general of the Fascist Party, made a futile attempt to infuse a little of the ardour of desperation into the hearts of the war-weary and indifferent people. "Resist! resist! resist!" he bellowed into the microphone of Rome Radio. He boasted that the Axis powers still had their enemy by the throat; that for two years Italy's fleet had dominated the Mediterranean; and then went on to warn his hearers that if they lost the war Italy would be dismembered and its manhood sent to work in the mines of the Urals.

A few days later hundreds of American Flying Fortresses appeared over Rome and wrought havoc with the railway yards on the edge of the city. While they were bombing Rome Mussolini was at Feltre in the Veneto, listening to Hitler ranting about the use and defence of the Italian airfields. He had come north with the intention of explaining to his partner that unless Germany could spare more troops for her defence Italy could not continue the fight, but Hitler's torrent of speech was too much for him and he came away without having been able to achieve anything. The official German *communiqué* in reporting the meeting stated tersely that military matters had been discussed. In fact nothing had been discussed.

On July 25 came the *coup de théâtre*. On the previous evening Mussolini had summoned the Grand Fascist Council to hear what he had to tell about his meeting with Hitler. The miserable tale of this fiasco set ablaze the revolt which had long been smouldering in the Party. Bitter criticism was vented on Mussolini's leadership. Heated and acrimonious debate lasted for hours. In the end a resolution proposed by Grandi, inviting Mussolini to hand back to the King his command of the armed forces, was passed by 17 votes to nine. Among those who backed the resolution were two of the original Fascist Quadrumvirate, De Bono and De Vecchi. Scorza, the secretary-general of the Party, and Farinacci were among those who stood up for the Duce. Next morning

Mussolini went to the Quirinal to report on these doings to the King. When he left the palace he was arrested and carried off in an ambulance van to confinement in a fortress, in spite of his vigorous protests. The King conferred full powers to carry on the government upon Marshal Badoglio.

There is little doubt that Mussolini's overthrow had been planned beforehand by Grandi and other members of the Party with the knowledge of members of the Royal Family. It is doubtful, however, whether Grandi and his Fascist fellow-conspirators intended the complete dissolution and downfall of the Party. That is what now occurred. King Victor Emmanuel issued a proclamation, announcing that he had assumed command of the armed forces and calling upon everyone "in the solemn hour of the Fatherland's destiny to stand by his place of duty, faith and combat." Marshal Badoglio next announced that by order of the King he had taken over the government of the country with full powers. He formed a cabinet of men without political associations selected mostly from the administration. Guariglia, who had held several diplomatic posts and who now became Minister for Foreign Affairs, was the best-known figure.

The Marshal's first proclamation said :

"The war continues. Italy, jealous keeper of her many thousands of years of tradition, maintains faith in her given word." This was followed by decrees placing the country under martial law, imposing a curfew and forbidding all public assemblies. The Fascist Party was formally dissolved and its premises taken over by the Government. By a stroke of the pen the Fascist militia was incorporated in the army. Many leading Fascists were arrested and the editors of all the leading newspapers were superseded.

This political transformation was received by the whole country with joy and relief. In the cities all work ceased and the streets were filled with crowds demonstrating for peace and liberty. The *Stampa* published a manifesto in the name of five anti-Fascist political parties which now emerged into the open (Socialist, Communist, Christian Democratic, Liberal Rehabilitation and Action), stating that "the dolorous nightmare of the last 20 years" was over, and that "the gigantic party which had confounded all spiritual values, wasted the greater part of

the national wealth, terrorized the conscience of men, and set up a regime of persecution, corruption and incompetence," had been forever discarded.

The ease with which the transfer of power had been effected, and the rapidity with which the elaborate system by which the country had been governed for the last 20 years had collapsed, showed how deeply it had been penetrated by decay. There was not the slightest reaction, either local or general, by the organs of the Fascist Party when the order for their dissolution went out. Its private army, the militia, accepted its new allegiance without a murmur. Fascism disappeared like a dream, as if it had had no real existence. Nevertheless, the task which now faced its successors was no easy one. The real cause of the régime's collapse had been its utter defeat in war. So long as there was the faintest chance of saving the country from the logical consequences of its failure the machinery of dictatorship had been able to bolster up Mussolini's leadership. The moment the threat of invasion became real the nation to a man threw up the sponge and the whole structure on which the Duce's authority was based fell to pieces. Italy was possessed with but one thought—peace.

The direction of Badoglio's policy was therefore determined for him in advance. Yet he was bound to proceed with caution if he wished to save as much as possible for Italy out of the wreck. Some 200,000 Italian troops were dispersed through Greece and Yugoslavia under German command and with their lines of communication partly under German control. Many thousands of Italian workmen were similarly in German hands, working in factories and on farms in the Reich. Italy was dependent on Germany for her supply of coal, oil and certain other essential commodities. These factors gave the Nazis a strong hold over their ally. It was therefore expedient for Badoglio to temporize, and he did so by his announcement that Italy would continue to fight. This at once aroused the opposition of the working-classes, whose corporations represented the only large organized body of opinion in the country once the Fascist Party had been dissolved. Strikes and demonstrations in favour of immediate peace began in the industrial cities of the north, and the newspapers which had sprung into existence as the mouthpieces of labour threatened Badoglio openly with revolution if an armistice was long delayed.

His position was not rendered any easier by broadcasts from Allied Headquarters in Algiers, assuring the Italian people that they could have peace on honourable terms if they ceased all assistance to the Germans, and a little later threatening the resumption of air-raids because the Badoglio Government were temporizing and the Germans were profiting by the opportunity to reinforce their troops in Italy.

Apart from these embarrassments Badoglio had a disastrous internal situation to grapple with. At the first meeting of his cabinet the new Minister of Finance, Bartolini, gave an unvarnished picture of Italian finances. He informed his colleagues that the provisional figures for the 1942-43 budget showed a deficit of 86,247,000,000 lire.¹ This deficit had been steadily growing in recent years. At the same time the sources of internal credit had been drying up, so that the Government had been forced to borrow heavily from the Bank of Italy and increase the fiduciary issue in order to obtain funds. During the month of July alone the Bank had had to advance more than 1,000,000,000 lire. The note issue had practically quadrupled since 1940 and the floating debt had attained astronomical figures. Bartolini did not despair. He observed that public confidence in the Government's finances had been undermined by the refusal of the Fascists to permit a true statement of the position to be made. "The situation is serious," he said, "but with firmness, fairly distributed sacrifices and general goodwill it may be overcome."

To give himself elbow-room for dealing either with the Germans or the Allies it was essential for Badoglio to get the country under control, to suppress the political ebullience excited by Mussolini's overthrow, and to induce the workers to cease political demonstrations and return to their foundries and lathes. To this intent he made full use of the dictatorial powers conferred on him by the King. He banned all political assemblies, while promising that a new Chamber should be elected within four months of the end of the war. He placed the staffs of the railways, posts, telegraphs and broadcasting stations under military discipline, and a little later proclaimed a state of siege. This caused his government to be violently attacked from the Left as representing "Fascism minus Mussolini," but secured him strong support from capitalist circles, the bourgeoisie, and above all the Church, who were afraid that the country might see a repetition of the anarchy of 1920.

¹ About £791,000,000 at the pre-war valuation of the lira.

He then entrusted his Minister of Corporations, Piccardi, with the task of conciliating labour. Piccardi proved himself a shrewd judge of the situation and an able negotiator. He made a tour of the industrial cities and listened patiently to the complaints of the workers. Their principal demands were for an immediate end to the war, an alleviation of their hard lot, and the release of political prisoners. Many of these were men who had taken refuge from Fascism in France before the war, and had been arrested there by the Vichy Government and handed back to Mussolini.

Piccardi counselled patience, assured the men that Badoglio was working for peace, and as a proof of his words arranged for the working week in the munition factories to be reduced from 84 to 48 hours. He then began with the release of political prisoners, selecting first those who were prepared to work with the new Government. One of the first to be brought out was Bruno Buozzi, a leading trade-unionist, who commanded the general respect of the workers. He was appointed Commissioner for the Federation of Industrial Workers and at once set about reorganizing their representation on a non-Fascist basis. This created the desired impression and the factory yards ceased to buzz with impromptu demonstrations.

Another step taken to impress anti-Fascist opinion and court popular favour was the institution of an inquiry into the fortunes accumulated by prominent Fascists during their period of office. The list of names published in this connexion included those of most of the Fascist ex-ministers.

Relieved by these means of internal preoccupations, Badoglio was now able to turn his attention to the task of getting Italy out of the war. It was clear that he had little time to waste if he were to remain a free agent. The Germans had drawn the obvious conclusions from the collapse of Fascism, and were already sending fresh troops to Italy in order to strengthen their hold on the peninsula. Rommel was appointed to take charge of Northern Italy and by the middle of August had established his head-

quarters in Verona in the role of an occupying authority, as was made clear by the resignation of the prefect of Verona province and the mayor of the city.

Guariglia, Badoglio's Minister for Foreign Affairs, before leaving Ankara, where he had been Italian representative at the time of Mussolini's fall, had been able to take soundings among the diplomatic corps and ascertain that there was no possibility of a negotiated peace with the Allies. The only hope was to accept what terms they offered with the least possible delay. Accordingly, Marshal Badoglio despatched a general with full letters of credence to Madrid and Lisbon, where he was ordered to get in touch with the British representatives and ascertain what were the Allies' conditions for an armistice. As an inducement to the Allies to treat Italy mildly he was to state Badoglio's offer to bring the Italian forces over to the Allied side to fight against Germany. Although all possible secrecy was observed, the arrival of the envoy at Madrid did not pass unnoticed and was actually reported in the Press, although its purpose could not be definitely established.

Meanwhile the Italian Press and wireless were given directives which caused them to convey the impression to the world that Italy was still pleading for negotiated terms. On August 21 the Stefani Agency gave a direct denial to the rumours that she was contemplating a desertion of the Axis. It said: "At the present historic juncture Italy has a clearly traced road to follow, fixed by a system of alliance and military collaboration which she does not intend to disown." At the same time Badoglio's military lieutenants were doing their best to block the German plans for gaining control of strategic points in Italy. General Roatta, who had been appointed Chief of the Army Staff just before the invasion of Sicily, contested the German plans for the distribution of their troops, moved brigades of Alpini to the frontier of the Tyrol, and had the road and railway-bridges leading to the Brenner mined.

The story of the negotiations was told by Mr. Churchill to Parliament in his review of the war on September 21. He told the House of Commons that

"On August 15 the Italian envoy, an officer with the rank of general, called upon H.M.'s Ambassador at Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, with credentials proving that he came with full authority" from Marshal Badoglio, and that he came to say that when the Allies landed in Italy, the Italian Government "was prepared to help them against Germany and when could they come." Mr. Churchill was then at Quebec and in the closest contact with President Roosevelt. Mr. Eden was with him and he had abundant means



MARSHAL BADOGLIO

keeping in hourly contact with the War Cabinet. With their approval and that of the President it was decided that General Eisenhower should send an American and a British Staff Officer to Lisbon to meet the Italian envoy. President and Prime Minister at once informed M. Stalin of what was afoot. On August 19 these officers met the envoy at Lisbon. They laid before him the military terms of unconditional surrender which had been prepared some weeks earlier, after prolonged discussions between London and Washington and General Eisenhower's headquarters.

The Italian envoy did not oppose these terms, drastic though they were, but "he wished to discuss how Italy could join the United Nations in the war against Germany," and he asked how the terms could be executed against German opposition. The British and American officers replied that they were only empowered to discuss unconditional surrender, but they could promise—and this had been decided at Quebec—that "if at any time, anywhere and in any circumstances" any Italian forces or people were found by our troops to be fighting Germans they would receive all possible Allied aid.

With these indications the Italian general departed to come with the military terms and with full warning that the civil and administrative terms would be presented later. He made his way back by a circuitous route to avoid the Germans. After he had left another Italian general sent by Marshal Badoglio, who had been puzzled by the failure of the first delegation to return, had made his way to Lisbon, and had brought with him "as his credentials no less a person than General Carton de Wiart, V.C., one of our most distinguished military figures," who had been made prisoner through a forced landing in the Mediterranean two years earlier. The second mission did not affect the general course of events, and General Carton de Wiart realizing this offered to return to Italy, a proposal which the Italian general rejected. Mr. Churchill continued :

"On August 31 the Italian envoy met General Eisenhower's representative, General Bedell-Smith, at Syracuse. The Italian Government were willing to accept the terms unconditionally, but they did not see how they could carry them out in the teeth of the heavy German forces gathered near Rome" who were threatening and were ready for violence. We did not doubt the sincerity of the envoy nor of his Government, but the real difficulty was "that the Italians were powerless until we landed in strength, and we could not give them the date." The only point now remaining to be decided was the question of publication.

The armistice was actually signed at Syracuse by General Bedell-Smith and General Castellano on September 3. It had been proposed to land near Naples on

September 15, but in view of the urgency of the situation the date was advanced to the night of September 8-9. It was arranged that the armistice terms should be published simultaneously with the landing, and that Marshal Badoglio, with whom the Allied High Command kept in touch by air at night, no easy operation in view of the urgent necessity for secrecy, should be given the date in time for him to take the necessary steps.

Preparations were also made to drop an airborne American division on the airfields outside Rome to help the Italians to deal with the two armoured divisions which Kesselring, the German commander, had concentrated in the Alban and Sabine hills, ready to seize the capital. This most daring and hazardous conception was never carried out, for on the very eve of the Allied moves Badoglio sent a code message to say that the airfields were not under Italian control.

American and Canadian troops stormed the beaches at Salerno, south of Naples, in the small hours of September 9. Taranto was occupied without opposition next day. On the evening of September 8 Marshal Badoglio broadcast a proclamation from Rome, announcing that his Government

"recognizing the impossibility of continuing the unequal struggle against the overwhelming power of the enemy, with the object of avoiding further and more grievous harm to the nation, has requested an armistice from General Eisenhower. This request has been granted. The Italian forces will therefore cease all acts of hostility against the Anglo-American forces wherever they may be met. They will, however, oppose attack from any other quarter."

Simultaneously General Eisenhower, broadcasting from Algiers, confirmed that he had granted a military armistice to Italy, the terms of which had been approved by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Republics. All Italians who helped to eject the Germans from Italian soil would have the assistance and support of the United Nations. These broadcasts were supported by leaflets dropped by Allied aircraft in many parts of Italy, appealing to transport workers to see that no train, ship or lorry carrying German troops or material was allowed to move.

The terms of the armistice were as follows :

- (1) Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by Italian armed forces.
- (2) Italy will use its best endeavours to deny to Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.
- (3) All prisoners or internees of the United Nations immediately to be turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief and none of these may now, or at any time, be evacuated to Germany.
- (4) Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief with details of disarmament so prescribed.

(5) Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief to meet the need of the military and naval programme.

(6) Immediate surrender of Corsica and all Italian territory, both of islands and mainland, to the Allies for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

(7) Immediate guarantee of free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of Italian territory by German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

(8) The immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever area wherein they may now be engaged.

(9) Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all available armed forces to ensure prompt and exact compliance with all provisions of this armistice.

(10) The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection and interests of the Allied forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and, in particular, the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied military government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied nations.

(11) The Commander-in-Chief Allied forces will have full right to impose the measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

(12) Other conditions of political, economic, and financial nature, with which Italy will be bound to comply, will be transmitted at a later date.

(13) The conditions of the present armistice will not be made public without the prior approval of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The English version will be considered the official text.

Many of these terms remained inoperative owing to Badoglio's inability to maintain his control over the greater part of Italy. Though the Germans did not know when the armistice was to be signed they were undoubtedly prepared for it. Badoglio's envoys had made it clear to the Allied representatives that it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Italians to resist the demands being made by Rommel and Kesselring for effective control of vital services. These demands were based on the German claim to have a free hand in organizing the defence of Italy against the Allies, to which Badoglio could, naturally, raise no objection. The Germans, moreover, had the whole-hearted support of a certain number of dyed-in-the-wool Fascist officers and officials. Hence they could post their forces where they wished. All plans had doubtless been made and all

orders issued. The moment that Badoglio showed his hand they came into action.

Kesselring at once moved his two divisions on Rome. There was a little skirmishing and artillery fire in the Campagna, but after a brief resistance on September 10 the Italian commander capitulated, and an agreement was signed whereby the Italian forces laid down their arms and the Germans undertook "the protection" of the capital. King Victor Emmanuel III and Marshal Badoglio had escaped from Rome the evening before and made their way by sea to Sicily, where they placed themselves at the disposal of the Allied commanders.

The collapse of the Italian resistance outside Rome was characteristic of what happened wherever forces of the Italian army were stationed. Badoglio's broadcast orders to the troops to resist attack "from any other quarter" than the Allies had little effect. No doubt many officers had heard nothing of it and were confused by the rapidity of the German movements. However half-hearted loyalty between allies may have become it is not easy for an army to change its allegiance overnight. In the north of Italy there was a certain amount of resistance by some Italian units which was mercilessly crushed by their ex-allies, and a good deal of promiscuous sabotage on the railways. Nevertheless Rommel was able to establish his control throughout the area during the next few days. He and Kesselring were thus able to secure the bulk of the Allied prisoners-of-war who were held in Italian camps. In France the Italian garrisons surrendered to the Germans without much ado, though they seem to have done some damage to the Mt. Cenis tunnel. Events in the Balkans and the Aegean Islands are chronicled in Section 4 of this chapter.

The German garrison of Sardinia made good its escape to Corsica.

The most substantial prize which the armistice brought the Allies was the Italian fleet. The Italian Navy, which had throughout the war resisted German attempts to control it far more effectively than the other services, obeyed Badoglio's orders with very few exceptions. The

largest portion of it, which was stationed in Spezia, Leghorn and Genoa, at once made for Malta. The squadron was attacked by German torpedo-bombers off Sardinia, and the battleship *Roma* was sunk. A few small vessels took refuge in Palma di Majorca, but the remainder successfully picked up units of the British fleet at the agreed rendezvous and, escorted by them, steamed into the Grand Harbour at Valetta on September 11. The Italian admiral was received on Admiral Cunningham's flagship with all the honours due to his rank. A guard of honour paraded on the quarter-deck. These courtesies, unusual in such conditions, were no doubt paid in view of the wish expressed by the Italian Government to fight the Germans. They did not detract from the magnitude of the British Navy's triumph.

The ships thus surrendered comprised the battleships *Caio Duilio*, *Andrea Doria*, *Italia* and *Vittorio Veneto*; the cruisers *Luigi Cadorna*, *Pompeo Magno*, *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, *Eugenio di Savoia*, *Duca degli Abruzzi*, *Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta*, and *Raimondo Montecuccoli*; the destroyers *Da Recco*, *Oriani*, *Velite*, *Artigliieri*, *Fuciliere*, *Legionario*, *Grecale*, and 14 submarines. Two days later they were joined by the battleship *Giulio Cesare* with four more destroyers, a seaplane-carrier and four submarines. The only battleships not accounted for were the *Conte di Cavour* and the *Impero*, the former believed to be under repair, the latter not yet completed.

With the Germans in control of Northern and Central Italy and the Allies in control of the southern provinces and the islands, two separate régimes now began their existence. The Badoglio Government ceased for a moment to exist when the King and the Marshal left Rome. The government of the city was taken over by an Italian general, Count Calvi di Bergolo, who had married King Victor Emmanuel's daughter, Princess Yolanda, but who was none the less hand-in-glove with the Nazis. He appointed commissioners to take charge of the various government departments which had been deserted by their ministers. Elsewhere in Northern Italy the orders were given by the Germans. On September 12, however, German wireless reports announced that Mussolini had been rescued from his confinement and was in Northern Italy. The surrender of the Duce to the Allies had been one of the supplementary conditions of the armistice,

and he had been kept under strict guard in a series of remote places. The last selected for his prison was a winter-sports hotel on the highest peak of the Abruzzi mountains. Thence he was rescued by a gang of picked German parachute troops, who descended from the air and terrorized his guards.

The rescue had been carried out on the orders of Hitler, and German propaganda made the most of it. The political capital which the retrieved dictator represented for the Nazis was not, however, to prove very substantial. Mussolini was a discredited man. The complete defeat which Italy had suffered had exposed the hollowness of the Fascist régime, and the nation was sick of it. Very few Italians desired the Duce's return. Moreover, the shock of his deposition had affected his health and he was no longer physically fit to dominate the scene. On September 15 he came to the microphone of some German wireless station to broadcast to the Italian people, but the changed *timbre* of his voice and his nervous delivery showed that he was not the man he had been. He announced the foundation of a Republican Fascist Party from which a new government was to be formed to direct the fortunes of Italy, and he appealed to Italians to throw over the treacherous House of Savoy, to continue the Axis policy and cling to Germany. Not until a week later, however, was he able to announce the members of his Government, in which Marshal Graziani, an inveterate and jealous enemy of Marshal Badoglio, as his first broadcast showed, became Minister of Defence. Guido Buffarini (Interior) and Domenico Pellegrini (Finance) were its other principal members. The complete absence of any of his principal collaborators in the former Fascist regime was striking. Scorza had faded away and one Pavolini became the secretary of the new party.

This attempt to revive Fascism aroused no enthusiasm outside the "trigger-men" and fanatics of the party. On September 26 Mussolini broadcast an appeal to the Fascist militia for loyalty and sacrifice and all its former members were ordered to report to their local party centres. Neutral

observers estimated that not one-tenth obeyed the summons. The most noticeable Fascist activity took the form of reprisals against anti-Fascists in towns where the Black Shirts could count upon the support of German garrisons. In one of their raids Buozzi, whose appointment as Commissioner for the Federation of Industrial Workers had infuriated the Party, was murdered, as was Roveda, another important trade unionist.

On September 29, the third anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, statements by Ribbentrop, Mussolini and Shigemitsu, the Japanese Foreign Minister, were broadcast from a German station. In his message the Japanese recognized the new Fascist Government and the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Croat and Slovak Governments were said to have followed suit, but Hungary apparently did not.

The Fascist Republican Government had no discoverable seat, but its principal services were apparently established in Rome, and it was well advertised by the Rome Radio and the Roman Press as "the Government of the people." An article in the *Messaggero*, now Fascistized again, stated that it would suppress every form of privilege and that there would no longer be any room for institutions which did not serve the people and did not originate directly from the people.

While this simulacrum of Government failed to mask German military rule in the north, King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio, with some of his ministers, had established themselves in southern Italy and were collaborating with the Allies. On September 30 General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio met at Malta and were understood to have discussed the question of Italy's becoming a "co-belligerent".

3: THE INVASION OF ITALY

Before dealing with the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland, it is expedient first to record the air operations over peninsular and northern Italy and the operations of the Allied navies which preceded the Anglo-American landings. In the first section of this chapter the writer carried the narrative to July 19 when the railway yards on the outskirts of Rome were heavily bombed. During the remainder of the month the attack by air was pressed

with such vigour that the enemy's air squadrons after being driven out of the Sicilian sky were being reduced to almost equal impotence in southern Italy. The airfields near Naples were heavily and frequently bombed as were those in the toe of Italy. Fighting patrols from Malta supplemented the Strategic Air Force by raids some of which were pushed nearly to Rome. Great sweeps of bombers and long-range fighters attacked the enemy's airfields in Sardinia in order to prevent his aircraft based on that island from intervening against the Allied troops in Sicily and their ships on the surrounding seas. On two occasions in late July Axis fighters attempted to intercept the forces attacking targets in Sardinia. On July 22 P40 Warhawks raiding hostile communications in the island were themselves attacked, but they shot down 17 hostile aircraft, losing less than a third of that number. On July 30 Warhawks made another extensive sweep over the south of Sardinia and destroyed 21 enemy fighters that attacked them, with little or no loss to themselves.

Another striking success was the fight on July 25 when our fighters in the course of an offensive sweep over both shores of the Straits of Messina encountered a large formation of transport aircraft with fighter escort.

"In the ensuing combat," recorded A.F.H.Q., "21 of the Ju52s and five of their escorting fighters were shot down. Later in the day three more enemy aircraft were destroyed by our fighters." It was the more remarkable to learn that the Germans, in spite of the punishment they were enduring, had raided Malta before dawn on July 26. An R.A.F. announcement said that three Ju88s had been shot down by night-fighters and three more had almost certainly been destroyed.

Heavy attacks on the harbour, railways, docks and airfields of Naples were resumed at the beginning of August. On August 1 the docks and Capodichino airfield were raided by heavy bombers and eight enemy aircraft were shot down. Reggio in Calabria was raided on August 2 and during the night of August 4-5 the docks and submarine base at Naples were attacked and 11 enemy fighters encountered here and in other night operations were destroyed. This was described by the Italian Radio as the most savage of the 96 attacks that Naples had endured. The city was again attacked on the night

of August 6-7. On the following night a large force of Lancaster bombers of the R.A.F. attacked northern Italy.

The official account of the raid issued on August 8 was laconic. It simply recorded that Milan, Turin, and Genoa had been attacked; that "visibility over northern Italy was excellent," and that preliminary reports indicated "that the attacks were well concentrated." It was the 29th raid on Turin. According to accounts from pilots who took part in the raid, there was no sign that the Germans had yet reinforced the A.A. defences of the cities; the flak was weak, the searchlights badly handled and night-fighters rarely seen. Of three Lancasters reported missing one succeeded in reaching North Africa in spite of engine trouble.

The second attack on Rome was delivered on August 12 by day. Five hundred Fortresses and Mitchells with a strong escort of Lightnings. The marshalling yards were the targets, and Major-General James Doolittle was in command. Great damage was done to the yards by 500 tons of bombs and the attack did not cost the Americans a single machine. That night northern Italy was attacked again. The Air Ministry reported: "Aircraft of Bomber Command were over northern Italy in greater strength than ever before. A very heavy attack was made on the industries and communications of Milan. Objectives in Turin were also attacked by a strong force. . . ." The weather had been clear and it was stated that over 1,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on Milan between 1.15 and 1.45 a.m. on August 13. "Zero hour" was the same at Turin and there again the whole bomb-load was dropped in half an hour. The defences were weak and our losses were light.¹ The third attack on Milan in eight days was made on the night of August 14-15 by a strong force of Lancasters. The Breda armament works were the R.A.F.'s chief target, but three aero-engine factories well-known to European motorists by name, Isotta Fraschini, Innocenti and Alfa Romeo, were much damaged. We lost only one machine.

The attack was repeated on the following night. The Aeronautical Correspondent of *The Times* wrote, "More than 100 4,000-lb. bombs were dropped on Milan's industries and railways in a heavier attack than on Saturday. Fires started 24 hours earlier were still burning when the first of the bombers arrived. Visibility was exceptionally good. . . ." The ground defences were somewhat stronger than on earlier occasions. The official statement did not say how many of the 10 bombers which the R.A.F. lost that night were brought down during the Milan raid. The last raid on northern Italy was directed against Turin on the night of August 16-17. We lost four machines out of a strong force mainly composed of Stirlings. The Fiat works were the chief target.

The Italian Press characterized the raid on Milan on August 13-14 as "extremely destructive and purely terroristic." This and the subsequent raids on Milan and Turin incurred some criticism in Parliament on September 22, in the course of the debate which had been opened by Mr. Churchill's review of events on the previous day. Mr. Aneurin Bevan asked why these cities were

¹ We only lost seven bombers that night in this operation and in attacks on Berlin and targets in France and the Low Countries.

bombed three weeks after the workers of Milan and Turin had driven Mussolini from power by strikes and revolts.¹ Mr. Eden replied that the Italian envoy arrived at Madrid on August 15 and that our Ambassador there informed the Government of his arrival on August 16. He added :

"The first meeting at which his credentials could be checked, and were checked, was in Lisbon, on the 18th, if I remember rightly. From the very moment that we were convinced that there was a chance of negotiations which would lead to an armistice, we called off the bombing of the north of Italy."

In the course of these raids on northern Italy the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. (Middle East) carried out an attack which authorities on air warfare considered one of the most significant raids of the war. Flying from Africa, Liberators made a round trip of nearly 2,500 miles on the night of August 13-14 to attack Wiener Neustadt, 27 miles from Vienna. The great airframe works were their target. They dropped 100 tons of bombs on the air parks where the finishing touches were being given to several hundred Messerschmitts and their observers believed that they had done great damage. Hangars and buildings were hit as well as the assembly plants and many fires and explosions were seen. Every Liberator returned safely.

With the end of organized resistance in Sicily, air attacks on Italy were redoubled. They were aimed at the principal railway centres in the south, but were heaviest over Foggia, a railway junction near which were a number of important airfields. The following were the chief attacks delivered by the Allied Air Forces between August 16 and the end of the month :

On August 16 Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. attacked Foggia by day, doing great damage to the Tortorella and San Nicola airfields and shooting down 43 out of about 100, mostly German, fighters which attacked them. Eight bombers failed to return. On August 19 heavy bombers of the North-West African Air Force visited Foggia, bringing a strong fighter escort and concentrating their bombing on railway yards. Thirty-four hostile aircraft were shot down in a "dog-fight" over the town. Liberators

¹ In fact, Mussolini was driven out by a "palace revolution." The working people of Milan and Turin, it must be confessed, threw away their chances of giving the Germans serious trouble by celebrating the armistice with rejoicings instead of obtaining arms and co-operating with the troops. Ten tanks and 1,200 Germans overpowered Milan.

of the 9th U.S.A.A.F. from the Middle East followed up, shot down four more fighters and did great damage to the yards and repair shops. A further attack on Foggia followed during the night of August 19-20.

On August 21 more Liberators of the Middle Eastern Air Force attacked the Cancelli marshalling yards with effect, beating off a swarm of intercepting FW190s with heavy loss. On the same day escorted medium bombers attacked railway yards at Villa Literno and "heavies," also from North-West Africa, bombed the yard at Aversa. At Villa Literno many Axis fighters intervened and were badly mauled, losing 25 machines. On August 22 railway communications near Salerno were raided by escorted medium bombers. Strong fighter opposition was encountered and 29 Axis aircraft were brought down against five of our machines. Fighter-bombers also carried out an effective sweep over Sardinia.

Bari had its turn on August 23 when Liberators of the Ninth U.S.A.A.F. attacked the marshalling yards and disposed of 14 intercepting fighters. An Italian cruiser was bombed and left on fire off the south Italian coast on the 24th, and on August 25 the North-West African Air Forces raided Foggia in strength, opening with "a strong force of low-flying fighters," which were followed up by heavy bombers. Many aircraft were bombed on the ground, transport and trains were strafed, "a number of personnel on the airfields were killed" and 40 enemy aircraft shot down in combat. Our loss that day was 15 machines. Then came three raids, on August 26, 27 and 29, on railway yards, aerodromes, and other targets in the Naples area, when the attackers claimed to have brought down nearly 70 fighters.

As "zero hour" for the invasion drew nearer the Allied raids extended farther north, and in the last four days of August railway junctions in central Italy, such as Terni and Torre Annunziata, were bombed and many goods trains were wrecked. On the heel of Italy Taranto was heavily bombed by night on August 25 and by day and night on August 29. On August 30 the railway yards at Civitavecchia and Aversa were attacked by medium bombers and 17 enemy aircraft destroyed. On August 31 the Pisa railway yards and an aircraft factory were raided by "heavies," while medium and light bombers attacked Cosenza and Catanzaro. Liberators from the Middle East raided Pescara on the east coast of Italy on the same day and did great damage. In that day's operations we lost three aircraft to the enemy's 16. Apart from these major raids there were multitudes of minor air operations over Sicily and Southern Italy which cannot be chronicled here. It need only be said that night-fighters and "intruders" of the Malta force alone destroyed 77 enemy aircraft over Sicily and Italy in July.

In spite of its heavy losses the *Luftwaffe* could still be reinforced from Germany, the Danubian region, and Russia, and the defensive activity of German fighters during the last ten days of August showed that reinforcements were arriving. The enemy also made some attempts to counter our attacks by bombing raids against convoys in the Mediterranean which, he claimed falsely, were prodigiously successful. The failure of his one important attack on Malta has been recorded. On August 26, after Flying Fortresses had made a successful attack on

the Capua airfield, the Germans took advantage of the new moon to attack Algiers for the first time since the night of June 4-5. The raiders did little damage and three were certainly brought down.

During the interval between the beginning of the enemy's abandonment of Sicily and the first Allied landing in Italy, the Allied Navies had been most active. Several ports in the toe of the Italian peninsula, Locri, Reggio in Calabria and Crotone (Crotona) were shelled by surface ships. British submarines were busy.


An Admiralty statement issued on July 27 said that three supply ships had been torpedoed by them, one in the Gulf of Genoa, one off the Island of Elba, and one near the romantic islet of Monte Cristo in the Riviera. All were destroyed. A small naval auxiliary vessel was engaged and sunk off Crotone and "in addition 17 small vessels and an armed tug were destroyed by gunfire from H.M. submarines." A.F.H.Q. in North Africa next announced the bombardment of Vibo Valentia Marina harbour on the Gulf of Sta. Eufemia on the night of July 31, and the shelling of Crotone before dawn next day.

On August 3 it was announced that the Dutch submarine *Dolfijn*, a ship with a fine record, had torpedoed a supply ship and sunk two enemy supply schooners by gunfire. E-boats were engaged and driven off on more than one occasion off the extreme south of Italy and German air raids on Allied warships and transports off Palermo or in harbour there did but little damage, and their heaviest attack (August 1) lost seven out of 30 Ju88s. The Egadi Islands off the west of Sicily had been occupied by the Americans at the end of July. On August 7 their ships secured the surrender of Ustica, 40 miles north-west of Palermo, where a garrison of 100 soldiers and sailors guarded 216 civil prisoners. The civil population was "destitute and without water, while many were ill with malaria."

On August 9 British cruisers and destroyers shelled the naval ship-building and repair yard of Castellamare di Stabia on the Gulf of Naples, while another force bombarded bridges on the mainland near Cape Vaticano. On August 17 the Admiralty recorded the destruction by four British submarines, using their guns on some occasions, their torpedoes on others, of five Italian naval auxiliary craft and two large transport barges wearing the German ensign off Corsica, and of a large transport and a large supply ship in the Adriatic.

On August 22 it was officially announced that the Lipari Islands, including the continuously erupting volcanic islet of Stromboli, had been seized without resistance by the U.S. Mediterranean squadron on August 17. All the Germans had departed a few days earlier. On the night of August 18 British warships sank seven hostile landing craft off Scalea in western Calabria and next night U.S. warships shelled Gioia Tauro on the western side of the Italian toe. On August 24 A.F.H.Q.

announced that the French light cruisers *Le Fantasque* and *Le Terrible* were co-operating actively with the Anglo-American naval forces and that British and American light coastal forces were "engaged in their normal sweeps" off the Calabrian coast. Finally, just before the crossing of the Straits of Messina by the Eighth Army, the battle-



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THE NAPLES-SALERNO THEATRE

ships *Nelson* and *Rodney*, escorted by the cruiser *Orion* and one Polish and eight British destroyers, shelled the enemy's batteries north of Reggio, after which the whole force engaged and silenced those south of Cape Pellarò (August 31).

The stage was now set for the invasion of the Italian mainland. It was the intention of the Allied High Command in the Mediterranean to lead off with a landing in the extreme south and to follow it up with landings near

Naples and at Taranto on the Italian heel. As recorded in the previous section of this chapter the date of the landing at Salerno, near Naples, was advanced by a week. This, and the landing at Taranto, were more important strategically than the first operation because the long narrow "toe" of the Italian boot was mountainous, broken and ill-supplied with lateral communications. Troops advancing northwards were tied, so far as their guns, transport and tanks were concerned, to the coastal road for the first fifty-odd miles, since the first lateral road across the "toe" only took off from the coast near Angitola. The fact that negotiations between Marshal Badoglio's envoy (*q.v.* section 2) and General Bedell-Smith had been virtually concluded made it necessary to conduct the crossing of the Straits of Messina in such a manner as to inflict the least possible loss on the Italians. On the other hand, it was certain that any Germans who might be manning the defences on the Calabrian shore of the Straits of Messina would endeavour to inflict the greatest possible damage upon the attackers. It was also clear that the reinforced *Luftwaffe* might intervene in strength against the landing craft of the invasion. These considerations made the crossing from Sicily to Italy a delicate, as well as a difficult operation.

To secure it as far as possible against air attack the Allied Air Forces made a number of heavy attacks on hostile airfields and communications. These last extended to the important railway junction of Bologna and into the Italian Tyrol.

Trento, the railway bridge at Bolzano (Botzen) and the road bridge to the Brenner Pass were bombed and suffered some damage, and it was alleged that attempts were made to bring down landslides of rock and debris on to the Brenner road by bombing the mountain-sides. It might have been inferred from the statements of some war correspondents that the Allied Air Staff hoped, perhaps believed, that the Brenner route had been blocked. Evidence received later did not confirm any such expectation. On the other hand the attacks on the enemy's airfields in southern Italy were most effective. During the four days, August 31–September 3, 71 enemy aircraft were destroyed, mostly in attempts to intercept the Allied bombers, against an Allied loss of only 33 machines.

Before dawn on September 3 a multitude of small craft put out from the Sicilian coast bearing the advanced

guards of the Eighth Army. They were covered by a cloud of aircraft and heavy artillery fire from ships and from batteries on the Sicilian shore, and the opposition was weak. The Germans, already "pulling out" from their positions, could do little to check or harass the attack. The Italians fired a few rounds and retired or surrendered. By nightfall Reggio di Calabria and San Giovanni had been occupied; our losses had been trifling; and the greatest obstacles to our advance came from German demolitions and the minefields on shore and in the shallows along the Italian coast, which had respectively to be lifted and swept. By nightfall on September 5 we had taken some 3,000 prisoners, the Straits of Messina were open to navigation and two columns of the Eighth Army were advancing, one on each side of the Calabrian "toe," engaging in occasional skirmishes with German rearguards, but nowhere encountering any serious resistance. On September 6 our troops entered Palmi on the west coast and Delianuova in the central mountains of Calabria, after several skirmishes and delays caused by German demolitions. The Italian population and such parties of Italian troops as our men encountered during their advance were giving abundant information about the siting of the enemy's minefields and the line of retreat followed by his troops.

On September 8 Commando forces and infantry were landed at Pizzo in the Gulf of Eufemia, and although they were heavily shelled they made good their hold and took a number of German prisoners. By this time the Eighth Army had reached Gioia Tauro and its vanguard was pressing hard on the Germans there with the object of linking up with the troops landed at Pizzo. During these operations the North-West African Air Force had delivered a series of heavy raids on the airfields at Foggia and had also attacked Frascati, the seat of the German Headquarters in southern Italy, and about 20 miles south-east of Rome. Our airmen claimed the destruction of 28 aircraft here and more were destroyed in air combat above Foggia.

By September 8 a great fleet of transports and landing craft had entered the Tyrrhenian Sea and was making for the Gulf of Salerno, escorted by powerful British and American squadrons. The news of the Italian surrender was broadcast by General Eisenhower at 5.30 p.m. that day and some twenty minutes of agonizing suspense followed until Marshal Badoglio confirmed the news by wireless from Rome. At 6.40 a.m. on September 9, A.F.H.Q. broadcast the laconic statement: "Further operations have been started in the vicinity of Naples." It followed up the announcement at noon with this statement:

The operations of General Eisenhower's Allied forces which landed about 04.00 hours this morning in the area of Naples are proceeding satisfactorily. Our troops are in contact with German forces, and prisoners have been taken. The landings were made under the protection and cover of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy. The disembarkation of the troops with their guns, vehicles, stores and equipment is proceeding according to plan.

All Allied forces on the Italian mainland are under command of General Alexander. Lieutenant-General Mark W. Clark is in command of the troops engaged in the landing.

These troops were British and American. They composed the Fifth Army and their strength at the opening of what was to be known as the battle of Salerno is believed to have been from three and a half to four divisions. They were engaged in an extremely difficult and risky operation. Apart from the possibility that Italian sympathizers with the Germans had acquainted the enemy with the Allied plans, the Gulf of Salerno was the natural choice for the landing of an army invading peninsular Italy, but unable to carry Naples owing to the German occupation of the city and of the strong coastal fortifications protecting it against naval attack. Moreover, should the Allies land successfully on the Salerno beaches and press rapidly inland, they would be well placed to drive a barrier right across Italy and thus to cut off the retreat of the German forces retiring before the Eighth Army. These considerations made it as certain as anything could be in war that the enemy would be ready to meet attack at this point and would have occupied the high ground commanding the beaches.

Yet the Allies had no alternative. Salerno marked the limit of the useful radius of their fighter squadrons based on Sicily. The gulf was the one place south of Naples where they could land on a wide front. Farther north the only aerial protection against German bombers on which they could count was that provided by the fighters borne by the aircraft-carriers of the Fleet and these could not be safely matched against shore-based aircraft.

The first day of the battle of Salerno saw Allied advances at several points on the 25 miles of coast on which the Fifth Army was landing. British, Canadians and Americans gained further ground during the next two days in the teeth of obstinate German resistance. They were greatly aided by the fire of small naval craft inshore and by the Allied air squadrons. The British took the port of Salerno on September 10 and the Americans now began to press up the Sele and Coloro River valleys. At first they gained ground in spite of active opposition punctuated by frequent counter-attacks in which the 16th Armoured Division, which had been re-formed after being destroyed in Russia, took part. But the Germans held the higher ground from which they could shell the beaches, they still had more heavy tanks on the spot than the Allies had yet been able to land; their success at Rome had cleared their communications, and on September 13 they delivered a furious counter-attack into which they threw at least four divisions.

There followed a grim four-day battle in which the Anglo-American Army was hard pressed and at some points driven back uncomfortably near its beach-heads. The Allies were being reinforced from the sea, but the shelling of the beaches, the frequent intervention of the enemy's aircraft and every advance inland sooner or later encountered strongly entrenched positions. The American troops who had taken the junction of Battipaglia five miles inland were driven out again. On September 13 A.F.H.Q., North Africa, announced :

"Very heavy fighting continues in the area of the Fifth Army at Salerno. The Germans are resisting desperately our determined thrusts to break through their positions." Next day came an admission of a set-back.

"Heavy fighting continues on the Fifth Army front. The Germans are counter-attacking desperately and, at certain points, have regained some of the ground previously taken by us. . . ."

The Germans, to judge from their *communiqués*, deemed victory already won. The British who were holding the Sorrento-Amalfi Peninsula nearly as far west as Amalfi were, they claimed, all but cut off from the Americans on the right. The Canadians were hard pressed at Vietri; there were "indications of demoralization" among some of the "beaten American units," and though the right wing of the Allies which had been landed near Paestum was still resisting vigorously, "there, too," said Captain Sertorius, "backward movements are discernible." In fact the Americans of General Clark's Army had fought as gamely and stubbornly as their forefathers had fought at Gettysburg or Chickamauga, and the situation, although so serious that on September 14 an evacuation of the beach-heads was regarded in London as possible, was never as desperate as the enemy pretended. On September 15 A.F.H.Q. announced: "Bitter fighting continues in the Fifth Army sector between Salerno and Agropoli. Determined counter-attacks have been carried out by both sides. In some places our troops have been forced to yield ground, but new positions are being consolidated and reinforcements continue to arrive rapidly. The support provided by naval units and our air forces is excellent."

It was this support, far more than the advance of the Eighth Army from the south that turned the tide of battle in favour of the Allies. Six British battleships, *King George V*, *Howe*, *Nelson*, *Rodney*, *Valiant* and *Warspite*, came into action at the critical period of the battle, and their great guns joined their terrible blows to the fire of the British and American cruisers and destroyers.¹ The Germans who had been so boastful on September 14 next day explained that the British Navy had "snatched the Americans from death at the last moment," and on the night of September 15 their official news agency declared that the American resistance had "stiffened surprisingly with the help of the artillery of numerous

¹ A *Reuter* message from Algiers published on October 16 gave the names of other vessels forming part of the "Western Task Force" as the large aircraft-carriers *Illustrious* and *Formidable*, the smaller aircraft-carriers *Unicorn*, *Hunter*, *Battler*, *Stalker* and *Attacker*, the cruisers *Aurora*, *Penelope*, *Sirius*, *Dido*, *Euryalus*, *Scylla*, *Charybdis*, *Mauritius*, *Uganda* and *Orion*, with a host of destroyers, the monitor *Roberts* and many minesweepers which did admirable work in clearing the approaches to the mainland. The American ships of the Western Task Force were the cruisers *Philadelphia*, *Savannah* and *Boise*, with 18 destroyers. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was in supreme command of the assault, with Vice-Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the U.S. Navy commanding the Western Task Force off the Salerno beaches. The Force was divided into two sections, the southern under Rear-Admiral J. L. Hall, of the U.S. Navy, and the northern under Commodore G. Oliver, R.N.

warships. . . ." although any resumption of their offensive "on a big scale" was now "inconceivable."

No less timely was the aid of the Allied air squadrons. On September 14 they opened the most concentrated attack that had been made in any single area of hostilities in one day. The bombers alone made over 600 sorties and many more were carried out by the Tactical Air Force. Next day the Tactical Air Force alone made over 1,000 attacks, losing only four machines, and the bombers of the Strategical Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm made at least as many more. The Germans were held; for the first time in the long battle they made no heavy counter-attacks. They had driven a wedge dangerously far into the low ground between the Sele and the Coloro Rivers but they had lost a number of tanks, including many of the formidable "Tigers," from the American anti-tank guns and the powerful artillery of the warships; and their own aircraft were unable to make head against their opponents. Reinforcements were arriving steadily from the sea and British motorized troops had landed at Castellabete and Paestum on the right of the Americans and was coming into action.

On September 16 the Allied Army passed to the offensive. A German air attack on the beaches was wiped out; the point of the wedge driven into the Allied lines was obliterated; the air bombardment of the German positions continued in full fury. In the afternoon the Germans were beginning to retire. Marshal Kesselring could claim that although he had failed to drive the Allies into the sea he had prevented them from thrusting deep into the peninsula of Italy and thus cutting off the retreat of the rearguards retiring before the Eighth Army. At nightfall the enemy's left and centre were swinging back, pivoting on their right, towards Avellino. General Clark had won his battle. So ended the decisive stage of the Battle of Salerno. Although they had failed to achieve the major strategical triumph for which they had hoped, the Allies had won a fine tactical success against equal numbers of German troops with all the advantages of position and only inferior in the air. Once again they

had breached the walls of the "Fortress of Europe" and had taught the Führer the meaning of sea-power.

In his survey of the war on September 21, Mr. Churchill gave a remarkable review of what he termed "the most daring amphibious operation we have yet launched or which I think has ever been launched on a similar scale." He explained that in the Gulf of Salerno we were fighting at the extreme range of our fighter aircraft flying from the conquered Sicilian airfields. Until we gained refuelling stations the single-engined fighter squadrons had only a quarter of an hour's activity over the battle area, a terrible problem for a pilot who engages in fighting with a few minutes to spare for reaching home across the sea. Further :

"We knew that the Germans certainly had the power to march against us in counter-attack with equal or superior numbers before we could secure any refuelling points for our aircraft or any harbour facilities. . . . At this stage in the war a disastrous repulse and enforced embarkation would have been particularly vexatious." In that case the Allied Governments would have incurred severe criticism from those who were clamouring "for the far more difficult, far larger and more serious operation across the Channel. The enterprise therefore seemed full of hazard, especially as such a long distance—over 150 miles—separated the vanguards of the Eighth Army from our new and major attack."

He then described the battle. "From day three to day seven the issue hung in the balance and the possibility of a large-scale disaster could not be excluded. . . . Every inch of the ground was savagely disputed." Reinforcements were poured in "but the battle swayed to and fro and the German hopes of driving us into the sea . . . must at times have risen high. We thought we had their measure and so it turned out. . . ."

The situation had been saved by the intervention of the battle squadron, by the magnificent work of the British and American Air Forces which had "surpassed all their previous efforts," the advance "with giant strides" of the Eighth Army from the south and the stubborn valour of the Fifth Army. "We must," he concluded ". . . consider this episode—the landing on the beaches of Salerno—as an important and pregnant victory, one deserving a definite place in the records of the British and United States armies . . . fighting together and shedding their blood in a generous cause."

Such was the Prime Minister's verdict on one of the most remarkable battles even of this war.

It had been costly, but far less so than the Germans had pretended when they claimed to have killed and wounded 10,000 Allied soldiers and to have taken 4,429 prisoners. It was, in fact, announced on September 26 that the U.S. units of the Fifth Army had lost 3,497 officers and men, all told, up to September 15. The British losses until then were understood to have been rather higher, and the total losses of the Fifth Army during the week's

fighting do not seem to have exceeded 9,000 of all ranks and Services. Several warships were damaged, some by the controlled glider bomb now employed by the *Luftwaffe*. The British hospital ship *Newfoundland* was sunk by a bomber before dawn on September 13, although she bore all the requisite distinguishing marks. Of the doctors and nurses on board 23 were killed. The U.S. minesweeper *Skill* and H.M. destroyer *Puckeridge* were lost during these operations. The loss of pilots and aircraft of the Allied forces was happily slight. The Germans would seem to have lost about 40 machines near Salerno and in fights over their airfields and lines of communication which were bombed daily and nightly.

It is now time to turn to the Eighth Army, which we left advancing up the Italian "toe." On September 10 its Vth Army Corps landed at Taranto, unopposed and indeed assisted by the Italians, to find the harbour in good order. Its vanguards immediately fanned out north, north-west and westward, occupying Brindisi on September 11. By September 15 the principal airfields in the heel and toe of Italy, S. Eufemia and Catanzaro in the toe, and Cotrone near the instep, were in British hands. On September 15 jeeps carrying war correspondents from the Eighth Army from Nicastro 200 miles away reached the American outposts on the extreme right of the Salerno position, unhindered to their own and the Americans' surprise by the retreating Germans and much aided by Italians, whether soldiers or civilians, on their way. On September 16 Eighth Army patrols had reached Vallo della Lucania, and on its left wing was in touch with the wheeling right of the Fifth Army. General Montgomery's men had covered some 200 miles by road in little more than a fortnight.

The Battle of Salerno now entered a new phase. The Germans who still clung to the rocky western end of the Sorrento Peninsula fought for every yard of ground. Their left and centre retired, but slowly, making the American advance difficult by skilful rearguard actions, demolitions and mines. On September 17 the Americans took the Montecorvino aerodrome about 12 miles east of Salerno, and on September 18 they retook Battipaglia. The British entered Amalfi on the 19th, but were unable to advance much farther; Eboli fell next day and on September 21 the capture of Montecorvino town and Campagna gave the Allies control of the Battipaglia plain. Next came the capture of Acerno (September 22) and an increasingly strong thrust to the north of Salerno which brought the Fifth Army in sight of the Neapolitan plain by the evening of September 23. But the last stages of the advance lasted a week. Cava di Tirreni fell on September 25, Calabritto and Cassano, the latter ten miles north of Acerno, on September 26. But it was not until September 29 that Nocera and the last German strongholds on the Sorrento Peninsula yielded

to the British. Avellino was captured on the 30th. For several days previously clouds of smoke and the sound of distant explosions had shown that the Germans were wrecking the docks and harbour installations before they evacuated Naples, and fugitives from the city brought news of German pillage and incendiarism and of anti-German riots.

Early on October 1 advance patrols of the Fifth Army entered Naples. What they discovered there and what were General Clark's next moves will, I hope, be told in the next volume of this series. While he had been fighting his way from the beaches, past Vesuvius and towards Naples, the concurrent advance of the Eighth Army had contributed to the German retreat. One of its columns from Taranto took the highly important road and railway junction of Potenza on September 21. The Vth Corps moving parallel with or along the Adriatic coast began with the capture of the port of Bari and the Gioja aerodrome (September 19).

Its further progress was rapid. Its forward troops entered Molfetta on September 23. Next day they advanced 25 miles, and hustled a German rearguard out of Barletta. On September 26 one column forced the crossings of the River Ofanto while another operating farther inland took Cerignola. The right wing of the Eighth Army was now near Foggia. On September 27 a sudden dash gave us the Foggia aerodrome and its 12 satellite airfields before German reinforcements could reach them. Meanwhile the R.A.F. had been raiding Viterbo and enemy airfields and communications on this side of Italy and its experts, examining the booty captured on the six airfields in southern Italy which we had already occupied, found 244 aircraft, some in good condition. Many had been wrecked at Foggia. But its capture was followed by a short pause in the advance. Bad weather from September 27 to September 29 prevented much flying, and it was ascertained that fresh German troops were banking up north of Foggia where it was necessary to consolidate our gains. On September 30, however, the improvement of the weather enabled the Allied aircraft to resume their activity on the whole front and to bombard Formia and many road junctions.

It remains to outline the course of events in the islands off the Italian coast, other than Sicily and the Lipari group. The small islands off the Bay of Naples, Procida, Ponsa, Ischia, were occupied by Fifth Army detachments helped by Italians on September 15 and 16. In Sardinia the German garrison appears to have been seen off the premises rather than expelled by the Italian forces on September 19. The Germans claimed that it retired across the Straits of Bonifacio to Corsica, but it is possible that part was brought by sea to Leghorn. Meanwhile,

French commando battalions from North Africa had landed in Corsica on September 13. They were joined by large numbers of Corsicans, and more French troops, including Moroccan *goumiers* and some American Ranger companies, were landed from French destroyers on September 17. Estimates of the military value of the local insurgents differed, although none contested their individual courage. But the situation was altogether unfavourable to the Germans. They could not hold the



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THE ITALIAN FRONT, SEPTEMBER 28

Linseca and Sorba passes; they sustained a reverse at Favone Murato, south of Bastia. At Bastia itself a British submarine co-operating with an Italian destroyer destroyed German-held shipping and army stores in the harbour shortly after the armistice with Italy. By the end of the month the Germans only held Bastia with a small and steadily decreasing hinterland.

They had lost Bonifacio and Porto Vecchio on September 23. The French had occupied Ajaccio on their first landing. German carrier aircraft evacuating troops to Italy or France were intercepted at times, and on September 24 French and Allied aircraft shot down 19 bound, apparently, for Italy, for the loss of four machines.

Further substantial losses were inflicted on the Germans in Corsican waters by British submarines. On September 27 the Admiralty announced

that during the German attempt "to evacuate troops and material from Bastia by sea," submarines had sunk four small supply ships, a Siebel ferry, and two landing-craft by gunfire and had damaged three other small vessels. A large supply ship and two small supply ships had been torpedoed and sunk, and two tankers had been torpedoed, one of which had been beached. These attacks had been made "off Corsica and in the Gulf of Genoa."

Before the Italian surrender our submarines had inflicted great loss on the enemy, especially in the Southern Adriatic. The Admiralty announced on September 10 that during the past four weeks three supply ships, one of large and two of medium tonnage, had been sunk and a large tanker driven aground by torpedo attack in Adriatic waters. A stranded destroyer in the Gulf of Taranto had been torpedoed and her after part blown away. An armed supply ship of medium size was sunk off the island of Monte Cristo in the western Mediterranean; another supply ship was torpedoed and went down off the south-east coast of Corsica, and yet another was sunk in the northern Aegean. In addition seven small vessels, three of them naval auxiliary craft, were sunk and two more run aground and abandoned by their crews. Ten submarines took part in these operations.

Another still more serious threat to the Germans emerged from the Allied invasion of Italy. On August 17 a strong force of Fortressers operating from North Africa had raided the aerodromes of Istres and Salon, north-west of Marseilles, with success. With the south Italian airfields in Allied hands it was only a question of time before long-range bombers attacked southern and south-eastern Germany, Hungary and the Balkans in strength. The attack on Ploesti in Rumania (*q.v.* Section 4A of this chapter) had shown what could be done from Allied bases in the more distant Levant. With Gerbini in Allied hands and with the prospect that hostile forces would soon be driven sufficiently far north of Foggia to make its numerous airfields reasonably secure against surprise from the air, the enemy's most vulnerable flank would be exposed to further blows. The Danube valley and its communications with the Balkan Peninsula, where an increasing number of German divisions were locked up by fear of Allied landings and by the national hostility which German violence had aroused in Greece and Yugoslavia, offered new targets to British and Americans.

NOTE.—The fate of British and Allied prisoners-of-war in Italy after the Italian surrender and the German counter-stroke is dealt with briefly in Chapter IV, Section 3, of this volume.

4: THE BALKANS AND THE LEVANT

A. ALLIED OPERATIONS

Except in the Dodecanese at the end of September, Allied operations in the Balkan Peninsula, off its coast and over the adjacent islands were confined to air raids, which became increasingly heavy with time. The raid on Sedes aerodrome near Salonika on June 24 (q.v. *The Fifteenth Quarter*, Chapter I, Section 3) had been an effective "lead-off" and it was followed by a succession of damaging blows. British and Greek submarines were active during July in the Aegean, where the Admiralty announced (July 27) that they had shelled hostile installations in Amorgos island, at Stratoni in the Gulf of Ierossis, Potidhaia in the Gulf of Salonika, Nea Playia near that port, and Kastro on the island of Lemnos, and had destroyed a tanker and three supply ships by torpedo and 19 small craft by gunfire. Owing, no doubt, to the demands on our Middle Eastern aircraft during the preliminary stages of the invasion of Sicily, it was not until July 23 that British and Greek aircraft attacked Crete in force by day. They hit factories at Ierapetra and Heraklion and attacked German camps and transport. In this and other operations in the Levant 17 British and Greek aircraft were lost. Next day Kalamata aerodrome in the southern Peloponnese was bombed by Beaufighters without loss and several Axis vessels were bombed or machine-gunned in the Aegean and the Ionian Sea in the last week of July.

On August 1 Liberators of the 9th U.S.A.A.F., about 175 in number, delivered a most gallant and highly successful attack on the Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti. To reach this vital target, which had been supplying one-third of Germany's fuel requirements, the American pilots had to fly a round trip of 2,400 miles. In and around Ploesti are 13 oil refineries, seven of which produce about nine-tenths of the entire Rumanian output. This supplies at least 33 per cent of Germany's aviation fuel and lubricating oil for transport. The pumping stations in the Ploesti oilfield, and the offices,

tanks, refineries and other installations cover an area of nearly 19 square miles. The pilots had practised low level attack and bombing for some time before the raid and their machines had been equipped with special low-altitude sights and delayed-action bombs. Headquarters, R.A.F., Middle East, issued the following account of the operation :

"A successful mass raid by a large force of Liberator bombers . . . was carried out on Sunday against oil refineries in the Ploesti area of Rumania. In attacks with bombs and incendiaries at heights of from 100 ft. to 500 ft., distillation plants, fractionary towers, boiler houses and tanks received many direct hits. Heavy explosions and sheets of flame were observed among the oil refinery installations and many fires were started. Heavy opposition was encountered from enemy fighters over the target area and on the return journey, and the bombers experienced intense light and heavy anti-aircraft fire from the ground defences. At least 51 enemy aircraft, including Me109s, Me110s and FW190s are claimed as destroyed.

"Twenty of the Liberators are reported to have been shot down over the target area, and a number have not yet returned to base."

The Germans claimed that 60 prisoners had been captured after baling out. Eight machines, some with dead and wounded on board, came down in Turkey. The courage with which the American pilots "went in" at low levels, facing deadly danger, to strike such important targets as the Astra Romana refinery, the largest in Europe, and the Credit Minor, the only 100-octane petrol plant in Rumania, was magnificent, and the thorough preparation of the adventure confirmed the high reputation of Major-General Lewis Brereton, commanding the U.S. Air Force in the Middle East.

During August Allied aircraft made a number of sweeps over the coast of Greece and the islands. After the surrender of Italy it was hoped that the Italian garrisons in the Dodecanese would seize or expel the much smaller German forces stationed there. In Crete the Germans appear to have disarmed part at least of the weak Italian division by a trick as soon as they heard of Mussolini's fall. It was expected that in the Dodecanese the orders issued by Marshal Badoglio and the warning of Crete would enable the Italians to make an effective resistance to the Germans until British help reached them. They were eight times their number and when Italian small craft and aeroplanes began to reach Cyprus and Egypt and to tell tales of the long-standing and bitter hostility between Germans and Italians in Rhodes and elsewhere the British authorities may have discounted

the possibility of a German *coup*. If they did, they were soon undeceived.

On September 11 fighting began in Rhodes. The Germans appear to have been in possession, or in control, of the Maritza and Calato aerodromes on the island. These had been bombed by the R.A.F. on September 11



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THE DODECANESE

but neither that attack nor one on the following day prevented German dive-bombers coming from Crete from attacking the Italian garrison with such effect that the Governor and Military Commander, Admiral Campione, lost his nerve and surrendered to the Germans, who, aided by Blackshirt elements, seized the key positions. A number of Italian soldiers and sailors, some wounded, escaped to Turkey, where they were interned.

In some islands the situation was no better. The Germans remained masters of Scarpanto, and they were unchallenged in Chios, Mitylene and Lemnos, where they had never admitted Italian garrisons. In Samos

however, where a force of some 1,500 Greeks under their leader Zaimis had held out in the mountains against the Italians, Greeks and Italians fraternized and the few Germans fled. On September 21, reports which had been current for some days in Turkey were officially confirmed in Cairo. Cos, an island possessing a useful aerodrome, and Leros, a valuable naval base in the Dodecanese, had been seized by the R.A.F. and contingents of "scout troops," who were followed in Leros by other units. British troops had also landed in Samos. Directly after the Italian surrender three officers, two British and one Greek, had landed in the islands and had prepared the inhabitants for their seizure. On discovering that the British were established in Cos, the Germans attacked the island by air on several occasions, inflicting some loss on the South African Spitfire squadron which had established itself there but suffering more themselves.

From September 14 onwards the R.A.F. made a number of attacks on German airfields, lines of communication and other military objectives in Greece and Crete, with the purpose of preventing the enemy from intervening effectively in the islands. Khalkis railway junction was attacked on September 14, Maleme airfield in Crete on September 19, and Scarpanto on the following day, when the airfields at Hassani near Athens, Heraklion (Candia) in Crete, and Maritza were raided. American-manned Liberators destroyed five aircraft on the ground at Maritza on September 22 and damaged the Eleusis aerodrome near Athens. On September 23 an official announcement issued at Alexandria said that Allied light naval forces had recently destroyed two German convoys in the Aegean, sinking the escort of one and damaging that of the other without loss to themselves. Further attacks on the aerodromes in Rhodes and Crete, near Athens, and elsewhere in Greece followed. Ships in the harbour of the Aegean island of Syros were bombed. But the enemy was able to hit back in the air with some effect. Two British bombers were engaged by German fighters over Rhodes and driven down in Turkey, where their crews were interned, and the enemy continued his attacks on Cos, where he was presently to teach us a disagreeable lesson.

B. YUGOSLAVS AND GREEKS

The destruction of the Axis forces in North Africa, the conquest of Sicily and the fall of Mussolini had greatly encouraged the patriots of Greece and Yugoslavia and their bands continued to keep the field and harass the Axis forces during July and August. The Italian surrender was a godsend for both. While the Italian forces in the Balkan Peninsula and the Islands numbered nearly 30 divisions,¹ these were not nearly as numerous or as well-armed as similar German units, nor, for that matter, were they nearly as efficient. But they were infinitely better equipped than the Greek and Yugoslav irregular forces, and when they were summoned to refuse obedience to German orders, and were also informed of the signature

¹ A total of 29 divisions or their equivalent found general acceptance.

of the armistice and its terms by Marshal Badoglio, the prospect for the Balkan patriots seemed at first sight to have become extraordinarily favourable.

The armistice terms have been given in Chapter I of this volume. On September 8 General Sir Maitland Wilson, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in the Middle East, broadcast six orders conforming with the armistice conditions to the Italian forces in the Balkans and the Aegean Islands. These were his orders :

(1) All hostile acts against the populations of the countries in which these forces were stationed must cease forthwith : (2) All units must preserve the strictest discipline and keep their actual formations : (3) Every attempt by the Germans to disarm the Italian forces or to seize their arms, munitions, stores, fuel, transport, etc., must be resisted by force and all German orders must be disregarded : (4) Italian troops must seize by force all points in the Dodecanese which were in German occupation : (5) All units of the Italian Fleet in Aegean and neighbouring waters to make their way to Haifa, and all Italian merchantmen to Alexandria : (6) All Italian aircraft to be flown to Nicosia in Cyprus, Derna, Tobruk or el-Adem.

General Wilson on the same occasion broadcast to the Greeks and Yugoslavs to tell them that the Italians had been beaten and that the gallant work of their guerilla bands and "underground communications" had helped the Allies to win a great victory. "Italian troops in the Balkans are now obeying my orders, not German orders," he added. The fight against the Germans was still going on. "To all of you who are our friends, I say, do not prevent the Italians from returning home." The Germans would certainly try to cause bloodshed between the Italians and the Patriot forces. They must not be misled. "Do your best to obtain peacefully Axis arms and equipment to enable you to carry on your glorious struggle against the remaining enemy."

Most of the Italian garrisons quickly began to hand over arms and equipment to the Yugoslav and Greek patriots, for few indeed of them had any wish to disobey Marshal Badoglio's orders. But the Germans who had suspected their intentions acted, it must be admitted, with remarkable speed and decision. They had already sent reinforcements to Greece where they now had between five and six divisions, counting the garrisons of Crete and the islands.¹ Their first blow fell upon the Italian Army in Albania. On the night of September 10, their High Command, in a broadcast from Hitler's Head-

¹ Two and a half divisions in the Peloponnese and as many in Crete. A division in Central Greece and Thessaly, a force of uncertain strength with the Bulgarian Army in call at Salonika and some 2,500 men in Lemnos, with weak battalions in Chios and Mitylene.

quarters, announced the beginning, and probably the end of the Albanian campaign as follows :

"In the Balkans the bulk of the Italian commanding authorities, fully understanding the situation, have submitted to the demands of Field-Marshal von Weichs. The divisions of the Italian group at Tirana and of the XIth Italian Army in Athens have, in the majority, laid down their arms already. The Italian naval units and merchantmen in the Aegean Sea have already been taken over by the German Navy. The air bases which till now had been under Italian command, as well as the key ports along the coasts of the Adriatic Sea, have been occupied. Only at isolated places is fighting still going on. . . ."¹

What part, if any, the Albanians played in these events was not known. Reports of the activities of bands of Albanian patriots had been put about by British Albanophiles and Albanians resident in Britain on several occasions before the fall of Mussolini, and after it they increased. Several such bands were understood to be operating in combination with the Yugoslavs in the extreme north of Albania. But it was also known that bands hired by the Italians in northern Albania had been operating against the Greek partisans in Epirus, and had on occasion pillaged villages some distance from the former Greco-Albanian frontier. The absence of any confirmation of extensive anti-Italian activity in Albania by the Staff correspondents of British newspapers in Istanbul and of any mention of serious disturbances by the Axis and satellite Press was also significant. No doubt the Albanians did not like Italian rule in war-time, but between dislike and general revolt there is a great gulf fixed.

While the German broadcast was probably accurate enough in its account of the seizure of Albania and its assertion that "the bulk" of the Italian commanders had submitted to German demands was not greatly exaggerated, the claim to have occupied all the key ports on the Adriatic coast was an overstatement at the time. A number of the Italian garrisons before surrendering to the first Germans who descended upon them had handed over their arms to the Yugoslavs, and in a few cases to the Greeks. The National Army of Liberation in the

¹ For the remainder of the broadcast see Chapter I, Section 2.

north, composed of Croats, Slovenes and a smaller proportion of Serbs, claimed to have obtained the arms and equipment of five Italian divisions within a few days of the armistice.¹

Whatever the truth may have been, it is certain that in Italian Istria, where there is a Slav population closely akin to the Slovenes, Italian Slavs, Slovenes and a certain number of Italians made common cause against the Germans and by its own admission caused their High Command great anxiety. The Italian Commander at Gorizia aroused German indignation by arming irregular forces and apparently inviting Slovene insurgents across the border, with the result that the small German force in Gorizia was hard pressed by Italians and Slavs and was in danger of destruction for several days. At the same time fighting broke out in the immediate neighbourhood of Trieste and the Free Yugoslav Radio which had suddenly begun to broadcast regularly announced that the irregulars had made their way into the suburbs.

On September 22 the German High Command reported :

"Slovene insurgents, together with Italian Communists and partisans from the Croat area, tried to get the mastery in the eastern part of the province of Venezia, in Istria and in Slovenia, making use of Badoglio's treachery. German troops, supported by national Fascist units and local volunteers, occupied the most important places and traffic centres, and are attacking the plundering insurgents."

The outbreak failed to capture any important strategical point at the head of the Adriatic, but it certainly imposed a serious strain on the German overland communications between north-eastern Italy and Croatia until the end of the month and later. Meanwhile, there had been serious fighting at Spalato (Split). On September 16 news reached the Yugoslav Government in London that partisan forces, who had already occupied the stretch of coast between Sushak and Zengg, and had occupied part of the railway between Sushak and Zagreb, had obtained the entire equipment of the Italian Bergamo Division and had already captured Split. Some of the Italians were joining the Yugoslavs and a German mechanized division, hastening coastwards from the interior, had suffered 800 casualties at Knin, 25 miles inland from the Dalmatian port of Shibenik (Sebenico). The Germans, however, had wrested the important harbour and stronghold of Cattaro from the Italians, who resisted but briefly, on September 15, and by September 22 they were air bombing and shelling Split. The Yugoslavs abandoned Split a day or two later. In Montenegro General Mihailovitch, back in his old haunts and joined, it was stated, by an Italian divisional commander and most of his troops, was

¹ On the other hand a British war correspondent with the insurgents said that they had more men than rifles.

attacking German communications in the neighbouring parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While these attacks caused the enemy no small anxiety and trouble, it is hard to resist the impression that the Germans, who were "caught on one foot" by the Italian defection in the Balkans, might have suffered serious reverses had the Yugoslav patriots been more united and their leaders less politically minded. It had been publicly announced in August that British officers were serving with both General Mihailovitch's army and with the force afterwards known as the National Liberation Army. The latter force was said to be commanded by a mysterious, allegedly Moscow-trained Croat leader, "General Tito." These British officers were technical and tactical advisers and they do not seem to have been able to influence the policies of the rival military chiefs and organizations in any substantial degree. In brief the old Serb-Croat hostility prevented any close co-operation between them, since in general the forces commanded by Mihailovitch were mainly Serb, while those under Tito were mainly Croat with a proportion of Slovenes. In addition the presence of Communists in the National Liberation Staff gave their rivals an excuse for greatly exaggerating the influence of Communism (which they disliked and distrusted¹) among the pious Catholic peasants who provided the National Liberation army with the bulk of its rank and file.

The same dissensions were only too visible in the Yugoslav Government in London. After the formation of the Trifunovitch Ministry (*q.v. The Fifteenth Quarter*, Chap. VIII), it became clear that Croats and Serbs still disagreed. The Croat Vice-Premier, M. Krnjevitch (pronounce Kernyevitch) urged that the new Ministry's statement of policy should contain a more emphatic acceptance of the Serbo-Croat Agreement of 1939 and of the principle of popular sovereignty in the federal Yugoslavia of the future than some Serb Ministers cared to give.² On the other hand, the Serbs complained that M. Krnjevitch had not denounced the numerous and horrid atrocities committed upon the Serbs by the pro-Axis faction among the Croats with the promptitude that Yugoslav unity demanded,³ and some Serb officers in

¹ Because the Communists had opposed the war and, indeed, had counselled submission to the Axis until Hitler attacked Russia, and because they continued to give the impression that they took their orders from Moscow and that Moscow was disposed to be wasteful of Yugoslav lives.

² It may be usefully remembered that the powerful Serb Radical Party considered that the Croats had been too generously treated territorially and had not supported the Agreement on that account.

³ Being temperamentally mistrustful and suspicious of Serb military men, he apparently jumped to the conclusion that these atrocities were Serb inventions designed to bring his compatriots into disfavour.

London talked as if the Croats were as deadly enemies as the Germans and deserved the same retribution.

The situation demanded broad views and a readiness to compromise. M. Krnjevitich showed a tendency to take an uncompromisingly legal view of Serbo-Croat relations and even his friends deplored his continual attempts to "score points" in the endless discussions over the Government's statement of policy. On the other hand, the Trifunovitch Government, like its predecessor, seemed entirely unable to make General Mihailovitch understand the importance of improving his relations with the Croat insurgents under "General Tito" or arriving at a firm understanding with the Croat Peasant Party. So, after some weeks, during which the crisis was further complicated by Ministerial differences as to the propriety of officially announcing the betrothal of the young King,¹ M. Trifunovitch offered his and his Ministry's resignation to King Peter, who accepted it. His place was taken by Dr. Puritch, who formed what was described as a service Cabinet on August 10.

Dr. Puritch combined the offices of Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Acting War Minister. General Mihailovitch remained Minister for War, Air and the Navy. Dr. Sorgo-Mirosevitch combined the portfolios of Social Welfare, Public Works, Health and Justice. M. Milicevitch took over Home Affairs (Interior) and Posts and Telegraphs, M. Rashitch, Agriculture, Supply, Food and Education, and Dr. Martinovitch combined Finance, Commerce and Industry.

It was not surprising that Mr. Eden, who, like the experts of the Foreign Office, had watched the development of these dissensions with concern, had strongly recommended the Yugoslav Government to establish themselves in the Middle East, where they would be in closer touch with their own country and would run no risk of being surprised by events. They agreed. On September 29 King Peter and his Ministers arrived in Cairo. There they learnt, if they had not learnt before, that Yugoslav opinion was unfavourably impressed by the composition of the latest Yugoslav Government and by the quarrels which brought the Trifunovitch Ministry down.

While the trend of Yugoslav affairs boded ill for the

¹ To Princess Helena, daughter of King Alexander of Greece.

future unity of the country, developments in Greece seemed to threaten the monarchy. Before making any reference to political developments it is necessary to chronicle the chief military events in Greece during the quarter. Early in July Greek partisan forces, advised by the British officers who had joined them, of the hopes of the Allied Middle Eastern Command, made a number of well-planned attacks on Axis communications in Greece and did sufficient damage to make the German High Command wonder whether Greece, and not Sicily, might be the next Allied objective. The reinforcement of the German garrison of Greece was the consequence of these doubts and, as it happened, the reinforcements were not withdrawn when Sicily was attacked.

In July strikes and riots were reported from Athens and the Piræus, and the German S.S. and military police took over the responsibility for maintaining order from the Greek police. After the fall of Mussolini the German command in Greece forbade all contacts between the Italian troops and the Greek population and the sale of civilian clothes to Italian soldiers who were deserting freely. By this time the Italians had virtually ceased to take any steps against the bands whose chiefs controlled local administration. They drove out "collaborators", organized their districts in order to prevent disputes, and established a co-operative system of intelligence by which German movements were signalled or otherwise communicated to the commanders of the different areas.

The Pindus, Acarnania and the mountains of Epirus were the chief centres of the Greek bands, but they were also established in Thessaly and the Peloponnese and in Crete. They included not a few British and Dominion soldiers who had been cut off during the retreat, were hidden, fed and protected by the peasantry and continued to fight.

After the Italian surrender there were several collisions between Germans and Italians on the mainland, and two more serious encounters in the Ionian Islands. On September 26 the German High Command reported :

"The Italian Division stationed on the island of Cephalonia had refused after the Badoglio betrayal to surrender its arms and opened hostilities. After preparation by the *Luftwaffe* German troops launched an attack, broke the resistance of the rebels and took the port of Argostolion. Apart from 4,000 men who laid down their arms in good time, the bulk of the mutinous division, together with the divisional staff, was destroyed in the fighting." Three days later the German news agency announced that German troops had landed on Corfu after an ultimatum to the Italian troops had been rejected, had overcome resistance and made several thousand prisoners. The German troops, according to a Berlin military spokesman, had landed with naval and air support.¹

¹ The Allied claims to dominate the Mediterranean by sea and air and the proximity of their naval, military and air forces to the useful anchorages of Corfu and Argostoli, made it somewhat surprising that no attempt was made to prevent the Germans from occupying them.

Infuriated by the "desertion" of the Italians and alarmed by the increasing activity of the Greek patriots, the Germans struck brutally at the civil population, taking hostages, not a few of whom were shot, and on occasions razing villages and shooting their inhabitants. Velestino, near Larissa, was one of these villages, and reports of the destruction of several villages in Crete reached Egypt early in October. M. Exindaris, a former Minister, who arrived there in September after escaping from Greece in July, stated that there was, perhaps, just enough food for a frugal peasantry in the villages but that the outlook for Athens and the other towns during the coming winter was little better than in 1941.

In July six leaders of the Greek Patriot bands arrived in Egypt. Their mission was military. They had been instructed or expected by the Allied High Command to abstain from political discussion, but they were Greeks, politicians as well as fighting men, with mandates from their far from extinct parties. It was unfortunate, yet it was quite natural, and critics might have remembered that Aristotle's dictum, "man is a political animal," has been particularly applicable to the Greeks for a great part of their history. They stated that the chiefs of the national forces considered that King George II had broken his constitutional oath by permitting General Metaxas to dissolve Parliament and rule Greece without a mandate for four years; and they consequently insisted that the King should not return to Greece with the armies of liberation until the nation had been able to decide in full freedom what form of Government it preferred. King George and his Government gave them no answer, but it was reported that they had made representations to the British and American Governments on the subject of the political demands made by a military deputation reaching Egypt under Allied auspices. It was thought that Mr. Churchill's expression of the British Government's hope that the Greek and Yugoslav dynasties would speedily be restored to their liberated countries with *the consent of their peoples* was, in some sense, a reply to these representations. It may equally well have been inspired by rumours emanating from no friendly sources that the British Government would insist on the return of King George. The issue was clearly one which concerned the Greeks and them alone.

NOTE.—In spite of his patriotism and of the military services which he had rendered Greece before and during the war with Italy by his reorgani-

zation of the armed forces, General Metaxas had not won the affection of large sections of the Greek people. His dictatorship was altogether too much of a *Polizeistaat* (Police State) for the liberty-loving Hellenes. His police did not apparently kill his political opponents as the military triumvirs had murdered theirs judicially in 1922, and as King Constantine's military supporters had done in the riots of 1917. But they were arbitrary, they "beat up" political suspects, they encouraged espionage; and by singling out the Communists for manhandling and exile to the islands, they gave this hitherto unimportant and suspected party a sympathy which it was surely not the intention of the Dictator to excite!

C. EGYPTIANS, ARABS, JEWS AND PERSIANS

Egypt In spite of the favourable result of the Parliamentary debate on the charges brought against the Prime Minister and his Cabinet by Makram Ebeid Pasha, a former Minister of Finance, a large and admittedly influential body of Egyptian opinion exhibited marked hostility to the Wafdist Government. It nevertheless continued to enjoy the support of Lord Lampson and, presumably, of the British Government. Makram Pasha, who had circulated the charges against his former chief, was expelled from the Chamber for "unconstitutional conduct" on July 12, after a stormy debate.

Later in July the Chamber passed a law guaranteeing the complete independence of the Egyptian judicature. The administrative control over appointments, promotions and transfers of judges and public prosecutors was transferred from the Minister of Justice to a professional judicial council.

After preliminary conversations in Cairo between Nahas Pasha and General Nuri es-Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, it was announced on August 5 that these talks on the subject of federation and collaboration among the Arab States which had opened on July 31 had been concluded; that they had been marked by a spirit of cordiality; and that Nahas Pasha would resume his conversations with the leaders of other Arab States in order to secure a working agreement. A congress would be held at which these nations would be able to express their demands. No date was fixed.

On September 16 Parliament approved a plan prepared by Amin Osman Pasha, Minister of Finance, to redeem part of the national debt amounting to £E5,500,000 and to convert the whole or part of the Egyptian Unified and 3½ per cent Preference Debt amounting to £E85,000,000 by means of an internal loan. On September 10 the White House announced that Mr. James Landis, Dean of Harvard University Law School, had been appointed American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East. The announcement added that he had

been designated as "principal American civilian representative at the Middle East Supply Centre," with the personal rank of Minister.

The Prime Minister of Transjordan, Tewfik Abu'l-Huda Pasha, discussed Arab collaboration with Nahas Pasha on the same lines as the Prime Minister of Iraq had followed. An Egyptian representative visited King Abdulaziz ibn Saud in Arabia on the same subject and found him favourably disposed. Trans-jordan
Arabia

On August 11 two British soldiers were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for smuggling arms into Palestine. They confessed to having sold arms to a Jewish military organization alleged to have been sponsored by the Jewish Agency. Some 300 Australian, German and Italian firearms had been brought to Palestine from various places in Egypt, including the battlefield of el-Alamein. On August two Jews, one of them the Secretary of the Seamen's Union, the other a former policeman who had been involved in the extensive theft and smuggling of arms, were found guilty of illegal possession of 300 Australian rifles and 105,000 rounds of ammunition and were sentenced, one to ten years' and one to seven years' imprisonment. Palestine

The introduction of the names of prominent Palestinian Jews and of official Jewish organizations by the testimony of the convicted soldiers gave the second trial a political flavour, which was not lessened by the introduction of witnesses who talked at length of the political and economic organization of the Jewish immigrants in Palestine but admitted the existence of illegal military associations among them. Although the prosecution insisted that it was not interested in politics, it was accused of anti-Semitism, and after the judgment the General Council of Palestine Jews publicly accused the prosecution of casting aspersions "on the whole Jewish community, their institutions and their war effort" (*The Times*, September 29).

On July 21 Dr. Ayoub Tabet, Chief of State and head of the provisional Government of the Lebanon, resigned. His place was taken by M. Pierre Trad. The first Parliamentary elections held after the proclamation of Lebanese independence by General Catroux took place on August 29. The new Parliament met on September 21 to elect its officers and the first President of the Independent Republic of Lebanon. M. Beshara Khoury, a Maronite, was elected President. The first Lebanese Prime Minister under the new dispensation was M. Riadh Sulh, a Moslem. M. Selim Takla was Foreign Minister. Lebanon

Parliamentary elections were also held in Syria. On August 18 M. Shukri Kuwatli was elected President of the Republic by the new Chamber of Deputies. Syria

Iraq It was announced on September 23 that the Emir Abdul-illah, Regent of Iraq, would visit London during the winter.

Persia On September 9 the Persian Government announced the existence of a state of war between Persia and Germany. The declaration was made in order to simplify the protection of the railway communications between Persia and Russia and to discourage spies, many of whom, taking advantage of Persian neutrality, had entered the country and were keeping the Germans informed of the movements of allied troops and of the import of munitions. On September 14 the Persian Minister to the United States signed the Declaration of the United Nations whom Persia was the twenty-third State to join. It cannot, however, be said that the attitude of Russian officials and military commanders in Northern Persia had always been such as to remove Persian anxieties as to the future, and it is possible that the Persians thought to improve their position by this step, which was welcomed in Great Britain and the United States.

The Persian Minister of Communications, M. Abdul-Husain Hegir, visited England in August to discuss questions arising out of the occupation of Persia and the exploitation of the Trans-Persian railway by the Allies.

CHAPTER II

INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS

I : RUSSIA AND OTHERS

In spite of the efforts of peacemakers behind the scenes and an appeal by General Sikorski, only two days before his tragic death, the breach between Russia and Poland was not closed during the quarter under review. On July 2 he had said in Cairo that there were two essentials for the restoration of the former good relations with Moscow.

"First it would greatly ease the present situation and pave the way for discussion if Russia would make a gesture of good will by releasing the 150,000 Polish women and children, families of Polish fighting men, still detained in Russia. As to the terms of any *rapprochement*, our minimum terms are basically the same as those contained in the agreement which I signed when I saw Marshal Stalin in December, 1941. That agreement with Russia is the charter of future relations between the two countries."

The detention of these Polish non-combatants who had been carried off to Russia when the Soviet Army occupied Eastern Poland in 1939, did not appear to "make sense" to British, American and Continental observers. The official reasons for which these luckless people were held have been described in the previous volume of this series (Chapter II, Section 2). It need only be said here that the Russian claim that all the people from the areas occupied in 1939-41 by the Soviet Army were Russian subjects appeared to constitute a breach of the Stalin-Sikorski Agreement whereby the question of the future frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R. was reserved until the cessation of hostilities.

At the same time the Soviet Press, which one must presume is not encouraged to publish anything out of accord with official views, continued to attack the Poles. There was, indeed, a brief "armistice" in which Russian newspapers paid a tribute to General Sikorski's memory, but they were soon attacking again, accusing the Polish

Government of being "unrepresentative," which was not at all borne out by the facts,¹ of exploiting the courage of its soldiers, sailors and airmen—not a few of whom were anti-Russian because their families had been deported to Russia and could not be recovered—and of "sabotaging the national resistance." This last accusation was based on the fact that the Polish Government warned their people against a premature insurrection which would accomplish nothing and might lead to still further destruction in a country which had suffered in some respects even more cruelly than Russia. Two "Free Polish" Divisions had been formed in Russia before the end of the quarter. They were commanded by Colonel Zygmund Berling whom the Russians promoted to the acting rank of Major General. On this side it was regrettable that small Polish newspapers published sporadically and sometimes clandestinely in Great Britain gave more prominence to often absurd Polish territorial claims than to legitimate Polish grievances, thus furnishing Russian critics with political ammunition.

More attention was paid in the United States, Great Britain and the neutral countries to the public and official sponsoring in Russia of a "National Committee of Free Germany." This body was formally appointed on July 12 and 13. It

"reached its final form in September, with the admission to membership of the 'Union of German Officers'—an organization formed in Moscow on September 12, 1943—which immediately expressed its complete solidarity with the aims of the Committee. This accession was followed by the election of several German officers of high standing and reputation to the executive of the Free German Committee." (*Time and Tide*, October 23). Among them were General von Seydlitz who had commanded the 151st Army Corps, Lieutenant-General von Daniel, and Major-General Lagmann, both divisional commanders, and two officers, Colonel Stödle and Major Stösslein, who apparently represented the Austrian element in the Army.

Beside these officers, some of whom represented the old Prussian tradition, while others had been connected with the S.S. units, stood a body of Communists and

¹ The Government kept in fairly close touch with the "Underground Organizations" in Poland and were apparently on better terms with them than the Yugoslav Government were with most of the insurgent bodies in their country.

semi-Communists, with a very few Social-Democrats and odd artists or scientists left high and dry in Russia by the war. The first Chairman of the Committee was Erich Weinert, a Communist poet, but its leading Communist figure was Wilhelm Pieck, once an associate of Thälmann, and formerly a vigorous critic of the military caste. There were a few Communist members of the last Reichstag and the notorious Wilhelm Ulbricht, described¹ as "obviously a man who is ready to plead for any cause for which he is briefed." In short it was a strange clan-jamfry of soldiers and revolutionaries who seemed united in calling on the German people to repudiate its present rulers and thus obtain "an honourable peace." The Union of German Officers, in a manifesto which was given full publicity by Moscow wireless, insisted that the whole of Germany must be saved from the fate that had befallen the "picked German armies" which had capitulated in Tunisia and at Stalingrad. Major Stösslein even described the German Army as "a valuable instrument which must be preserved at any cost and in full" and urged that a repetition of the events of 1918 must be avoided.

To the Western Powers, whose Governments felt equally strongly that a repetition of the events of 1939 must be avoided unless the civilized world was to be barbarized by a succession of wars, the toleration, to say the least, extended to this movement by the Russian Government was an unpleasant surprise, as was its initiation without any consultation of Russia's Allies. The activities of the "National Committee of Free Germany" were calculated to increase the suspicion of Russian intentions which still prevailed in the United States, in spite of the dissolution of the Comintern, and existed even in some Left-wing quarters in this country.

Nor was this the sole cause of mistrust of Russian intentions. The hostility with which the Russian Government regarded all schemes for a federation of the succession States or the Balkan countries on their western

¹ *Time and Tide*, Vol. 24, No. 43, pp. 860-61. Ulbricht had defended the German recourse to war against British criticism in February, 1940.

flank was very disconcerting. Many advanced thinkers in Great Britain and the U.S.A. had proclaimed that the only hope for these States, indeed for all small States, was to form federal groups or, at least, closely linked politico-economic associations, if they wished to preserve any semblance of independence. They were inspired to give this advice by the military weakness or political helplessness displayed by several of these States when threatened by the Axis and also by the contemplation of the nationalist madness which had criss-crossed with customs frontiers the basin of the Danube, a region made by heaven to form a single economic unit. It was unlucky for these progressive thinkers, some of whom had regarded Russia with unfeigned admiration, that the Russian Government should have lost no opportunity of criticizing all such suggestions and of making it clear that they preferred to have weak individual States instead of groups on their western border. The deduction, that this was simply another phase of power-politics with "divide and rule," or, better, "divide and control," as its directive, may have been erroneous, but it was natural.

There were minor causes of friction between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. The discovery that President Benesh proposed to visit Moscow to sign a treaty with the U.S.S.R. displeased the British and U.S. Governments, and when Dr. Benesh mentioned the matter to Mr. Eden, the proposal was ill-received. On September 22 the Foreign Secretary, answering a question in Parliament, said :

"During M. Molotov's visit to London last year discussions took place regarding the conclusion of agreements between His Majesty's Government or the Soviet Government on the one hand and any of our other European allies on the other concerning post-war arrangements. As a result of these discussions His Majesty's Government understood that both Governments held the view that it was preferable for neither of them to conclude any such agreements for the moment. When President Benesh spoke to me of his proposed visit to Moscow with a view to concluding such an agreement I naturally informed him of the discussions which had taken place with M. Molotov, and the matter was also mentioned to the Soviet Government in accordance with our understanding of the arrangements reached between us in 1942. Shortly afterwards I was informed by President Benesh that his visit had been postponed."

Mr. Eden added, however, that discussions were proceeding between

the British, Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments and that he hoped to discuss the matter personally with M. Molotov at his forthcoming meeting with Soviet and American representatives.

Another cause of anxiety was provided by the widely-read Russian fortnightly review, *War and the Working Class*, which had laid about it with great vigour during the quarter. Besides Poland and, naturally, the Axis and its satellites—though Japan was left alone—the review had attacked our Allies, Turkey and China and neutral Sweden. On September 19 it gave much offence in this country by an article on the Trades Union Congress meeting which averred that

“in the first stage of the present world war, in 1939 and 1940, before the character of the war was definitely established, wide masses of English workmen maintained a more or less critical waiting attitude towards the war and defended in the factories only their immediate interests.” But all this had changed when Hitler had attacked the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-Soviet Alliance had been concluded. Then “English workmen began to support the war effort.”

Referring to this in a plea for frankness in Anglo-Russian relations on September 22, Mr. Eden said that while his Russian friends said that we did not understand their point of view, there were occasions when they clearly did not understand ours, and when we felt that they did not, it was in the ultimate interest of our good relations that we should say so. After quoting the above passage he said :

“When I read that, there came into my mind the very familiar story of the Duke of Wellington, how somebody came up to him in Birdcage Walk one day, took off his hat and said : ‘Mr. Smith, I believe?’ To which the Duke turned round and said : ‘Sir, if you believe that you will believe anything.’ Those were my sentiments when I read that article. It does not represent or understand the sentiment there was in this country at the time of the Battle of Britain . . . and it is fair and right that I should say so in this British House of Commons. It does not capture anything of the spirit there was in this country. It was only true of that small section represented by the Communist Party. . . .”¹

By this time, however, arrangements had been made for a meeting between Mr. Eden and his “opposite numbers” from the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., as will be shown in the last section of this chapter, and the situation was to that extent easier than it had seemed to be in August

¹ *Hansard H. of C.*, Vol. 392, No. 103, p. 354.

when the recall of M. Litvinov, whose place was taken at the Embassy at Washington by M. Gromyko, had followed that of M. Maisky, appointed Assistant-Commissar of Foreign Affairs.¹ The departure of these two distinguished envoys and the substitution for the experienced M. Maisky of M. Gusef, Minister to Canada, who had had only six years of service in the Soviet Foreign Commissariat, had left the impression in some quarters that relations between the U.S.S.R. and the English-speaking nations were changing for the worse.

This seemed too gloomy a view. To begin with, M. Maisky's presumed good will to this country could be displayed even more effectively in the Kremlin than in Kensington. Further, although understanding between two nations which had had such different experiences and training was the reverse of easy, it was a mistake to make too much of Russian misconceptions. Few of the surviving leaders of the Russian Revolution had been abroad. The intervention of the *Entente* Powers in the Russian Revolutionary struggle, the *cordon sanitaire* and other events had filled them with suspicion of the Western nations even when the international relations of the U.S.S.R. became normalized. As for the Russian people, the propaganda with which they had been dosed in the past predisposed them to suspicion of foreigners: the party dictatorship had prevented them from forming any independent judgment of foreign nations and affairs and their chances of foreign travel had been almost as restricted as those of the Japanese in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Most of the leaders of the Party shared their ignorance.¹ Only time, better acquaintance and fuller confidence could remove the misunderstandings which the recent past made inevitable.

¹ Hence, for example, the utter misreading of the Finnish situation which cost the Russian Army so many lives in 1939 and their tragic belief that Germany was "bluffing" in 1941. But many British military men were equally ignorant of the real value of the Red Army, and many British politicians had not taken Hitler seriously.

Still, though the extent of the misunderstandings between the English-speaking Allies and Russia was exaggerated on each side by anxiety or suspicion, their mutual relations could obviously be improved. The next meeting between the British Prime Minister and the American President was concerned among many other matters with the means of bringing this about. But before taking the reader across the Atlantic, it is necessary to say something of the French National Committee at Algiers and the problem of its recognition, on which the

¹ M. Maisky left London on July 8 and his new appointment was announced on July 28. M. Litvinov's recall was announced on August 21.

Foreign Office and the State Department had not seen eye to eye.

NOTE.—*For the Russian Church and its relations with the Soviet Government see Chapter III, Section 2.*

2 : THE FRENCH NATIONAL COMMITTEE

Before referring to the difficulties which continued to embarrass the relations of the United States and British Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers it is necessary to chronicle the principal actions of that body. One of its first tasks after its formation had been to set about the reorganization of the armed forces both in North and West Africa and in other parts of the French Empire.

On July 1 it was announced that the Committee had appointed the following high officers to assist the joint Commanders-in-Chief, Generals de Gaulle and Giraud. In North and West Africa General Juin and Admiral Collinet were appointed Chiefs of Staff to the Army and Navy respectively, General Larminat and Rear-Admiral Auboyneau as Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy in the rest of the Empire, and General Bouscat Chief of Staff for Air in all the regions under the Committee's control. Two days later General Giraud left Algiers for Washington to discuss the rearmament of the French forces. There he told the Press that he had no other purpose than to continue the co-operation based on mutual confidence which had sprung up when he had met President Roosevelt early in the year. He said that he and General de Gaulle had for their sole aim "the defeat of the Axis forces, the liberation of France, and a return to a political structure in conformity with the natural aspirations of our country." He estimated that an expeditionary force of 300,000 French troops would be formed, excluding the garrisons left for the protection of North Africa. Of these, 125,000 would be white troops, 55,000 Senegalese, 50,000 Moroccans, and the remaining 70,000 Algerians and Tunisians. They would be under agreement to receive American material, although if Great Britain wished to contribute, he would gladly take all that was offered.

After a short visit to Canada, which also related to the question of rearmament, General Giraud returned to Algiers by way of London. He was received by the King on July 21. He then broadcast a message to the French people "from London, where General de Gaulle rallied the heroic vanguard of the army of liberation; from London, which bears the honourable scars of the enemy's bombing and which was, in the very darkest days, the citadel of hope and resistance." Next day he told the Press that he had gone to America to ask for more equipment for the North African Army and to have it delivered as soon as possible. He praised its exploits in the Tunisian campaign but pointed out that it had first gone into battle with no more than such arms as the Italo-German Armistice Commission had left it. They must be well equipped for the coming battles, for Great Britain and the U.S.A. alone could not be left to liberate France. Delays were tragic. France was dying of hunger and her sufferings were increasing

daily. A genuine and a lasting peace must be secured, on the basis of a firm alliance between the democracies of France, Britain and the U.S.A. together with Russia. For these reasons he had gone to America to beg for arms and he would beg for them anywhere to enable his countrymen to fight for their freedom.

Meanwhile, the National Committee, after much discussion, had decided on further changes and appointments. On July 31 it appointed General Giraud Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces with General de Gaulle as President of a newly formed body, the Committee of National Defence. The system of the alternating presidency of the Committee of National Liberation¹ was abandoned and it was decided that General Giraud should preside over military and General de Gaulle over civil and political discussions. The following important appointments were announced :

Assistant-Commissioner of National Defence, General Legentilhomme ; C.G.S. of the Army, General Leyer ; Assistant C.G.S., General Koenig ; C.G.S. of the Navy, Admiral Lemonnier ; Assistant C.O.S. of the Navy, Rear-Admiral Auboyneau. General Bouscat was to remain C.O.S. of the Air Force. The C.N.L. would decide the general position regarding the distribution of French forces in the various theatres of operations and the measures to hasten their fusion. It delegated General Giraud to take part in any inter-Allied discussions for the establishment of joint plans, and to supervise the distribution of armaments received from the U.S.A. and Great Britain. Thus the union of the two French forces was at last achieved.

In other respects the C.N.L. did useful work. It decreed the dissolution of Doriot's pro-Nazi *Parti Populaire Français* and repealed the corporative organization of production, commerce and the professions introduced as a sop to Fascism by the Vichy Government. It also abrogated the decree of October 20, 1940, which had set up French imitations of the *Hitlerjugend* or the *Balilla* in the shape of national youth associations. It adopted several measures improving the condition of Algerian Moslems, equalizing their pay to that of French soldiers of like ranks or seniority and simplifying the procedure by which they could obtain French citizenship. The C.N.L. decided (August 12) to establish a committee of *épuration*—"cleaning-out" is the closest English equivalent—to remove from office persons who while holding positions

¹ Henceforth the C.N.L.

of responsibility, had acted in a manner that assisted the enemy, hindered the Allies or helped to overthrow Republican laws and institutions.

The committee, it was stated, must distinguish between "those who carried out the orders of their superiors without having the necessary authority to discuss them, and those who, going beyond their strict obligations, had wittingly associated themselves with a policy directed against the nation and Republican and democratic institutions." Measures to revise salaries in order to meet the increased cost of living were adopted on August 14.

Useful as these reforms were, uneasiness persisted in French circles in North Africa as to the future evolution of French politics and the relations between France and the Allied Powers. In North Africa the rivalry between "de Gaullists" and "Giraudins" aroused some anxiety, as did the anomalous situation, the result of the original compromise regarding the conditions of the fusion of the Fighting French and North African forces, of General Giraud who combined the functions of joint Chairman of the C.N.L. (which was, in effect, a Legislature) and Commander-in-Chief. The separation of military from civil powers was a principle which most Frenchmen, remembering Napoleon III and the later example of Marshal Pétain, upheld, and they found General Giraud's joint tenure of the highest civil and military offices abnormal and alarming. The rivalry of the followers of the two Generals was greatly eased by the decrees of July 31 (*q.v.* p. 72), and was likely to disappear with time and better acquaintance. The problem of General Giraud's position was not susceptible of rapid solution.

Equal anxiety was caused among the French in North Africa by the reluctance of the United States and British Governments to accord at least *de facto* recognition to the C.N.L. The American attitude towards this issue was summed up in *The Times* on July 19.

"The view hitherto taken in Washington appears to be that, so long as the mainland of France is in enemy occupation, and so long as other French territories are more or less immediate theatres of war where military considerations predominate, no need exists for any recognized and centralized French political authority." Something might be said for this view, the leading article continued, and the moderate and reasonable men who formed the C.N.L. did not claim to represent France or to prejudge the character of the Government eventually to be established in France. On the other

hand, tradition and convenience had established the rule "fully accepted and applied by Washington, that where the territory of one of the United Nations has been overrun . . . either the Government operating in the territory before the invasion, or a group formed for the purpose, shall be recognized by the other United Nations as a Government of the nation concerned ; and it is hard to find a valid reason for departing from this practice in the case of France."

The results of non-recognition were almost farcical in one instance. Admiral Robert, the Vichy High Commissioner in Martinique, had invited the American Government to name an envoy "to fix terms for a change of French authority." He could hold out no longer ; revolt was simmering in the island, and he offered to hand over the Governorship provided that the United States guaranteed the maintenance of French sovereignty and the resumption of supplies. On July 13 the State Department announced that he had relinquished his authority over the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, and that the American Government had accepted the designation by the C.N.L. of M. Henri Hoppenot, a member of the French Military Mission at Washington, as his successor. Nevertheless, M. Hoppenot, although the delegate of the Committee, was obliged to carry out his mission "in a private capacity"—which was absurd. In the United States far more than in Great Britain the position had been obscured by an "undue attention to the personality aspects of the new French organization," which Mr. Churchill had deprecated when answering questions in Parliament on July 1. A number of attacks on General de Gaulle in the American Press, which were thought to have been inspired by the State Department, did not improve matters.

British policy on this issue seemed to follow Washington. On July 1 Mr. Churchill, replying to questions regarding the North African situation, explained what had happened on June 19.

General Eisenhower, he said, with the authority of the British and American Governments, had asked Generals de Gaulle and Giraud for an assurance that there should be no important change in the French command in North Africa at present and that the French military organization should be such as to give the French Commander-in-Chief effective and proper control of all French troops in the area. This representation had been made on military grounds in view of the serious effect that prolonged

controversies between the French leaders might have on the furtherance of the war and the safety of the Allied armies in North Africa. It was not intended to invest General Eisenhower with control over the political organization there. After deprecating the focussing of attention on personalities, he said that the Government had consistently encouraged the union of all Frenchmen against the Axis and that it had never been their policy to take sides or to use their armies to impose any particular leader on the French, but rather to ensure that the "broad and settled will" of the French people, expressed under free conditions, should decide upon the future government of France.

This was satisfactory as far as it went, but it did not touch the problem of recognition.

On July 14, the French National holiday, Mr. Eden told the House of Commons that the Government were treating with the C.N.L. on all matters of common concern relating to French territories acknowledging the Committee's authority and affecting French forces in British territory. No decision had yet been taken as to "the precise degree of formal recognition to be accorded," but he said that the Government regarded the C.N.L. as the sole authority over all Frenchmen seeking to liberate their country from the Germans, and that the British Government's dealings, financial and otherwise, would be with the National Committee as a whole. They looked with sympathy and goodwill on the Committee and would like to see its authority extended and strengthened.

On the same day General de Gaulle had spoken at Algiers in a tone which, while most friendly to the United States, seemed to be in some sort an answer to overt or implied American criticisms, and also, perhaps, to suggestions that he aimed at a Left-Wing Dictatorship.

He said that after three years of trial the spirit of resistance in France was stronger than ever. France was no sleeping beauty to be gently wakened one day. She had to fight for her freedom, and her people were united in their desire to fight until their freedom was won. Never before had the underground organizations been so numerous or so well organized. Nothing could separate France from the American people, for French resistance and U.S. power were inspired by the same principles. He appealed to America for arms and guaranteed an increased French contribution to the common effort in return.

He was convinced that the French people would not consent after the war to return to the regime which collapsed under defeat or to accept the system of oppression and delation for which Vichy stood. The Fourth Republic would differ from the Third for it would demand not to be exploited but to be respected. He also assured the timid that Frenchmen had no intention of emerging from the present struggle only to plunge into civil war.

On July 27 General de Gaulle said in a broadcast that the change in Italy (Mussolini had fallen) might soon bring up the question of a "settlement of accounts." Such a settlement could be neither valid nor lasting without

France. The proximity and in some degree the interdependence of the two great Latin peoples remained, in spite of the wrongs inflicted on France, one of the elements on which the "reason and the hopes of Europe were founded."

Recognition came at last, although its scope was still limited, after and as a result of the Quebec Conference. The reader will find the terms on which it was granted in the next section of this chapter. The delay had been unfortunate. The attacks on General de Gaulle in several American newspapers had rankled the more since it had been alleged that they were based on a British memorandum emanating from the War Cabinet which was most critical of the General's policy and accused him of attempting to play off the two English-speaking Powers against each other. The British Embassy in Washington denied all knowledge of the document and their denial was accepted, but the *Washington Post*, followed by other American newspapers, protested against this "pipe-line" journalism, inspired, they suggested, by anti-de Gaullist officials who were "using the British as a stick to beat General de Gaulle with." Admittedly the French leader had frequently been "difficult." There had been occasions when he had been quite unnecessarily temperamental or obstructive, but neither Americans nor British had always understood that he could risk no action which Laval and his likes could interpret as sacrificing the interests of France to those of the English-speaking Powers. Not did some of his British critics fully realize the magnitude of the service which he had rendered us when France seemed lost and the fate of Britain hung upon a thread.

On September 3 the C.N.L. decided to mobilize all French subjects abroad and in the Empire, and set up a committee composed of Generals de Gaulle and Giraud and M. André Philip, to direct relations between the C.N.L. and the branches of the resistance movement in France. The Committee also decided that Marshal Pétain and his "pseudo-Government" should be tried as soon as the circumstances permitted.

On September 9 the C.N.L. issued a statement taking note of General Eisenhower's announcement of the armistice with Italy and of the approval of its terms beforehand by the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. It gave an assurance that the sacrifices made by France beside her Allies would continue in increasing measure until the final victory. It added: "The Committee had the opportunity earlier to acquaint the Governments in London, Washington and Moscow with the position taken up by France regarding the stipulations of the armistice which was being prepared. It has decided to renew and clarify . . . for the benefit of these Governments, as well as for those of other States at war with Italy, its statement of the terms which it regards as indispensable for the safeguard of the vital interests of Metropolitan France and her empire, interests which require the participation of France in any convention concerning Italy." The statement was a reminder that the C.N.L. expected to be consulted if the question of Italian co-belligerency arose.

On September 12 it was made known that the C.N.L. had completed arrangements for the formation of a Consultative Assembly at Algiers, to represent French opinion as widely as possible. It would follow Parliamentary lines but would not be elected. Its function would be to guide the Committee.

The C.N.L. undertook that this consultative body would be dissolved as soon as a National Assembly had been elected to set up a Provisional Government. The Consultative Assembly would have 85 members of whom 20 would be members of the Senate and Chamber of the Third Republic who were now in North Africa; 12 would be members of the *Conseils Généraux* in North Africa; 40 would represent organizations for resistance in France and 12 would be drawn from similar organizations overseas.

3: THE QUEBEC CONFERENCES

Two of the major problems confronting the British and United States Governments, that of easing the tendency towards strains in their relations with Russia and that presented by the mounting demand of the French National Committee for recognition, have been outlined in the earlier sections of this chapter. Others remained—notably the apportionment of British and American strength to the various theatres of war. At Casablanca President and Prime Minister had decided to concentrate their chief effort during 1943 on the Mediterranean front with the object of expelling the Axis from North Africa and breaking Italian resistance. At Washington in May they were obliged to make concessions to that large body of opinion in the U.S.A. which was mainly inter-

ested in the defeat of Japan ; now in August victories in Sicily had made the Italian collapse inevitable ; powerful armies were poised for the invasion of the Italian Peninsula ; but American opinion made it necessary to include more extensive preparations for the counter-attack on Japan among the decisions for the conduct of the war in East and West during the last months of the year.

But before the Anglo-American meetings an Anglo-Canadian Conference must be held. The increasing power of the Canadian contribution to the war effort would alone have demanded this. Canada had become the fourth largest producer of war supplies among the Allied nations. Her financial assistance to the mother-country had been magnificently generous ; Canadian troops had done admirably in Sicily ; on Allied combined boards, on committees planning post-war relief and food production, Canadian Ministers had shaped or helped to shape constructive policies and "in Ottawa, with its diplomatic missions from a score of foreign Governments," the Department of External Affairs was "laying wide plans of future development in concert with old partners and new friends." Quebec was chosen as the meeting-place of the Anglo-Canadian and Anglo-American Conferences, and it was felt that the old French-Canadian city had been appropriately selected for discussions that would have an important bearing on the future of France.¹

On the night of August 10 it was officially announced in London that Mr. Churchill had arrived in Canada, accompanied by Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport of the United Kingdom and the British Chiefs of Staff. The announcement continued :

"Mr. Churchill was received on arrival by Mr. Mackenzie King, and during his stay in Canada he will be the guest of the Canadian Government. Mr. Churchill will have discussions with Mr. Mackenzie King, and later on will attend a conference with President Roosevelt and the combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the United Kingdom."

¹ The quotations in the above paragraph are taken from an appreciation of the Canadian effort written by the Diplomatic Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* August 12).

The Canadian Government lost no time in opening the Conference. Work began on August 11. That night Mr. King and Mr. Churchill issued a joint official statement, which began :

"A joint session of the War Cabinet of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the War Committee of the Cabinet of His Majesty's Canadian Government, was held this morning, at which the British War Cabinet was represented by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mr. Churchill, and the Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson.

The Canadian Government was represented by members of the Canadian War Cabinet Committee, the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King ; the Minister of Mines and Resources, Mr. Thomas A. Crerar ; the Minister of National Defence, Colonel James L. Ralston ; the Minister of National Defence for Air, Major C. G. Power ; the Minister of Finance, Mr. J. L. Iisley ; the Minister of Transport, Mr. J. E. Michaud ; the Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. Clarence D. Howe ; the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, Mr. Angus Macdonald ; the Minister of Justice, Captain Louis St. Laurent.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. N. A. Robertson, and the Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, were also present.

The session which began this morning lasted nearly three hours. The field of war was surveyed and questions of special joint interest to the two Governments were discussed. A further joint session will be held at a later date."

While Mr. Churchill then took a short holiday at Niagara with his daughter, Miss Mary Churchill, and paid a three-days' visit to the United States, during which he was the President's guest at Hyde Park, preliminary discussions opened at the Chateau Frontenac in Quebec between the Canadian and British Chiefs of Staff. Some disappointment was expressed in Canada as in the U.S.A. that the Russian Government were not represented at the Conference. Press reports from across the Atlantic had asserted erroneously that Soviet leaders or, at all events, a military representative would attend it. This drew the following blunt correction which was wirelessly from Moscow :

"According to information available to Tass (i.e. the official News Agency of the Soviet Government), the reports are based on a misunderstanding. The Soviet Government did not receive an invitation to this conference, since by its nature the presence of any representative of the Soviet Government at the conference in Quebec has not been and is not being planned."

In fact this statement was entirely correct, but it might have made two points clear, viz : that there had been no misunderstanding between the

Governments but that the Soviet Government had given their allies to understand that Marshal Stalin's military duties and cares prevented his attending an inter-Allied meeting at the time ; and also that since the Quebec Conference covered the war in the Far East where the attitude of Russia was governed by the non-aggression pact with Japan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. could not take part in it. At the same time it became known that the British and American Governments desired a wider conference on general European strategy and post-war policy, that they had kept the Russian dictator informed of their views and their broad plans, and had sought his opinion on them, and that they were planning a meeting with the representatives of Russia.

On August 15 Mr. Churchill returned to Quebec where he was met by Mrs. Churchill, who had accompanied him across the Atlantic, Mr. King and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner in Canada. It was announced that day that Mr. Eden was coming to Canada, that Sir John Dill, head of the joint staff mission in Washington, had arrived in Quebec, as had the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the American officers who with their British colleagues comprised the combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington, and that the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff had been for several days in continuous session. On August 17 President Roosevelt arrived in Quebec, where he was greeted by the Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, and Princess Alice, Mr. Churchill, Mr. King and the Chiefs of Staff. He was accompanied by Mr. Hopkins. For the first time in the history of the old fortress of Quebec, four flags, the Union Jack, the Stars and Stripes, the Canadian ensign and the Governor-General's own banner, floated over its battlements.

On August 18 Mr. Eden arrived in Quebec with Mr. Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information. By this time the larger conference which had followed the Anglo-Canadian discussions was under way and it was clear that the discussions would be extended to include political as well as military affairs, and to deal with the problems presented by a somewhat critical Russia, a collapsing Italy and a reviving France. Next day Mr. Cordell Hull left Washington for Quebec, taking with him Mr. James Clement Dunn, the State Department's political adviser on European affairs. His departure prompted

an article in the *New York Times* from Mr. Harold Callender, who frequently reflects the views of the State Department. In this he assumed

"that Anglo-American relations with Russia and with France will be examined," and he cited officials as expressing their feeling that there had been "much misunderstanding of the American attitude." There were gaps between Great Britain's "necessarily opportunist" policy towards Russia and that of the United States which was "based upon certain long-asserted principles." Then he cited the Baltic States, annexed by Russia in 1940, as a case in point, since "it has been said that the United States intervened to persuade Great Britain not to recognize those annexations in her treaty with Russia." Thus America had "interposed a qualification or limit upon Anglo-Russian co-operation in a region where this Government could offer no positive contribution." But, he continued, "it is pointed out here," that American refusal to recognize annexations anywhere "is a long-standing policy." At the same time he admitted that Great Britain was justified in seeking to protect herself by an alliance with Russia, more especially since American collaboration remained to be defined.¹

Current and post-war political problems were believed to have been the principal topics discussed by the weekend (August 21-23) during which Mr. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary for War, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. T. V. Soong, arrived. On August 23 a meeting described as of "very great importance" was held at the Citadel of Quebec to discuss Pacific strategy. President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. T. V. Soong were present. Next day the Anglo-American conference ended and the President, Mr. Churchill and Mr. King received correspondents on the terrace of the Old Fort in the afternoon. Mr. Churchill, after making it clear, as did the President, that military information could not be divulged, told the Press that the Conference had completed its task.

There had been absolute unity of purpose. Plans had been made for a short-term and a long-term war with Japan and were being pressed forward. The Allies, although they had started so badly, were now superior; the U-boat campaign was "flowing to our side," and Britain and the U.S.A. would bring their whole weight to bear on the enemy in due course, and their attack coupled with the "superb operations" of Russia would bring the peoples of Europe out of the dark valleys through which they had been passing for four years.

Mr. Roosevelt said that conferences alone were not enough. They required the full co-operation of those employed in factory, field or shipyard and elsewhere on the home fronts to secure fulfilment. The effort in all countries must be kept at the highest pitch for the armed forces needed

¹ Summarized from a message from the correspondent of *The Times* at Washington, published on August 21.

the backing of the civilians. He reminded them that what was decided at conferences took time to translate into action. What was planned in June, 1942, was not put into effect until November.

On the evening of August 24 Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt issued the following joint statement :

"The Anglo-American war conference, which opened at Quebec on August 11 under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work. The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward actions of the fleet, the army and the air forces of the two nations. Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction. Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and the British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens. It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcements of decisions which have been reached. It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the Chiefs of Staff turned very largely on the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Mr. T. V. Soong, representing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was party to the discussions. In this field as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement was also reached upon the political issues underlying all or arising out of military operations.

It was resolved to hold another conference at the end of the year between British and American authorities, in addition to any tri-partite meetings which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions, so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy, will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

Consideration has been given during the conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of Governments will be made in the latter part of the week."

On August 24 President Roosevelt visited Ottawa—the first visit of an American President to the capital of the Dominion—and addressed the two Houses of the Canadian Parliament. He said that the war had been

violently forced upon the United Nations "by criminal aggressors who measure their standards of morality by the extent of the death and destruction they can inflict upon their neighbours." To-day they were celebrating the brilliant victory of the Allied forces, British, Canadian and American, in Sicily ; they were also rejoicing over the expulsion of the Japanese from the Aleutian Islands. "I regret to say that some Americans and some Canadians wished our Governments to withdraw from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean campaigns and divert all our vast strength to the removal of the Japanese from a few rocky specks in the Pacific." Wiser counsels had maintained their efforts in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the China Seas and the south-west Pacific "with ever-growing contributions."

At Quebec the Combined Staffs had talked things over and "talked constructively of our common purposes in the war, of our determination to achieve victory in the shortest possible time, and of our essential co-operation with our brave and fighting allies; and we have arrived harmoniously at certain definite conclusions." These were secret but, he added amid loud cheers and laughter: "In due time we shall communicate the secret information of the Quebec Conference to Germany, Italy and Japan . . . in the only language which their twisted minds seem capable of understanding."

He sometimes wished that that great master of intuition, the Nazi leader, had been present at the Conference. If he and his generals had known our plans they would have known that discretion was the better part of valour, and that surrender would pay them better now than later. The evil characteristic that made a Nazi a Nazi was his utter inability to understand, and therefore to respect the rights of his fellow men. His only method of dealing with his neighbour was to delude him with lies, then to attack him treacherously, beat him down, step on him and either kill or enslave him. This was equally true of the fanatical militarists of Japan. Their enemies could not understand how decent, sensible, individual human beings managed to live together as good neighbours; and that was why they were trying to misrepresent the purposes of the Conference. They still sought to divide and conquer the Allies. That was why "we have been forced to call out what we in the United States would call the sheriff and his posse to break up the gang, in order that gangsterism may be eliminated in the community of nations. We are making sure . . . this time, that the lesson is driven home to them once and for all. . . ."

At Quebec there was much talk of the post-war world and that talk was duplicated among millions of people. There was a longing in the air, but not a longing to go back to . . . "the good old days." He had "distinct reservations as to how good those good old days were. I had rather believe that we can achieve new and better days." Absolute victory would give greater opportunities to the world because the winning of the war in itself was proving what concerted action could do. He concluded with an admirable attack on the cynics.

"I am everlastingly angry only at those who assert that the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter are nonsense, because they are unattainable. These people, if they had lived 150 years ago, would have sneered and said that the Declaration of Independence was simply piffle; if they had lived nearly 1,000 years ago they would have laughed uproariously at the work of Magna Charta; and if they had lived several thousand years ago they would have derided Moses when he came down from the mountain with the Ten Commandments. . . . I would rather be a builder than a wrecker, hoping always that the structure of life is growing, not dying. . . . Some day, in the distant future perhaps, but some day with certainty, all will remember with the Master, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'"

After the recognition of the French National Committee of Liberation had been announced (*q.v.* pp. 88, 89) it was made known that Mr. Churchill would rejoin the President at Washington shortly. Mr. Roosevelt had returned there immediately after his Ottawa speech. After a rest the Prime Minister broadcast from Quebec on August 31. He began by saying that no more fitting

place could have been chosen than Quebec, the capital of French Canada, from which to send an assurance to the French people that the services of France to culture and civilization were not forgotten.

He then paid a high tribute to the great contribution which Canada had made to the combined efforts of the British Commonwealth and Empire, pointed out the immense value of Empire Air Training Organization and said that Canada had become "an important seafaring nation" building many score merchantmen and warships and guarding the vital supply lines across the Atlantic. The munition factories of Canada had played an immense part in British war economy and Canada had relieved Britain of what would otherwise have been a debt for those munitions amounting to no less than 2,000,000,000 dollars. Canada's part in the war arose from no treaty or formal obligation but sprang in perfect freedom from sentiment and tradition.

Turning next to Russia, he said: "We have made a twenty-year treaty of goodwill and mutual aid with Soviet Russia. You may be sure that we British are resolved to do our utmost to make that good with all our strength and national steadfastness." Since next to the Mediterranean War the Conference had been mainly concerned with the speeding-up of operations against Japan, and since Soviet Russia had a five-year non-aggression treaty with Japan, the Soviet Government could not have been represented at the Conference, but "nothing is nearer to the wishes of President Roosevelt and myself than to have a threefold meeting with Marshal Stalin." The Marshal, however, could not leave the battle-front where operations vital to the United Nations were being pursued. On behalf of the British Empire he saluted Marshal Stalin on his brilliant summer campaign, and added: "The President and I will persevere in our efforts to meet Marshal Stalin and in the meantime it seems most necessary and urgent that a conference of the British, United States and Russian Foreign Ministers, or their respective representatives, be held." There was every desire to associate Russian representatives with them in "the political decisions which arise out of the victories which the Anglo-American forces have gained in the Mediterranean."

On the question of the Second Front he said it was natural that the Russians should be urging it ceaselessly, and they had inflicted such vast injury upon German military strength that "nothing they can say in honest criticism of our strategy will be taken amiss by us." However, we had lost the front in France, and "it is easier to have a front pulled down than to build it up again." He looked forward to the day when the Anglo-American liberating armies would cross the Channel, and whenever the blow was struck "you may be sure that it will be because we are satisfied that there is a good prospect of continuing success, and that our soldiers' lives . . . are expended in accordance with sound military plans and not squandered for political considerations of any kind." He thought that history would judge the strategy adopted by the United Nations as having been "bold and daring," since it was the best which Britain and the United States could adopt given the limitations of ocean transport, the peculiar conditions of amphibious warfare and the character and training of our armies.

He had always thought of the Third Front as well as the Second Front. The North African expedition had given rich returns, the conquest of Sicily, the clearing of Africa and the fall of Mussolini. The greater part of the German Air Force had been drawn off from Russia and was being worn

down by the continued assaults of the Allies. "An immense diminution" of the enemy's war-making capacity had been achieved by the air bombardment which might be expected to increase in intensity. Much of this, admittedly, would not have been possible but for the magnificent exertion of the Russian Army. Russia had survived and recovered from frightful injuries and had inflicted "as no other force in the world could have inflicted" mortal damage on the German army machine.

After a reference to the Balkans he turned to the Pacific. The principal British responsibility lay in the Indian Ocean and on the Indian front. He then announced the formation of an Anglo-American Command in that theatre and the appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten to be Supreme Commander of the South-East Asian front (cf. Chapter V, Section 1). Speaking finally of the duration of the war, he said that the Germans were certainly hated as no race had been hated before in human history or with such good reason. The scars they had left in a dozen once free and happy countries would never be effaced. He believed that the Nazis and the Prussian militarists might well "foresee and dread their approaching doom," but it was impossible to measure the force of the blows that were being prepared or the results of bombing on German morale. There were "dangers in allowing our minds to dwell unduly on the favourable circumstances which surround us" and speculation as to when the war would end was at present "dangerous and unprofitable."

Conversations in which Mr. Eden, M. Maisky, Soviet Assistant-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who was visiting England, and the American Ambassador took part, began in London in early September, and it was soon known that the conference of the three Foreign Ministers would be held, probably in Moscow, in October. It was also understood that the Governments concerned hoped to set up a three-Power Commission to share information, more especially with regard to political problems arising from military events, and having powers to make recommendations and even to act under the general authority of the three Governments. It was, no doubt, in preparation for these developments that the U.S. State Department in late September appointed Mr. Averill Harriman to succeed Admiral Standley as Ambassador in Moscow. It was not then known whether Mr. Cordell Hull's age and health would permit him to make the long journey mainly by air to Russia.

Mr. Churchill did not return immediately to England after his Quebec broadcast, but remained in the United States for about a fortnight before returning in H.M.S. *Renown*. He stayed on in order to be with the President, "while Marshal Badoglio signed the armistice and until the first days of crisis in Italy were overcome. They could approve of the decisions of the

combined Allied command without delay ; their instant personal co-operation was of especial value during the swift German counter-moves." (*The Times*, September 20.) Nor did Mr. Churchill leave the President until the extent of the German defeat in Russia had become clear and its consequences could be estimated.

Meanwhile, he had made a remarkable speech at Harvard University, which had conferred the honorary degree of D.L. on him on September 6. He spoke on behalf of Anglo-American co-operation after the war, and he made a most eloquent plea for the maintenance after the war of the military machinery which was now giving such excellent results. He led off with what was really an attack on isolationism backed by powerful arguments.

It was no use saying that the United States did not want to be involved in the war. The long arm reached out remorselessly and everyone's existence, environment and outlook underwent a swift and irresistible change. The price of greatness was responsibility. Had the U.S.A. remained in a mediocre station, of no consequence to the movement of the world, they might have remained undisturbed behind their protecting oceans, but "one cannot rise to be in many respects the leading community in a civilized world without being involved in its problems . . . convulsed by its agonies and inspired by its causes." Meanwhile as responsibilities were growing the world was contracting in relation to human powers of locomotion. They could not stop. They would find good comrades in the British Commonwealth bound by other ties than those of State policy or of common need, ties of blood and history, language, literature, common conceptions of what was right, the sentiment of fair play, of impartial justice and the love of personal freedom. Tyranny was their common foe, whatever trappings or disguise it wore.

They had now in continual vigorous action the British and U.S. combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, which disposed of their common resources and, in fact, used them as though they were the resources of a single State. Naturally there were divergences of view and that was why it was necessary to have plenary meetings of the principals every two or three months. But all these men now knew and trusted each other, liked each other, and thrashed things out with great candour and plain blunt speech. This was a wonderful system, unprecedented in any previous alliance and it was reproduced in an even more tightly knotted form at General Eisenhower's Headquarters. He went on :

"In my opinion it would be a most foolish and improvident act on the part of our two Governments, or either of them, to break up this smooth-running and immensely powerful machinery the moment the war is over. For our own safety, as well as for the security of the rest of the world, we are bound to keep it working and in running order after the war . . . not only till we have set up some world arrangement to keep the peace, but until we know that it is an arrangement which will really give us that protection we must have from danger and aggression. . . ."

He did not know whether this would become a party question in the United States. He was sure it would not be in Great Britain. We must

not let go the securities we have found necessary to preserve our lives and liberties till we were sure we had something to put in their place. Referring to the great significance of the fact that they spoke the same language he said that this "might even some day become the foundation of a common citizenship." He did not see why they should not try to spread their common language throughout the globe even more widely, and he advocated the teaching of basic English.

He concluded by telling his audience that hard experience had taught us that stronger, more efficient and rigorous institutions than the League of Nations must be set up to preserve peace and forestall the causes of future wars. In this must be combined the strongest nations and those who had borne the burden and heat of the day and suffered under adversity. Whatever form the system might take, whatever derogations might be made from national sovereignty for the sake of the larger synthesis, nothing would work soundly or for long without the united effort of the British and American peoples. If they were together nothing was impossible, if they were divided all would fail. He therefore preached the doctrine of the fraternal association of the two peoples, not for material advantage or territorial aggrandizement, but "for the sake of service to mankind and for the honour that comes to those who faithfully serve great causes."

The speech encountered criticism in the U.S., not only among the professed isolationists and Anglophobes, but among those who argued honestly that alliances invariably beget counter-alliances. At the same time Mr. Walter Lippmann's admirable book on American foreign policy which showed, *inter alia*, that the isolationism of the United States had been made possible only by British sea-power, had converted many prominent Americans, e.g. Governor Dewey, a prospective Republican candidate for the Presidency, to advocacy of such an alliance, and it was known that the Administration approved Mr. Churchill's views concerning organized co-operation during the transitional period after the war. As for the American people, their attitude was summed up probably accurately by the Correspondent of *The Times* at Washington (*loc. cit.* September 9) :

"The American people certainly agree . . . with the orators who tell them that their country must be made 'impregnable.' When they come to the full realization that this is a state, which if it is to be achieved at all, requires an alliance for its fulfilment, or active membership in some great organization of nations they will not hesitate."

To complete the picture it is necessary to outline the action that was taken immediately after the close of the Quebec Conferences to give recognition to the French National Committee. On August 25 Mr. Harold Macmillan, representing the British, and Mr. Murphy,

representing the United States Government at Algiers, communicated memoranda setting forth their respective Governments' attitude towards the recognition of the Committee. These communications were replies to requests for recognition contained in letters addressed to the two Governments on behalf of the Committee. In the letter addressed to the British Government on June 7 the Committee had described itself as "the central French power," which directed the French war effort in all its forms, and consequently

"exercises French sovereignty on all territories not subject to the power of the enemy . . . undertakes the administration and the defence of all French interests . . . assumes authority over the territories and the land, sea and air forces which up to the present have been under the authority of the French National Committee and of the . . . Commander-in-Chief."

The declaration went on to say that all necessary steps had been taken to bring about the fusion of the administrations dependent on these two authorities ; that as soon as the liberation of France permitted it the Committee would hand over its powers to a provisional Government ; that the Committee would continue the struggle for the complete liberation of French and Allied territories "in close co-operation with the Allies." It solemnly undertook to re-establish French liberties, the laws of the Republic and the Republican régime through the destruction of the régime of "arbitrary authority and personal power" now imposed upon France. It concluded by calling upon all Frenchmen to follow it and thus aid France to regain her former greatness "and her traditional place among the great Allied Powers," and so that France "might be able to make her contribution to the councils of the United Nations at the Peace Conference."

In their memorandum the British Government, after making clear their purpose of collaborating with all patriotic Frenchmen seeking to liberate their country and welcoming the establishment of the C.N.L., on the understanding that this body took collective responsibility the prosecution of the war and that the French people would settle their own constitution and establish their own government after having had an opportunity of expressing themselves freely. On this understanding they wished to make the following statement:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize forthwith the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French oversea territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. His Majesty's Government . . . also recognize the committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied co-operation.

They take note with sympathy of the desire of the committee to be

regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and the defence of all French interests. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise."

After welcoming the assurance that the C.N.L. would continue the struggle in co-operation with the Allies until France had been liberated and victory won, the memorandum continued: "During the war military needs are paramount and all controls necessary for operational purposes are in consequence reserved to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in any theatre of operations. In respect of certain of the territories under . . . the committee, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United Kingdom authorities." The creation of the C.N.L. might make it necessary to revise these arrangements. His Majesty's Government assumed that pending their revision all such agreements save those which had been "automatically made inapplicable" by the formation of the C.N.L. would remain in force.

There were differences of emphasis between the American reply to the C.N.L. and the British and Canadian memoranda. These last were more sympathetically worded; to take one example, while the British and Canadian Governments commented on the Committee's desire to be regarded as the guardian of French interests in the passage quoted above, "It is the intention . . . cases as they arise," the American reply stated, "The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire must, however, be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises." Still, the result was to invest the Committee with a new authority. The other Allies, save Belgium which had recognized the C.N.L. on August 25, immediately followed the example of the English-speaking Powers.

CHAPTER III

THE RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGNS

I : THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR

By Lieut-Col. H. de Watteville, C.B.E., M.A. (Oxon), p.s.c.

IN German radio and other pronouncements the month of July, 1943, was greeted as "the most momentous of the whole war." There was much truth in these boastful forecasts. Nevertheless the prospect that was opening before the German High Command as the campaigning season drew near, could scarcely be termed alluring. Throughout the spring and early summer Germany had been gathering herself for a great stroke on the Eastern Front ; a stroke of such power as might at least give her breathing-time if not actually to yield her a conclusive success against the Soviet Union. But the problem involved in any such action was one of immense gravity. The heavy German losses incurred in Russia, both in 1941 and in 1942, had in fact to a large extent been made good ; yet neither in strength of man-power nor in quantity of material could the German Armies of 1943 now allotted to the Eastern Front be termed the equals of their predecessors. The enormous dispersion of German fighting power throughout "the fortress of Europe" was beginning to tell its tale. The German strategic reserve had been drained of all its better elements and it possibly lacked some power of mobility, whilst it was, probably at that moment, inadequately supplied with modern equipment and stores to meet any graver emergency. In addition, the situation in the Mediterranean, the threat of an Anglo-American invasion of the western continent, the destruction of German industry caused by the massive air attacks of the British and American Air Forces, and the evidently increasing difficulties of the German war industries, all these circumstances seemed to be becoming more insistent and relentlessly demanding a speedy end to the war—a victori-

ous end, too, unless Germany were to face the risk of being engulfed in measureless disaster.

For these and many other lesser reasons the German General Staff saw itself compelled to look to the Eastern Front for a definite solution—at the least one that would release them from the strangle-hold of the Russian menace, whilst affording Germany a chance of attempting to cope with the aerial peril in the west, not to mention the probability of some large-scale Anglo-American invasion of the Continent. No commonplace victory would suffice ; little short of a resounding defeat of the Red Army would serve the German cause. Time was pressing ; the need was great. Delay might only serve to intensify the destructive effects of the aerial war ; time could only help to increase the armaments and striking-power of the western democracies, now that the U-boat warfare had shown itself powerless to check the steadily rising torrent of war material which was pouring out from the United States. Even if the German Armies should be able to do no more than paralyse the offensive power of the Red Army by some great feat of arms there lay the additional incentive to a German assault in that the weakening economic situation of the Soviet Union might possibly contribute to an internal collapse of the entire Russian State. Such a contingency had been freely set forward in the German Press.

Accordingly, the German General Staff sought for some plan of action that might bring about a clear-cut military success against Russia. Owing to the shrinking German resources this plan was to be limited in respect of the area which it covered ; on the other hand, the blow must be designed to prove all the more shattering in its effect by the concentration of the huge fighting power which should be assembled to deliver the stroke. Indeed in proportion to space such a concentration was to exceed all that the Germans had hitherto attempted. Towards this end, too, the German High Command was relying largely on the possession of a new type of armoured fighting vehicle as yet untried on the Eastern Front. This was the new "Tiger" tank, a few of which

had been despatched to North Africa to resist the attacks of the British Eighth Army. The "Tiger" tank was, in fact, a trump card on which the Germans were setting high hopes of victory.

Basing themselves on these premises, the German General Staff decided to launch their great assault on the immense bulge that protruded from the Russian front at Kursk between Byelgorod and Orel. Ever since the close of the fighting in the previous autumn the existence of the two salients, the first of these being the Russian bulge at Kursk, the second the German projection lying further to the north round Orel, had attracted both belligerents when contemplating a new campaign. From the German point of view, moreover, the Kursk salient was most favourably situated with a view to undertaking any ulterior operations, either for taking Moscow itself from the rear or for splitting the Russian Armies. Further, the Germans knew that this Kursk salient was now being packed with Russian troops for a Soviet attack on themselves. Finally, the lie of the front would favour that very type of plan of campaign which the German strategists had always maintained must conduce to their ideal battle, that is the enveloping attack which, coming from two flanks, seeks to encircle the enemy's forces and destroy them by eventual attack from the rear. It was this same object of *einkesselung*, that is creating a cauldron in which to destroy the enemy, which had been the great aim of the German High Command in the Polish campaign of September, 1939, and again in Russia in 1941.

Now in making their plan the Germans were falling into the old familiar error of overrating their own powers whilst ignoring the true strength of their enemy. It could hardly have been otherwise. For two years the German official *communiqués* and propaganda had been pouring out magniloquent pronouncements as to the ruin of the Russian Armies and their impending destruction, let alone repeated boastful statements concerning Russian inadaptability to the needs of modern war. They had never ceased singing the praises of the superb

fighting qualities of the German soldier, and at the same time extolling the peerless talents of the German general. The Russian Armies could never be compared to such troops. So they had chosen to shut their eyes to the growing proofs of the strength of the new weapons and of the new military quality of the Red Army.

At 4.30 a.m. on July 5 the German offensive was set in motion on both flanks of the Kursk salient. A long-range bombardment, followed by strong aerial attacks, took place both on the Orel and the Byelgorod fronts. They were intended to prelude the heavy surprise attack by means of which the Germans were hoping to overpower the Red Army front line at one single blow. If so, then they were destined to be disappointed. Fierce fighting took place at all the points of attack in which the Germans employed heavy infantry formations in combination with serried groups of tanks. The latter comprised numbers of "Tigers" and seem to have been organized in units of 100 to 200 tanks, the "Tigers" numbering at least 10 per cent of the machines thus employed. Losses on both sides grew heavy. But nowhere did the Germans achieve a clean break in the Russian front.

Next day, the 6th, the German pressure continued unrelenting. On the Orel-Kursk front all attacks were held by the Russians; but on the Byelgorod front the German tanks succeeded in driving forward the German line, though only at heavy cost. Over 400 tanks alone were claimed by the Red Army as being put out of action. The Russian artillery seems to have distinguished itself by its skill in scoring direct hits on the redoubtable "Tigers."

Yet a third day, the 7th, saw little better result accruing from the terrific German attacks, although some ground was once more gained north of Byelgorod. By nightfall, however, it grew clear that the German plan of an overpowering onslaught would not attain its main object, even though it might continue to make some headway. The suddenness of the blow had not brought the expected success; the huge concentration of armour and firepower had not smashed the Soviet resistance.

German publicity now began resorting to curious artifices to conceal this lack of success. In the first instance it had remained entirely silent as to the launching of this offensive. Next, it attempted to minimize the scale of the attack so far as to call it an operation to forestall and to throw off its balance an impending Russian offensive. Finally, tales were told of the failure of the Red Army's great attack. On the 8th the Soviet High Command, stung to the quick by these German statements, published the following details :

"On the morning of July 5 the German-Fascist troops, with large tank and infantry forces supported by numerous aircraft, launched an offensive against the Soviet positions. Their blow was aimed in two directions—from the area south of Orel against Kursk, and from the Byelgorod area northward, also in the direction of Kursk. The Germans hurled into this offensive their main forces concentrated in the Orel and Byelgorod areas.

"In the Orel-Kursk direction the German Command sent into action the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 18th, 20th and 23rd Tank Divisions, the 36th Motorized Division, the 6th, 7th, 78th, 86th, 216th, 258th and 383rd Infantry Divisions.

"In the Byelgorod direction the offensive was conducted by the 3rd, 6th, 7th 11th and 19th Tank Divisions, also the 'Adolf Hitler,' 'Great Germany,' 'Reich' and 'Death's Head' S.S. Tank Divisions, and the 106th, 167th, 168th, 225th, 320th, 162nd and 332nd Infantry Divisions.

"Thus 15 tank divisions, one motorized division and 14 infantry divisions were taking part in the offensive on the German side. To support the infantry and tanks, the German Command had concentrated in this sector of the front numerous air formations, not only withdrawn from other sectors of the Soviet-German front, but also transferred from Western Europe and even from Yugoslavia.

"While preparing for the offensive the Germans also transferred to the Orel and Byelgorod area large numbers of tanks to make good the losses sustained by tank divisions in the course of the offensive.

"All these facts show that when launching the general offensive on the Soviet-German front on July 5, the Germans had planned, by concentrating and bringing into action the main forces of their army on narrow sectors of the front, promptly to smash the Soviet defence and achieve important operative results on the very first days of the offensive."

It is in short no exaggeration to state very definitely that at nightfall on July 7 the great German gamble had definitely failed. Together with this failure there vanished Hitler's last hope of winning the war on the Eastern Front by any deliberate surprise offensive action.

For an entire week this fearful struggle continued. The Germans fought furiously, even blindly. Yet try as they would the north flank of the great Kursk salient held good, whilst on the southern side the wedges that the

German "Tigers" had forced into the defending Soviet lines could only be enlarged with the greatest difficulty and at an insensate cost. The fighting never ceased. Thick clouds of blinding dust from myriads of shellbursts rolled over the battlefield. In this dense cloud the German tanks would scurry about in a desperate effort to find a loophole through the Russian front. They now tried to act in large groups, dashing from one sector to another and then in sheer desperation they might rush on headlong all alone. But this manœuvring under the muzzles of the Soviet guns and under remorseless attack from the air was costing the Germans almost incredible losses. Thus on July 6 one-third of a force of several hundred tanks operating on a single sector was destroyed. Yet in spite of such sacrifices the Germans failed to achieve anything of significance.

In the air overhead Soviet fighter planes, too, were effectively intercepting German aircraft. Frequent use was being made by the Germans of gliders towed by Junkers 88s, in order to speed up the rushing of reserves into the fighting, and to replace lost transport planes. On July 6 Soviet fighters destroyed two such gliders even before they had reached the front-line zone.

Soviet sappers also played an important part in holding the attack. Under the heaviest fire they went on working close to the enemy lines, laying mines and anti-tank obstacles. Not in vain; in one place over thirty German tanks had been so busy steering clear of minefields that they failed to observe the Soviet guns to which they fell an easy prey.

Now this failure was fraught with such grave consequences for the Germans in the ensuing months that it is worth examining it a little more closely.

The formidable concentration of armour, air units and infantry which the German High Command had assembled before launching their attack against the Kursk salient was such that they can only be assumed to have been aiming at a truly decisive result. No better appreciation of their motives could be found than that contained in the words of a highly placed Russian staff officer, as

well as in the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, which were published at the time by the Zürich journal, *Die Weltwoche*.¹ Pronouncements coming from official Russian sources, however vague and optimistic, had hitherto been rare. In this case the context of the remarks, as given below, has endowed them with greater probability and carries the more weight when it is seen how closely they coincide with subsequent reality.

"We harbour no illusions," declared the Russian, "as to the true purpose of this German mass attack, which they themselves have been most unwilling to admit as having been set in motion. But our Intelligence makes crystal clear the aims which the German High Command cherished in the matter. With the utmost confidence we can assert that there never existed any question of this German attack merely anticipating and so neutralizing any intended Russian offensive; nor was it limited to flattening out the Kursk salient. We believe that foreign military critics in putting forward either one or the other of the aforesaid alternatives have been led into the erroneous assumption that the Germans were in fact attempting to realize one of these lesser objectives. Such a line of thought completely fails to take into consideration the simple circumstance that the German High Command would never have dared to hazard some 100,000 to 200,000 men and thousands of tanks simply to attain some purely local success, however advantageous that might eventually prove to them, and moreover to run such a risk at a moment when the Axis must be taking into account a possible assault by the Allies against the fortress of Europe.

"It has perhaps escaped the notice of the average reader of the daily press that the very first week of these battles surpassed by far in intensity even the climax of the fight for Stalingrad. At Stalingrad during the decisive weeks the German rate of loss is calculated to have stood at about 5,000 casualties per day. Yet during the first week of the Kursk-Byelgorod fighting this rate increased to over 8,000 casualties per day. In the Stalingrad struggle the German *Luftwaffe* intervened with about 1,200 sorties per day, whilst at the very opening of this summer's battle German aircraft are calculated to have made no less than 2,000 such daily sorties. Lastly, the total of Hitler's tanks made available for this fighting in 1943 is infinitely greater than at Stalingrad. Consequently we can assume the net outcome of these facts to be that at this moment (July 12, 1943) the most massive infantry and tank battle in the world's history is being fought out. Never before have so many hundred tanks been sent into action on so narrow a front. Moreover, the tanks of to-day are not only more numerous but far more deadly by reason of much increased fire-power. Russian artillery experts have proved by practical tests that the new German 'Tiger' tank possesses between two and three times the fire-power of the medium tank which formed the backbone of the German offensive in 1942."

Careful investigations which had previously been made by these (Swiss) journalists on the spot, so the *Weltwoche* continues, had tended to show that the morale of both German officers and men had been perceptibly affected by

¹ July 16 and 23, 1943.

the reverses suffered at Stalingrad and in Tunisia. Since those days, however, German propaganda had succeeded in inspiring the front-line troops with renewed enthusiasm. Consequently the morale of the German troops engaged in the Kursk fighting could still be regarded as undoubtedly "very high" and as eager as ever to fight for a decision.¹

This same Russian officer reverted to the same topic one week later :

"We Russians have always attempted to remain realists and to avoid self-complacent optimism. I will emphasize this fact once more before I state my firm belief to be that, in spite of any gain of terrain, the German offensive which was intended to break through the Kursk front by two massive thrusts has utterly failed. For a long time past we had been expecting these attacks and had made ready to meet the blow in every possible fashion. On the northern side of the salient natural conditions rendered easy the perfection of the defence. On this flank, indeed, a high proportion of the total of 2,300 German tanks that have now been destroyed found their end.

The German method of attack, he continued, was generally the following. The attack was headed by massive waves of 'Tiger' tanks, which were followed by a wave of self-propelled artillery. Behind them followed a wave of medium tanks ; and close in their rear came a wave of light tanks escorted by motorized infantry. The object of our defence was naturally to hold up the leading wave of the 'Tigers' so that they should not as much as reach our first line of defence. Should this not succeed, our front troops were instructed to allow the 'Tigers' to pass through them and at all costs to hold their ground. The fire of the defence was then to be directed against the second enemy tank line and against the accompanying infantry. On no account was the front line of the defence allowed to pay the least notice to what might be happening in its rear. It was the second line of the defence which had to carry on the struggle against the leading 'Tigers' and mobile artillery. In this process a call could be made upon the armoured brigades, which owing to such a disposition of troops should be retained in the third line. During the course of the previous few months it had been abundantly proved that the Russian defence obtained the best results when it had not thrown any armoured masses against the German attack in too great a hurry. The attack must be allowed to some extent to wear itself out in its initial thrust."

The "Tiger," says the Swiss journal, was, in fact, a formidable opponent and the Russians had to learn some very bitter lessons before they found out how best to deal with it. Its head-on armour, four inches in thickness, was naturally its strongest protection ; but its flanks could more easily be pierced. The remarkable fact remains

¹ This circumstance recalls very vividly the intensive courses of "Patriotic Education" established by Ludendorff for raising the morale of the German Army during the winter of 1917-18.

that hits scored in the propelling undercarriage invariably appeared to lead to the whole machine catching fire. The Russians turned this weakness to good account.

Throughout this fighting the German tank attack remained a severe trial of nerve to the Russians, as this description shows :

The Germans hurl two to three hundred tanks, including dozens of "Tigers," against separate narrow sectors. Their air force clears narrow passages for them by raining small bombs on the mined areas. The tanks crawl forward slowly, engines howling, treads screeching. It seems as if nothing can check them. Those tanks which are not blown up on the minefields, not stopped by anti-tank bullets, not mangled by the artillery, crawl on to the advanced line.

The guardsman lies down at the bottom of his deep trench, carefully shielding his weapon, whether it be anti-tank rifle, machine-gun or grenades, against possible damage. To lose one's arms means to lose one's life. And to be heroic is to stay alive.

The tank pivots slowly, trying to demolish the trench under its weight. Hot, dry dust falls on the guardsman. He sees above him the oily black belly of the tank. Exhaust gases burn his face. But he does not flinch. He waits for the tank to crawl over the trench. Because the tank cannot stand still, it must move. That is its only hope of escaping the Soviet shells.

The tank crosses the first line of trenches. That used to mean that the men in the trenches were cut off. Not so to-day. The guardsman rises and empties his anti-tank rifle into the back of the tank, flings a pack of grenades under its caterpillars or smashes an incendiary bomb against its sides. Then he turns about to face the German infantry advancing behind the armour.¹

And :

In the early phases of the attack a typical German "fist" consisted of 20 to 30 "Tiger" tanks followed by gun-carriers. In the third wave came medium tanks with infantry. The Red Army's method of dealing with this type of assault is to lure the heavy tanks forward into a "fire bag." When the "Tigers" are within murderously close range—two to three hundred yards—the open end of the bag closes, severing the enemy tanks from the rest of the assault party. Then the Soviet infantry, artillery, and tanks, all dug deep into the ground in preparation for this moment, open up from ambush.

The powerful turrets and long gun barrels of the "Tigers" are in full view. A savage duel begins. The "Tigers" manoeuvre, firing incessantly. They try to smash their way through the "fire bag." But the fabric holds.²

Or again, a German version this time :

So quickly the battle lapsed into the semblance of a mad struggle, perhaps the maddest of the whole war ; it was certainly the most costly. Night brought no respite. Men's minds grew numb in that inferno. The giant hand of destruction lay heavy on the earth, until it seemed never to

¹ *Soviet War News*, July 10, 1943.

² *Soviet War News*, July 12, 1943.

relax from the tremor of exploding metal. He who fought here never slept; he could but exist in dust, mud and agony. The ear had long ceased to hear. The voice was stilled by the roar of explosives. So overwhelming was the infernal din that it seemed as though the hellish powers released by man had mastered even the elemental forces of nature.

Such was a picture of this fighting sent out by German radio.

In the air the struggle was no less fierce. The Germans were attempting to employ the bulk of their planes so as to provide powerful air support for the advance of their ground troops. The Russian reply was a systematic and heavy bombardment of every known German aerodrome within practicable range, and the process had begun even before the German offensive had opened. In this bitter fighting the German losses in fighter aircraft mounted apace. Gradually the *Luftwaffe* ceased to take any great risks. The German machines would patrol the skies in groups of six to eight; they would dodge the Russian fighters through the cloud. Even the bombers flying in formations of 50 to 60 were beginning to be less daring in their movements.

By July 11 German reserves had been brought up on both sectors to begin a sustained and furious attack on the Russian defences. Again and again on the Orel-Kursk front ferocious onslaughts were launched. On the Byelgorod front the struggle grew even fiercer. There the Germans seemed to throw all restraint to the winds in their attempts to break the Red Army's resistance by sheer weight of fire, tanks and infantry. The comparative narrowness of these onrushes, which finally degenerated into mere battering-rams, only assisted the Soviet troops by offering easier targets to their anti-tank defences. On the Byelgorod front alone the Red Army could claim to have demolished at least 2,500 tanks. At length, after three days, the fury of these assaults began to slacken a little. As they slackened, it seemed that the Red Army counter-attacks suddenly assumed a more decisive and aggressive rhythm.

Yet although on the Byelgorod flank the Germans finally managed to storm two important localities, they still could not, even then, make sufficient headway to

compensate for their reckless expenditure of fighting energy. Indeed when in firm possession of these two fiercely contested points they were little better off. Around them everything was blazing furiously. They were still under bombardment from mortars and guns of every calibre. They could only be reinforced with difficulty. Ammunition, supplies, even water, were not everywhere obtainable. Never before had weapons of war been so numerous or so murderous.

For the paltry gains that these titanic efforts had brought the price to be paid by the Germans had been inordinately high. In the end, after those many days of bloody combat they could claim an advance of 10 miles over a 12-mile front to the south of Orel, and a gain of 20 to 30 miles in depth over a front of less than 40 miles to the north of Byelgorod. And there seemed no end to the masses of German war material that had been lost during those days. The Russians, too, had lost quantities, but the same Swiss journalists already quoted, on the strength of such personal observation as was possible to them, place it beyond doubt that the Russian losses can be reckoned to stand in a very favourable ratio to the German: and this belief could be regarded as being more than a probability when consideration is taken of the care with which the Russian attacks had been planned. All over that country-side the material destruction visible on those fields surpassed by far all that had hitherto seemed possible. Not a village, not a hamlet, not a tree remained standing. Fire had completed the destruction that high explosive had failed to achieve. It might have been Flanders at its worst once more.

And what might have been the true purpose of the German General Staff in continuing for so long this costly operation?

Even if we were prepared to admit that the German attacks of July 5 might be regarded as a desperate measure to disorganize the coming Russian offensive of which the Germans had unquestionably become aware, it is scarcely probable that the German High Command could not have limited the attacks in extent, in duration and

in cost. Yet the German Press would have us believe that this fearful carnage saved the German situation. The excuse put forward that this attack fell into the Russian preparations for a great offensive and succeeded in precipitating its release before the Russian dispositions were complete or ready will scarcely hold water. Such indeed is the plain deduction that can be made, especially when we consider the course of events subsequent to that terrible beginning of July.

Then like a bolt out of the blue on July 15 there came the news that out of local counter-attacks the Russian riposte had grown to the stature of a counter-offensive, small in its beginnings maybe, yet none the less a major blow. For three days the new attacks had gone on gathering way to the east and to the north of Orel, until the Russian High Command felt that it might announce the great fact to the world. The beginning of the attack east of Orel on July 13 was dramatic. On a dull, drizzly morning a terrific barrage opened on the complex system of the German outer defences of Orel. In front of barbed wire entanglements lay three rows of minefields. Behind these there had been built a network of trenches, block-houses and pill-boxes. In two days the Red Army had fought its way through the greater part of this formidable belt.

To the north of Orel there was the same story to tell. In two days the Soviet troops were through the labyrinth of the German defence.

Twenty-five years earlier, almost to a day, Foch had launched his historic counter-stroke against the German right flank after their furious onslaught to the River Marne. The "strategy of the buffalo," as Foch so aptly termed it, was to pay the price of its savage clumsy onrush. So now once more the more subtle Russian generalship was to show that even the hammer-strokes of Thor himself could not avail against superior intellect in war, when the weight of arms was at least equal.

Before analysing the new Russian counter-offensive let us for a moment consider wherein lay this newly acquired superiority of the Red Army. If we turn once

more to that well-informed journal, *Die Weltwoche*, we read that on July 18 to those same correspondents the same Russian General Staff officer declared :

"When I stated a week ago that the German offensive had failed, this judgment may have appeared to be somewhat premature. To-day the developments taking place on the Kursk-Byelgorod front fully justify that opinion. Is it not the Germans who have been led astray by their own too optimistic statements concerning 'the last Russian reserves,' 'ill-trained subordinate commanders' and the like clap-trap? What astounds us Russians is the ineptitude of the German Intelligence Service. We have ascertained from more than one hundred responsible German officers who have fallen into our hands that their High Command had no conception of the impending Russian thrusts against Orel. They were all convinced that we were being entirely held by the German penetration into our positions (south of Kursk) and that all our available reserves were being hurried to that point. Yet for over a fortnight we had been concentrating troops and material along those more distant sectors of the front. The fact is that the Germans are unable to obtain information as we do from our guerilla fighters who are active in the rear of the enemy. Through them we can obtain information of German movements up to nearly 200 miles behind the front. When the German *communiqués* declared that their strategic aim was the destruction of our impending offensive, we could only be thankful that we had not been led astray by the opening moves of the enemy. If the Press had believed our reports of the enormous losses that the enemy had suffered on the Kursk-Byelgorod front alone, it might more correctly have assessed our coming offensive on the sectors over against Orel."

The Intelligence work of the Russians, supported by this invaluable fund of information obtained from the guerillas, had indeed been of a high order. As was stated in the *Daily Telegraph* :¹

"At the moment when the Russians were ready to strike [at Orel], the Germans were still labouring in the dark. The Russians, on the other hand, had worked out a complete picture of the fortifications they might be called upon to destroy. The artillery batteries had each received its task ; every gun had had assigned to it some definite target. Such was their success that little trace of the bombardment could be found between the German lines in which concrete blockhouses and strong-points had been destroyed."

Everywhere guerillas had proved admirable spies and secret agents. "Men picking strawberries or mushrooms in the woods," thus wails a German report, "would-be porters at railway stations, peasants going to market, however harmless and 'brainless' they might appear, have time and again been discovered to be dangerous agents of some neighbouring guerilla band. In more than one farm our military police has found a flawless radio set which had been in regular contact with the neighbouring bands and even with a secret station in Moscow." Was it surprising that German troop-trains proceeding to the zone of concentration had so often been derailed on their journey?

¹ July 17, 1943.

This faculty of acquiring accurate and speedy intelligence was enhanced by the progress achieved by the Russian Air Force since 1942: its reconnaissance work in particular had grown more certain and accurate. The strides made by the aircraft constructors were equalled by the increased war experience and the improvement in training of the flying personnel. To this state of affairs the British and American air offensive over Germany could be regarded as having very greatly contributed, not only because it brought about the withdrawal of numerous units of the best German fighter aircraft from the Russian front for purposes of home defence, but also owing to the disturbance of the German aircraft industry that had occurred as a result of bombing damage. In addition the German air forces had been suffering from heavy losses among their best aviators as well as from the increasingly unsatisfactory conditions prevalent at the German air training schools. In all but transport aircraft the Russians were probably becoming the superiors of their enemies. In consequence the relentless dive-bombing attacks from which the Russians had suffered so severely at Sebastopol and Stalingrad were now all but a thing of the past. Moreover, the precision bombing from a height of 4,000-5,000 feet which had been the normal German procedure in 1941 was no longer practised by them. They were keeping to altitudes of 15,000-20,000 feet.

In the province of artillery the conditions had radically altered to the advantage of the Russians. In 1941 a considerable proportion of the Red Army was still dependent on horse-drawn artillery. This latter had now given way to motorized and self-propelled guns throughout the Russian divisions. New quick-firers of all calibres had appeared, particularly among the anti-tank units. The lack of infantry guns had been remedied when in 1942 a number of factories were turned over wholly to the production of these new weapons, which in point of fact were largely copied from and improved upon captured German types. New artillery units had been created; even whole "divisions" consisting solely of artillery had

been set up. Finally, the system of command and fire-control had been modified to suit the new forms of warfare. Consequently it would be legitimate to assert that in the Orel-Byelgorod fighting the German "Tiger" tanks were met, and defeated, by a radically reformed, reorganized and rearmed anti-tank defence that relied as much on its artillery and infantry tactics as on its tanks to meet the savage German assaults. These great changes had indeed been made in the nick of time.

The tank arm of the Russian Army had also been remodelled and largely re-equipped; but its successes were never so startling as those of the new artillery. The new *Kutusov* tank was a greatly improved version of the older heavy *Voroshilov* of 1941-42. Still, in practice, this machine was left far behind in point of utility by the improved Russian medium tank, T34, which now appeared armed with a 3-in. Q.F. gun. On its very broad tracks it possessed a surprising degree of mobility and speed; it was dubbed by the Germans themselves "the best tank in the world."¹

Such improvements were not confined to weapons alone. Discipline, command, selection of officers had improved. Even the Swiss *Journal de Genève*, no friend of the Soviets, could write:

"One can but admire the resilience and the intelligence with which the Russian General Staff of the Red Army has been able to learn from the defeats and the experiences of the first two years of the war." And this progress was not confined to the General Staff: down to the very company officers a like improvement was perceptible throughout every rank of the army.

Visits paid to the Russian armies in recent days, stated the reporters of the Swiss *Weltwoche*, strike the observer profoundly. The organization of the Russian forces is infinitely better in 1943 than it had been in 1942. It is literally true that the Red Army of the present day is now provided with motor vehicles throughout, down to its smallest unit: it is astonishing to observe also how many Russian soldiers are already qualified to attend to such vehicles. The bulk of the artillery has become self-propelled or tractor-drawn. Every division keeps in touch with its neighbour either by a motorized regiment or by a motorized brigade. In 1942 really critical situations, that is from the Russian standpoint, might arise out of the surprises that could be scored against them by the sudden appearance of German motorized units. In 1943 it might be said that this danger was no longer insistent, although it could not yet be claimed that the Russians

¹ *Das Reich*, June 27, 1943.

on their side had sufficiently developed their motorized troops as to be able to surprise the Germans in mobile warfare. Above all, it was remarkable how the magic of the slogan "Stalingrad" was reacting on the minds of those Russian troops. It was literally true that this single word marked the entire difference now perceptible between the Russian soldier of 1942 and his successor of 1943. Self-reliance had grown : confidence in the leadership had reached a high level. On the lips of the Russian soldier there was constantly heard the phrase : "What they could do in Stalingrad, that we also can do here !" Behind the scenes, also, drastic reforms had been carried through with regard to the whole corps of officers and to the discipline of the troops. The depth of feeling that now united the Red Army with the Russian people would be difficult to describe. It permeated the whole army, every factory, every collective farm, every mine and quarry.

On the other hand, no observer on the Russian front could fail to be struck by the deep change that has come over the German *Luftwaffe*. Only a few months ago it could still be regarded as risky to move along any main road leading up to the Russian front ; the German air squadrons seemed to be ubiquitous overhead. Now it is surprising to catch sight of two or three Messerschmitts, let alone a whole squadron, in the sky. A feeling is abroad that the Russian *Stormoviks* are now fully competent to defend all truly important areas behind the front. One year earlier foreign observers could but testify to the German superiority in the air ; now countless incidents could only be taken to mean that this is all a matter of the past. Even the heavy losses which Russians and Germans alike had suffered in the air during the first week alone of the terrific battles round Kursk had, on the Russian side at least, been made good within a very short interval.

Under such conditions it may be claimed that the war had entered on a new phase, a change that had been most clearly demonstrated by the battles of Orel-Byelgorod. Still the Germans could not be brought to see the writing on the wall. So the first act of this new phase lasted well beyond the Orel-Byelgorod struggle, which was obstinately maintained by the Germans for nearly three weeks, i.e. until July 24. It was indeed a seeming military absurdity, even in this mad struggle, to see two belligerents simultaneously and for some days carrying out an offensive of the first magnitude almost within reach of each other. Yet so it was : the Germans obstinately struggled on against the vastly increased strength of the Russian defences around Kursk, whilst the Russians in their turn were calmly embarking upon an offensive against Orel. Such a situation could only arise, firstly, because the Russians were confident that they were perfectly capable of defending themselves in the Kursk salient, whilst at the same time they might be driving home their onslaught against Orel : secondly,

because the Germans would not recognize that the Russians had organized new well-trained armies, possessed new equipment, whilst they had developed new methods of warfare. So this situation, unique in the annals of war, went on until by the last week of July the Germans were compelled to abandon their obstinate efforts round Kursk.

But even then the Germans did not desist from this battle altogether of their own free will. They were driven to take this decision by Russian pressure. Not only were the Russians continuing their efforts against Orel, but from July 15 onwards they had also been feeding their counter-attacks with reinforcements on the Byelgorod front with a view to reducing those gains which the Germans had wrested from them in the first few days of their offensive. Then, lastly, on July 18, the Russians went over to the offensive in the Donetsk basin along the River Mius. Thus the Germans had no less than three major battles on their hands simultaneously; and this situation they were called upon to face after they had organized their great stroke only against the central of these three active sectors. Their difficulties were obvious and grew apace. The terrific expenditure of troops, tanks and munitions in the first days of the Kursk battles were penalizing them heavily. They could no longer hope to parry these three Russian offensives at once. Their lengthy lines of communication, the long sparse railway lines, the guerilla activity, all added to the disadvantages under which they laboured. Still, in spite of these pitiless facts, the Germans could not, would not, acknowledge the truth. In this spirit they had fought violently to check the Russian progress at Byelgorod until the Russian High Command on July 23 could, with perfect truth, announce that they had recaptured the entire ground which the Germans had taken from them earlier in the month.

Likewise the Russians were making slow but sure progress in their drive on Orel. From both north and east their advance towards the city never faltered, even though progress might be slow. Yet if this were slow it

was obvious that there was method in the Russian plans, that they were relying on their superior artillery to reduce German strong-points rather than sacrifice hundreds of lives in such enterprises. So on July 20 Mtsensk was occupied. Two days later Bolkhov was captured. Another two days on it was the turn of Zmienka, to the south of Orel. The attack had by this time become concentric. On August 2 the Russians had reached Znamenskoye, on the outskirts of the city. Two days later they at length penetrated into Orel, when after a violent struggle in the streets they were finally left in full occupation of the city on the afternoon of August 5.

On that same day the Russians had also entered the town of Byelgorod. Thus the battles of Kursk could be said to have become definite German defeats of the first rank.

At length the German General Staff began to appreciate the true facts of the case, although the Führer's Headquarters could not bring themselves to take the inevitable step called for by the situation. Some time later the military expert of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* stated his recognition of the situation quite plainly; and this opinion had obviously been that of the German General Staff:

"The aim of the Russian strategy is to bring about the break-up of the German front at several points, especially in the south. In this process the Ukraine and the Donetz basin are to be regained not only for military but also for political and economic reasons. The general pattern of the operation resembles that of last winter's campaign. After a series of attacks delivered at various points along a very wide front, these being designed to bewilder and scatter the German reserves, the main and very heavy blows are launched against the sectors where a decisive success is desired. Such was the strategic conception of last winter: here now it is found once more. On this occasion the Russians have selected the Ukraine as their chief focal point of attack. The first step was, therefore, the elimination of all danger from the direction of Orel."¹

Still the Russian advance in the Donetz basin proved less spectacular, though constant in its pressure on the Germans and in the occasional intensity of the fighting. No startling result was achieved, since the Germans meant to defend their conquests tenaciously whilst the

¹ September 6, 1943.

Russians could scarcely afford to divert great strength to such an eccentric scene of operations. Yet although the Germans were, for economic reasons, most loth to give up this territory, they were, nevertheless, making ready to wreck the coal mines and all the industrial installations in case of their being forced to abandon the district.

Not for an instant were the Russians prepared to rest satisfied with their successes at Orel and Byelgorod. On the very morrow of their entering either town they began to move forward once more. From Byelgorod their advance by now already on its way towards Kharkov, while on August 6 they were heading due westward from Orel on the road to the important railroad junction of Karachev. At the same time, a fierce if lesser battle was fought to the east of Smolensk which is worthy of description since it affords a clue to a great part of the fighting along the entire front during this period. In fact it may be taken as a sample of the entire fighting that took place during the German withdrawal. To the west of Vyazma on August 6 the Russians, after a violent bombardment of several sectors of the German front, attacked with somewhat weak forces. These obtained no success. So on the next day, after a more violent artillery preparation, a renewed effort was made by several divisions supported by tank brigades. The attack was met by fire from every single artillery piece on the German side. This brought the Russian advance to a halt. Then by gradual and patient efforts they renewed their attacks on either flank, a proceeding which owing to their having now obtained some considerable numerical superiority they could well afford to do. Gradually success came their way and the enemy thereupon retreated. The Germans ascribed this failure to Russian numerical superiority. But why? After all, Clausewitz himself had stated that the height of strategic skill in war is to assemble the necessary superiority of troops and weapons at that point where a decision appeared most desirable! It is difficult to reconcile these constant German lamentations as to the unending Russian superiority of numbers with their own claims as to the peerless quality

of the German troops and the unbounded excellence of German generalship.

There seemed no end to the Russian resources or their versatility. Following the principles of Foch's strategy of 1918, they next planned two subsidiary attacks which were intended to keep the German reserves in uncertainty as to the more likely points of heavy attack. The first of these moves was made on August 10 and originated on the Vyazma front, whilst the second headed in the direction of Kharkov, but diverged towards Zenkov, which in fact was captured on August 20.

Throughout the first three weeks of August the Russians may be said to have advanced methodically and slowly at several points along the entire front, from White Russia to the Black Sea, in spite of the fact that the Germans were clearly doing their utmost to hold up this inexorable pressure ; but in vain. Up to a point the fighting continued to be severe at several points ; yet it never came to a major battle, while it never affected the general nature of the operations. The Russian progress was everywhere slow but sure. Finally, as though their numerous attacks were not enough to distract the attention of the German General Staff, the Russians launched yet another attack, this time a somewhat minor effort, on the Sievsk sector. Nevertheless, the general trend of the various Russian offensives was always subordinated to the maintenance of the two main powerful thrusts, one moving from Orel in the direction of Bryansk, the second advancing through Byelgorod on Kharkov.

It was noticeable that in the case of the latter city the Russian advance seemed more inclined to surround Kharkov than to deal with it by direct assault. By such a manœuvre yet another point, too, was being threatened ; this time it was the important centre of Poltava. Thus, on August 12, Cherguyev fell to the Red Army. On the 15th the troops heaping for Bryansk entered Karachev. Fighting of a heavy nature flared up on the 18th when the Germans made a determined effort to bar the road towards Kharkov. But the Russians countered this attack by their capture of Zmiev on the River Donetz.

On the 20th they entered Lebedin to the north-west of Kharkov. Finally, on the 23rd, the first Russian troops penetrated into Kharkov itself. This event, though seemingly only a single step in a great Russian advance, seems to have exerted considerable influence on the course of the campaign; this for two reasons. Firstly, it convinced the German High Command that the time had come to order a rapid withdrawal of the entire German forces in the Donetz basin, in the Ukraine and in White Russia. For owing to its situation and its control of road and rail communications, Kharkov might have been recognized as a centre of the first rank. Secondly, it proved to both the German and the Russian General Staff that in fighting ability the Red Army was now the equal and in some ways superior to the German *Wehrmacht*, even when every allowance had been made for all possible numerical superiority of the Russians. It justified to the hilt a bolder Russian strategy.

Not a single German report, be it official *communiqué*, press report or radio commentary, would now cease lamenting the inexhaustible masses of men produced by the Russians in every battle, from Smolensk to the Sea of Azov. To these hordes of barbarians from the East were attributed all the German misfortunes. The German press spoke of them as if they were the proverbial rabbits extracted from his silk hat by the conjuror at a children's party. It all seems so strange after the grandiloquent German *communiqués* of 1941. Moreover, this overwhelming numerical and material superiority of the Russian forces was always tempered by the addition of the stupendous losses claimed to have been inflicted on the Red Army as the result of the incomparable superiority of the individual German soldier as well as of the superb quality of German leadership. Thus, according to the *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*, the Russians had now engaged more than 300 divisions, 25,000 aircraft and 16,000 tanks in this offensive. In the two months of July and August indeed the Germans claimed to have inflicted on their enemy over 600,000 fatal casualties—a matter of 10,000 per day!

On the other side the figures so constantly quoted by the Russians as to huge German losses may be assumed to have been compiled in moods of varying optimism. At times indeed these totals distinctly savour of exaggeration. Still, it is only fair to the Russians to allude to statements such as those made by neutral journalists conducted over the battlefields around Kharkov in August. According to their descriptions these resembled a vast, limitless cemetery of German war material. Not a road that was not lined with wrecked German tanks or lorries ; not a field that was not dotted with demolished German artillery. Even the gutters along the roads were choked with German rifles and small arms of every kind.

The fall of Kharkov may be said to have marked a radical change in the character of the campaign, at least on the German side. Owing to the gigantic losses in men and material suffered since July 5 the Germans were being compelled to give up all thought of engaging in further actions of so costly a nature, at any rate until they could find new reserves of men and material. Accordingly, they continued to expedite the evacuation of the Donetz basin and the Ukraine and to withdraw, certainly in the first instance as far back as the line of the River Dnieper. From the Pripet marshes down to the great dam of Zaporozhe the river was to serve as an approximate limit of withdrawal. From Zaporozhe to the sea, through Melitopol, a strongly fortified line must serve to hold the Russian advance. It was not to be a retreat but a methodical withdrawal. But how far the withdrawal was intended to be taken is by no means clear ; it was never made known. When, on September 10, after a lengthy silence, Hitler addressed the German people, he referred to the Eastern Front only in a cursory manner : "Tactical necessities . . . may now compel us to yield something."

Thereupon all German radio commentators and the entire apparatus of propaganda redoubled their efforts to extol the excellence of the new German system of "elastic defence." The superb qualities of the German

soldier were the sure foundation of success to be obtained by the new tactical methods. Everything was done to give the world to believe that a remarkable military manoeuvre was afoot. "Space as a weapon" became the text for every military critic. General Dittmar brought his unrivalled historical knowledge to bear on the lessons to be drawn from campaigns of Frederick the Great in which the Prussian King had withstood all Europe in arms—and had emerged triumphant.

But no official pronouncement on the subject was given out until an Army Order of the German High Command, dated September 17.

The summary of the reasons given therein for this grave decision are these: the shortening of the front had been undertaken in order to provide for a strategic reserve. This was inevitable owing to the following causes: heavy casualties incurred during two years' struggle with the Red Army, the activities of the guerillas, increasing claims made on the *Luftwaffe* arising out of the air defence of the home territory, Germany's desertion by European allies, serious dangers looming up in the south and south-west of Europe, the growing threat of Allied landings in the north and west of the Continent, unquenchable unrest in subjected territories. Truly this was tantamount to an admission of great and growing weakness!

The official Nazi press then sought to comfort the German public:

"Those who carefully examine the situation, as it has now been left after fifteen weeks of battle¹ must take note of the extent of the evacuated regions. They will then realize how far forward the German national frontier still lies in every country, while they will console themselves with the great fact that the fighting front is now shortened by some hundreds of kilometres. The military critic will readily grasp the number of divisions which have thus been economized to be placed to the account of a general reserve. That indeed is a wonderful result now that events in the south are claiming German reinforcements. Even so enough reserves remain in the east to meet the call of any major counter-offensive when this is sounded; and such a call must come. . .

"Almost more exacting than the struggle against the Red Army, moreover, had been the transport to the front of the necessary war material and of the troops' subsistence over the sparse and inadequate lines of communication. The German people had been called upon to make very great sacrifices in order to eliminate all those difficulties and the friction that was perpetually being created all along these lines of supply. This friction will now be reduced: especially in the matter of wear and tear of locomotives, tracks of vehicles, motors. The armies will be better supplied with munitions, food, and motor fuel than at the beginning of this summer." What a confession!

To return to the last week of August. The first fruits

¹ *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 26, 1943.

of this policy of withdrawal were not slow in maturing. By August 30 the River Mius had been crossed by the Russians into the Donetz basin and Taganrog, on the Sea of Azov, had been captured. Although the Germans proclaimed loudly that the town had been evacuated, the Russians stoutly maintained that they had destroyed four German divisions as they sought to withdraw from the place.


In the meantime, if the Germans were steadily trying as far as possible to evade any major battle owing to their shortage of men and arms, this desire did not prevent them from making the most determined efforts to avoid suffering another *débâcle* in the nature of their Sixth Army's destruction round Stalingrad.

So in order to cover the left flank of the withdrawal of their armies from the Donetz, the Germans had already organized a formidable defensive position in the form of a pyramid. The apex lay at Kharkov, while one side, the north-western, followed the railway embankment stretching to Poltava, whilst its north-eastern side lay mainly between Murafa and Morefa. Even after the loss of Kharkov, it was in this position that the Germans proposed to protect the flank of their Donetz forces in their withdrawal. The position was strong. The Russians, however, planned to undermine it by attacking it strongly from the base in the region of Poltava and frontally at its apex. But the obstacles in the way of any strong attack against Poltava were many and it took a long time before Poltava fell.¹ By that time the German Donetz basin armies had mostly managed to withdraw. On September 2 the Russians had entered Lisichansk and Voroshilovsk. Finally, on September 8, they entered the great industrial centre of Stalino.

Elsewhere the Russians were following the withdrawing Germans along the entire front. West of Kursk they made good progress; on September 2 Sumy was recovered; on the 6th came the turn of Konotop; on the 9th they occupied Bakhmach. All the time the Germans kept on withdrawing methodically; and so

¹ This event took place on September 23.

Russian progress continued unchecked all along the front. Both sides continued reporting heavy fighting; the *communiqués* on both sides descanted upon the huge losses being suffered by the enemy. But maybe these.



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THE SMOLENSK-BRIANSK-KONOTOP SECTORS, SEPTEMBER 1

totals were mainly intended as propaganda—*pour épater le bourgeois*.

Before the middle of the month it had grown obvious that the Russians intended to advance with all possible speed so as to reach the line Smolensk-Pripet marshes-Kiev on the centre of their entire front. Once they should have touched the Pripet marshes they would virtually have

split the German front in two parts, particularly in respect of the rail communications linking the two wings of that front.

And this programme seemed likely to be carried out to the letter. But a remarkable feature of this Russian advance through the Ukraine is that the Germans should show so little inclination to contest their progress towards the city of Kiev. Many forced marches, much manœuvring, bitter rear-guard actions took place. Yet it is difficult to believe that the actual fighting was ever conducted by any but lesser forces. So on September 15 the Russians were able to occupy Nezhin; on the 20th they entered Priluki and next day Chernigov. These places all fell, so it was reported, after a bitter fight, yet without being fiercely contested. Nevertheless, should Kiev fall into Russian hands, it was difficult to see how the Germans would be able to save the line of the River Dnieper. The question arises, did they really mean to hold that line? The mystery remains to be solved.

Whatever the official *communiqués* of both sides might be publishing concerning this German withdrawal, there is indeed every reason to doubt whether any truly major or even more modest battle took place except on a very few occasions. Information concerning this whole period is most inconclusive. The Russian advance varied considerably from day to day, and their rate of progress is the only satisfactory indication of the course of events throughout the withdrawal. Whenever the Russian rate of progress amounted to as much as 6, 8, 10, 12, or as much as 15 miles in a day, it may be assumed that the fighting was brief or light or virtually lacking; the contrary reasoning would hold good where no advance was announced over a period of one, two or more days. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to ascribe this circumstance wholly to the degree of opposition offered by the Germans. The difficulties in the way of a massed Russian pursuit, enhanced by the skill in effecting demolitions of the German Army, may have contributed largely to save the latter from being severely handled during their withdrawal to the River Dnieper.

In fact this question of the Russian communications and the condition of the railways, as left by the Germans, must have largely dictated the Russian speed of march. Amid this uncertainty, the surprising fact stands out that even the great and all-important German bases of Kiev and Smolensk should have been occupied by the Russians without any great or prolonged battle.

That the Russians, as much as the Germans, were anxious to avoid casualties at this period is more than probable. Possibly they could not maintain sufficient numbers on the actual fighting front to risk any such loss. An extract from an official Russian report dealing with the battle of Kharkov illustrates the point.

"Shaposhnikov [the Chief of the Russian General Staff] realized quite clearly that the Germans had not the slightest chance of maintaining their hold on Kharkov. The vast losses of material which the German armies had suffered during the previous weeks must sooner or later tell their tale. Hence the reason why the Russian High Command could afford not to press home infantry and tank attack on Kharkov. Had they done so they might easily have gained possession of the city a few days sooner than they actually did. But by going more slowly they avoided countless casualties. Herein lies the true significance of the fall of Kharkov, which thus stands out in yet sharper contrast to the prodigal methods employed by the Germans in their attempts to take Stalingrad. It is permissible to emphasize how very low was the casualty list which the Russians incurred when they had at length taken Kharkov. The consequences of this true economy of force were felt immediately after the fall of the city. The Russian armies, which had not been weakened by its capture, were able to continue their march without a halt. Close on 400,000 men were thus rendered available for the ensuing operations."

In fact it may be asserted that unless the Russian commanders could see a true possibility of bringing the Germans to a decisive battle which would end greatly to the material advantage of the Red Army, they were content to drive back the enemy without his finding a chance of scoring a decided success against any isolated fraction of the Russian forces. They knew that the campaign was now set for a truly great Russian victory. In fact, in view of the damaged communications which the Russian armies were finding before them in their advance, the Russian commanders were fully justified in such an attitude by the subsequent course of the campaign. In the meantime the Russian *communiqués* and numerous

special orders of the day were making full use of this priceless opportunity—and right well had the Russian troops deserved all these artillery salvoes and rewards!

It is difficult to find any expression which adequately describes this great operation of war—namely the German withdrawal and the Russian pursuit. All Russian accounts are insistent on the fact that this German rearward movement was not voluntary, but forced upon them by Russian action. That is unquestionably true; in that sense the withdrawal was a defeat or, better still, the consequences of the total German failure to obtain a victory round Kursk, followed by the brilliant Russian success won round Orel, Byelgorod and in the Donetz basin. On the other hand, the absence of any major battle during the withdrawal—although there undoubtedly occurred numerous minor severe encounters—the display of effective tactics employed by the Germans, the absence of any large haul of German prisoners to be announced by the Russians, these are all facts that point to a not unsuccessful rearward German movement. True, the Russians could claim much captured war material, but such booty, it may well be, was mainly equipment abandoned by the Germans in a damaged or unserviceable condition. If it be admitted that the withdrawal had been an obligatory, and indeed an inevitable, consequence of many severe defeats, then that description of the operation may be assumed as approximating to the truth. In this manner, during the latter part of September, the Russians were able to capture Bryansk on the 17th; Smolensk and Roslavl on the 25th. On the 26th they reached the eastern bank of the Dnieper below Kiev, as well as many other points further downstream; on the 27th they were coming to Dniepropetrovsk; on the 29th they had seized Kremenchug; on the 30th in the central front they crossed the River Sozh and had taken Krichev.

In the meantime the Russians had also been pressing the Germans on the Kuban peninsula. As early as September 16 they captured the Black Sea port of Novorossisk. Then about the 24th their progress grew

more rapid ; on the 23rd they took Anapa ; on the 27th Temryuk had been occupied.

In the end the Germans appear to have been able to evacuate most of their troops and material from the Donetz basin without undue losses. Between the fall of Stalino on September 8 and the fall of Poltava on September 23, and then again the arrival of the Russians at Kremenchug and Dniepropetrovsk on September 26-27, troop movements westwards would appear to have continued mostly undisturbed by the Russians. Insufficient evidence on this head is forthcoming to state the true conditions of this retreat. By the end of September, so it may be assumed, German withdrawal was generally reaching the line of the River Dnieper and the fortified zone extending from the apex of the river bend to the Sea of Azov. The Russians, in the face of difficult transport conditions, in spite of finding their road and rail communications in a state of chaos and destruction, had accomplished a truly remarkable feat in thus following up their retreating enemy. Their railway troops and their railway personnel had literally performed wonders.

It was now the moment for the weather to break and the Russian country-side to lapse into the state of mud and slime normal at this time of year. As early as September 20 reports from Berlin seemed to be anxiously emphasizing the approach of the first autumn rains—not without a sense of eager expectation. Yet even when these rains materialized no check seemed to slow down the Russian advance. Maybe such a calculation of the possible effects of rain on the Ukrainian country had been the reason why the Germans had left so vague the probable line on which their withdrawal was to be halted. But the Russian High Command had not shown, and did not now show, the slightest intention of calling a halt to their advance merely as the result of a change in weather. Their confidence was based on the sure knowledge that they had organized their forces for the maintenance of offensive action throughout the year at all costs and through every climatic vicissitude. To that end they had distributed their man-power into three echelons, as



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had already been demonstrated in their previous summer and winter offensives.

In the first instance there stood the "summer" armies armed, equipped, and clothed for all natures of fighting that the Red Army might be called upon to undertake

between May and October. In the second place there came the "winter" armies, these being armed, equipped and clothed to meet the exigencies of the Russian winter. It was on the latter armies that had fallen the brunt of the fighting during the second battle for Moscow in 1941-42 and again in the winter campaigns of 1942-43. These armies were armed with special tanks and artillery, all painted white; they comprised numerous regiments of ski-troops; whilst—most important item of all, perhaps—their transport was specially designed to cope with winter conditions.

But in between these seasons, as the experiences of 1942-43 had shown, it was necessary to have recourse to another type, namely of "intermediate" armies, that is troops specially armed and equipped to meet the conditions of rain, mud and thaw that might prevail in western Russia from March to May and again from September to November. These armies comprised all the Russian Cossack cavalry divisions, whilst they were mainly furnished with horsed transport, since it was these more old-fashioned arms which were best adapted to work during the period of universal mud and ruined road surfaces.

The Germans, on the other hand, had virtually given up cavalry in favour of motorized troops, and so they had been forced to extemporize horsed transport units to meet the horrors of the Russian season of mud. The Russians were thus prepared to meet the adverse conditions of autumn roads, ground and weather far better than their enemy; so much so that they might even welcome a change that must give them a considerable military advantage.

Moreover, the Russians had gone far beyond this point in organizing their relief armies. The "summer" army, which has been credibly stated to have numbered over three and a half million men during 1943, had been distributed among three equal reliefs, of which never more than one relief would be actually fighting in the front line at any one moment, unless the second relief might be called upon to play the part of a "strategic

reserve" at any time of great crisis. The most interesting point in this organization is the fact that the armament of the first relief would be handed over on the spot, as it stood, to the second relief when the latter came up for its spell of duty. Renewals of material, moreover, would be despatched straight to the front, whereas repairs and exchanges of damaged arms would be carried out by the second relief, i.e. the troops awaiting their turn of duty behind the front. The third relief would be resting and, even possibly engaged in training. New units would be inserted in the second and third reliefs. By such an organization and method of supply the mobility of the whole army is said to have gained very greatly. It is also possible that the two rearward reliefs might be employed on restoring communications, but on this subject no information can be said to be forthcoming.

By instituting such a system of reliefs and of "seasonal" armies, the Russians had thus fully prepared to meet the peculiar nature of the new type of battle which this war was bringing into being. This form of "intermittent" or "recurring" battle¹ indeed had grown into a well-marked characteristic of the summer campaign of 1943. It was the fruit of the limitless war that was being waged by armies numbering millions over the immense plains and open spaces of Russia. Under such conditions a battle had long ceased to be the short, sharp, final climax of the Napoleonic epoch. Neither did such protracted actions have so much in common with the long-drawn-out struggles of 1914-18. In Russia movement and fighting, which might be the normal component elements of a single combat, might alternate over a space of days or weeks in a manner that was unknown in the first world war. A battle might open suddenly, maybe, in the old-fashioned way; but then it might drag on and on over an unforeseeable length of time. It was surely the very antithesis of the conception of the German *Blitzkrieg*.

¹ This is also called the "chain battle"—on the analogy of the cigarette addict's mode of smoking—in an excellent article published in *La France Libre*, for November 1943. The writer has freely used this article.

Moreover, if the organization of the *Wehrmacht* was not so well adapted as that of the Red Army to face such a situation as was now arising, this also held good of its armament. In this respect, as the Russians themselves expressed it, the Germans were being caught in their own snare—or, to use the old phrase—were being hoist with their own petard. Since 1935 the entire equipment and tactics of the *Wehrmacht* had been calculated on a basis not only of pure offence but it had also been designed almost solely to deal the lightning stroke of the *Blitzkrieg*. Everything had been sacrificed to that end. Consequently, the whole structure of the Army had centred round the fierce and heavy tank attack. So the tank had become the radial centre, in fact the very soul, of the German Army. Now, that system of warfare had answered admirably so long as it could secure the advantages of surprise and make felt the full weight of its first impact. Yet even in the winter battles before Moscow in 1941-42 the tank had been losing a little of its efficacy. The quick, far-reaching lunges, so effective in Poland and France and before Smolensk, were giving place to the driving of more modest "wedges" into the enemy's front. Then, to counteract the increasing weaknesses of tank warfare there had come the armoured square, the *mot-pulk* of 1942. Nevertheless, the doubtful success of this expedient had only served to encourage the Germans to design bigger and better tanks. So the process went on until the "Tiger" tank of 1943, with its 60-ton weight and 4 inches of head-on armour, had been produced. They could not shake themselves free of the obsession of the tank.

The Russians had proceeded on other lines. They had laboured unceasingly to evolve a whole system of anti-tank defence by which to defeat every form of German armoured attack. The process had conduced, among other things, to the re-armament, expansion and reorganization of the Russian artillery. The results had been made plain to the world in those savage battles that took place round Kursk in early July, 1943.

An analogous process had been at work in the air. For years before the outbreak of war in 1939 the Germans

concentrated all their energy and resources towards the production of the dive-bombing aeroplane—and that in spite of the proved vulnerability and many other defects of this machine. But it was pre-eminently the weapon of the *Blitzkrieg*, so they thought it must be good. When war broke out and as long as the Germans enjoyed the full benefits of surprise and aerial preponderance, the dive-bomber could carry all before it—as it may still do under given conditions. But in Russia things slowly began to take a different turn. After the German capture of Sebastopol in 1942, where the dive-bomber found a cheap and unrestricted field of action, matters altered considerably. The Russian fighters began to come into their own. The Germans began to feel a shortage of other aircraft models, until in 1943 the lack of more suitable types became more than acutely felt.

Similar conditions had affected the German infantry and other arms. Everything possible had been done by the Germans to augment the fire-power and the shock-power of their troops in attack. Even when they spoke of defence, of "Siegfried Lines," of "West Walls" and of the impregnable defences of Europe, they only considered all these structures and devices from the standpoint of gaining time or of acting as shelters to their troops until such a moment when their field formations should once more sally forth to the attack. The construction and nature of such works had done nothing to influence at all deeply the fundamental principles that had been observed in the armament and training of the *Wehrmacht*.

In 1943 the nature of the Russian advance combined with the undoubted tactical aptitude of the German troops to save the *Wehrmacht* from a catastrophe, and so to disguise the existence of this blemish of the German armament. And such a state of affairs could further conceal one possible moral weakness of the German soldier, namely that once he begins to lose faith in his own arms or in his leadership, his morale may begin to break, and possibly break rather badly. Was there not some hidden canker of this nature in the rot which overtook the German Army in Africa in 1943? In Europe,

on the other hand, their fanatical fighting capacity seems as yet unimpaired, while their resourcefulness remains remarkable.

Yet a final, if minor, result of the German withdrawal to the Dniéper is the birth of a legend that has since been growing up among the troops themselves. Every German soldier will now tell the same tale in such similar terms that it may be assumed to follow from a carefully studied system of propaganda emanating from higher authority. The German Army on the Eastern Front, it is averred, had been overwhelmed by hordes of half-trained barbarians drawn from the backwoods of Asia ; it had been swamped only by sheer weight of numbers. Here one single German battalion is said to have fought a whole division ; there one single German battery is reputed to have fired on till its last round was spent against a fearsome superiority of metal. At length the withdrawal was only ordered because of this crushing Russian superiority ; this grew so great that even the peerless *Wehrmacht* could not stand up against it. How those men have forgotten the boastful *communiqués* of 1941 ! "The destruction of whole Russian armies" ; "The appearance in battle of the last existing Russian reserves !" That matters little ; what does matter is that here we can trace the origin of a legend which in due course of time may come to replace the myth of the "undefeated" German Army of 1914-18.

2 : THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

While the German armies were retreating before the mighty blows of the Russian armies, the Government of the U.S.S.R. took an important, indeed, a momentous decision. On September 5 the following statement was broadcast from Moscow :

On Saturday (i.e., September 4), as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, received Metropolitan Sergius, *locum tenens* of the Patriarch's See, the Leningrad Metropolitan Alexey, and Nikolay, Metropolitan of the Ukraine. Molotov, vice-chairman of the Council, was present.

In the course of the interview the Metropolitan Sergius informed the chairman that the authoritative circles of the Orthodox Church had formed the intention of convening in the near future a conclave of bishops for the election of a Patriarch of Moscow and of all Russia, and for the

establishment of a Holy Synod. The head of the Government, Comrade J. J. Stalin, then stated on behalf of the Government that there would be no objection to this proposal.

In spite of earlier local persecution and subsequent discouragement of the Church by the Communist authorities in Russia, it had preserved much influence among the masses, especially the peasantry, and the clergy and laity alike had shown themselves good patriots and had done their duty as soldiers and more than their duty in the ranks of the partisan formations. During the years immediately preceding the war the organized attack on the Church by the "anti-God" organization had died down. It had become "bad form" to insult or deride Christians publicly for their beliefs. In the Army in particular such behaviour was discouraged. So though pro-religious propaganda was not permitted and no professing Christian could join the Communist Party, while the Government was still neutral rather than friendly, its chiefs had begun to recognize that popular opinion even among many unbelievers was averse to anything savouring of intolerance of the national form of Christianity. There was also a section of the Communist Party which believed that a controlled Church was less dangerous to Communism than a persecuted Church. It is possible that its counsels weighed with Stalin although that very shrewd dictator had always shown his readiness to respond to popular feeling outside as well as within the ranks of the Party.

The first Patriarch since 1935 and the first Holy Synod of Communist Russia were elected on September 8, when the Episcopal Assembly unanimously chose the Metropolitan Sergius to be Patriarch of All the Russias, and elected him with six Metropolitans to the Holy Synod. On September 19 the Archbishop of York, Dr. Garbett, arrived in Moscow. *The Times* had published the following explanation of his visit on September 16 :

"The Archbishop of York, accompanied by two other Anglican clergymen, is visiting the U.S.S.R. in order to communicate to the Russian Orthodox Church the profound sympathy felt for the Russian people at this time. He has gone there at the invitation of the Russian Orthodox Church, to further the relations between the Anglican and Orthodox Churches. No doubt he will meet the new Patriarch of All the Russias."

The Archbishop of Canterbury issued a statement on the relations between the two Churches on September 17. He said that the war of 1914-18 and its aftermath had made intercourse difficult for a time, but, he added,

"I was happy to exchange greetings with the Metropolitan of Moscow after my enthronement as Archbishop of Canterbury and in the spring of this year it seemed that the friendship between the two Churches could be served by an exchange of visits." It had therefore been arranged that the Archbishop of York should visit Moscow, taking with him a formal letter of greeting from the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Metropolitan, since elected and enthroned Patriarch, expressing "our sympathy with and admiration for the Church and people of Russia in the great trial through which they are passing," and "the unity of our two Churches in the service of our one Lord." The Archbishop of York would also express the hope that a delegation from the Russian Church would visit this country.¹

On September 20 the Archbishop of York met the Patriarch for the first time and on September 24 he announced that a Russian Church delegation had accepted an invitation to visit Britain. He left Moscow on September 28. The favour shown to the Orthodox Church had a favourable reaction at Jerusalem and, so far as was known, among the mainly Orthodox Balkan Slavs. It was not clear whether similar privileges would be allowed to other faiths and sects in Russia, e.g., the numerous Baptists, the Roman Catholics, the Moslems and the Jews. It was not certain whether pro-religious propaganda would be permitted and whether the Church would be given more educational freedom than it had been granted under Communism. It was easy to be cynical about the political aspects of the concession, but the cynics forgot that the step that Stalin had taken could not be easily reversed, and that whatever his motives may have been, it was plain that Christian belief was far more alive and active in Russia than most Left-Wing tourists had reported.

¹ The text of the letter of greeting, which was warmly and affectionately worded, was published on September 21.

CHAPTER IV

THE WAR IN THE WEST

I : THE WAR AT SEA

The Sixteenth Quarter of the War at sea was marked by the temporary but heavy defeat of the U-boats in the Atlantic. Towards its end they reappeared in some strength, but their withdrawal had not only given the United Nations a respite from the severe shipping casualties of previous months but it had also enabled them to train more naval crews and airmen for the defence of the life-line between Great Britain and the United States. Four statements made in July, August, September and October respectively told the story of their defeat in outline though not in detail.

On July 10 a statement was issued from No. 10 Downing Street. It began by announcing that in order to prevent the publication of unauthorized statements and rumours in Great Britain and the United States about the anti-U-boat war, it had been decided to publish a monthly statement approved by the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. The statement said that during June the losses of Allied and neutral merchant shipping had been the lowest since the United States entered the war, and that the losses from "all forms of enemy action"—a phrase obviously covering losses inflicted by enemy mines, aircraft and surface ships as well as by U-boats—were the lowest since the beginning of the war between Great Britain and Germany. Allied anti-submarine forces, whether ships or aircraft, had had less numerous targets of late but the number of sinkings of U-boats was "substantial and satisfactory." The heavy losses inflicted on them in May had resulted in the Atlantic convoys being almost unmolested in June. The merchant shipping of the Allied nations showed a net increase for every month in 1943 and large numbers of anti-submarine vessels and aircraft were being brought into service.

The promised monthly statement was issued on August 14 by the President and Mr. Churchill, after consultation with the Admiralty, the U.S. Navy Department and the Canadian Department of National Defence for Naval Services. It gave the following highly satisfactory account of the situation :

During July the U-boats met with but little success. The steady flow of supply across the Atlantic continued on the largest scale without molestation. Sinkings had been few and insignificant. July, indeed, was

probably the most successful month since the opening of the war, since imports were high, shipping losses "moderate" and U-boat losses heavy. There had been scarcely any interference with the great force of warships, transports, supply ships and landing craft which had passed through Atlantic and West Mediterranean waters before the invasion of Sicily. Since then large reinforcements had been landed in Sicily, again with little interference, and the total loss of shipping in the various stages of the great operation (wherein over 2,500 ships were engaged) only amounted to about 80,000 tons. Moreover, the efficiency of the U-boat crews was declining. In the first half of 1943 the number of ships sunk per U-boat engaged in operations was only half that recorded for the last six months of 1942 and only a quarter of that recorded for the months of January-June (both inclusive) in that year. During the current year new ships completed by the United Nations had exceeded losses from all causes by more than 3,000,000 tons. Over 90 U-boats had been sunk at sea during the three months, May 1-July 31, but the enemy still had important reserves of U-boats and it was therefore necessary to use shipping with the utmost economy.

The next monthly report was issued on September 10. It was most encouraging, since it showed that for the time, at least, the U-boats had virtually ceased to trouble the Allied communications in the North Atlantic. Its first three paragraphs ran :

"1. August has been another successful month in U-boat warfare. Owing perhaps to re-armament and other causes, there appear to have been fewer U-boats at sea than in recent months, and shipping losses have continued to decrease.

2. It is significant that the enemy made virtually no attempt to attack North Atlantic shipping, and opportunities for attacking the U-boats have been relatively few. Nevertheless, U-boats have been hunted relentlessly wherever they have appeared and a heavy toll has been taken of the enemy. In fact more U-boats have been sunk than merchant ships.

3. Surface and air forces have both contributed to this satisfactory month's work by the efficiency of their escorts, patrols and offensive operations. Shore-based aircraft have often had to face powerful enemy air opposition and carrier-borne aircraft have played a most important part."

The fourth paragraph of the statement announced the readiness of the Allied forces to attack the enemy with the utmost vigour, should he provide the opportunity.

But a still more important and encouraging statement was made to Parliament by Mr. Churchill in his review of the military situation on September 21. After dealing with the air warfare against the Reich and with the possibility that the Germans might try new weapons against our shipping, as their use of a new type of bomb indicated (*see* the next section of this chapter), he turned to the naval situation and what he described as "the

revolution effected in our position at sea." Since invasion had become so much more remote our greatest danger was the U-boat war on our communications and upon Allied shipping all over the world. This must be measured by three tests : first, the sinkings of our own ships ; secondly, the killings of the enemy U-boats ; and thirdly, the volume of new building. The great victory which had been won by our North Atlantic convoys and their escorts in May had been followed by "a magnificent diminution in sinkings." He continued :

"The monthly statements which are issued on the authority of the President and myself, and about which the Canadian Government, who contribute to the Battle of the Atlantic brave men, planes and escort vessels, are also consulted, deserve close attention. I have little to add to them to-day, but it is a fact that for the four months which ended on September 18 no merchant ship was sunk by enemy action in the North Atlantic. The month of August was the lowest month we have ever had since the United States entered the war, and it was less than half the average of British and Allied sinkings in the 15 months preceding the American entry into the war. During the first fortnight in this September no Allied ships were sunk by U-boat action in any part of the world."

This, said the Prime Minister, was altogether unprecedented in the whole history of the U-boat struggle in this war or in the last. Naturally, he did not suggest that this immunity was likely to continue. Indeed, during the last week or so a new herd of U-boats had been coming out into the Atlantic from their bases in France and Germany, no doubt fitted with what was considered the best and latest apparatus. One convoy was already being attacked. If they attacked, we had not been idle.

In spite of the reduced number of U-boats which had been engaged since "the May massacre," a day rarely passed without the destruction of one of these vessels. British and United States attacks on German bases and building yards and on the factories where the components of the U-boats were constructed had definitely reduced the rate of production in Germany. Equally "the high percentage of killings has affected the morale of the U-boat crews, and many of the most experienced U-boat captains have been drowned or are now prisoners. . . ."

Thirdly, said the Prime Minister, the output of new shipbuilding from the United States had fulfilled all that had been hoped from it, and more. We built our regular quota and the Canadian output had been quite remarkable. "The credit balance of new building over losses of all kinds, including marine risks, since the beginning of the year, the net gain, that is to say, exceeds 6,000,000 tons, and should the present favourable conditions hold we shall soon have replaced all losses suffered by the United Nations since the beginning of the war." The mounting achievement of United States shipbuilding had been shared generously with us. The favourable position now enjoyed had enabled a larger number of faster ships to be built and projected. We had taken advantage of the lull in the U-boat attack to bring in the largest possible convoys. We had thus replenished the reserves in these islands of all essential commodities, especially of fuel, "which is almost at its highest level since the outbreak

of the war, and we have substantial margins between us and what is called the danger level, on which level we have never touched even at the worst time." But this had not come about accidentally. It had been the consequence of astonishing efforts of industry and organization on both sides of the Atlantic and of the "hard, faithful and unwearying service" of our multitudes of escort vessels of all kinds. "Most of all, so far as last year is concerned, it is the result of the startling intervention of the long-range aircraft of the British Empire and the United States and especially of our Coastal Command."

Besides this the large numbers of auxiliary aircraft-carriers now coming into service enabled us to give a measure of protection to convoys and to conduct aggressive operations against U-boats in those ocean spaces "which are beyond the range even of the very long-range aircraft, the V.L.R.'s as they are called, of the two countries." He repeated his warning that no guarantee could be given of a continuance of these favourable conditions but, he added, "I will go so far as to say that we could only be defeated by the U-boats if we were guilty of gross neglect of duty in the shipyards and on the sea, and of an inexcusable falling-off in that scientific and technical ability . . . which has hitherto stood us in good stead." The Prime Minister closed the naval portion of his survey with a eulogy of the officers and men of the Merchant Navy, "whose losses have been in greater proportion than those of the Royal Navy," men on whom the nation had never called in vain, and the observation that the more ships we had, the more we seemed to want.

The joint statement for September was issued on October 10. The Germans, who had armed their U-boats with more powerful A.A. guns, had published on September 24 an inaccurate and grossly exaggerated account of the attack on the convoy to which Mr. Churchill had referred. They claimed to have sunk 12 destroyers and to have torpedoed three more which probably sank and to have sunk nine cargo steamers and damaged two others with torpedoes. The statement ran thus :

"During the third week in September no Allied merchant ship was lost by German U-boat attack. Then on September 19 the U-boats ended the four months' lull in the North Atlantic, and a pack of at least 15 U-boats concentrated on a west-bound convoy.

"The combat lasted four and a half days. The loss of three escort vessels has already been announced. A small number of merchant ships were sunk, but as a result of vigorous counter-attacks by the surface and air escorts a larger number of U-boats were sunk or damaged.

"In spite of the increase in U-boat activity at the end of the month, the average merchant ship losses from all causes in September and August together are the best record of the war. Nevertheless, this resumption of pack tactics is evidence of the enemy's intention to spare no efforts to turn the tide of the U-boat war, and the utmost exertion and vigilance will be required before its menace is finally removed."

The warships lost in this action were the Canadian destroyer *St. Croix* (Lieut.-Commander A. H. Dobson),

from which there was but a single survivor, the frigate H.M.S. *Itchen* (Acting-Commander C. E. Bridgman), and the corvette H.M.S. *Polyanthus* (Lieutenant J. G. Aitken). More than half the nine officers and 146 men of the Royal Canadian ship *St. Croix* who lost their lives had already been picked up by H.M.S. *Itchen* when she was torpedoed in her turn. According to a message from "an east coast Canadian port" published by *The Times* on October 2, six merchant ships were torpedoed and 150 survivors, including Norwegian and American seamen, were landed. Many had been injured.

Few details of the encounters between the U-boats and their pursuers were released during these three months.

On July 30 the Admiralty described the destruction of two U-boats in the North Atlantic by an escort group of sloops commanded by Captain F. J. Walker in H.M.D. *Starling*, which rammed one of the submarines. The sloops *Woodpecker*, *Wren*, *Wildgoose* and *Kite* were also engaged in the action. They were commanded respectively by Lieut.-Commanders R. E. Hugonin, R. M. Aubrey, D. E. G. Wemyss and W. F. Seagrave. On August 4 the Admiralty and Air Ministry in a joint announcement described how a force of from 25 to 30 U-boats concentrated against a North Atlantic eastbound convoy were subjected to such relentless assaults by surface escorts of the Royal Navy and aircraft of Coastal Command that the enemy failed to launch a single attack on a large and valuable convoy. The action began when a *Liberator* sighted three U-boats on the surface, engaged one and sank it. The convoy escort under the command of Commander P. Gretton in H.M. destroyer *Duncan* was informed of the position of the other two. During the search the frigate *Tay* (Lieut.-Commander R. E. Sherwood) and the corvette *Snowflake* (Lieut. H. G. Chesterman) sighted two U-boats, and the *Snowflake* may have destroyed one. Two more U-boats were driven off by the corvettes *Pink* (Lieut. R. Atkinson) and *Sunflower* (Lieut.-Commander J. Plomer).

"Meanwhile about 15 miles away from the convoy, look-outs in the crow's-nests of the frigates *Wear* (Commander E. Wheeler) and *Jed* (Lieut.-Commander R. C. Freaker) sighted two U-boats travelling towards the convoy. As both ships altered course and proceeded towards the enemy at full speed one of the U-boats fired torpedoes. They passed harmlessly between the frigates." Both U-boats submerged but H.M.S. *Jed* and the cutter *Sennen* (Lieut.-Commander F. H. Thornton) regaining contact with one, carried out a sustained counter-attack until "muffled under-water explosions" and the appearance of oil and wreckage on the surface justified confidence that the enemy had been destroyed. Some 20 U-boats were still in contact with the convoy but five attacks by *Liberators* forced them to turn away. Just before dawn two more were driven off by the *Jed* and *Spey* (Commander H. G. Boys-Smith). During the following day more U-boats were driven off by five more attacks by the *Liberators* and on the second night two were forced to dive quickly. On the third day the enemy made no further attempt. The Coastal Command aircraft taking part in the action were drawn from five "R.A.F. squadrons commanded

by Wing-Commanders G. C. G. Bartlett, R. D. Williams, R. M. Longmore, R. E. G. van Kiste, R. B. Thomson, P. E. Hadow, and from an R.C.A.F. squadron commanded by Wing-Commander F. J. Rump."

The Americans showed no less vigour in their defence of the Atlantic life-line. On July 16 the Navy Department announced a successful attack by aircraft from a small carrier on a pack of U-boats, in the course of which two U-boats were certainly destroyed, ten more were "probably destroyed" and 41 German prisoners were taken. Already Admiral Lutzow had enlarged in a broadcast (July 7) on the increasing difficulties facing the U-boat commanders and admitted that "the enemy at present has the upper hand." The Allies, he said, had left nothing untried. They had doubled the belt of protective vessels round the convoys; they directed these along lanes "kept under control" by aircraft which continuously increased in number and efficiency, and which operated from Greenland, Iceland and Newfoundland. A wide stretch of the Atlantic west of Europe and another east of America was watched by shore-based aircraft which, not content with observing the U-boats, attacked them too. The area in which the U-boats could operate was thus narrowed and the appearance of auxiliary aircraft-carriers accompanying the convoys was a further blow. Though the Admiral sought to comfort his audience by references to Germany's historic mission and prophecies that the situation would improve, his admissions must have been most dispiriting.

So the struggle went on. The U-boats hit back at times with effect. On September 12 the Air Ministry released a description of an action in which a Sunderland flying-boat of the R.C.A.F. in Coastal Command had been shot down in flames by a U-boat, but her commander, Flying Officer Bishop, had hit the submarine with a depth-charge just before she force-landed. Six of her crew survived, three seriously injured. Most of the U-boat's complement were captured. On September 28 the U.S. Navy Department told the story of the sinking of three U-boats within a few days by Lieut. R. P. Williams, flying an Avenger bomber.

No less than 66 prisoners were taken from the U-boats.

In September the German High Sea Fleet, which had been lurking in the protection afforded by the cliffs and minefields of the Alten Fjord, suddenly put to sea. The powerful battleship *Tirpitz*, and several other large ships, with seven destroyers, were sighted off Spitzbergen early on September 8 by the small Norwegian garrison. No further news was received from the Norwegians there, who were chiefly occupied in meteorological duties. The Germans boasted of having destroyed coal-mining and other installations after "overcoming strong resistance."

On September 24 the German official wireless broadcast news of an attack by British midget submarines seeking to penetrate "the Norwegian island area" which were caught and destroyed in time and some of their crews made prisoners. The attempt to emulate "the daring deed of Gunther Prien at Scapa Flow" had been a complete failure.¹ Not until October 11 did the Admiralty disclose the truth in the following statement :

"His Majesty's midget submarines have carried out an attack on main units of the German battle fleet in their protected anchorages in Alten Fjord, northern Norway, inflicting under-water damage on the battleship *Tirpitz*. This involved hazards of the first order.

The attack was made on September 22. . . . Insufficient evidence was available at that time to assess the result of the attack, as operations were still proceeding. Interrogation of crews of midget submarines which took part in the exploit, and subsequent photographic reconnaissance, now leave no doubt, despite enemy claims to the contrary, that the attack met with success. Air photographs taken after the attack show the *Tirpitz*, which has not moved from her anchorage, surrounded by thick oil which covered the fjord where she lay and extended over a distance of more than two miles from her berth. The photographs also show a number of small unidentified craft alongside the battleship, possibly repair ships or ships to provide power and light. Personnel who took part in the operation report that on September 22, while still in the immediate vicinity of the anchorage, they heard a series of very heavy detonations at the time expected for units to be attacking.

Three of his Majesty's midget submarines have so far not returned from these operations and must be presumed lost, but in view of the German claim of prisoners taken it is not unlikely that some of the personnel . . . are in enemy hands. . . .

To give some idea of the magnitude and difficulties of this remarkable

¹ The sinking of H.M.S. *Royal Oak*.

achievement, it must be remembered that Alten Fjord, in which the *Tirpitz* lay, was 1,000 miles from the nearest British base. The midget submarines were set the task of penetrating the highly defended base where the enemy ships had thought themselves safe. They had to pass through the minefields guarding the approaches to the anchorage, and after negotiating the intricate fjords, always vigilantly patrolled by the enemy, they had to carry out an attack in the strongly protected and confined waters where the ships were moored. Finally, to regain their base, the same obstacles had to be overcome.

The Admiralty considers that the crews of these midget submarines displayed the highest qualities of courage, enterprise and skill. The names of the commanding officers of the midget submarines which did not return from this very gallant enterprise, and who undoubtedly pressed home their attack to the full are :

Lieutenant D. Cameron,
Lieutenant H. Henty-Creer,
Lieutenant B. G. G. Place."

Other British naval losses during this period outside the Mediterranean and presumably in the Atlantic and neighbouring seas were H.M. submarine *P615* (reported July 29), commanded by Lieut. C. W. Lambert, the sloop *Egret* (Acting-Commander J. V. Waterhouse), reported September 3, and a trawler. The Americans lost the gunboat *Plymouth*, sunk by an under-water explosion off the North Carolina coast. It was not stated whether the submarine *Pickrel*, presumed lost on August 15, met her fate in these waters or in the Pacific.

There were many encounters between British and Allied and German light craft in the Channel and North Sea and many German light vessels and merchantmen were also damaged and some destroyed by air attack. Early on July 16 British and Norwegian light naval forces under Lieut. G. E. Baines met three German torpedo-boats escorted by R-boats 45 miles north-east of Ushant. We had a few casualties in the fight, in which a hostile torpedo-boat and an R-boat were probably sunk. The Germans admitted losing one ship. Vessels in a small escorted convoy were surprised off the Dutch coast early on July 17 by light coastal forces commanded by Lieut. D. G. Wright, and one merchant ship was probably sunk. In a fight off Gravelines on July 25 an E-boat was blown up and prisoners taken. Two attacks, off the Texel and Ymuiden respectively, during the night of July 24-25 damaged ships in convoy and some of their escorts. We had a few casualties. Our light forces engaged on this occasion were commanded by Lieutenants W. S. Strang, R. M. Marshall and P. G. C. Dickens. On July 27 there was an action off Cherbourg between light

naval forces commanded by Lieut.-Commander P. Scott and a dozen armed enemy trawlers and R-boats, in which honours appear to have been easy.

On August 4 light coastal forces under the command of Lieut.-Commander D. G. Probert engaged armed enemy trawlers off the Texel and inflicted damage. One of our ships was temporarily disabled but was nevertheless towed to her base. In September there were several sharp actions. Light forces commanded by Lieut.-Commander P. Scott engaged a number of armed mine-sweepers, later reinforced by heavily armed patrols, and returned safely, leaving one patrol vessel burning and having torpedoed another. We had slight casualties in this engagement, which was fought off the French coast. Norwegian light forces sank a 4,000-ton merchant ship off Kristiansund and engaged her escort on September 11, returning without loss, and two nights later, vessels under the command of Lieut. I. C. Trelawney attacked German patrol ships, torpedoed one and returned with one rating slightly wounded. Lieut.-Commander D. G. Bradford's force encountered a strongly escorted enemy supply ship off Ymuiden early on September 21 and planted two torpedoes in her. They also engaged the escort, leaving two trawlers on fire, and returned with slight losses to harbour.

The last week-end in September saw four actions in the narrow seas. Early on September 25 a German E-boat was twice rammed, then shot up and finally set ablaze and blown up off the east coast of England in a severe engagement in which we lost a trawler which the enemy torpedoed. Another group of E-boats was engaged at close quarters in conditions of bad visibility by a corvette and a destroyer and two were hit but the weather prevented full observation of the results of our fire. During the night of September 26 motor torpedo-boats of the Royal Netherlands Navy commanded by Lieut. E. H. Larive and supported by light coastal forces of the Royal Navy, under the command of Lieut. R. B. Rooper, intercepted a large and heavily escorted supply ship which he torpedoed. The Allied vessels all returned safely with but one casualty. Finally, on September 27 Lieut.-Commander P. Scott attacked three heavily-armed enemy patrol vessels off Havre early on September 27, blew one up, damaged another and left a third in flames. We had but one casualty, an officer slightly wounded. This was the last action reported during this most satisfactory quarter.

2: THE ALLIED AIR OFFENSIVE

The Anglo-American attack on German war industry and on the enemy's communications in the Reich and in the occupied countries was pursued with untiring energy throughout the quarter. These attacks wrought great destruction; they also shook the moral of the civil population in some areas, and they inflicted heavy losses on the *Luftwaffe*. It is true that the Allied Air Forces suffered heavily on several occasions, but the German

fighter squadrons were often terribly punished by Allied fighter sweeps over France and still more by the Flying Fortress and Liberator bombers of the 8th U.S.A.A.F. Late in the quarter it was stated by the neutral Press that the Americans had tried the experiment of sending bombers of these types carrying no bombs, but fitted instead with a still more powerful armament of cannon-guns and carrying a greatly increased quantity of ammunition, to escort the bombing machines. The volume and continuousness of their fire would enable them to play a part analogous to that of heavily armed warships supporting an attack by lighter craft. The R.A.F. persevered with marked success in their tactics of concentrating very heavy attacks in the shortest possible time, "cascades of bombs" of a tonnage far surpassing any quantity dropped at one time during the earlier stages of the war being unloaded in half an hour or less on chosen targets. Feint attacks or demonstrations were increasingly adopted to prevent the enemy from concentrating his night fighters in time for the defence of the attackers' real objective. Admirable work was done by the skilled and gallant pilots of the "Pathfinder" aircraft who led the way to the targets, dropping flares from low heights as they spotted their objectives to guide the airmen who followed them.

Notwithstanding their boasts of the impending employment of new weapons which would protect German industry effectively against Anglo-American raids, the Germans produced no new defensive weapons for this purpose during the quarter. Improved types of A.A. guns and ammunition came into service as they were doing elsewhere. The experiment of mounting a searchlight in the nose of a night-fighter was tried, but if it sometimes dazzled a bomber pilot or gave the fighter a target, it equally often gave the gunners of the illuminated aircraft a chance of shooting straight down the beam with deadly results. One tactical innovation was the employment of high-flying night-fighters to drop parachute flares over the expected "bombing run" of the attacking machines, thus exposing them to the view of other night-fighters at

a lower level. But in general the Germans met the attack by increasing the numbers, improving the equipment, and strengthening the armament of their fighters. On October 21 the Aeronautical Correspondent of *The Times* stated that it was believed that by then two-thirds of the *Luftwaffe's* fighters had been transferred to western and central Europe for defence against the Anglo-American attack; that less than a fifth remained on the Russian front; and rather more than one-ninth in the Mediterranean area. This would give the enemy a strength of perhaps 2,400 fighters in the west, including Germany, about 700 in Russia and perhaps 450 in the Mediterranean region. It was certain that since the spring the Germans had been concentrating on fighter production to the marked detriment of their bomber output.

Apart from new tactics and new dispositions of their strength the Germans were experimenting with new weapons and contrivances. They were said to have produced a new and excellent bomb-sight for use by dive-bombers. They certainly produced a "dirigible bomb," really a glider carrying a heavy charge of explosive and steered, it was said, up to a distance of five miles, by waves from a radio apparatus carried in a controlling aeroplane. While this contrivance was useless at night since the director of the apparatus could not then follow the course of the glider with accuracy, if at all, it could be used by day especially against ships lacking fighter cover. It was said to have done damage to merchant shipping and warships on more than one occasion in the Mediterranean, as Mr. Churchill, indeed, admitted in his review of September 21. Another contrivance was said by neutrals to have reached the experimental stage. This was a huge shell fired from a large cannon or mortar and then propelled by a series of rockets igniting successively in its tail so that it could travel as far as London from the French coast. It was said that this formidable engine of war was being tried out at the research works at Peenemünde, 60 miles north-west of Stettin. Although the stories about this weapon lost nothing in the telling, the British Government did not treat them with scepticism.

The following were the chief attacks delivered by the Allies on Germany and the occupied territories during the first three weeks of July. Losses of attacking aircraft are given within brackets.

The R.A.F. led off with a raid on the night of July 3 in which the Kalk and Deutz industrial areas of Cologne, Hamburg and the Ruhr were the targets (32). Mines were also laid on this and several subsequent raiding nights. On July 8 Cologne (8) was again raided by night, and on the following night Gelsenkirchen (10) and, according to the enemy, Essen, Barmen and Bochum in the Ruhr. After an interval of three nights the R.A.F. bombed Aachen (20) and, according to the enemy, hit the cathedral and did great damage to residential quarters. Our pilots, however, were certain that much destruction had been wrought in the industrial area of the city. On July 14 heavy bombers of the U.S.A.A.F. attacked Le Bourget by day making the aircraft factories and repair shops their principal target. They were heavily counter-attacked, but they inflicted a loss, placed at 45 machines, on the German fighters against their own loss of eight bombers and four of their fighter escort. On the night of July 15 the R.A.F. bombed the Peugeot motor works at Montbéliard, also in occupied France (7), and on July 16 they raided Munich. The Americans made another heavy daylight attack on July 17, this time selecting industrial districts near Amsterdam and factories in north-west Germany as their chief objectives. They scored many hits and they claimed to have disposed of over 50 German fighters against a loss of but two machines.

These raids were combined with frequent attacks on the enemy's airfields, shipping and railways in France and the Low Countries. Abbeville, Maupertus, St. Omer and Caen, airfields which had frequently attracted the attention of the R.A.F. during the past thirty months, were bombed and Poix, Amiens-Glisy and Villacoublay also suffered. Coastwise shipping and vessels in harbour at Cherbourg, Den Helder, and other ports were frequently bombed or strafed, and the bombing of railway junctions and the machine-gunning of rolling stock continued. At sea the R.A.F. damaged several minesweepers and trawlers, and sank or damaged ships in convoys off France and Holland. It was estimated that 42 hostile aircraft had been shot down in the sweeps and intruder operations undertaken by British, Dominion, American and other Allied fighter aircraft during these three weeks against a loss of 28 Allied machines.

The last week of July saw a great intensification of the Allied attack on industrial Germany. The principal target was Hamburg which was attacked seven times.

from the night of July 24 to that of July 29, both inclusive. In the first of this terrible series of raids a powerful force of R.A.F. bombers dropped 2,300 tons of bombs on the docks and shipyards in 50 minutes at a cost of 12 bombers. This operation, so to speak, "set the pace" for subsequent night attacks on the Reich's greatest port. Next day (July 25) was one of widespread air activity.

American "heavies" attacked stricken Hamburg by daylight and raided Warnemünde, an important centre of aircraft construction near Rostock, Kiel and the seaplane base at Wustrow. British and American fighters and light bombers shot up and bombed Woensdrecht aerodrome near Antwerp and Schiphol aerodrome near Amsterdam, while other bombers attacked aircraft factories at Amsterdam and other industrial objectives near Ghent. The attacks on the aerodromes were obviously designed to reduce interference with the American heavy bombers on their return from Hamburg and further east, and there and in the attacks on the Fortresses and Liberators many German fighters were destroyed or damaged. The Allies lost 19 heavy bombers and seven fighters.

That night the R.A.F. made the heaviest attack yet loosed against Essen (26) in which 2,000 tons of bombs were dropped. July 26 was marked by day attacks by the Americans on Hanover, Wilhelmshaven and Wesermünde in which some 50 German fighters out of a large force attempting interception at various points were shot down, many in flames. Hamburg was raided that day and again during the night of July 26-27, and yet again on the night of July 28, the sixth raid in 72 hours and the heaviest so far in which 2,300 tons of bombs were dropped in 45 minutes. The attack was repeated and the same weight of bombs dropped on the night of July 29. But Hamburg was not the only target in the last days of July, although it was their chief mark. The Kassel and Oschersleben aircraft factories were raided by day on July 28 when some 60 fighters were claimed by the U.S.A.A.F. against a loss of 24 machines. Kiel and Warnemünde were attacked next day. Kassel sustained a very heavy attack on July 30 when the Americans claimed 61 German fighters besides recording many hits on the Fieseler aircraft works and on the locomotive factories, and on the night of July 30 R.A.F. bombers hit the machine tool factories at Remscheid hard (17).

There were many raids and sweeps over France and the Low Countries during these days in which airfields, power stations, railways and shipping in harbour or steaming off the coast were attacked. The U-boat base at Trondheim and aluminium works at Heroya 65 miles south-west of Oslo were raided on July 24 when 17 enemy fighters were claimed. The enemy's fighter loss had indeed been serious. On August 1 it was announced that the American heavy bombers had certainly destroyed 500 of them during July and had "probably destroyed" 150 more, against 108 Flying Fortresses. During the period

July 23-31 over 10,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on German territory, a figure which was compared with the 5,000 tons dropped by the Germans in the period August 23-31, 1940, on British targets. From the opening of these concentrated attacks on the night of July 24 until the end of July, the Allies had lost 212 machines, mostly heavy bombers. Happily a large number of the crews of the missing aircraft were picked up at sea; indeed, no less than 101 British and American airmen were rescued from the North Sea during the 50 hours ending at nightfall on July 27.¹

The last attack of a terrific series and the 107th of the war on Hamburg was made by the R.A.F. on the night of August 2-3 (30). By this time great numbers of the foreign workmen employed in the port had bolted or had been allowed to leave by the authorities who could neither house nor feed them. Reports from neutral sources largely corroborated by photographic reconnaissances gave the extent of the area devastated in the city and the dockyard district at about 7,000 acres. Targets in the Ruhr and Rhineland were bombed on this and several subsequent nights during the first half of August, e.g. the factory at Bonn where precision instruments were made which was attacked on August 12.² Large-scale attacks were launched on the night of August 9 on Mannheim and Ludwigshafen (9) and on Nuremberg (16), where 1,500 tons of bombs were dropped on the following night. Berlin, after being attacked by Mosquitoes of the R.A.F. on the night of August 12, was bombed by heavier machines on the nights of August 14 and 15.

On August 17 a great force of Flying Fortresses set out to attack two important targets. Schweinfurt, 65 miles east of Frankfurt on the Main, one of the chief centres of the manufacture of ball-bearings, those most essential parts of every sort of moving machine from a typewriter to a tank, was one. The other was Regensburg in Bavaria where the aircraft works were the chief target. The attack on Schweinfurt encountered about 300 fighters. These were terribly mauled. The force sent to Regensburg made many hits on its target and though several American bombers were brought down, the Fortresses inflicted a heavy loss on the attackers and the majority reached North Africa safely. The Americans assessed the total German loss in the two air battles at the record total of 307 machines. These operations which marked the anniversary of the 8th U.S.A.A.F.'s first bombing of targets in the Reich were reported to have cost the Americans altogether 59 heavy bombers. They were escorted across the Channel by large numbers of British and U.S. fighters, six of which did not return.

On the following night the R.A.F. made a very heavy attack on the Peenemünde research station, reference to

¹ For these figures the writer is indebted to the *Bulletin of International News*, vol. XX, no. 16.

² When Gelsenkirchen was also bombed for the loss of some 25 Fortresses against 20 German fighters.

which has already been made in this section. The heavy flak and the great number of night-fighters which attacked our bombers showed the importance which the enemy attached to this place. Great damage was done to the installations there and many night-fighters were shot down but we lost 41 aircraft.

Our next big night raids in August were directed against Berlin (58) on the night of August 23 when over 1,700 tons of bombs were dropped in 50 minutes and a dozen night-fighters were destroyed. Then came the turn of Nuremberg again on the night of August 27, when we lost 33 bombers in a short fierce attack when 1,500 tons were dropped in under three-quarters of an hour. At least five German fighters were claimed by our returning airmen. On August 30 the R.A.F. attacked the Munchen-Gladbach-Rheydt area and the great river port of Duisburg (28), and on August 31 a concentrated attack lasting 45 minutes was launched against Berlin. But there were many other attacks in which less numerous but important forces of aircraft raided the Reich. Thus the chemical works at Leverkusen, near Cologne, and other Rhineland targets were bombed on August 22 for the loss of five bombers. Mosquitoes made harassing attacks on Berlin on four nights and also raided the Ruhr.

Enemy-occupied territories were not neglected during August. Airfields were particularly heavily attacked by day and night during the month, and much damage was done, notably at Poix and at Gilze-Rijen in Holland on the night of August 19. Railway yards in northern France were frequently bombed. Other targets included the shipyards at Le Trait, the Bordeaux aircraft factory, the airframe works at Flushing (Holland), several power stations, the transformer station at Guerledan in Brittany and the important depots at Rennes. Mines were laid in enemy waters and several small craft sunk. One exceptionally successful attack on German light naval craft was carried out on August 11 when Whirlwind fighter-bombers escorted by Polish Spitfires destroyed four E-boats and a small armed ship off the Isles de Vierge on the Breton coast. Perhaps the most extensive of these raids was that of August 16 when bombers of various types, including Fortresses with powerful fighter escorts, attacked many airfields, Le Bourget, Amiens and Abbeville among them, destroying between 35 and 40 German machines for the loss of a dozen aircraft. August 17, when 16 German fighters were shot down by American heavy bombers, was another good day for the United Nations.

In September the Allied air attack on Germany continued, but although several heavy raids were launched on the Reich, the daily record of operations gave the impression that greater attention was being paid, at least temporarily, to aerial attacks on the enemy's vulnerable points in France and the Low Countries. There were many factories in France and Holland which were contributing in greater or less measure to the German war effort and these, even if less important targets as a rule than the factories in Germany, could not be safely neg-

lected. Moreover, a large proportion of the enemy's total fighter strength was based on the numerous airfields of northern France, Belgium and Holland and could be struck on the ground or in the massive sweeps of the Allied fighter squadrons. It is probable that this partial change of direction in our attack had the effect of leading the enemy to regard it as a prelude to a landing in Western Europe: it is even more probable that it prevented him from detaching any fighters and fighter-bombers for service against the advancing Russians. In either case it assisted our Allies.

The heavy attacks on Berlin and targets in Western Germany were repeated on the night of September 3, the most concentrated attack on Berlin yet made, 1,000 tons of bombs being dropped in 20 minutes. We lost 22 bombers that night. Various targets in the Ruhr and Rhineland were raided on the night of September 4-5, and Mannheim-Ludwigshafen was the chief objective on the following night when we lost 34 machines and destroyed 11 German night-fighters. Munich (16) was the objective on the night of September 6, after a heavy American daylight attack on Stuttgart. After this operations were chiefly confined to France until September 22-23 on which night Hanover was heavily bombed for half an hour (26). On the same night the R.A.F. bombed Emden and Oldenburg, and airfields in north-west Germany and Holland. On the night of September 23 the R.A.F. attacked Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, Aachen and Darmstadt (32). Emden was raided in some strength on the night of September 26 and Berlin endured a number of harassing visits by Mosquito light bombers.

On September 2 Fighter Command carried out their most important operation of the year over France. Squadrons of Spitfires and Typhoons escorted Marauders of the U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. squadrons of Bostons, Mitchells and Venturas, in attacks on objectives in the Pas de Calais, airfields at Mardych and Denain, the power station at Mazingarbe and other targets. Heavy bombers were escorted by squadrons of Thunderbolts. The results were good "on all targets." The Allies lost four machines in this operation and four more in a successful attack on the lock gates on the Hansweert Canal in Holland. Next day Flying Fortresses with fighter escort attacked an aircraft factory for the repair of Me109s on the outskirts of Paris, the repair base for single-engine fighters at Romilly-sur-Seine, the fighter reserve base at Beaumont-le-Roger, an operational fighter base at St. Andre and the repair and service factory for Me109s at Meulan les Mureaux near Paris. The Allies lost 12 aircraft (eight Fortresses) but shot down 29 hostile aircraft. September 4 and 5 saw many raids on a great variety of targets in which seven enemy small craft, including two naval motor-boats, were destroyed by Typhoons and Albacores off the Dutch islands, and 19 German aircraft were destroyed to the Allies' five. September 6 was another day of air raids and battles from Stuttgart to Boulogne and the enemy airfields at Orleans and Centhes. These attacks cost the U.S.A.A.F. 34 bombers, and four Spitfires were lost, against a German loss of over 80 fighters. The offensive was maintained with vigour for the next three days, and it was announced on September 9 that during the previous

hours 2,000 fighter and 1,000 bomber sorties had been made across the Channel. On that day, which was also the day of the great amphibious exercise in the Channel, the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. made a number of heavy attacks on enemy airfields and other targets.

After a brief delay the operations over France were resumed. On the night of September 15-16 the R.A.F. raided a rubber factory at Montluçon some 40 miles north-west of Vichy which covers an area of 150 acres, and had been turning out tyres for the enemy. The defences were negligible but there were night-fighters along the route and cloud interfered with the bombing. We lost 10 aircraft in this and other operations that night. Meanwhile a number of Fortresses had attacked and seriously damaged the Hispano-Suiza and Caudron-Renault aircraft repair works and a ball-bearing factory near Paris. They lost six heavy bombers to the enemy's 16 fighters. This was the first time that American heavy bombers in the European theatre had taken off at dusk and landed at night. The Anthéor viaduct near St. Raphael in the French Riviera, and the Modane marshalling yards at the French end of the Mont Cenis tunnel were raided by the R.A.F. on the night of September 16.

On that day Nantes and La Pallice were bombed by Flying Fortresses, which also raided the airfields at Cognac and La Rochelle, flying 1,600 miles to and from their more distant targets. American and British light and medium bombers covered by British, Allied and Dominion fighters made many attacks on other objectives during the day. These daylight operations cost the Allies 16 bombers and fighters against 29 German fighters. Brest and the Evreux-Sauville airfield, 45 miles west of Paris, were attacked by British and American medium bombers respectively on September 22. On the 23rd there were "widespread attacks" on targets in France and Holland from Nantes to the canal entrance at Welmedinge in the outer Scheldt, and 26 enemy fighters were destroyed to nine Allied aircraft. On September 24 the railway centre at Amiens and five airfields in northern France and Brittany were bombed and 21 aircraft were destroyed at a cost of nine Allied fighters. The Fighting French Alsace squadron was particularly successful in these actions. The last large-scale operation over France during September was carried out in combination with the day attack of American Flying Fortresses of the 8th U.S.A.A.F. on Emden. The heavy bombers were escorted to their target by Thunderbolts and met on their return by R.A.F. Spitfires, while Mitchells and Marauders made diversionary raids and fighter aircraft covered the medium and fighter-bombers and made supporting sweeps. It was a costly day for the Germans who lost 58 fighters (40 to the Fortresses and Thunderbolts) to 15 Allied machines, including seven Fortresses.

German air attacks on Great Britain during the quarter were sporadic, sudden "nuisance raids" alternating with relatively long periods of quiet. On few occasions did more than a dozen enemy bombers or fighter-bombers cross the British coast by night and on fewer still did any considerable proportion of them press far inland. Civilian losses were light, although there were occasions when ignorance of the effect of the enemy's new high-explosive incendiary bombs caused a number of casualties, but the authorities responsible for civil defence were quick to

warn the public and the services concerned against taking unnecessary risks with these unpleasant missiles.

Early in July enemy activity over Great Britain was slight, although bombs were dropped in the Greater London area and caused some loss of life and several persons were killed in a cinema when "a south-east coast town" was raided on July 9. On July 13 there were casualties in an east coast town, Grimsby according to the Germans. On the following night the enemy claimed to have done some damage at Hull. A few bombs were dropped elsewhere on the southern and eastern coasts with little or no effect. A lull followed until the night of July 25-26 when Hull was raided without suffering serious damage or casualties. Civilian casualties in the United Kingdom from air attack during July were :

| | Men | Women | Children under 16 | Total |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-------|----------------------|-------|
| Killed | 59 | 80 | 28 | 167 |
| Injured and de- tained in hospital | 73 | 104 | 33 | 210 |

During the first half of August German raids were few, but on the night of August 11-12, south-west coast towns, Bournemouth and Plymouth according to German *communiqués*, were attacked and some damage was done. In a raid on the night of August 15 about 25 hostile aircraft reached our coasts. Six were destroyed.

On the night of August 17 the enemy sent about 50 machines to raid east coast towns and points in the south-east of England. These did some damage but 11 were brought down. On August 22 and 23 the enemy appeared again, but in smaller numbers. Five of his aircraft were shot down over East Anglia during the night attack of August 23. Civilian casualties in August were :

| | Men | Women | Children under 16 | Total |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-------|----------------------|-----------|
| Killed | 38 | 41 | 29 | 108 |
| Injured and de- tained in hospital | 75 | 72 | 17 | 164 |
| | | | | <hr/> 272 |

Few raiders crossed the British coast and few places were attacked in early September, but the enemy showed a little more activity towards the middle of the month, and bombs were dropped in the London area by night on September 14 and 15, though no serious damage was done. On the second occasion about 15 aircraft crossed the coast and four were shot down. Occasional small-scale raids were recorded later in the month, but the following return of civilian losses for September shows what little harm they did.

| | Men | Women | Children under 16 | Total |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-------|----------------------|----------|
| Killed | 2 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
| Injured and de- tained in hospital | 4 | 6 | 1 | 11 |
| | | | | <hr/> 16 |

The following were the losses in air operations of the *Luftwaffe*, the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. respectively on the Western Fronts:

| <i>Over and Around Britain</i> | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------|--|
| | <i>German</i> | <i>R.A.F.</i> | <i>U.S.A.A.F.</i> | |
| July .. | 18 | 1 | — | |
| August .. | 25 | — | — | |
| September | 17 | — | — | |
| | <hr/> 60 | <hr/> 1 | <hr/> nil | |
| | — | — | — | |

| <i>Over Western and North-Western Europe</i> | | | | |
|--|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|
| | <i>German</i> | <i>R.A.F.</i> | <i>U.S.A.A.F.</i> | |
| | <i>by</i> | <i>by</i> | | |
| | <i>R.A.F.</i> | <i>U.S.A.A.F.</i> | | |
| July .. | 111 | 500 + | 258 | 121 |
| August .. | 136 | 631 | 381 | 116 |
| September .. | 198 | 312 | 282 | 99 |
| | <hr/> 445 | <hr/> 1,443 | <hr/> 921 | <hr/> 336 |
| Grand Total | 1,948 | 921 | 336 | |

An official record of aircraft losses since the beginning of the war to the end of June, 1943 was published on July 4. It showed that whereas the total Axis loss on British fronts was 18,031, the combined losses of the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. in Europe, North Africa, India, Burma, and the Middle East amounted to 9,906. The total American loss in the Far East was not known.

The following were among the principal appointments and promotions in the R.A.F. announced during the quarter. Air Vice-Marshal R. H. M. Saundby was appointed Deputy A.O. C.-in-C., Bomber Command. A partial reorganization of the Air Staff was announced on August 8. Air Vice-Marshal N. H. Bottomley was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff to the Air Ministry, Air Vice-Marshal D. Colyer to be Assistant C.O.A.S. (Policy) to the Ministry and Air Vice-Marshal D. Harries to be Director-General of Personal Services. The other senior members of the Air Staff under the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Charles Portal, were Air Marshal Sir R. Peck, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, (General), Air Vice-Marshal F. F. Inglis, Assistant C.O.A.S. (Intelligence), and Air Vice-Marshal J. D. Breakey, Assistant C.O.A.S. (Technical Requirements). Air Commodore A. H. Orlebar, Deputy Chief of Combined Operations, and holder of the world's air speed record, died in London on August 4. Air Vice-Marshal R. P. Whitham who had been missing since March was presumed dead.

The Battle of Britain was commemorated by special Thanksgiving Services and parades on September 26

and Civil Defence Day was celebrated with it for this occasion. A statement to this effect and that Sunday, September 26, should be specially observed as "Battle of Britain Sunday" was issued from Lambeth Palace on September 6. It was signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, the Archbishop of Liverpool on behalf of the Roman Catholic hierarchy of England and Wales, and the Moderator of the Federal Council of the Free Churches. The King and Queen, members of the Government and more than 1,000 members of the R.A.F., the A.A. Command and the various civil defence services were present at a fitting and memorable ceremony.

3: THE ARMY IN BRITAIN AND BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR

For obvious reasons little can be said of the Army in Britain during the Sixteenth Quarter of the war. Allied and Dominion contingents continued to arrive from overseas. Units went abroad and training continued. New weapons were the subject of experiment. One, the 4.2-in. 20-pounder mortar, had been tried in Sicily and was known to have been most effective. There were a number of important exercises for British and Allied troops. One was the subject of a joint announcement issued by the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, on September 9. The announcement ran:

A full-scale amphibious exercise has recently taken place in the English Channel. It has been most successful and valuable lessons have been learned by Service and civil authorities concerned.

The operation was carried out under cover of the Allied Air Forces, which had made over 1,000 sorties on hostile airfields in France from which attacks on the landing craft used in the exercise would otherwise have been made. In fact only one German fighter showed up and it was shot down very quickly. The troops employed were mostly British and Canadian. Their concentration for the exercise in the course of which they were carried by the landing craft 30 miles out into the Channel, was effected with admirable secrecy and the civil population of the prohibited areas on the South Coast did their part with credit to themselves. These areas had become "prohibited," i.e. only open to regular residents and closed to visitors save persons who obtained permits from the military and civilian police, during 31 days in August and September.

There were occasional exchanges of shells between the Dover batteries and the enemy's guns near Calais. No Commando operations on the French coast were recorded during the quarter.

Among the appointments and promotions recorded the following may be specially mentioned. *The London Gazette* announced on August 21 that Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Paget, C-in-C., Home Forces, and Lieutenant-General Sir William Platt, C-in-C. in East Africa, had been promoted Generals. On the retirement of Major-General and Chief Paymaster H. G. Riley, Brigadier R. G. Stanham was appointed Chief Paymaster in his stead and promoted Major-General (September 1).

After the announcement of the appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten to be Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia Combined Operations H.Q. issued a statement that the Combined Operations Executive, acting as a body, was the "Commission entitled to act on his behalf." The Executive consists of the following officers: Major-General G. Wildman-Lushington is Chief of Staff to the Chief of Combined Operations; the Flag Officer, Combined Operations, and Naval Chief of Staff, is Rear-Admiral C. S. Daniel; the Air Officer, Combined Operations, and Air Chief of Staff is Air Vice-Marshal R. Graham.

Negotiations with Germany for the exchange of disabled prisoners of war continued during the quarter and were understood to be nearing a successful conclusion. A large number of British prisoners of war were released by the Italians on the conclusion of the armistice, but while some escaped into Switzerland from camps near the border, most of those in northern and central Italy were rounded up. A few, including Major-General Kloppers who was in command of the Tobruk garrison when the stronghold fell at the end of June, 1942, succeeded in making their way to the Allied lines with Italian assistance. A proclamation issued by the German Commander-in-Chief in Italy (apparently Kesselring) ordered British and American prisoners to return to their camps immediately or report without delay to the nearest German authorities outside Rome. The proclamation continued:

Prisoners
of War

"All prisoners who report will be treated according to the Geneva Convention. Those found in possession of arms or who attempt to resist capture will be treated according to martial law. Italians giving any aid to escaped prisoners in food, money, shelter or in any other form will be judged according to German military law."

The British Government replied by the statement that such escaped prisoners were under no obligation to report

to the German authorities ; that if they were recaptured they were entitled to all the benefits and privileges of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929 ; and that

“Any German authority who treats such a British prisoner-of-war otherwise than in accordance with these principles will be held by His Majesty’s Government personally responsible for his actions.”

A painful impression was left on Parliament by the statement made in answer to a question in Parliament by Sir James Grigg on August 3. The Secretary of State said that 69 British prisoners of war in Germany had been shot up to date. He added :

“These cases fall under different categories. Some have been shot while attempting to escape, and that is usually regarded as legitimate. There are a number of cases which we consider unjustifiable, and we have protested against them, and we are keeping account of these cases from the point of view of any trials of war criminals after the war. In a certain number of cases which are still under investigation I cannot say yet under which category they fall.”

Many readers of Hansard (House of Commons, Volume 391, p. 2063) would have preferred to hear Sir James Grigg speak of “*the* trials” rather than of “*any* trials.”

CHAPTER V

THE FAR EASTERN WAR

I : BURMA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

While the advent of the monsoon rains had terminated all major operations on the Arakanese and northern fronts in Burma, it did not prevent the R.A.F. and the 10th United States Army Air Force from inflicting many shrewd blows on Japanese communications. Nor did it put a stop to the patrol operations of our tribal levies in the forest country along the border of the province of Assam and between that border and the Chindwin River. July opened with a number of attacks on small craft and Japanese army installations around Akyab, in which over 20 sampans were sunk or damaged, and with raids on river traffic on the Irrawaddy and on transport on the Prome-Taungup road. On July 8 an official announcement made it known that Vengeance dive-bombers were being employed by the R.A.F. against the Japanese in Burma, the only theatre of war in which we had used a real dive-bomber. They had been particularly useful in attacks on small targets obstructed by forests where more or less vertical descents gave the best opportunity of successful bombing. On the day when this information was given out they took part in a highly successful attack at Thaungdara in Arakan, in which, as it was afterwards learnt, 120 Japanese soldiers were killed.

During the rest of July the R.A.F. and the 10th U.S.A.A.F. continued to harass the enemy's transport and communications. On July 18 Major-General Bissell, the Commander of the American Air Force on this front, told newspaper correspondents that his heavy bombers had knocked out a span of the Myitnge railway bridge, south of Mandalay, which had been badly hit early in the year. Photographs showed that the span had been blown 30 feet out of position; the Irrawaddy was in flood; and as the Americans frequently revisited and

bombed the approaches to discourage the enemy from bringing up heavy machinery, repairs were likely to take a long time.

Another American objective was the railway, some 280 miles long, which the Japanese were constructing from Bangkok in Siam to Moulmein in south-eastern Burma. They could not expect to retain the potential command of the Bay of Bengal¹ much longer. Their sea communications with Moulmein and Rangoon were already endangered by Allied air superiority and would be cut were the British Navy to receive reinforcements from the Mediterranean. At the same time, their command of both shores of the Straits of Malacca and Sunda made it improbable that the Allies would begin their counter-offensive by a direct attack on Singapore. If, therefore, they could move troops from Indo-China and Siam into Burma by rail by the time that the Indian Army and the King's Navy were ready to attack them, their military position would be greatly improved. They consequently did their utmost to expedite the construction of the new railway while the Americans began to attack the construction headquarters, offices and accumulations of material at Thanbyuzayat, below Moulmein. Other American targets were road bridges in the difficult country between Myitkyina and Suprabum in Upper Burma, two of which were destroyed by fighter-bombers on July 25, when the railway bridge at Namti was also hit and badly damaged. Our losses of aircraft over Burma in July were slight and the U.S.A.A.F. do not seem to have lost any machines. The Japanese Air Force appeared to have gone into retreat.

There were some small fights "on the ground" during July. On July 10 the following official report from Delhi was published in London :

"During the past few days British and Indian troops have successfully carried out a raid on the Japanese at Maungdaw on the Arakan front. In the first stages of the operation our units had to overcome some stiff

¹ I say "potential" since the Japanese, if they cared to run the risk of weakening their Fleet in the Pacific, could still concentrate a much more powerful naval force in the Bay of Bengal than Admiral Somerville's squadron.

enemy opposition in taking up positions at different points outside the town. The enemy were driven out of Maungdaw itself on Thursday afternoon [July 8] after a machine-gun position had been stormed and its crew wiped out. Our troops held the town for several hours and finally withdrew as planned. They inflicted casualties on the enemy, gained valuable information and captured some equipment. Our casualties were very light. . . ."

On July 19 G.H.Q., Delhi, stated that in three recent encounters near Suprabum our Kachin levies had killed 15 Japanese soldiers with slight loss to themselves. In the Myittha valley a small patrol had attacked a stronger Japanese patrol with success. Other successful patrol operations by Kachins near Suprabum and by Indian troops in Arakan were recorded on July 30.

On August 1 a Tokyo broadcast stated that the Japanese Government had recognized the independence of Burma and that the defence of Burma would now pass from Japanese hands into those of the new State. The last statement was taken with more than the proverbial grain of salt by all who heard it. The broadcast added that Burma had "formally declared war" against Great Britain and the United States and that its Prime Minister, Ba Maw, who had been imprisoned for treasonable conduct but was released by the Japanese when they invaded Burma, had notified friendly Governments of the independence of his country. The entry of Burma into the war on the Japanese side did not, in fact, make any difference to the military situation. A small number of Burmans of the Thakin faction¹ remained, as before, partisans of the Japanese, whom they supplied with a few not very reliable troops and a larger number of secret agents, spies, and other jackals. The bulk of the population, according to those with whom the Wingate flying columns and our patrols operating in northern Burma made contact, were passively hostile to the Japanese and hoped for better times.

In spite of unfavourable weather in early August, the British and American Air Forces continued to harass the Japanese, devoting special attention to their railway and river communications. The Japanese Air Force played an increasingly effaced part; indeed, the correspondent of *The Times* at Delhi described it (*loc. cit.*, August 16) as having for the time "disappeared from the skies," while

¹ q.v. *The Tenth Quarter*, pp. 84-5.

General Bissell told correspondents (on August 14) that the Americans had not lost one aircraft through enemy action in three of the last four months. The General added that for the fact that the Americans were able to fly on 27 out of 31 days during the rainy month of July most credit was due to the meteorologists. Their forecasts had proved accurate even for weather over targets 800 to 1,000 miles away.

There were a number of raids on enemy positions in Burma during the last half of August. On August 23 an American official report announced several successes.

It said that on August 22, B25 medium bombers (Marauders) had destroyed "a record number" of freight cars on the Japanese-controlled Burmese railways, demolishing 65 rolling-stock at least in two raids on Sagaing and 50 or 60 freight cars at Mandalay. Hostile installations at Monywa had been bombed, apparently with great effect. A day later the R.A.F. announced the destruction of 60 supply craft on the Burmese rivers and as many more, all loaded, were reported to have been sunk by R.A.F. fighters on August 29. On the ground occasional patrol encounters were recorded, mostly from the Chin Hills and the forests of the Chindwin valley and less frequently from Arakan.

Meanwhile important decisions affecting the Far Eastern War had been taken at the Quebec Conference. The statement issued by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill on August 24 (q.v. Chapter II, Section 2 of this volume) had made it clear that the provision of effective aid to China had played a great part in the military discussions there. Such aid could only be given in the near future through a reconquered Burma. It was therefore natural and logical that the statement was followed up on the night of August 25 by the following announcement from the Citadel of Quebec :

"It has been decided to set up a separate South-East Asia Command for conducting operations based on India and Ceylon against Japan. It will be an allied command similar to that set up in North Africa.

"The King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Acting Vice-Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten . . . to be Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia."

The impending formation of this new Command had been announced at the same time as the appointments of Lord Wavell as Viceroy and of General Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief in India. Lord Louis Mountbatten

had shown himself a bold and skilful leader of destroyers. While the duties of Chief of Combined Operations, which he became, *vice* Sir Roger Keyes, in October, 1941, had never been publicly defined, he was

"understood to have been responsible for the training of personnel and the design and provision of special material, as well as the preparation, in the first place, of the plans for specific operations. He has also attended the meetings of the Chief of Staffs Committee, whenever matters in his special province have been in hand or under discussion. Among the Combined Operations carried out during his tenure of the office of C.C.O. have been the raids at Vaagsö, St. Nazaire and Dieppe."¹

While Lord Louis Mountbatten's appointment was welcomed in this country, there were discordant voices in America, where the isolationist and anti-Roosevelt newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst, Colonel Robert McCormick and Captain Joseph Patterson started the following ingenious theory. The President and Mr. Churchill, they averred, had elevated Lord Louis Mountbatten to the chief command in South-Eastern Asia in order to eliminate General MacArthur as "a dangerous political opponent" of the President in the 1944 election. It was strange that some American critics who had been accusing the British Government of the intention to shirk serious commitments in the Far Eastern War and to leave the chief burden to be borne by the United States should a few months later have been voicing their wrath at this proof of the British intention to play an important part in the counter-attack upon Japan.² On September 28, Mr. Curtin, answering a question in the Australian House of Representatives, said that Lord Louis Mountbatten's appointment did not impinge upon General MacArthur's command, nor was the latter command subordinated to Lord Louis's.

The eastern boundary of the South-East Asian Command coincided with the western boundary of the South-West Pacific Command. As the Commonwealth Government was a party to the creation of the South-West Pacific Command and the delimitation of its boundaries, no change could be made in them without its agreement. There was the closest

¹ *The Times*, August 26.

² The inquiring reader will find some characteristic extracts from isolationist newspapers in the *Daily Express* of September 15, p. 4, columns 7 and 8.

co-operation in matters of high policy between Mr. Churchill, President Roosevelt, and the Commonwealth Government, and General MacArthur himself.

Attacks on railways, river traffic and transport in many parts of Burma, on factories in the Prome District and elsewhere, and on Japanese troops in barracks and on the march were carried out with much success by the R.A.F. during the first half of September. An official report published on September 14 said :

"Attacks made last week on sampans on the Mayu River near Kwazon were extremely effective. Out of 45 sampans carrying about 300 Japanese troops, all but seven were sunk and had many of the occupants killed." An equally important announcement has been issued by the Headquarters of the 10th U.S.A.A.F. on September 9. After describing an attack by medium bombers on the Gokteik viaduct midway between Mandalay and Lashio on the Burma road, it continued : "This vital link in the Japanese communications for the supply of troops opposed by the Chinese in Yunnan province has been protected from bombing for three months by monsoon storm clouds. It is a sign of the breaking monsoon that this attack was possible. All our aircraft and crews returned safely."

Speaking at Delhi at a parade of the R.A.F. held in commemoration of the third anniversary of the Battle of Britain on September 15, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, A.O.C.-in-C. in India, recalled the early days of the war with Japan when the Allied air squadrons in the Far East had been overwhelmed or reduced to a mere remnant left to defend India and Burma.

Since March, 1942, a very large airforce had been built up in India and to-day they stood in battle array, not only ready to meet the enemy but to go out and find him. That enemy was no less dangerous to the peace of the world than Hitler. They must adopt in Delhi his (the speaker's) own motto : "No laurels without labour," and he concluded, "The campaigning season is about to begin. Let us go to it."

Brigadier-General Caleb Haynes, who was returning to the United States after commanding the U.S.A.A.F. operations in Assam with marked success, gave British and Allied correspondents an important review of the air situation on the same day. Sporadic Japanese air raids on India could not be ruled out, but anything in the nature of a sustained attack was, he considered, no longer practicable. The construction of new airfields, particularly in Central Burma, need not be interpreted as signifying any intention of carrying out such an offensive.

The principal effect of sustained American and British air attacks on Burma had been, in fact, to prevent the Japanese from transporting the material they needed in order to reorganize Burma as a base for the invasion of India. Rangoon had virtually been denied to them, and communication between north and central Burma, and south by road, rail or river had been made extraordinarily difficult. He remarked upon the deterioration in the quality of Japanese pilots; it seemed that the enemy could not turn out trained personnel quickly enough to keep pace with his losses. Japanese aircraft had been improved in speed and rate of climb, but they had not caught up with the performance of American aircraft and, in his view, were too far behind to be able to catch up.

During the last half of the month the R.A.F. continued to harass Japanese river and railway transport and did great damage. Only two of our aircraft were reported missing during this fortnight. The Japanese Air Force did not put in an appearance. On land activity was confined to patrolling. Our troops had the best of the only skirmish recorded during the month in published official statements.

Enemy aircraft approached the Ceylon coast on two recorded occasions during the quarter but they dropped no bombs and did not come near enough to draw fire. Strong African reinforcements reached India and Ceylon in September. At sea a merchantman was shelled without warning by a raider in the Indian Ocean, crippled and then torpedoed apparently on August 12. On September 27 a U-boat was destroyed in the Indian Ocean off the South African coast after a five days' hunt by aircraft of the R.A.F. and the South African Air Force. The Italian submarine *Ammiraglio Cagni*, which had been operating apparently with some success against Allied shipping in the western Indian Ocean, surrendered to the Union naval authorities and was brought into Durban Harbour on September 20. The Italian escort ship *Eritrea* (2,200 tons, 20 knots), which had escaped from Massawa on February 21, 1941, to avoid capture, surrendered at Colombo on September 14. She had apparently been used as an escort for Japanese convoys during the last two years.

Liberator heavy bombers attacked Chatham Island in the Andamans on August 15 and did great damage, destroying an A.A. battery. On September 3 they flew

2,000 miles to raid Car Nicobar island in the Nicobar group south of the Andamans and hit a dock and neighbouring installations. The Japanese claimed to have refloated the King George V Dock at Singapore in July after working at it since March. It was announced on September 7 that a Dutch submarine had sunk a Japanese supply ship of 5,000 tons in the Straits of Malacca.

It was made known late in September that the new road from India to China, which had been the subject of various rumours during the past year, was being constructed by American, Chinese, Indian and Negro labour under the supervision and technical control of Brigadier-General Raymond Wheeler. Brigadier-General Hayden Boatner, Chief of Staff to the Chinese Army in India, was responsible for its tactical protection. The new road starts from a point in Assam and may link up with the Burma Road between Lashio and Chungking. It will pass through some of the most difficult country in the world. Work began in December, 1942.

2 : CHINA AND JAPAN

After the failure of the Japanese thrust towards Chungking in late May and early June, the war in China died down to an affair of outpost affrays, patrol encounters and occasional food raids all along the front. The Chinese, still isolated from their allies, and lacking tanks, heavy artillery and transport, were quite unable to take the offensive. The Japanese seem to have decided that their repeated plunges into Republican Chinese territory were in most cases a waste of effort and material. They therefore confined themselves to holding a number of cities on or near the main lines of communication and the railways, metalled roads, and navigable waters that linked these strong points with their bases on the coast and along the Yangtze River. As the map on page 157 shows, the regions remaining under Chinese control were much more extensive than the Japanese or the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei cared to admit. *The Times*, indeed, observed (*loc. cit.* September 11) that a detailed map of "occupied" China

"in which the areas entirely in Japanese hands were shaded would bear no small resemblance to a drawing of a torn net, so large and numerous would be the blank interstices between the darkened meshes of road,

following were the chief aerial operations in China recorded during the quarter :

On July 15 U.S.A.A.F. Headquarters announced from Chungking that during the past week American Liberators had made five attacks on Japanese military installations in Indo-China. They had done much damage to the dockyard area at Haiphong and had sunk a large cargo ship and a tanker. Other bombers had raided Canton where they claimed the destruction of 15 river craft and a large motor vessel. A week later the Japanese opened an air offensive against the advanced bases of the 14th U.S.A.A.F. in Kwangsi and Hunan. About 100 bombers and fighters raided two Hunan bases on July 23. They were intercepted by a much smaller force of P40 (Tomahawk) fighters which compelled the enemy to jettison his bombs short of their target. Only minor damage was inflicted. American pilots claimed to have brought down ten Zero fighters and six bombers. One American machine was destroyed on the ground. Next day 40 enemy aircraft raided one of the Hunan bases. They were again intercepted and prevented from bombing accurately, and they lost six machines. A force of eight Zeros which rashly attacked the Kwangsi base lost seven of its number. Only one American aeroplane was shot down. Its pilot escaped.

The Americans lost no time in retaliating. Mitchells and Tomahawks attacked Hankow on July 25 and 26, when the Pailochi aerodrome was their main target. The enemy, they claimed, lost 13 Zeros in attempted interceptions and more were probably destroyed. On July 27 escorted Liberators attacked Samah Bay, on Hainan Island. They hit two ships and claimed 13 more Japanese fighters. On the same day Mitchells and Tomahawks made a successful raid on Hong Kong. U.S.A.A.F. Headquarters announced that from July 23 to and including July 27, eight Japanese bombers and 49 fighters had been destroyed for certain, and 42 "probably destroyed," against one U.S. aeroplane lost in action.

On August 17 General Chennault's Liberators attacked Japanese troops and supply concentrations near Hanoi in Indo-China. Twenty-eight large buildings were wrecked and many smaller ones, and all the raiders got safely away. Three days later the Japanese raided the Kwangsi base but lost two machines and did so little harm that General Chennault counter-raided the Tieho aerodrome near Canton on the same day and shot down at least five Zeros. On August 21 Liberators bombed Hankow. One was lost, but the Americans claimed 25 Zeros. On August 23 Chungking was raided by the enemy for the first time for two years. The Japanese attacked in no great strength, 21 bombers escorted by six Zeros. They killed 20 civilians, wounded two score and were beaten off with loss by Chinese pilots flying P40s (Tomahawks). On August 23 and 24 heavy and medium bombers with P40s to escort them hammered hard on Hankow. Here there was heavy air fighting.

In the first attack the Americans claimed to have destroyed 35 Zeros on the ground and 11 more during an air battle lasting 27 minutes with over 50 Zeros. After this action the U.S.A.A.F. medium bombers with fighter escort attacked the aerodrome at Hankow and also raided Japanese advanced bases in Hunan. Four more Japanese aircraft were shot down. A Liberator was lost over Hankow and a P40 was shot down, but its pilot escaped. On August 24 the Americans attacked Wuchang aerodrome. After the bombing some 40 Zeros attacked, and in an action lasting three-quarters of an hour, 19 were claimed as victims of Liberators or Tomahawks. Two American machines were lost and their pilots were machine-gunned after baling out. Continuing their offensive the Americans raided Hong Kong harbour where they sank or damaged many ships on August 26. They followed up with three consecutive attacks, the last on August 29, in which, according to Chinese refugees, King's Wharf was destroyed, the naval and commercial dockyards laid in ruins, 40 Japanese were killed, and many motor-vehicles wrecked by a bomb which hit the area in front of the Governor's offices and the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank. Early in September Chinese and American machines raided enemy shipping on the Yangtze and off the port of Swatow. American losses during the week ending September 4 amounted to but one machine. On September 11 their Lightnings reappeared over Hong Kong, seriously damaged two large ships and set a destroyer on fire. One Lightning was lost. Next their bombers returned to Haiphong in Indo-China and bombed a factory. Zero fighters intercepted them and in the long running fight which ensued (September 15) suffered heavy loss, 10 machines certainly and 18 "probably" destroyed. On the same day Mitchells escorted by Tomahawks raided the Hankow area and destroyed an intercepting Zero. Three American machines were lost.

Unable to destroy their elusive opponents on the ground or in the air the Japanese sought to create dissension between Americans and Chinese. To that end their Intelligence Service bribed a Chinese ex-student to assassinate American pilots after which he undertook to spread rumours and publish leaflets alleging that the murders had been committed by Chinese airmen "as a protest against unequal treatment." The conspirator was caught in time and was induced to confess before his execution.

On September 20 the Japanese made a determined air attack on "a major U.S.A.A.F. base." General Stilwell reported that 30 Japanese bombers with a strong fighter escort were intercepted before they could get into bombing position and suffered heavily. Fifteen bombers and two Zeros were shot down and nine machines were "probably destroyed." The Americans lost no machines and damage from Japanese bombs dropped hurriedly and inaccurately under fighter attack was slight.

July 7, the seventh day of the seventh month, opened the seventh year of the struggle with Japan, and the occasion was celebrated by patriotic demonstrations in

China and by an exchange of messages between the Chinese Government and their Western Allies. In a message to the peoples of the United Nations General Chiang Kai-shek said that what most disquieted the Chinese people was not whether they would win the war, but when they would win it and at what price. Whether they would win the ensuing peace would depend largely on whether before the war ended they could reach complete agreement on a common policy and lay a strong foundation for post-war co-operation.

China, said the Generalissimo, hoped that there would be no negotiated peace. The enemy must be forced to surrender unconditionally and be disarmed and the seeds of aggression in their institutions and creeds must be uprooted. "Any negotiated peace will sow the seeds of another war." Secondly, the future peace should emancipate all mankind. Thirdly, the United Nations should set up at the earliest possible moment joint machinery to help to unify strategy and policies; and finally to safeguard international justice and collective security and to ensure the successful working of democratic Governments there must be established a world organization with the solid backing of international forces.

Official greetings came from Mr. Churchill, the First Sea Lord, and the Chief of the Air Staff. The Prime Minister spoke of the necessity of the unconditional surrender of our enemies, and while neither Great Britain nor China would underrate the difficulties that lay before us, he expressed his confidence that Anglo-Chinese collaboration, "tested and tempered in the fire of war," would "play its rightful part in the solution of the problems of peace."

Special messages from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Wendell Willkie were broadcast to Chungking from San Francisco. The President said that the friends of the United States had long known what their foes were learning, that "the promises of the United States are always kept and our pledges are always redeemed." In London Mr. Eden and the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wellington Koo, were the chief speakers at a "Salute to China" meeting at the Albert Hall. The British Secretary of State's speech opened with a stern warning to Japan. That country, he said,

"has run up a long account, a very long account of evil-doing; and that account must and will be settled. . . . There is in our hearts a fixed and

grim resolve to teach Japan once for all the lesson that co-prosperity is not achieved by cruelty and oppression and that he who draws the sword shall perish by it." Later in his speech, Mr. Eden said that our enemies had from time to time suggested that Great Britain did not wish to see China strong. These were ludicrous suggestions. The interest of the British Empire was bound up in the existence of a strong and united China. Without a strong and united China there was no prospect of lasting stability in the Far East. On the problem of assistance to China he said that the task of finding alternative routes to supplement the air route had largely fallen on Great Britain, and we were doing our best to meet it. We had extended lend-lease facilities to China, we were supplying her with technical experts and we had met the request of the Chinese Government for the training in this country of large numbers of research and other students. The British Council had granted a number of scholarships, tenable in British universities, to post-graduate research students and many of these were already here.

Dr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in this country in July. In a talk to journalists on August 4 he dissociated his Government from any idea of territorial aggrandizement. Formosa and Manchuria, former Chinese territories, must revert to China, but his country had no desire for expansion in Thailand or Indo-China. Asked his views as to the future of Hong Kong, he said that if he were a member of the British Government answering questions in Parliament he would reply: "I must have notice of that question." He described the suggestion that the world should be split into spheres of influence of the Great Powers as "archaic."

On August 14, when Dr. T. V. Soong was returning to Washington, the Foreign Office issued a statement to the effect that during his visit, the result of an invitation from His Majesty's Government, Dr. Soong

"had a number of informal conversations with the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, other Ministers of the Crown and high British naval, military and air authorities. An extraordinary meeting of the Pacific Council was convoked under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister at which the strategical situation in the Far East was reviewed. In the course of these meetings, which were held in a most cordial atmosphere, views were exchanged on many aspects of the war both in the East and in the West. Post-war issues also came under discussion. There was complete agreement on the need for the rigorous prosecution of the war until the utter defeat of Germany and Japan has been achieved and for the organization of measures thereafter to secure a stable peace. . . ."

Relations between China and Russia might have been better. An attack on the Chinese Government by the

officially inspired Russian periodical, *War and the Working Class*, was much resented at Chungking. Relations between the Government and the Chinese Communists, who were reputed to take their directives from Moscow and were defended by the periodical to which reference has been made, were bad.

There were sanguinary collisions between Communist and Republican troops in more than one province, and although the Chinese Generalissimo described the Communist problem as political rather than military, the Minister of Information, Mr. Chang Tao-tan, was more outspoken. Asked by journalists how far the Communists were hindering the war, he replied : "The effect can well be imagined if any army fighting the enemy finds the threat of a stab in the back from supposedly friendly units in the rear."

President Lin Sen, an old and much-respected scholar, died at Chungking on August 1. On September 13 the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party met and, after modifying the Constitution and greatly extending the President's powers by these modifications, it elected General Chiang Kai-shek President. Whereas the President had been no more than the titular head of the Government, General Chiang Kai-shek now became Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces, was empowered to represent China in foreign affairs, and was elected President of the Executive Yuan, a post equivalent to that of Prime Minister. As "Tsung Tsai" (Chief Executive) and chief of the armed forces he was now the virtual dictator of China.

To turn to Japan, it may be noted that towards the end of the quarter the Japanese people were warned, more emphatically than on any previous occasion, of the increasing danger of their position. On July 19 General Tojo, after inspecting parts of occupied China, the Philippines, Siam and some of the conquered islands, urged regional governors to encourage the people in a firm will to victory. He was confident of victory, but the strength of the English-speaking combination must not be underestimated. The final Japanese offensive must be decisive but it would require the fullest national support. On July 23 he held a special war council of elder statesmen and leaders of the present Government. On July 29 a Tokyo broadcast warned the nation that

shipbuilding must be expedited and expanded if the nation wished to capitalize the resources of the conquered regions. The knowledge that further offensives against Japan were planned at Quebec increased official anxieties. Military spokesmen did something to prepare an arrogant and fanatical public for unpalatable news, and on September 22 the German Overseas Radio broadcast a most significant statement by the Japanese Prime Minister, a summary of which follows.

Presenting new measures to the public, General Tojo said, according to the Japanese News Agency :

"The general position is grave and the war has entered a phase in which no slackening of the present efforts can be tolerated. The British and Americans are attempting, without regard for their own high losses, to force the Japanese Empire to its knees by fresh offensives. Heavy battles are in progress, and others may be expected. The time has come for the Japanese people to adapt themselves to the present war situation in all fields, and to strengthen their resolution and energies to carry on the war until victory is won.

"In the first place provision has been made for the closest collaboration between high military authorities and the State. Second, a determined battlefield will be established at home, which will guarantee victory by giving support to the conduct of the war in every respect. Third, prompt and active diplomatic measures will be taken. Finally, measures are to be applied to ensure an epoch-making increase in war output, and especially in munitions and aircraft production. Direct and indirect effects on military events are to be expected which will amaze the world."

Details of the new measures were subsequently issued by the Japanese Information Office. It said, according to the German Overseas Radio :

All classes of the Japanese people must be imbued with the will to win and must realize the gravity of the situation. The whole strength of the nation must be concentrated on the arms industry and particularly on aircraft production, and the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese Air Force. Absolute self-sufficiency in the food situation of Japan and Manchukuo must be achieved. Plans for a far-reaching strengthening of the defence of the Japanese motherland must be worked out immediately.

To achieve these aims the Government will further simplify their administrative apparatus, partly by decentralization. All administrative measures unessential for the prosecution of the war at this decisive stage are to be eliminated. The Saturday half-holiday is to be dropped. Work will continue in Government Offices on Sundays and holidays by day and night. There will be complete mobilization of the whole Japanese people. Students will no longer be deferred. Military service is to be extended. Employment of women shall be expanded : the age-limit in all professions is to be abolished and elderly persons are to be put to profitable employment. Air defences, particularly in the industrial zones, are to be expanded. Special measures are to be taken for the protection of Government buildings and

factories in Tokyo and other big cities. Preparations are to be made for the transfer of Government buildings (? Departments), and industrial works and the shifting of sections of the population in the capital and other important towns in the interests of defence. Taxes are to be increased and war savings encouraged. There is to be a further simplification of prices. . . . (*Reuter.*)

The statement was interpreted in Britain as a sign that the Japanese Government were growing anxious, and that the country was feeling the strain imposed on its shipping by the necessary maintenance of the inordinately long lines of communication between the centre and the conquered outposts in Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the south-west Pacific. It appeared, too, that Japanese losses in aircraft had been particularly heavy and that naval and shipping casualties were compelling the High Command to trust increasingly in air defence against the Allies, whose production of aircraft already exceeded by far any figure to which Japan might aspire. There was no reason to anticipate any decline in Japanese moral, notwithstanding the break-down of the defence at Lae and the evacuation of Kiska. But it was plain that the Government now lacked that hearty confidence in the invincibility of Japanese arms which had inspired its chiefs at the opening of the Far Eastern War.


NOTE.—For Japanese breaches of international law at Macao the reader is referred to Chapter VIII, Section 4, of this volume, under "Portugal."

3: JAVA TO THE SOLOMONS

A. THE SOLOMONS

During the quarter American operations in the Solomons were centred on the reduction of three islands, New Georgia, Kolombangara and Vella Lavella. Since the enemy had lost Guadalcanal these islands had become outposts, strongly held and covering the direct sea approach to his bases in the Shortland group and Bougainville Island, which in turn covered the approaches to Rabaul. Until he had been deprived of his airfields at Munda in New Georgia and Vila in mountainous Kolombangara they presented a constant threat to

American warships and transports in these waters, and aircraft using them could keep the garrisons of Buin (Bougainville) and Faisi (Shortland Islands) informed of American movements. The Japanese garrison of New Georgia was thought to number 5,000-6,000 men.



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NEW GEORGIA TO BOUGAINVILLE

Kolombangara was more strongly, Vella Lavella much less strongly, held.

At the end of the previous quarter the Americans had seized Rendova Island off Munda Bay and landed at Viru Harbour on the south-eastern extremity of New Georgia. On July 2 official statements from various American authorities told the following story:

The Americans had taken Rendova before dawn on June 30. Within two hours they were shelling Munda with heavy guns which they had landed, and by midday they had wiped out the small Rendova garrison. Throughout that day and July 1 they had been constantly attacked from the air, but aided by ship and carrier-borne aircraft, by shore-based machines from Guadalcanal and their own A.A. batteries, they inflicted great losses on the enemy, and claimed to have brought down 123 aircraft in the two days at a cost of 25 machines and 15 crews. Some days before the capture of Rendova American Marines had disembarked undetected near the south-eastern extremity of New Georgia and it was these Marines who had forced their way through the jungles and taken Viru, after encountering what Admiral Halsey described as "medium opposition."

As had been expected, the Japanese Navy attempted to intervene. On July 2 warships shelled Rendova by night without effect and were driven off by American ships. During that day there had been more air fights wherein the Americans claimed the destruction of 20 fighters and eight dive-bombers against the loss of 11 machines. U.S. dive-bombers had also sunk a 1,500-ton cargo ship at Bairoka anchorage north of Munda. There was more air fighting on July 3 when American warships also shelled Wickham anchorage on Vanganu, the southernmost island of any size in the New Georgia group. Next day American troops landed on Vanganu and stormed the village of Vura, killing 300 Japanese and dispersing the remainder with slight loss to themselves. Round Viru the Marines continued to mop up stragglers, and it was announced that the capture of that harbour had cost them only 33 casualties. After another costly air attack on Rendova came news of a naval action. Details came slowly, but it was soon known that the Japanese had been worsted. On July 7 General MacArthur's report began :

"Preliminary dispatches report that our naval surface units intercepted an enemy force of cruisers and destroyers in the Kula Gulf (between New Georgia and Kolombangara) during the night of July 5. Details are not yet available . . . but it is indicated that six enemy ships were probably sunk and four damaged. We lost one cruiser." The report added that a destroyer beached on Kolombangara had been set on fire by American bombers, the escort of which had beaten off intercepting Zeros and had destroyed four. It was also made known that the U.S. destroyer *Strong* had been sunk by a torpedo while shelling Japanese positions on New Georgia. Later reports, this time from Admiral Halsey, showed that in the first stage of the action in Kula Gulf, four or five Japanese destroyers had been caught by smashing broadsides and sunk or set ablaze, after which three or four enemy light cruisers were in turn under concentrated fire which sank them or set them on fire in a quarter of an hour. One had been beached.¹ The American cruiser lost was the *Helena*, a fine ship, carrying 15 6-in. guns, with a speed of 32½ knots.² Admiral Halsey's H.Q. estimated the Japanese loss at eight ships, mostly destroyers, and believed that the two surviving ships had been much damaged.

¹ The reader is again reminded that the silhouettes of Japanese light cruisers and large destroyers are not easily distinguished.

² On July 19 it was announced that 161 of her complement who had got ashore on a Japanese-occupied island (? Kolombangara) and lay hid there for a week had been rescued at great risk by U.S. destroyers.

The enemy, it was clear, had hoped to break in upon the landing of American troops at Rice Anchorage near Bairoka on the northern shore of the western tip of New Georgia. They had been landed before dawn on July 5 under cover of naval gunfire but the warships escorting them had been ready for the Japanese. Another American force had crossed from Rendova on the night of July 4-5 and had established a beach-head at Zanana, six miles east of the Munda airfield. In spite of heavy rains and bad weather these two forces closed in on Munda. Enogai inlet north of Bairoka was beleaguered in order to prevent landings from barges starting from Kolombangara or other islands ; the 10-mile track from Munda to Bairoka was blocked and Munda airfield was copiously bombed. Light guns were landed at Zanana and brought forward for the attack on Munda. The Japanese airfields on the other islands, Vila, Kahili at Buin, Ballale near Faisi, Rekata Bay in St. Isabel Island, were frequently attacked by long-range U.S. bombers.

The Japanese Navy, however, had not yet given up Munda as lost and continued its attempts to relieve it. On the night of July 9-10 hostile ships were bombed in Choiseul Bay. Two were hit, they may have landed supplies at Vila, for when next seen they were heading north from Kolombangara towards Faisi. On the night of July 12-13 General MacArthur reported, Allied warships engaged Japanese cruisers and destroyers, sinking a cruiser and three destroyers and damaging others. The American destroyer *Gwin* was damaged and sank later. The General's report added the following details of the Munda fighting :

"Our naval units bombarded the aerodrome at night and they were followed in the morning by torpedo-aircraft and dive-bombers which attacked in force. . . . Earlier our fighters had intercepted 20 Zeros, shooting down five for the loss of one Allied machine. On the north-west coast [of New Georgia] our ground troops destroyed the Japanese garrison at Enogai Inlet." . . . Artillery and machine-guns were captured at this point where 150 Japanese dead were found, with many wounded. Further mopping-up operations conducted by warships and shore parties on Vanganu led to the destruction of three barges and 150 Japanese seeking to escape.

Nevertheless, the Japanese fought most stubbornly round Munda. They had constructed many pill-boxes made of coral blocks and palm trunks which stood severe battering. Their snipers were pervasive and cunning. Their fighting patrols seeped into the American lines by night, exploiting the weapon of noise and keeping their opponents awake in their wet "fox-holes," and searching for weak points. On the night of July 17-18, indeed, they reached the Munda-Bairoka trail and attacked the U.S. Headquarter Camp. But for the promptitude of the American gunners who put down a protective barrage around the camp for several hours they might have inflicted an impressive disaster upon their enemies.¹ The rains and the abundance of biting insects and poisonous snakes, which last were alleged to be absent from the fauna of Guadalcanal, added to the trials of the American troops who encountered the same tactical and natural difficulties which the Allies had experienced in New Guinea. But in important respects they were better off than the men who had crossed the Owen Stanley Range to destroy General Horii's Army. They had far stronger air support; the Allied command of the sea made it possible to land more guns and far more shells than could be carried by porters over the mountains of Papua; and though few of the ground troops had been in action before, their staffs were well informed of Japanese methods.

Badly mauled though they had been, the Japanese air squadrons still attempted counter-attack. On the night of July 16-17 they caused some casualties and damage at Guadalcanal. The Americans that night attacked Kahili aerodrome on the island of Buin off Bougainville and bombed it heavily. The intention was to pin down the Japanese aircraft. During the following forenoon Liberators, Avengers and Dauntless bombers with a strong fighter escort attacked vessels in the anchorages between Buin and Faisi. They claimed the destruction

¹ From an article by Mr. J. Norman Lodge, war correspondent of The Associated Press, published in a special supplement of *The Stars and Stripes*, September 2.

of seven, a light cruiser or flotilla leader, two destroyers, a submarine-chaser, a tanker and two cargo ships. The Japanese tried to intercept them and a series of fierce fights followed in which the Allies claimed the destruction of 44 fighters and five float-planes for the loss of only six machines. The special correspondent of *The Times* in Australia added :

"According to official statements . . . American naval and air forces in the Solomons during the past 12 days have sunk 17 Japanese warships and three cargo vessels, probably sunk two warships, and damaged four warships and a cargo vessel. Since the present operations in the Solomons began on June 30, the Allied air forces¹ have shot down in the Solomons alone a total of 304 Japanese aircraft. This figure does not include machines reported as probably shot down or aeroplanes destroyed on the ground. The American losses, as recorded in the official reports, numbered 53."

Another attack on the Buin-Faisi area on July 18 cost the Japanese a cargo vessel sunk, another with two destroyers damaged, and 13 fighters against four U.S. aircraft. The Japanese flotillas, however, were not beaten yet, and on the night of July 17-18, when the enemy attacked the U.S. Headquarters at Munda, there were two encounters with Japanese ships off the western coast of Kolombangara. Two Japanese destroyers were hit by torpedoes. One may have sunk, and the whole force, which was perhaps conveying supplies to Kolombangara, turned back.

Undeterred, the enemy sent an escorted convoy to Kolombangara. Catalina aircraft sighted it on the night of July 19-20 while it passed through the Blackett Strait between Gizo Island and Kolombangara. Two transports and three destroyers made for Vila, three cruisers and three destroyers stood off to protect the first group from attack. General MacArthur reported:

"Strong forces of our bombers of all categories attacked both groups during the night and after dawn. They sank a light cruiser and two destroyers, probably sank another destroyer, and damaged one transport and four destroyers. Two medium bombers and two dive-bombers are missing. The remaining enemy vessels were forced to withdraw without reaching their objective."

The defeat of this attempt seems to have put a stop to further Japanese attempts to supply the Central Solomons

¹ Which included New Zealand aircraft.

by means of large ships. Henceforth, indeed, they had some difficulty in supplying the northern islands of that archipelago, witness the destruction by U.S. aircraft on July 22 of a seaplane tender of the "Nishin" class (9,000 tons) which was trying to run supplies to Buin with destroyer escort. Intercepting Japanese fighters destroyed three American aircraft, but lost five of their number.

Meanwhile, the Americans closed in on Munda. On July 30 their front had advanced to within a mile of the aerodrome and many "pill-boxes" had been captured. On August 4 they had reached the eastern end of the aerodrome. Next day the Americans, aided by their light tanks, carried a hill overlooking the airfield, and this decided the struggle. On August 6 came this special announcement from General MacArthur's Headquarters: "Munda is now in our hands. All organized enemy resistance has ceased and action is now limited to the destruction of isolated enemy groups. Already 1,671 enemy dead have been collected." Press correspondents who visited the captured aerodrome said that it would soon be used by the victors, and that flame-throwers had been most useful in dislodging the Japanese from their caves in the coral rock.

From Munda General Millard Harmon's force, which included elements of the 25th, 37th and 43rd Divisions with contingents of Marines, turned to attack the Japanese positions on each side of Bairoka Harbour which had hitherto been observed by U.S. detachments. The enemy resisted obstinately and he had received some reinforcements and supplies ferried by night in barges from Kolombangara. That island was now the chief centre of Japanese resistance for Bairoka obviously could not hold out long, while Kolombangara, mountainous, well-wooded and garrisoned by perhaps 7,000 men, was far more defensible. The Americans, accordingly, began by isolating it. This they effected by a sudden landing on Vella Lavella¹ Island. The Japanese were

¹ Vella Lavella lies north-west of Kolombangara, the nearest point on which is 17 miles distant. It is about 25 miles long by about 15 miles wide at its broadest.

surprised. The Americans took 350 prisoners, a record in the campaign in this region until that date, but they admitted that these were unarmed men, mostly survivors from ships recently sunk off the island. The rest fled to the eastern side of Vella Lavella. Japanese aircraft made five attacks on the landing beaches, killing a dozen soldiers and wounding a few more, but Allied fighters counter-attacked most effectively, bringing 22 fighters and 12 dive-bombers down for the loss of but two machines.

This bold move seemed to have robbed the enemy of any chance of relieving Vila, the garrison of which was known to be short of supplies. It offered other advantages.

"The Allies," said the New York correspondent of *The Times*, "... have brought themselves 50 miles nearer than they were in New Georgia to the great Japanese base at Rabaul, New Britain, now only 400 miles away; and are in a position to intensify their attacks on the Bougainville area which contains four out of the six air bases remaining in enemy hands in the Solomons. Of these bases the biggest, Kahili, is now a bare 80 miles away." (*The Times*, August 18.)

The Americans also scored another naval success. On the night of August 17-18 their warships encountered four Japanese destroyers escorting some 30 troop-carrying barges towards the north-eastern coast of Vella Lavella. In a brief action the Japanese destroyers were driven off, two of them out of action, and the barges were rapidly destroyed. About 300 of the 2,200 men whom they were believed to have carried reached Vella Lavella, where they took refuge in the jungle. The rest perished. Other attempts were made to land smaller parties on the island, and Allied light naval craft found and "shot up" barges on the coast of Vella Lavella, in creeks on Kolombangara, and off islets in the Kula Gulf on the night of August 21-22. Japanese aircraft attacked Munda airfield on the night of August 23 and twice raided Vella Lavella by day, only to be intercepted by American fighters and to lose nine more machines.

On August 28 A.H.Q. announced the evacuation of Bairoka. Most of its garrison got away in boats and barges to Vila. The small remnant was destroyed. The Americans next landed a force on Arundel Island which

bars most of the southern entrance to the Kula Gulf, finding . unoccupied. Its northernmost shore is only a mile from Vila and it was expected that American artillery would soon be bombarding that stronghold from Arundel. The Japanese, however, were resolved to prevent them as the event proved. On September 4 American official dispatches announced that the Japanese had evacuated their once important seaplane base at Rekata Bay, on St. Isabel Island, but it was not certain whether they had withdrawn the whole garrison.

Owing, perhaps, to the demands of the expedition against Lae, which is described in the next section, fighting on land lessened in the Solomons during September. An exception was Arundel Island. The Japanese managed to get troops across from Kolombangara in barges and heavy fighting broke out on September 20. The invaders were finally liquidated as a force on September 22, but mopping-up lasted several days. The Americans counted 345 dead. Attempts to land troops from barges on Vella Lavella from Kolombangara seem to have met with some success, if a Japanese broadcast mentioning fighting at the northern end of Vella Lavella at the end of September was more than mere propaganda.

In the air both sides were active. After September 15 the enemy in the northern Solomons had received enough new aircraft to make a new bid for air mastery. A heavy raid by some 250 Allied aircraft on the enemy's positions in Bougainville on September 14 was said to have done much damage, but on subsequent occasions his fighters appeared in such numbers that the Allied Command suspected at first that he had secret aerodromes on that island. The following attacks and counter-attacks were recorded by A.H.Q. during the last half of September :

On September 16 about 100 Japanese fighters intercepted some 200 American aircraft of all categories over the Ballale, Kara and Kahili aerodromes, but lost 16 machines to our Allies' three. Forty Japanese aircraft raided Munda in reply. On September 17 the Americans again attacked the northern aerodromes over which they encountered 50 hostile machines, shooting down 14 but losing three themselves. That night the enemy raided Munda thrice. After attacks by night on Kahili and Ballale,

the Americans attacked Ballale by day, using dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers with fighter escort. This time 60 fighters intercepted them, shooting down six U.S. aircraft at a cost of 14.

On September 20, 50 machines, including 30 dive-bombers, attacked Vella Lavella, but were intercepted and lost 20 aircraft. The enemy also attacked Munda and the Navy Department stated on September 23 that he had attacked Guadalcanal five times in the last ten days. On September 27 A.H.Q. reported a large-scale attack on Kahili in which nine of 60 intercepting Zeros were shot down for the loss of two American fighters. In the Central Solomons Japanese coastal batteries on Kolombangara, which had caused some loss to American forward troops on Arundel, were silenced, after which Vila aerodrome was heavily bombed, and a raid by 38 fighters and bombers on Vella Lavella was easily beaten off by American fighter patrols.

The month closed with American-escorted bombers raiding Bougainville and Japanese night-bombers attacking Munda and Vella Lavella less effectively. It was announced late in September that New Zealand troops had joined the Americans on one of the Pacific fronts, which was rightly or wrongly identified by military commentators with the Solomon Islands, where New Zealand airmen had been engaged for several months. At the beginning of October the New Zealand Government issued an account of the sinking of a large Japanese submarine by the New Zealand corvette *Tui*, which forced the enemy to the surface with depth charges and shelled her, after which aircraft completed her destruction. Survivors rescued by the New Zealanders said that the submarine was the one which shelled the Californian coast near Santa Barbara in February, 1942. Mention may also be made here of the excellent work done by a very small but most gallant contingent of Fijians who took part in the later stages of the Guadalcanal campaign and proved themselves excellent jungle-fighters, silent, skilful and valiant.

B. NEW GUINEA AND INDONESIA

At the end of the Fifteenth Quarter the Allies had opened a new campaign in northern New Guinea. By occupying the Trobriand and Woodlark Islands they had obtained potential air bases which brought them within fighter range of the Japanese base at Rabaul. The

Americans' landing at Nassau Bay, 11 miles south of Salamaua, threatened that stronghold and endangered the Japanese force holding the outpost of Mubo, 15 miles south-west of Salamaua. Already a brigade of the 6th Australian Division had established itself on three sides of Mubo. It now extended its right down the Bitoi River and thus made contact with the Americans on the coast. Japanese intervention by air was ineffective and attack from the Rabaul aerodromes was staved off by American heavy bombers which dropped over 50 tons of bombs on them on July 2 and 3. For the first fortnight of July operations were chiefly confined to air and sea. Mitchells bombed Salamaua heavily on July 11 and the Lightnings escorting them shot down five intercepting Zeros, losing but two of their number. In the Huon Gulf light motor-torpedo boats sank Japanese barges, and Liberators and Fortresses continued to raid Rabaul by night. Japanese bases in Dutch New Guinea, whence aircraft were reaching Wewak and Madang to relieve the pressure on Salamaua, were raided by Dutch, Australian and Allied aircraft as were bases in the Aru and Tenimber Islands and in Timor.

On July 15 the Australians carried "Greenhill," the key of the Mubo position which the enemy evacuated next day. The remains of the garrison escaped to Komiatum, four miles to the north-east. It was claimed that they had lost 950 killed, many by our bombing raids since the landing at Nassau Bay. The Australians followed up their retreat and established themselves to the south-west and north-east of Komiatum, beating off several counter-attacks.

It was necessary to prevent the enemy from concentrating any large force of aircraft at Wewak and Madang. On July 21 and 23 there were fierce air combats above Bogadjim, 16 miles south of Madang, and between that Japanese post and Lae. The enemy lost 32 aircraft to the Americans' four. He used Messerschmitt fighters, no doubt built in Japan on German plans, and lost six of them. He retaliated by raiding Bulolo in the goldfields area, but did little damage there. For the next month

the Australians and Americans seem to have marked time on land, but their air activity was incessant. On July 27 Salamaua received 123 tons of bombs. On July 28 two destroyers and a cargo ship were sighted by Allied aeroplanes off Cape Gloucester, at the western tip of New Britain, and were subsequently attacked by heavy bombers. One destroyer sank. The other and the cargo ship went aground and were wrecked. Light motor-torpedo boats and aircraft carried out successful attacks on the barges which the enemy were using increasingly to supply and reinforce the Lae-Salamaua positions; and although the barges themselves could be built rapidly enough by Japanese craftsmen in these wooded isles, the loss of soldiers and stores could not always be made good in time to relieve the pressure on the garrisons whom they were sent to succour. On August 2 American bombers attacked small craft and ports west of Lae and were attacked by a number of Zeros. Fourteen Lightnings escorting them countered, and of the 14 Japanese fighters 11 were shot down.

After this date air operations slackened for a while, perhaps through unfavourable weather, perhaps because General MacArthur, learning that the Japanese were concentrating many aircraft in the Madang-Wewak area, allowed them to mass with the intention of eventually surprising them by a sudden attack. On August 15 Allied fighters intercepted a force of 12 bombers escorted by 25 fighters, some 40 miles west of Lae and shot down 14, 11 bombers among these, for the loss of three machines. That day Allied heavy bombers dropped 99 tons of bombs on the Komiatum positions and medium bombers had a field-day among the barges, destroying 10 off New Britain while five more were sunk by Catalinas as they edged along the coast towards Lae from the west.

On August 18, A.H.Q. announced a brilliant success. Reconnaissance had revealed the arrival of many aeroplanes at Wewak and its satellite aerodromes of Borum, Dague and Bui. On the night of August 16-17 the blow fell. It found the Japanese machines ranged wing-tip to wing-tip on some of the runways.

"At Borum," said the official report, "the motors of 60 fighters and bombers were being warmed up, the air crews were in their places, and ground crews were standing by as we struck. Some of the pilots frantically endeavoured to take the air and were burned with their machines. Machine-gun fire and fragmentation bombs turned the airfield into a mass of flames as flight after flight pressed home the attack. At Wewak aerodrome six fighters took off of which three were shot down." Aerial photographs taken later showed that 120 aircraft had been destroyed in these attacks and that at least 50 more had been damaged. The losses among personnel on the airfields must have been heavy. The Allies lost but three machines. Commenting on the operation, General MacArthur said: "It was a crippling blow at an opportune moment. Numerically the opposing forces were about equal in strength, but one was in the air and the other was not. Nothing is so helpless as an aircraft on the ground. In war surprise is decisive." Major-General A. C. Whitehead, commanding the advanced echelon of the Fifth U.S.A.A.F., described the action as "the opening of the battle for air supremacy in Central New Guinea."

The Americans speedily renewed their attack. On August 18 Liberators and Fortresses attacked the airfields near Wewak by day. Mitchells and Lightnings followed them and attacked from a low level and had bombs to spare for the town and harbour, where they left supply dumps and three cargo ships ablaze. On August 19 A.H.Q. gave the following estimate of the damage inflicted in the two days' attacks:

"On Tuesday 120 Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground, 50 damaged and three Zeros shot down in air fights by Mitchells. Yesterday 64 aircraft, some of which had been damaged the previous day, were destroyed on the ground, and 28 out of 30 fighters which intercepted the attackers were shot down. In other words, only 10 of an original concentration of 225 Japanese aircraft escaped destruction. . . . Our total losses during the operations were six machines."

On August 22 A.H.Q. announced that the Japanese had evacuated Komiatum and the positions around it. Their communications with Salamaua which followed the southern bank of the San Francisco River were commanded by our occupation of higher ground, so they retired to the north of the river. The Allied left flank was now at Bobdubi, while their right reached the sea at Tambu Bay. The enemy had abandoned artillery and machine-guns at Komiatum and 350 fresh graves represented his recent losses.

Meanwhile, the 5th U.S.A.A.F. closely watched the Japanese airfields to the west and soon discovered that the enemy was still bringing up aircraft from the Hollandia and Manokwari aerodromes in Dutch New Guinea.

On August 20 Liberators with Lightning escort destroyed some grounded machines at Borum and the escort beat off 30 intercepting Zeros, claiming the destruction of 19 machines against our loss of two. On August 21 Mitchells escorted by Lightnings attacked the Bui and Dague airfields. "They reported having left 34 aircraft burning. . . . Some of them were probably . . . damaged in previous raids; others were replacements. Large numbers of fighters took off and heavy engagements ensued. Our pilots claimed to have shot down 33 fighters. . . . Three of our fighters are missing. . . ."¹

By August 23 the Allies were in sight of Salamaua aerodrome and the Japanese were shortening their line. That night light warships shelled Finschafen near the eastern end of the Huon peninsula between Lae and Madang, and damaged shipping and port installations. This was the first attack of the kind made in this theatre. During the last days of August the Allied forces continued their air attacks. Nearly 100 heavy and medium bombers dropped 180 tons of bombs on the enemy's supply and shipping base at Hansa Bay, midway between Wewak and Madang, and an important stage for Japanese coastwise traffic in this part of New Guinea. During the attack they sank a large cargo ship and destroyed or damaged several landing craft. On August 29 escorted Liberators raided the Wewak and Borum airfields, destroying several aircraft on the ground. Some 40 intercepting fighters were beaten off by Lightnings and seven were felled. A second attack by about 30 machines reached the Liberators, but was shot to pieces by the American gunners, who claimed 17 more machines. Raids on Alexishafen and Bogadjim, near Madang, on New Ireland, New Britain and Babo, in Dutch New Guinea, were recorded on the same day. Dague, Bui and another airfield at Tajdi, near Wewak, were raided on August 31, and on September 1 Liberators and Mitchells dropped 206 tons of high explosives on Madang, doing great damage on shore and sinking many barges.

On that day the largest expedition that had set out against the Japanese in these seas left its base, escorted by a powerful squadron of American warships and covered at all dangerous points of its passage by American and Australian aircraft from the New Guinea airfields. Its

¹ The special correspondent of *The Times*, *loc. cit.* August 23.

aim was to isolate and capture Salamaua and Lae. The troops composing it were largely Australians of the famous 9th Division which had won such distinction in Libya. On their way they were further encouraged by the news of the invasion of Italy. Before they reached their destination on the morning of September 4, heavy air attacks had been directed against Lae, against Wewak, where three freighters had been sunk and a destroyer and a fourth freighter were left burning and 12 of 35 intercepting Zeros were shot down, and also, during the night of September 3-4, on the Rabaul airfields.

Beaches on the northern shore of the Huon Gulf had been chosen for the landing. After a brief bombardment by the warships the first landing craft made for the shore. Lightnings, Kittyhawks and Airacobras covered them against air attack. Mitchells raided Finschafen and the western extremity of New Britain. Heavy bombers raided Lae airfield. The enemy was completely surprised. Not a shot came from the shore as the boats and barges approached.


"Only once," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times*, "did Japanese aircraft appear. Three fast medium bombers came sneaking along . . . from the west and dropped their bombs among the first waves of landing craft. So close were the boats drawn up on the beach that some damage was inevitable, and the casualties . . . were negligible. Our fighters pounced on the raiders shortly afterwards and it is doubtful if any escaped. Thereafter fighters of the R.A.A.F. kept up a low-level cover against . . . such attacks. But no more occurred. . . . The Allied Air Forces had done a magnificent job. On their performance depended the success not only of this operation but of any similar operation carried out in the future. For our strategy here, as in Europe, is founded surely on the rock of air superiority.

"Nor, incredibly enough, was any opposition encountered from the ground. The assault troops pressed inland and along the coasts and secured a large area without making contact with the enemy. Long before the landing was completed they had crossed the river that was expected to be at least a minor obstacle. . . . The men on the beaches never saw a shot fired or even heard one. . . ."

On the beaches the engineers did marvels in bringing heavy material across the sands on wire mesh strips which prevented the heaviest vehicles from being bogged. Tractors, jeeps and bulldozers were at work before the larger landing craft had touched the shore. Gangs cut paths in the jungle. Bulldozers cleared the beginnings of roads. To north and east detachments fanned out to

block every track by which Japanese troops from the west or from Finschafen might cut in on our flank.

General MacArthur followed up the blow with another shrewd stroke. On September 5, after an intensive air attack on the enemy's positions covering the Nadzab airfield some 20 miles west of Lae, American paratroops, engaged for the first time in the south-west Pacific, were dropped through a smoke screen laid by bombers. The fighters which had escorted the transport



By kind permission of *The Times*

LAKE TO WEWAK

aircraft then joined in the attack. Next the Japanese field fortifications at Heath's Plantation, six and a half miles north-west of Lae, were heavily bombed. Specially trained field artillerymen were dropped with their guns. As the last paratroops descended, an Australian composite force which had marched 55 miles in five days through the jungles from the south, had reached and was crossing the Markham River. It soon linked up with the Americans and advanced upon the airfield.

"General MacArthur led the American paratroops in the flight to their objective. He reached the aerodrome at 7 a.m., walked along the line of transport aircraft and wished the commander of the unit good luck. After watching the loading and take-off of the first few machines, he boarded a Flying Fortress, which flew at 5,000 feet over the area in which the paratroops were landing and remained until all had reached the ground."¹

¹ The Special Correspondent of *The Times*, loc. cit. September 8.

This brilliant operation speedily brought about the capture of Nadzab aerodrome and the isolation of Lae from Madang and Finschafen. Its garrison could only make contact with Salamaua along the coast road. The two garrisons were thought to number 14,000 men all told, a composite force drawn from four infantry divisions, with a fair number of guns and mortars. This estimate may not have allowed for the enemy's heavy previous losses from sickness and in the Mubo-Komiatum fighting.

In any case Salamaua was hard pressed. Its garrison fought stubbornly, counter-attacking at times, but on September 13 the capture of the now disused airfield was announced, and on the night of September 13-14 came news that Salamaua had been evacuated. The enemy had tried for a while to hold positions on the Lae side of the perimeter, but he was too weak, and in the end only a few hundred men struggled along the coast hoping to reach Lae.

By this time reinforcements from the tried 7th Australian Division had been landed at Nadzab by air, arriving in a few hours at a point which marching infantry would have taken 30 days to reach. By September 15 the 9th Division had crossed the Busu River and had brought Lae aerodrome under their guns, while the 7th Division moving down the Markham valley had driven the Japanese from most of the plantations which they had fortified, since the cleared ground gave them a better field of fire. On that day the Japanese air squadrons at Wewak, strongly reinforced from Hollandia aerodrome, were attacked by American bombers with Lightning escort and heavily punished. Over 60 of their machines took the air and 48 were claimed as "certainly destroyed," mainly by the concentrated fire of the Liberators. All these returned safely. American fighter loss was light.

On September 16 Australian troops entered Lae. A.H.Q. reported its fall in the following terms :

"Lae is in our hands. Our continuous air bombardments over the past weeks reduced it to a shambles. Our troops have now overwhelmed all remaining resistance. Scattered elements of Japanese troops attempted to break out . . . towards the north, but found the jungle trails to the mountains locked. Their destruction is certain." The remains of some 20 aircraft lay on the disused airfield, the runways of which were covered with grass. The wrecks of two cargo ships lay offshore. The mangled hulks of a dozen launches and barges were found in the mouth of the Butibum River. A few guns were discovered but the Japanese had generally removed the

breech-blocks. Their resistance had been unexpectedly weak. They were short of food and it seemed that air-bombing, isolation and tropical diseases had broken down their will to resist. "The Australians," wrote the Special Correspondent of *The Times*, "never cease to wonder at the filthy conditions which the Japanese soldiers tolerate. They think nothing of fouling their own shelters and trenches." This had been remarked elsewhere in New Guinea and was the more singular in view of the cleanliness of the Japanese at home. Their losses at Wau, Mubo, and Komiatum had been heavy. Documents showed that in one regiment with an effective strength of 2,250 men, they had totalled 1,453 including sick and wounded. Altogether 6,300 corpses or graves were discovered in the Lae-Salamaua positions, the majority about Salamaua. Of the groups who sought to escape northwards but had delayed their retreat too long, most were killed.

Although Japanese resistance had been relatively feeble at Lae the troops engaged in its capture had well deserved the tribute paid by General MacArthur to their efforts.

He particularly mentioned "two of the A.I.F.'s most famous divisions." He spoke most highly of the work of the U.S. Navy, the R.A.A.F. and the 5th U.S.A.A.F., and not least of the Royal Australian Engineers, among whose exploits he cited the bridging of five flooded rivers and the construction of four miles of corduroy over tidal swamps where the men worked up to their waists in water. The Allies had captured large quantities of military material, but the most useful prize had been the well-designed Lae aerodrome which they had speedily brought back into serviceable condition.

The captors of Lae did not rest upon their laurels. While the "stops" occupying the trails leading west and north cut off Japanese fugitives or drove them into the foodless mountains of this region, further air raids were directed against Wewak and Madang, and Australian air-borne troops surprised and took the landing-ground at Kaiapat, 60 miles up the River Markham from Lae. Japanese troops, perhaps evacuated from Lae before the landing, were surprised and roughly handled at Boana, 19 hours' march north of Nadzab, on September 21. Barges off the coast were "strafed" and a Japanese cargo ship was bombed and sank in the Bismarck Sea. A counter-raid on Nadzab by 21 aircraft was repulsed and three machines brought down for our one. Early on September 23 A.H.Q. announced another landing, this time north of Finschafen, at dawn on September 22. The convoy had been spotted on the previous evening by a small Japanese air group which attacked, to be beaten

off with the loss of nine machines to our one without having damaged the convoy. But Finschafen had been warned and the landing was opposed.

It was made "on a small stretch of sandy beach about seven miles north of Finschafen port, the only suitable spot for landing operations anywhere on this coast, which is formed over most of its length by cliffs, 20 to 30 feet high. The landing was preceded by an intense bombardment, lasting six minutes, from the U.S. Navy which escorted the convoy. . . . The first wave of assault troops . . . were met even before they began to leap ashore by fire from machine-guns and mortars, and by hand-grenades. They suffered some casualties but overcame the resistance. . . . Then came several more waves of landing craft. Finally came those of the largest type. . . ." A powerful force of fighters covered the operation.¹

The troops took their first objective, a beach-head comprising two miles of coastline and extending a mile inland, early in the day, and by 4 p.m. they had reduced a strong Japanese pocket of resistance in Katika village on the beach-head's southern edge. An air attack on the U.S. warships as they steamed away was intercepted north of the port and the ensuing "dog-fight" went ill for the Japanese, who were completely defeated, losing, it was claimed, 40 machines to the Allied three. On the ground the attack on Finschafen progressed slowly in difficult country against tough resistance. By September 25 the Australians had taken the airfield, and by the 27th they were established on some of the ridges commanding the settlement from the west. A Japanese group holding positions some miles inland was also attacked by troops landed on a beach near the Sattelberg mission. Meanwhile, every effort was made to prevent any Japanese interference by air with the operation. On September 24 Lightnings intercepted 39 bombers and fighters and forced the bombers to jettison their bombs, although for once our aircraft were outnumbered. Then came a heavy raid on Wewak on September 27. On the previous day Lightnings on reconnaissance over the base had shot down six at least of over 15 fighters which had tried to intercept them and had reported another concentration of aircraft and shipping at Wewak. Next day 200 bombers and fighters attacked the neighbouring airfields and the harbour.

¹ *The Times*, September 25.

They did great damage, and A.H.Q. claimed the destruction of 50 aircraft on the ground and the burning of most, if not all, of the shipping in harbour, which included three tankers, four freighters and 29 barges or luggers. The Japanese put up a very heavy barrage which shot down three Allied bombers and damaged others. Of 20 fighters which intercepted the bombers, eight were shot down. Next day Liberators escorted by Lightnings renewed the attack, dropped 145 tons of bombs on the enemy's supply dumps and installations and blew up his chief ammunition dump. Forty enemy fighters intercepted and lost eight of their number. All the Allied pilots returned, although several machines were damaged by the enemy's flak, which was heavy and well sustained.

Meanwhile the Australians in the Markham Valley continued their advance westwards with strong air support and by the end of the month they had reached a point about 90 miles east of Madang. Japanese positions on the coast were also attacked from the air, and before long the enemy was in full retreat on this flank. On the other hand the enemy established at Cape Gloucester in New Britain made frequent counter-attacks by air on the troops beleaguering Finschafen only 87 miles away and did some damage.

Nevertheless, neither these raids nor the frequent counter-attacks of the Finschafen garrison could check the steady Australian advance, and by the night of September 30 the besiegers were within 600 yards of the centre of the settlement and the besieged, though still fighting stoutly, were obviously doomed.

During the quarter the Allied bomber squadrons based upon the north and north-west of Australia had extended the range and increased the weight of their bombings. Besides making frequent attacks on the Aru, Kei and Tenimber islands where the enemy had several seaplane bases and an airfield at Selaru in the Tenimbers, they raided the enemy's holdings in western (Dutch) New Guinea on many occasions. Liberators, Dutch Mitchells and Australian Hudsons attacked airfields in Timor on the night of July 14 and these raids were repeated five nights later. Macassar was bombed for five hours by Liberators during the night of July 19-20. A more ambitious enterprise was a raid on Surabaya in Java early before dawn on July 22.

A small group of Liberators found the dockyard well lit up and they bombed it heartily for an hour, hitting an oil refinery, a dock and many

warehouses. They all returned safely leaving great fires behind them, having made a journey of nearly 2,400 miles. They encountered no night fighters and the enemy's flak died down towards the end of the raid. More raids were directed against Timor during the last week of July, and on July 30 it was announced at Canberra that 500 Portuguese subjects, officials, priests, nuns and natives of the island had been successfully evacuated from Timor by Allied warships and brought to Australia, where the Commonwealth Government took charge of them. It was rumoured about this time that the Dutch and Australian troops who had been holding out in the interior of the island had been successfully withdrawn, but there was no confirmation of this.

The next long-distance raid was directed against Ambon in the Moluccas which had been attacked on several previous occasions. On August 13 the Liberators went further afield. A small formation of Liberators flew from Australia to Balikpapan and back, a distance of over 2,500 miles. They remained for more than an hour over their targets, the great oil refineries and reservoirs and they left the whole area ablaze. Seven of the larger oil reservoirs exploded, setting two big refinery groups on fire. A tanker in harbour was left burning. All the bombers returned in spite of heavy A.A. fire. This was the first of three raids. The second was carried out by only two Liberators on reconnaissance (August 16) but they managed to hit a tanker, to rekindle dying fires and to shoot down four of six Zeros which attacked them. During another attack on the night of August 17-18 four large ships in harbour were hit. On August 21 Pomelaa in Celebes, a nickel-mining centre, was raided, and later in the month Kendari, also in Celebes, and airfields in Timor were attacked by small forces. Halong in Amboina was raided later in the month.

The Japanese made several attacks on Darwin during the quarter. On July 6 they raided the port.

"The enemy again employed his favourite formation of 27 bombers escorted by 21 fighters. The Spitfires destroyed five bombers and two fighters, probably destroyed two more bombers and damaged others. Seven Spitfires were lost. The pilots of three were saved. . . ." A later estimate set the enemy's loss at 12 machines. The Japanese claimed to have made a successful attack on Brooks Creek, 70 miles south-east of Darwin, and to have destroyed over 50 fighters and bombers on the ground on July 8, but there was no confirmation whatever of this story. Raids on Darwin and Broome on August 20 and 27 respectively did no damage worth mentioning. On their next appearance (September 8), when 20 fighters escorted a reconnaissance machine, Spitfires certainly destroyed five and

may have destroyed half the force for the loss of three machines. Two of their pilots were rescued. A raid on Darwin on September 19 was ineffective. On September 27, 25 aircraft made a hit-and-run attack on the airfield at Drysdale River Mission, on the north-west coast of Australia, 200 miles south-west of Darwin, when they damaged the mission building.

It was not definitely known whether remnants of the Dutch East Indian forces were still resisting the Japanese in the interior, but in the mountains of the Philippines the Japanese admitted that some American and Filipino soldiers remained in the field.

4 : THE ALEUTIANS, WAKE, AND MARCUS ISLANDS

After the fall of Attu Island, American and Canadian aircraft and surface ships had raided the Japanese positions on Kiska whenever the weather permitted attack. Meanwhile, preparations were made for a large-scale landing on that island which the Japanese were believed to have garrisoned with 10,000 men. The importance of Kiska as an air and submarine base inspired the belief that it would be stoutly defended and that its reduction would require much more time than that of Attu. But on August 21 it was officially announced in a statement signed by President Roosevelt and Mr. King, the Canadian Prime Minister, that a strong force of Canadian and United States troops, supported by warships, had occupied the island without encountering opposition after landings which had begun on August 15. The "birds had flown." Their supply lines threatened by the loss of Attu, their batteries and other installations damaged by air attack and by naval bombardments, the Japanese had evacuated Kiska under cover of the characteristic fogs of those melancholy seas. For security's sake the announcement of the occupation of the island had been delayed until the transports had unloaded. Three Japanese "midget submarines" were found damaged by the Allies at the Kiska naval base. On August 23 U.S. Navy Department announced the unopposed occupation of Segula island, 20 miles east of Kiska. No Japanese were found there.

With Attu in their hands the Americans had sat down

to fortify the island much more thoroughly than the Japanese had done. Foggy weather, unusually heavy even for the Aleutians this summer, had protected them against any Japanese interference by air and the enemy's submarines were unexpectedly unenterprising and failed to push their attacks home when U.S. and Canadian anti-submarine craft were on patrol. Even before the occupation of Kiska American aircraft had struck at the northernmost Kurile Islands. On July 20 the Navy Department announced :

"On Monday, July 19, during the morning, a formation of Army Liberators attacked Paramushir, in the Kurile Islands, causing a number of fires. In addition Japanese ships in the Paramushir Straits were bombed. Near hits were observed." Another attack on the morning of August 12 on enemy "installations in the Kurile Islands" was intercepted by about 40 Japanese fighters, but the nine Liberators shot down five and scored bomb hits in the target areas. Two of the U.S. machines did not return. Three more were damaged but got clear without casualties. The attack was concentrated on the Kataoka naval base at Paramushir and an army base. Japanese flak came chiefly from warships and steamers. It was described as heavy but inaccurate.

On September 13, after a Japanese broadcast had referred to another raid on Paramushir, the U.S. Navy Department announced that Army bombers had raided the island that day, doing much damage to shipping and ground installations and shooting down 10 Japanese fighters for certain. Ten American machines did not return. On September 27 it was officially announced in Moscow that seven U.S. air crews had been interned in Siberia "according to international law" for flying over Russian territory. Three had landed in Kamchatka on September 12 owing to engine trouble. Four had appeared over Kamchatka on the same day and "were compelled to land in Soviet territory." What compelled them to land was not stated. The statement, while "correct" enough (for Russia was not at war with Japan), did not please the American public.

While the Americans and Canadians were edging towards Japan in the North Pacific, the U.S. forces were also active in Central Pacific waters. Wake Island was attacked by Liberators of the Army Air Force on July 24 and again on July 27.

The official statements said that on the first occasion 30 Zero fighters attacked the Liberators, but nine were certainly shot down. One American bomber did not return. In the course of the second attack 25 Zeros intervened but they lost seven of their number and failed to destroy a single American bomber. Damage was done to installations and runways.

The next American attack was directed against Marcus Island, which lies in a remote area of the Central Pacific

about 500 miles north-east of the Mariana group (Mariannes) and just short of 1,000 miles south-east of Yokohama. On August 31 (Far Eastern time) Tokyo wireless said that American naval air forces had attacked the island and next day the Navy Department said that an aircraft-carrier task force raid, planned for September 1, was "presumably in progress." The island had been an important air base since the early months of the war, "serving the dual purpose of a relay point on the enemy's supply lines to the mandated islands¹ and an outpost of the air defences of Tokyo."² The Japanese broadcast said that two aircraft-carriers had sent off fully 90 fighters and 60 bombers to the attack and that 12 of the raiders had been shot down. No American account of the operation was published during the quarter, but it was stated later that a new aeroplane, the Grumann F6, known as the "Hellcat," had been used in the operation and had proved superior to the excellent "Wildcat" produced by the same firm. It was described as "one of the fastest and most manoeuvrable fighters ever produced" (*The Times*, New York message, September 11).

Several minor operations were carried out in the South Central Pacific during the quarter. Fifteen Japanese aircraft attacked Funafuti in the Ellice Islands on the night of September 13, doing light damage. One was brought down by A.A. fire. Canton Island, another American outpost, was also raided. On September 19 Pacific Fleet Headquarters announced :

"Strong air forces to-day conducted a heavy raid on Japanese bases on Tarawa Island, in the Northern Gilbert group, and on Nauru Island, west of the Gilbert group. These operations were carried out according to plan during the night preceding and for a good part of the day of September 19. Details are not yet available." Later Admiral Nimitz announced that great damage had been done. It was disclosed on September 29 that U.S. forces had occupied Nanumea, the northernmost of the Ellice Islands, without opposition on September 4. An American reconnaissance aircraft was attacked near Nauru on September 27 by five Zeros but shot down one certainly and may have destroyed another. On the night of September 30 another reconnaissance aircraft escaped from nine Zeros, which attacked 15 miles north of Nauru, after shooting one down.

¹ The Carolines, Mariannes and Ladrões.

² *The Times*. New York message, published September 3.

On September 3 Colonel Knox, Secretary of the U.S. Navy, described the effects of the war on Japanese shipping.

The Japanese, he said, had started the war with a mercantile fleet of 6,368,000 tons and had since built or captured another 1,250,000 tons. Of this powerful fleet approximately 2,500,000 tons had been lost since Pearl Harbour. Shipping was one of the enemy's most vital war resources and this loss of tonnage was impairing his ability to exploit his conquests in the south-west Pacific. Most of the destruction had been accomplished by U.S. submarines which had done splendid work but all the United Nations' sea and air forces had shared in it. Asked whether these losses had contributed to the Japanese withdrawal from Kiska and some of the Solomons, he said that difficulties in communications had certainly brought about these retreats. The fleet of U.S. submarines in the Pacific was being constantly increased and the Japanese losses might be expected to increase too.

The following sinkings of Japanese vessels by American submarines were reported on various occasions during the quarter :

July 8 and 15. *Sunk* : three large transports, a medium-sized transport three large, six medium-sized and two small cargo vessels, one large and three medium-sized tankers, one schooner. *Damaged* : eight vessels.

August 15. *Sunk* : a large transport, a medium-sized cargo vessel, a medium-sized passenger freighter, two small freighters, a supply ship and a schooner. *Damaged* : five vessels.

September 9. *Sunk* : five cargo ships, three large, one medium-sized, and one small and one medium-sized tanker.

On September 14 the Navy Department announced the presumed loss of the submarine *Grenadier* "on patrol operations," apparently in the Pacific. Early in October the Japanese official wireless claimed that six hostile submarines had been destroyed by the Japanese Navy in the Pacific and in the China seas.

CHAPTER VI

THE AMERICAS

I : THE UNITED STATES

On September 21 Mr. Paul McNutt, the chairman of the United States War Man-power Commission, announced that the United States already had more than 63,500,000 men and women actively engaged in industry or serving with the armed forces. This, Mr. McNutt said, was the greatest number of persons at work in American history. Throughout the period under review the American war effort continued to develop strength, and when President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress summarizing the military and production position there was little criticism of it. Mr. Roosevelt pointed out that there was only one war and one basic strategy, and that there was no such thing as a "home front" divorced from war considerations. General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, made his contribution to the story of the war effort. In his Biennial Report to the Secretary of War he brought up to date the history of the building of the United States Army. His first report had covered the period between July 1, 1939, and June 30, 1941, and the events were treated in two phases.

The first phase included the fall of France and covered the period of uncertainty as to the influence of the war upon the United States. The second phase, commencing with the Battle of Britain and terminating with the German declaration of war against Russia, was conspicuous for a growing national appreciation of the seriousness of the international situation and was marked by a limited peace-time mobilization of the citizen army, large appropriations by Congress of funds to develop the military establishment, and the orientation of industry to speed up the peace-time production rate of munitions of war. In his new report General Marshall covered the third phase—the preparation up to Pearl Harbour—"which was brought to an abrupt conclusion by the Japanese attacks of December 7, 1941." The fourth phase covered the complete mobilization of the power of the United States and its co-ordination with that of its Allies.

In the summer of 1941 the United States had an army of 1,500,000 men which was likely to disintegrate unless legislative action intervened to save the situation. Under the terms of the Selective Training and Service Act

men could only be retained in the services for a period of one year unless a national emergency existed. "The critical international situation," General Marshall wrote, "demanded the retention of these men and organizations if the security of the Western Hemisphere was to be assured, and such a recommendation was made to the Congress by the President early in July. The Selective Service Extension Act was approved the latter part of August, four months before the attack on Pearl Harbour." By July 1, 1943, the enlisted strength of the Army had been increased by 5,000,000 men, making a total of just under 7,000,000. General Marshall concluded : "The end is not yet clearly in sight, but victory is certain."

At the end of September, after 22 months of war, the total of United States casualties announced was 108,007 : 20,773 dead, 29,691 wounded, 33,420 missing, and 24,123 prisoners of war.

Some details of the cost of the war were given in Mr. Roosevelt's interim Budget summary which was issued at the beginning of August. The estimates of expenditures and receipts, for the year ended June 30, 1944, showed that total Federal expenditures would reach \$106,000,000,000 in the coming fiscal half-year.

The total commitments for the war since July, 1940, amounted to \$344,000,000,000, with \$110,000,000,000 actually spent up to June 30, 1943. Even these gigantic estimates, the President said, might prove too small if wages were to rise or if the cost of living were not stabilized, because they were based on current wages and price-levels ; controls of wages and prices would break down unless they were supported by the heavy taxes and saving recommended in January, 1943. In an attempt to keep the public informed of the battle against inflation the Office of War Information (O.W.I.) issued on August 24 the first of what it described as "box scores." They took the form of a summary of the factors working for and against a rising cost of living and the first one was interesting for its review of buying by instalment. There had been a decline in this form of buying since Pearl Harbour and the figures quoted by the O.W.I. showed that the volume of hire-purchase credit outstanding at the end of April, 1943, was just over \$1,000,000,000 in contrast with a total of more than \$4,000,000,000 in the autumn of 1941. A report of the Federal Reserve Board showed a striking increase in cash purchase. Of the total retail sales in 1942 it found that 73 per cent were cash transactions in contrast with 64 per cent the previous year. The trend towards cash purchase was not entirely due to restraint on the part of the normal hire-purchase customer. It was very largely due to the fact that goods of the type usually bought on hire purchase were no longer being made in large quantities. Thus, while American retail sales in 1942 were greater than ever before, there had been a big drop in the sales of cars and their equipment, household appliances, and heating equipment.

Under the title, "Wages, Prices and Inflation," the National Association of Manufacturers issued on September 1 a report which said that since the war began four

years ago the average weekly wage of factory workers in America had increased by 82.4 per cent. Living costs in the same period had risen less than 27 per cent, and thus the increase in real wages was substantial. It was estimated by the National Association of Manufacturers at 44.1 per cent between August, 1939, and June, 1943.

On September 3 the Department of Commerce reported that during the first seven months of 1943 Americans received \$56,761,000,000 in wages and salaries, an increase of 31 per cent on the amount earned in the corresponding period of 1942 and an increase of 87 per cent on the earnings in the corresponding period of 1939. Exports from the United States during July, the latest figure available during the quarter, were \$1,251,000,000, an increase of 25 per cent over the June total, and an increase of 92 per cent on the total for July, 1942. These figures excluded the value of goods sent to the United States armed forces abroad, but included lend-lease goods sent to the United Nations. These lend-lease shipments represented 78 per cent of the total value of exports during the first half of 1943.

Throughout the quarter the United States continued to search for a foreign policy. Grand strategy, with its implications in the field of foreign relations, had been discussed at the Quebec Conference (cf. Chapter II, Section 3), but the issue before the United States remained: How willing were Americans to take their part in building up a system of international collaboration which would prevent another war? Two who spoke on the subject were Mr. Henry Wallace, the Vice-President, and Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State. Mr. Wallace spoke on September 11 at Chicago, a stronghold of the isolationists. He defined the seven freedoms which, he said, went to make up freedom from want, "itself the essence of the new declaration of freedom."

Foreign
Policy

In the world of modern technology, Mr. Wallace added, the possibilities of abundant production are so great that it is only a question of time until we can bring the blessing of freedom from want to everyone. Our new declaration must go on to cover freedoms we have not got now, but which we must have. Three of the President's famous four freedoms deal with freedoms which we in the United States have long enjoyed. The fourth freedom, which must be the essence of the new declaration of freedom, is freedom from want . . . there should be provision for joint action on the problem of unemployment and overproduction due to international cartels which are strangling production, competing unfairly, or using methods which lead to war. Wherever these forces are found, our job is to fight them. Those groups which rule over economic empires have usurped the sovereignty of the people in international relations. In reality much of our

economic relationship with the rest of the world has been governed by a small group seeking to parcel out the resources and markets of the world . . . their emissaries are found in the Foreign Offices of many of the important nations.

Mr. Wallace insisted that the United States must take its part in world co-operation against future war and, according to the New York correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*:¹ "American Liberals are delighted by Mr. Wallace's courageous statement in the face of criticism from conservative quarters. They believe that President Roosevelt approves the Wallace position and is indeed permitting the Vice-President to 'hold the franchise' of Liberalism for him while he is busy with the war."

Mr. Cordell Hull spoke the day after Mr. Wallace's address. He called for the creation of a system of international relations based on rules of morality, law and justice as distinguished from the anarchy of "unbridled and discordant nationalism, economic and political."

At the present time, he said, the paramount aim of our foreign policy and the paramount aim of the foreign policy of each of the other United Nations, is to defeat our enemies as quickly as possible. Here we have a vast area of common interest and a broad basis of co-operative action in the service of that interest. . . . During recent months public discussion and debate on a high plane have revealed the profound concern of our people with the issues of the country's foreign relations. These issues need to be seen in their full perspective. Unless our people see them, and unless our people are willing to translate their understanding of them into action, the well-being of the nation, and even its very life, may be gravely menaced. The foreign policy of any country must be expressive of that country's fundamental national interests. No country can keep faith with itself unless that is so.

Mr. Hull's speech, with its repetition of fairly obvious principles of international conduct, was not received in the United States with any great enthusiasm. Foreign policy was very much in the public mind and many looked for a lead as to the future policy of the United States from the head of the State Department. On September 13 the *New York Herald Tribune* expressed its disappointment:

When Mr. Cordell Hull stood before the microphone last night, it said, he had an opportunity such as comes to few statesmen. His audience was larger than his own great country; it encompassed the globe—millions intent to hear the authorized voice of American foreign policy expound and clarify the aims of the United States. . . . In sentiment Mr. Hull's speech was admirable; as a contribution to the understanding of present realities it was worthless. And as a guide to the future it was like a match held up before the darkness of a gale-swept night. It flickered—and died.

¹ September 13, 1943.

In England the *Manchester Guardian* described the speech as "a cautious approach which introduced nothing new."

About the time of his address Mr. Hull was understood to be a party to what was generally known in America as the "Hull-Welles Feud." Over a long period there had been rumours that Mr. Hull and Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, did not always see eye to eye on policy and that their disagreement might lead to Mr. Welles's resignation. Yet it was difficult to see just where Mr. Welles held different views from Mr. Hull. So far as public appearances went he was a loyal second-in-command to Mr. Hull and had often acted as Secretary of State during Mr. Hull's absences through illness. The political positions of the two men were different. Mr. Hull had the ear of Congress, assuring President Roosevelt of the support of the Southern conservative Democrats who had never favoured the policies of the New Deal. Mr. Welles was a professional diplomatist who, at 51, had spent 28 years in the service of the State Department where he was known as a most competent and liberal-minded administrator. He was a friend of the President and was understood to be very close to Mr. Roosevelt in the conduct of his work at the State Department. He had become fairly well known in Europe when he made his fact-finding mission for Mr. Roosevelt in the early part of 1940. The rumours about his resignation revived just before the Quebec Conference. On August 4 the *New York Times* printed in its news columns a strong attack on Mr. Hull's administrative methods at the State Department, in the course of which it said: "Rivalry between Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles is common knowledge in Washington." On August 25 it was reported that the long-rumoured resignation of Mr. Welles had become a fact, and that the Under Secretary's letter of resignation was already in Mr. Roosevelt's hands. Further reports were that the resignation had been forced on Mr. Welles because Mr. Hull had demanded that Mr. Roosevelt should choose between his two State Department chiefs—himself and Mr. Welles—as there were differences between them

which could not be composed and that Mr. Roosevelt had decided in favour of Mr. Hull, largely for political reasons. Mr. Welles said little. He refused to confirm or to deny the reports of his resignation, but the fact that he had gone to Bar Harbour in Maine at a time when both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull were away from Washington, thus leaving the State Department in the hands of subordinates, was taken as a significant indication of his state of mind.

It was believed that among the recent causes of disagreement between Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles was the political handling of the invasion of North Africa by the Allies. Mr. Welles, it was said, objected to the recognition of Darlan as the French political and military head in North Africa, and also to the introduction of Peyrouton as Governor-General of Algeria. Mr. Welles was also known to have been much more friendly to the cause of General de Gaulle than the State Department, under Mr. Hull, had shown itself to be.

Commenting on the reports of the resignation the *New York Herald Tribune*, on August 26, said: "If . . . the Under Secretary is at last being forced out of the State Department, most people will regard the episode as a fairly brutal sacrifice of American foreign policy to Roosevelt fourth-term politics." The *Philadelphia Inquirer* said: "[The resignation] is a disquieting indication of weakness on this country's diplomatic front. . . . Mr. Welles's departure from the State Department conceivably will be received with misgivings in the Latin-American countries and in Moscow." This was the comment of the *Washington Post*: "To be sure, Mr. Welles was one of the 'hbsanna boys' or 'star-gazers' as Mr. Hull stigmatizes the expositors of the four freedoms. . . . But in terms of ultimate loyalties surely no sin of disloyalty could be chalked up against Mr. Welles on that account. With much more justice Mr. Welles could return such a charge to his State Department chief."

On August 31, Mr. Roosevelt, at his Press Conference, said that if and when there was any news about Mr. Welles the Press would be informed. At the same time he denounced Mr. Drew Pearson, the newspaper writer and wireless commentator, for his recent assertions that Mr. Hull and other key officials in the State Department were anti-Russian and "would like to see Russia bled white."¹ Throughout the rumours which still surrounded

¹ Statements which Mr. Hull stigmatized publicly as "monstrous and diabolical falsehoods" (August 30).



MR SUMNER WELLES

his name Mr. Welles kept his silence. Almost a month later, on September 25, Mr. Roosevelt announced that he had accepted Mr. Welles's resignation "with deep and sincere regret," adding that Mr. Welles had advised him of his desire to be relieved of his heavy governmental duties in view of his wife's health and that he could understand and sympathize with that desire.

The resignation of Mr. Welles had already been a topic of such long-continued discussion that when the President formally announced it there was little new editorial comment. In England *The Economist* described the officially stated reasons for Mr. Welles's departure—on the ground of his wife's health—as an "extraordinarily uninspired face-saver." Mr. Welles's successor as Under Secretary at the State Department was Mr. Edward Stettinius, formerly Lend-Lease Administrator. The Lend-Lease Administration was now abolished together with the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, the Office of Economic Warfare, and the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination. In their place Mr. Roosevelt set up the Foreign Economic Administration under the direction of Mr. Leo Crowley who, it was said, would work with the State Department, but would be responsible to the President. This reorganization was a sweeping stroke and it indicated that Mr. Roosevelt intended to have an efficient instrument for handling United States foreign economic dealings.

Public interest in the part the United States was likely to take in world co-operation steadily increased. In his message to Congress on September 17, President Roosevelt said :

"As the war progresses we seek a national co-operation with other nations toward the end that world aggression be ended and that fair international relationships be established on a permanent basis. The policy of the good neighbour has shown such success in the hemisphere of the Americas that its extension to the whole world seems to be its logical next step. In that way we can begin to keep faith with our sons and daughters who are fighting for freedom and justice and security at home and abroad." Dealing with the domestic scene, Mr. Roosevelt said : "As the war grows tougher and as new problems constantly arise in our domestic economy, changes in method and changes in legislation may become necessary. We should move for the greater economic protection of our returning men and women in the armed forces—and for greater

educational opportunities for them. And for all our citizens we should provide a further measure of social security in order to protect them against certain continuing hazards of life. All these things, as well as eventual demobilization, should be studied now and much of the necessary legislation should be enacted. I do not mean that this statement should be regarded in any way as an intimation that we are approaching the end of the war, but when the war ends we do not want to be caught again without planning or legislation, such as occurred at the end of the last war."

In Congress the House of Representatives adopted, on September 21, by a vote of 360 to 29, the Fulbright resolution which read :

Resolved by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring, that Congress hereby expresses itself as favouring creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favouring participation of the United States therein, through constitutional processes.

The measure then went to the Senate for scrutiny by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where it remained among other resolutions under consideration by the committee. The Senate at this period was not hurrying to commit itself on post-war policy. It was watching the President and Mr. Hull for a lead and waiting to see what was to come of the projected Moscow conference of the three Powers.

The Republican Post-war Advisory Council met at Mackinac Island on September 6 and 7 to consider what statement on foreign policy would best serve the interests of their party. The meeting was chiefly important and interesting for the proposal, made by Mr. Thomas Dewey, Governor of New York State and a possible candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1944, that a post-war alliance should be made between the United States and Great Britain. Mr. Dewey said to reporters :

"We have had a *de facto* military alliance with Great Britain ever since the war of 1812. In the two principal cases since, when war was made on Britain, we went to her defence. . . . The American people never before had such a shock as the one they had when they realized that Germany might capture the British fleet. You in this room remember how everyone was chilled."

But in the autumn number of *Foreign Affairs* Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor, warned his readers against making a sentimental peace. His prescription for a successful peace was that "it should be based on

common agreements among several nations rather than on any Big Power alliance. . . . The general acceptance of a general relationship, with general though graduated responsibilities, offers the only basis for organizing world peace. . . ."

2 : CHIEFLY ARGENTINA

While the affairs of most Latin-American States took a normal course and their Governments gave the Allies much direct or indirect assistance in their prosecution of the war on the seas or on the "supply front," Argentina continued to present the Grand Alliance and more especially the United States with a puzzling problem. The belief that the change of Government in that country betokened an early reversal of the policy of neutrality in the war and authoritarianism—or sub-Fascism—at home, had wilted more than somewhat during the previous quarter and had entirely withered by the end of the period under review. In spite of friendly references to Latin-American solidarity and hints¹ of a greater contribution by Argentina to the defence of the Continent on the part of the Foreign Minister, Admiral Storni, the internal policy of the Government seemed most unfavourable to the United Nations.

On July 13 the police suppressed the German League of Welfare and Culture, but they also closed the Headquarters of three organizations in sympathy with the Allies. Two days later Accion Argentina, an organization formed soon after the war to support the Allies, met with the same fate. On July 19 the Government announced the suspension for an indefinite period of *Argentina Libre*, a pro-United States weekly, and the issue of a grave warning to the proprietors of an anti-Fascist Italian newspaper. On July 20 *La Vanguardia*, the Socialist Party's organ, was temporarily suppressed, and though the ban was speedily lifted the Government ordered the raiding and closing of two Left-Wing publishers' premises and the burning of the books found therein. President Roosevelt's speech of July 28 was censored owing, according to the head of the Office of Information, to "an erroneous order." On August 1 an "authoritative"—if anonymous—spokesman of the Government declared that an Argentine breach with the Axis could not now help the Allies. Argentina had stopped Axis code messages from Buenos Aires. The Government who were supplying the United Nations and no other countries with agricultural raw products would gladly co-operate with them in reconstruction after the war. But to break with the Axis now would give the impression that the United States had "coerced" Argentina out of her neutrality. The Government

¹ In a letter to Dr. Guani, President of the Inter-American Committee of Political Defence. Cf. *The Times*, July 10.

therefore hoped that their attitude would be understood in Washington and that there would be no "snap judgment" there of events in Buenos Aires.

The Government's standing in the United States did not improve. On August 2 the American Office of Economic Warfare notified some 16,000 exporters of goods from the U.S.A. to Argentina that all licences for exports from the U.S.A. to Argentina approved before May 1, 1943, had now been revoked in order to secure the dispatch of shipments only to such consignees whose trade connexions were satisfactory from the Allied standpoint. On August 3 the Argentine Government announced the cancellation of the decree of July, 1942, prohibiting Argentine ships from sailing to ports on the Atlantic coast of the United States.

Meanwhile, the British and other Allied Governments had addressed a note to Argentina on the subject of war criminals. They called upon the Government to refuse asylum to any war criminals who might seek refuge in Argentina, and they declared that they would regard any shelter, assistance or protection given to such persons as a violation of the principles for which the United Nations were at war and which they were resolved to put into effect by all means in their power. Like all the other neutral nations,¹ to whom similar notes had been addressed, Argentina stood strongly on her sovereign rights. The Government replied to the British note on August 31. They stated that they were prepared to give asylum only to "political criminals," and they declared that Argentina had always maintained the right of sanctuary as a humanitarian institution designed to prevent blind and unconsidered acts of vengeance during periods of political passion.

To judge from their acts the new Government of Argentina were in danger of being carried away by political passion in their attitude towards Communism. Obviously a party which has almost always advocated minority rule and dictatorship (which is none the less dictatorship because it claims to represent the "proletariat") must expect differential treatment from a military Government of revolutionary origin but professing entirely different views. But the Ramirez Government appeared to make no distinction between Communists, Social-Democrats and advanced Liberals.

On August 11 the Minister of the Interior (Colonel Alberto Gilbert) instructed the federal commissioners

¹ Cf. Chapter VIII, section 4.

administering the provinces of Argentina to suppress Communism in the national interest. He also drew their attention to the "infiltration" of Communists into the Trade Unions. As was to be expected after this opening, the campaign against Communists rapidly became a campaign against Trade Unionism. Large numbers of persons merely suspected of Communism were packed off to southern Patagonia and to Ushuia in Tierra del Fuego without trial; many labour unions were closed by official order on the ground that they had been invaded and influenced by Communists. Señor Araujo, a Radical deputy of the dissolved Chamber, was one of the persons banished without trial to the sub-Antarctic south.

With this campaign the new Government undertook a purge of the Conservative and Radical parties. The Conservatives were the chief victims since they were associated in the minds of the military chiefs with the easy-going corruption that had marked ex-President Castillo's regime. But the Radicals were accused, with some truth, of having dirtied their hands on occasion and their headquarters in Buenos Aires were closed by the police. The Socialists, who had not been discredited as a party but had no great influence outside the capital, only suffered from the censorship, which grew increasingly severe and was far more efficient than it had been under the Castillo regime. It was not surprising that these symptoms should have aroused anxiety in the United States and Great Britain. It was all very well for the Ramirez Government to point to their occasional suppressions of pro-Axis newspapers as evidence of the genuineness of their neutrality, or to defend their suspension of naturalization during the war as a method of "making Argentina more Argentine." What the Allies and many of Argentina's Latin-American neighbours saw was a persecution of elements which had in general been friendly to the democratic Powers and hostile to the dictators. In September relations between Argentina and the United States took a turn for the worse. In a letter dated August 5 which he addressed to Mr. Cordell Hull, Admiral Storni, with the approval of President

Ramirez, had assured the Secretary of State that Argentina was opposed to totalitarian regimes and that the Axis had nothing to hope for from the Argentine Government. This said, the Admiral invited and received a diplomatic snub by asking for permission for his Government to purchase war material in the U.S.A.

He pleaded that the evolution of the Argentine people towards the side of the Allies would be more rapid and effective if President Roosevelt would make a gesture of genuine friendship towards Argentina such as providing the country with the aircraft, spare parts, machinery and armaments which it urgently needed. Such a gesture would help Argentina to restore that equilibrium to which it was entitled in respect of other South American nations. American countries, notably the United States, had been misinformed by rumours that gave the impression that the new Government professed or at least sympathized with totalitarian ideology. He gave Mr. Cordell Hull his word of honour that this was not the case.

Replying to his letter, Mr. Cordell Hull wrote on August 8: "It is with regret that my Government and the people of the United States have been forced to the conclusion that the undoubted sentiments of the Argentine people have not been implemented by action called for by the commitments freely entered into by their Government in common with the Governments of the other 20 American Republics. It is notorious that Axis agents in Argentina have been and are engaging in systematic espionage which has cost the United Nations ships and lives. . . ."

On the publication of the correspondence at Buenos Aires and Washington, the Argentine Press was informed that it might comment thereon provided that comment was couched in serious and polite language.

La Nacion urged that now was the moment to regain the respect of the world; *La Prensa* did not touch the international question, but declared that the rulers who governed the country illegally, not Argentine democracy, had caused this diplomatic reverse; the Socialist *La Vanguardia* attributed this and all other ills to the suppression of public liberties.

Although the Press had been "requested and almost ordered"¹ to comment, at least ten newspapers were suspended for various periods mostly for their treatment of the incident. Admiral Storni took the blame and resigned office. General Alberto Gilbert, recently promoted in rank, was appointed Foreign Minister *ad interim*, and several high officials of the Foreign Office were compelled to resign or relieved of their posts. President Ramirez, in a proclamation, said that the historic tradition of the nation on the road of peace, work, and justice could not be diminished or compromised by the confidential statements of any official. The Government with national support would show the necessary strength to choose the path demanded by the national dignity and interests. The British Government, who had bought up the whole exportable surplus of Argentine meat for the two years ending September 30, 1944, concluded another agreement in September for the purchase of eggs. On September 26 the Foreign Office

¹ *The Times*, September 10.

issued a statement explaining that these two agreements must not be taken as having any political significance. The statement continued by expressing British disappointment at the attitude of successive Argentine Governments in maintaining neutrality in a struggle which threatened the principles of the founders of the Western Republics, and added :

"It has . . . never been understood in Great Britain why Argentina alone of the Western Republics has failed to give effect to the recommendation of the Rio Conference regarding the severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, with the result that Axis agents are still free to conspire on Argentine soil against the interests and security of the United Nations." The statement concluded with the observation that the naturally friendly sentiments of the British people towards Argentina were also affected by the treatment of British subjects and interests in that country—a hint that certain arrests of British subjects were engaging official attention in Whitehall—and the expression of the hope that the Argentine Government would at an early date range their country "whole-heartedly on the side of the freedom-loving nations." Towards the end of September the persecution of Communism extended to the arts.

The increasing military strength of Brazil, which explained the Argentine desire to preserve South American "equilibrium," led the Government to contemplate the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Europe, and one adventurous plan was said to have been mooted but abandoned on British advice. In August one of the U-boats still active in the South Atlantic sank the S.S. *Bage*, the largest Brazilian merchant ship, with the loss of 78 lives. In August General Enrico Dutra, the Brazilian War Minister, visited the United States to arrange with General Marshall for Brazilian participation in the European war. Later in August came news of the breaking of another Axis spy ring in Brazil. A U-boat was sunk by Brazilian aircraft on July 31 and prisoners were taken.

On August 21, the anniversary of Brazil's entry into the war, Mr. Eden sent a message of greeting and thanks to the Brazilian Federal Government. Brazil, he said,

"is contributing to hasten the day of deliverance by her active participation in the Battle of the Atlantic and by placing her vast material resources at the disposal of the war effort of the United Nations. . . ." By this time Brazil was supplying her allies with bauxite, manganese, bismuth, beryllium—an important metal in alloys—tin, fibres, vegetable oils, hides and rubber. Her army, numerically far stronger and also far better equipped than a year ago, was undergoing strenuous training. Her air force had attained respectable dimensions and she was playing an important part in the South Atlantic patrol. Natal, in north-eastern Brazil, had become one of the most important air ports in the Western hemisphere, and it was announced that Brazilian factories would soon be building aero engines for the Allied

effort. Commenting on the appointment of General Rawson, who had led the Argentine revolution of June 4, to represent Argentine at Rio de Janeiro, the New York Correspondent of *The Times* justly observed (*loc. cit.* August 23) that there he would be able "to see how Brazil has earned the right to raise her voice" in the peace conference from which, he had said, his country could not absent herself.

The Chilean Government, learning that Bolivia would request the cession of a port on the Pacific, refused emphatically to cede any part of their territory. They were diplomatically supported by Argentina. In June the President of Brazil had made it known that free port facilities would be accorded to Bolivia at Santos, on the Atlantic, and it was thought that this had encouraged the Bolivian demand. Three conventions between Chile and Argentina were signed at Buenos Aires on August 24. They provided for the appointment of a joint commission to study the formation of a Customs Union of the two States, to improve their mutual communications by road and rail and, pending the establishment of a Customs Union, to grant each country free transit through the other's territory for goods going to or coming from a third country. On August 29 it was stated at New York that a Trade Agreement had been signed at Buenos Aires during the recent visit there of the Chilean Foreign Minister, Señor Joaquín Fernández. It was understood that the new agreement set up commissions to determine what products, other than some already specified, should have free entry. On August 31 the Chilean Cabinet resigned in order to give President Ríos "full liberty of reorganization." He re-formed his Cabinet for the fourth time in less than eighteen months and gave the majority of posts to his own Radical Party (September 1). Dr. Joaquín Fernández visited the United States late in September and conferred with Mr. Cordell Hull. It was understood that President Ríos would visit Washington early in 1944.

In Bolivia President Peñaranda's Cabinet resigned on August 27 in consequence of severe criticisms by the Left-Wing members of the Chamber, who were indignant at the drastic suppression of a strike in which 19 miners lost their lives.

On September 10 it was announced that the B.B.C. would double its transmitting hours to the countries of Latin America.

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY UNDER STRAIN

THE deterioration in the political and military situation of Germany became fully apparent in the second half of the year. The German leaders themselves made no attempt to disguise that matters had taken a turn for the worse, although they always insisted that victory was assured if only the people bore their sufferings patiently and held on. The massive air assaults on the centres of war industries and the absence of any comparable reply by the *Luftwaffe*; the failure of the U-boat campaign; the realization that the Red Army was on the move in all its immense might and that Germany now faced a two-front war; the dismissal of Mussolini from power and the defection of Italy from the Axis—these, among other developments, brought about something very like a crisis of confidence.

The appointment (August 24) of Himmler as Minister of the Interior was clear and dramatic proof that the home front was shaken and sagging. After Hitler, Himmler became the most powerful man in the Reich. This sinister character controls the whole hideous machinery which has been constructed to enforce internal security in the Reich and in the occupied countries. The Gestapo, with its vast spying service, its concentration camps and torture chambers, and its rule of bullet and bludgeon is under him. In the *Schutz Staffeln*, originally no more than Hitler's bodyguard, but to-day a fully-equipped force hundreds of thousands strong, he has a party army of fanatical allegiance. As the foremost technician of terror his name stinks in the nostrils of Europeans. The foreign service of the German wireless, broadcasting on his appointment, said :

With his collaborators, Himmler is known for treating everybody from the humblest man to the highest official with human sympathy and consideration. . . His personality embodies all the factors for a further concentration of forces and a stronger cohesion of the home front.

The party organ, *Völkischer Beobachter*, commenting on Himmler's programme, wrote :

It means a clear front against every coward, every weakling, against dirt and half-measures, against every obstacle, big or small, on Germany's way of destiny.

A noticeable increase in beheadings in Germany followed Himmler's taking up the still wider duties of Minister of the Interior. Noteworthy were the number of death sentences in Austria. There was a temptation to interpret Himmler's appointment as a further reinforcement of the party *vis-à-vis* the Army and High Command. Certain evidence suggests that, on the contrary, Himmler is on good terms with the High Command. With the steady deterioration in the German military situation the possibility of the Army's turning against the party was the subject of much but ill-informed speculation.

What caused leaders of the régime serious concern were the signs of rot among party members. "It would be better," it was said, "to have fewer members if only we were fanatical and determined. We must sweep our ranks with an iron besom." Jürgensen, a leader of high rank in the N.S.K.K. (the National Socialist Motor Corps), spoke as follows :

Nobody can be expected to find real pleasure in blowing the war trumpet in these days, and we have nothing against the man who explodes into a downright curse. Indeed, we do that ourselves sometimes. But we cannot tolerate lukewarm or wavering members who are ashamed of their party badge, which should be worn proudly by the Führer's trusty warriors, convinced that the Führer is always right.

An ominous admission this. There were more of the same kind as summer gave place to autumn, and the news from the battlefronts and the bombed home front continued uniformly bad. On July 25 had come the stupefying announcement that in Italy Mussolini had been dismissed from office. Only a few days before Hitler and Mussolini had met. Afterwards this *communiqué* had been issued :

"The Führer and the Duce met on Monday in a town in upper Italy. Military questions were discussed."

A German commentator spoke of the "monumental

brevity" of the *communiqué*, but the significance of the brevity soon became clear and it was far from monumental in the intended sense. When the news of Mussolini's fall became public it was given a deliberate twist, as a German newspaper frankly confessed some weeks later. Important military and political discussions took place at Hitler's headquarters. Among those who took part were Göring, Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, Speer (Armaments), Admiral Dönitz, Bormann (head of the party Chancery), Field-Marshal Milch (Air Force General Staff), and General Jodl. Far-reaching decisions, which soon became apparent, were taken. One—Himmler's own appointment as Minister of the Interior—has already been referred to. Others concerned the steps to be taken to redress the situation in Italy, where Mussolini's dismissal was followed by defection from the Axis camp. On September 10, after a silence which was beginning to disturb Germans and to puzzle the free world, Hitler broadcast from his headquarters.

He opened with a strange confession. "Freed from the heavy burden of the strain and expectation which for a long time has been laid on us," he said, "I see that now the moment has come when I can speak to the German people without being under the necessity of lying to myself or to the public." The collapse of Italy had long been foreseen. He spoke of Mussolini as "the greatest son of the Italian land since the downfall of the ancient Roman Empire," and of the "deceit" practised by Italians from the King downward in assuring Germany that Italy would never capitulate. There would never be a July 25 in Germany. The belief to the contrary of "the international plutocratic conspiracy" was based on "the fundamental error into which they have fallen both as regards my personal position and the attitude of my political comrades in arms, my field marshals, admirals, and generals. More than ever before the German Command stands as a fanatically united combination opposed to this design." Speaking of the "air terror," Hitler claimed that technical and organizational conditions were being created which would not only break the attacks, but would also enable the Germans to retaliate effectively. Nothing, he boasted, would ever break the steel ring which screened the Reich.

No part of Hitler's broadcast was more enthusiastically acclaimed than his promise of coming German retaliation for the "Anglo-American air terror." For months the effects of the bombing had been growing worse and were biting more and more into all organized life and, not less important, the people's psychology. The "barbarity" of bombing, coupled with hints of the preparation of a

secret weapon for the day of reckoning, was a leading theme of all the party propaganda. Early in August it became known that the general evacuation of Hamburg had been ordered. A day or two later Goebbels issued a leaflet urging all those whose presence in Berlin was not necessary to leave as soon as possible; and all school-children were evacuated to the east, most of them to the Lodz and Poznan districts. On August 13 it was estimated that more than 1,250,000 of Berlin's 4,250,000 inhabitants had already been evacuated. Several ministries were moved to Prague, Vienna, Poznan, and Cracow. Germany, in the words Goebbels used in one of his articles in *Das Reich*, was "beginning to learn what war means."

Something like a "Strength Through Fear" campaign was undertaken. Ugly facts were frankly disclosed—not because of any German conversion to veracity, but rather in the hope of hardening the spirit of the nation. "To-day," Rosenberg declared, "it can be said that the entire nation has burnt its bridges: it has no choice except battle." Goebbels said: "It rests with the people themselves whether the enemy will succeed or not. . . . This war is irrevocably the last war." With this insistence that the only hope lay in holding on and holding out went, curiously, exhortations to show the same fortitude as Great Britain did in 1940 and 1941. It was not only the Allied air offensive, but also developments on the Russian front which were invoked to reinforce the "Strength Through Fear" campaign. Dittmar, the candid spokesman of the High Command, made the confession in July that warfare on the Eastern front was "no longer an art."

The British and Americans in the previous war had had countless masses of men and material at their disposal, and the same was true of the Russians at present. The fact that they had an unheard-of amount of man-power and were in a position to call forward ever fresh gigantic masses of men and material was responsible for the extreme difficulties of the struggle, which was burdening the shoulders of Germany with new problems. An overwhelming weight of material on either side degraded warfare to the level of sheer stupidity. "The side which wields such masses of material," he said, "can afford to make the most stupid mistakes and yet be sure of the outcome."

All this was in strange contrast to the mood which prevailed when Germany's own masses of men and material overran first Poland, next the Low Countries and France, then the Balkans, and finally large parts of European Russia. It was, however, strictly in tune with the new and sombre mood which had settled on the German people. There was no disguising the effects of the bombing. Significantly, German commentators did not try to conceal that on land, too, the *Wehrmacht* was now facing, as the result of the Anglo-American landing in Italy, a war on two fronts—which was the nightmare of the High Command. Not less significantly, there were public admissions that the U-boat campaign was not achieving the success hoped for. In August Admiral of the Fleet Dönitz (who early in the year had been made commander-in-chief of the Navy by Hitler because of his pre-eminence in U-boat fighting) broadcast an appeal to crews for steadfastness, warning them that there must be no yielding to "some mood of the moment." A few days later came a statement that the Allied defences had got the better of the U-boats "for the present," but that the setback was temporary and measures were being taken to redress the balance in favour of the U-boat. So here, too, the prospect was bleak.

There is no doubt that in the three months July–September, Germany passed through a severe crisis. Against the background of the bombing, the failure of the U-boat, the withdrawals in Russia, the capitulation of Italy, the silence of Hitler (his "somewhat depressing reticence," Goebbels called it), assertions by Ribbentrop (who became less and less a formative figure in German policy) that, notwithstanding the defection of Italy, the Tripartite Pact retained its full vigour, counted for little. By the end of September, according to some neutral and other observers, the *Stimmung* was as low as it had ever been. There was a tendency in some Allied countries to talk airily of an early collapse of the Reich. Yet the facts were that the High Command and party hierarchy had acted vigorously as every emergency arose and had taken measures to strengthen their defences and to force up war

production. In this connexion the appointment of Speer, an extremely able and forceful man, as head of the war industries has to be noted. The results were to be seen only later, but it had to be recognized at the end of September that, bad and worsening as the situation of Germany was, there was little or no evidence of defeatism. The evidence, rather, was that the enemy was preparing for a fight to a finish and to bring about the widest destruction and distress to others in the process.

CHAPTER VIII

VICTIMS, ACCOMPLICES AND NEUTRALS

I : THE VICTIMS

The principal decisions of the Committee of National ^{France} Liberation and its relations with the Allied Powers have been treated in Chapter II of this volume. In France the Germans continued to make levies for their factories, but their tyranny was somewhat mitigated by the general belief (which most of the officials serving the Vichy Government shared) that they would lose the war, indeed, that they had lost it already. Consequently the orders of their Vichois creatures were seldom obeyed and the strain on their military and civilian administrators increased steadily.

On July 27 M. André Philip, in a report on resistance in France, addressed to the National Liberation Committee, said that about 160,000 young men were believed to be in hiding to escape forced labour in Germany. It was believed that the Germans, by mobilizing women, might free some 200,000 men for service in German labour camps; perhaps half of these would escape and the problem of feeding them would arise. On August 17 the Vichy Commissioner for Prisoners of War broadcast an appeal from Paris to all French prisoners of war on leave in France to return to Germany when their leave expired instead of going into hiding.

Acts of sabotage and attacks on German oppressors and French traitors multiplied. Executions were no deterrent. There were so many shootings and explosions that on August 14 the Vichy Government called on the people to surrender all arms, ammunition and explosives in their possession, promising that persons declaring the arms in their possession by August 24 would go unpunished. On August 20 the Vichy authorities and the German Military Command in France issued a joint statement that a four days' amnesty had been granted to all Frenchmen in possession of arms. The authorities knew that many people had arms and they must now hand them over. No punishment would be inflicted on persons declaring arms before August 24, but after that date any person who had failed to surrender his arms or ammunition was liable to the death penalty. The statement added that it was known that arms dumps existed all over France since Allied aircraft had dropped war material in many places. Persons revealing the whereabouts of these dumps would not be punished.

It was not long before Vichy was again threatening recalcitrants with the death penalty for destroying crops or wrecking threshing machines. But if sabotage died

down in one area it flared up in another. Two speeches delivered late in September were interesting in this connexion and as throwing light on the attitude of the chief French pro-Germans. On September 30 Laval addressed mayors and municipal councillors in Paris. He said even at the risk of hurting his compatriots' feelings he had always admitted that he wanted Germany to win the war, because of the Communist danger. The war had ended for France three years ago, but he could not yet tell what the solution would be. Life was hard for the workers, but he had full confidence in the future of France. Four days before him Deat had spoken in Paris in very different tones.

"France careers to disaster. Only strong action can save us from catastrophe," was his text. A huge army of terrorists was only awaiting a signal from the Allies to take up arms in order to paralyse the action of the German armies when zero hour struck. Ere long war might descend on France and the French Fascists must expect great demands to be made on their heroism. "At all costs we must prevent treachery in France like that which Badoglio perpetrated in Italy. There are clear signs that some such plot is brewing."

Belgium

German violence continued throughout the quarter. On July 26 the Belgian Government in London stated that information reaching them confirmed reports that the Germans were torturing prisoners in order to extract confessions or in reprisal for attacks on soldiers. They would demand the surrender for merciless punishment of those responsible when victory was won. On July 28 nine hostages were shot by the Germans who had failed to discover the perpetrators of attacks on German soldiers.

On July 30 news reached England that a group of deputies representing the Catholic, Liberal and Socialist parties and a number of Senators had written two letters of protest against the extensive deportations of Belgians to Germany. The Senators stated that it would be a betrayal of their fellow-citizens if they did not protest against a policy, persistence in which could only increase the undeserved misery of the Belgians. Some three weeks later the Government learnt that the number of deportations now totalled at least 500,000. Fully 4,000 had been sent to Germany in a single week this summer.

Apart from these deportations there had been many arrests on suspicion of anti-German activities. Some 300 men were arrested in the province of Antwerp in August on the charge of belonging to a secret organization with the picturesque title of "The White Brigade." Neither arrests nor deportations availed to crush the spirit of resistance. It was strong in all classes.

In September the Bishop of Namur excommunicated Leon Degrelle, the chief Belgian quisling and leader of the "Rexists" for laying violent hands on a priest who refused to administer the Holy Sacrament to him while he was wearing uniform.

Deportations and executions continued in Holland. Holland
When more than two-thirds of the Dutch physicians refused to join the Nazi-run "Physicians Chamber," protested against German policy and communicated their protests to the underground Press, the Nazi or Nazi-controlled authorities arrested several hundred of them, seized their property and placed them in concentration camps. In September news reached this country that the fall of Italian Fascism had accentuated the serious differences already existing between the relatively "moderate" and the extreme elements in the Dutch Nazi Party and between that party and the German S.S. A Dutch correspondent wrote (*The Times*, September 22) :

"... The belief is widely held in Holland that the S.S. were responsible for the death of Schmidt, one of Seyss Inquart's commissars in Holland. Schmidt was known to have held relatively moderate views in opposition to the S.S. and some of the Dutch extremists such as Feldmeyer, van Rappard and Rost van Tonningen, and his death deprived Mussert of his closest German supporter." The correspondent added that the position of Mussert, the head of the Dutch Nazis, had been precarious for some time. Hitler had refused to see him, although he pleaded urgency and although Himmler had received Feldmeyer and the Germans had ordered a "reconciliation meeting" at the Hague to kill rumours of dissensions in the Dutch Nazi ranks. Seyss Inquart himself had been inclining more and more to the side of the extremists, such as Rauter, the head of the Gestapo in Holland.

On September 23 the Information Services of the Dutch and Belgian Governments in London made an important announcement. Negotiations between the Belgian and Dutch Governments regarding a financial agreement which they believed would favourably influence post-war trade were nearly completed. The statement continued :

"Realizing that restrictions on the use of foreign currencies constitute one of the greatest obstacles to international trade, both Governments have agreed to put at each other's disposal the respective currencies needed for their mutual relations. Appreciating the importance of monetary stabilization both Governments have agreed on a stable rate of exchange between their respective currencies. The agreement . . . is the first . . . step towards the realization of an international monetary plan, now being prepared at

Washington, to which both Governments are favourably inclined. Both Governments hope that they will thus make a real contribution towards international co-operation and the development of a good neighbour policy.

Denmark Late in August Danish discontent with German tyranny came to a head. Although Dr. Werner Best, the German plenipotentiary, had played at conciliation,¹ the Danes saw clearly that their country was being systematically plundered by its so-called protectors. A Danish correspondent to *The Times* stated (*loc. cit.* August 24) that the uninvited guests' bill was rising from 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 kroner a day

"for exports to Germany, for occupation costs . . . and in the spring of this year, to an alarming extent for fortifications along the Danish coast. . . . Up to now Denmark has been exploited to the equivalent of some £175,000,000, or about one-fourth of all the private property in the country. Agricultural output started to decline and the bombing of Germany made Danish factories and shipyards more and more important to the German war machine. Consequently Danish patriots, assisted by Allied parachutists, increased their activities. A wave of effective sabotage swept Denmark. Everybody engaged in it from company directors to students. . . ."

In the second week of August the Germans proclaimed a state of siege at Esbjerg on account of the destruction of fish destined for Germany. The trade unions called a general strike except in certain essential services and the Germans, finding that it was spreading to other towns, raised the state of siege, whereas the Trade Unions called off the strike. The German Government then demanded the agreement of the Danish Ministry to their insistence that Danish saboteurs should be tried and sentenced by German courts and imprisoned in the Reich. On August 9 the Cabinet, although headed by the pro-German Scavenius, unanimously refused compliance. Scavenius himself offered to resign, but Dr. Best told him flatly that the Reich Government would not tolerate his resignation. The public knew what was happening. Sabotage increased; there were collisions between Danes and Germans, and at Odense an officer who had wounded a boy with a pistol shot was killed by an angry

¹ As in permitting a general election in March, *q.v.* *The Fourteenth Quarter*, Chapter VIII, Section 2.

crowd. On August 22 an aluminium factory was wrecked by a party of patriots well provided with explosives. On August 24 the largest public hall in Copenhagen was blown up.

The failure of Best's policy was obvious, and General Hanneken, Commander of the Army of Occupation, insisted on drastic measures. Danish sabotage, he held, would continue while those committing it were merely sentenced to imprisonment by Danish courts with a tolerable certainty of release as soon as the war ended. There was no death penalty in Denmark; executions alone would quell sabotage; and the Danish Government must be forced to yield. On August 28, therefore, Dr. Best served an ultimatum on the Scavenius Government demanding the proclamation of a state of emergency, the prohibition of strikes, the surrender of arms, the establishment of a German Press Censorship, the introduction of the death penalty for sabotage, and the imposition of a fine of 1,000,000 kr. on the town of Odense. The Government refused the ultimatum and King Christian endorsed their refusal.

General Hanneken, to whom Hitler gave full powers, promptly took charge of the situation. He proclaimed martial law, introducing the proclamation with the words :

"Recent events have proved that the Danish Government is no longer capable of maintaining order in Denmark. The disturbances caused by enemy agents are directed against the German Army. In consequence of them I proclaim, in accordance with Articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations a military state of emergency throughout Denmark. . . ."

Five orders followed the preamble. Officials must remain at their posts and conform to the regulations issued by the German authorities. Gatherings and meetings of more than five persons were forbidden. Theatres and entertainments must close at nightfall, after which all traffic must cease until dawn. Public use of the postal, telephonic and telegraphic services was temporarily suspended. Strikes were prohibited and incitement to any strike that would be "detrimental to the German military forces" would be punishable "usually by death." The proclamation added that military force would be "ruthlessly employed" against meetings, attacks on German soldiers, and like offences.

The German Commander had issued the proclamation on August 28. Before dawn next morning fighting had

broken out between the Germans and the Danish Army at various places. Hopelessly outnumbered and under-armed, the Danes had no chance, but they gave the Germans no little trouble, notably at Naestved, where the garrison was ordered to fight to the last cartridge, at Svendborg, where a battalion commanded by Prince Gorm, King Christian's grandson, fought for nearly two days, and in Copenhagen where the Royal Guard had constructed tank-traps and destroyed more than a dozen tanks and armoured cars before they were overpowered. Eleven ships of the small Navy escaped to Swedish waters and were interned with their crews at Karlskrona. The flagship, the coast-defence ship *Nils Juel*, was disabled by bombs and captured by the enemy. For several days refugees, a few of them British who had been marooned in Denmark by the German invasion, with a number of policemen, soldiers and sailors, escaped to Sweden before the Germans stopped up all likely bolt-holes. At least one swam five miles of sea to safety.

Little news reached Sweden of Danish affairs after the first days of September. It was known that the King and his family were kept under close supervision; that the Army had been disarmed; that most, perhaps all, trade union leaders had been arrested, but that in spite of German threats sporadic sabotage continued. The Government had resigned, the Press was censored, but no Danish politician offered to form a "collaborationist" Ministry and the Germans were obliged to fall back on the unsatisfactory expedient of governing the country through obstructive permanent officials under the control of vigilant martial law. As usual they attempted to explain their own unpopularity and Danish resistance to their demands by allegations that the people had been misled by Jews—whom they began to persecute—Communists, and British secret agents dropped by parachute.

Norway There were signs of some deterioration in the morale of the German garrison of Norway. Desertion increased and the German G.O.C. ordered posters to be put up in all

barracks occupied by his troops inveighing against "the shameful and disgraceful increase" of the numbers who secretly crossed the Swedish frontier. German rule, however, was no less oppressive.

On August 16 Gunnar Eilifsen, chief of the Oslo civil police, was shot after condemnation by a quisling tribunal for refusing to arrest Norwegian women who had disobeyed labour mobilization orders. Immediately after this all policemen not on duty were urgently called to a meeting convened by the quislingite Police Minister. When they had arrived they were commanded to sign a new declaration of loyalty to the Quisling Government under the threat of immediate execution should they refuse. Oslo radio next gave out that a state of siege had been proclaimed throughout Norway, and that members of "the Leader's" (Quisling's) bodyguard, of the Norwegian police, the "Germanic" S.S. units¹ in Norway and of the "Hirdmen" (Quisling's followers) were henceforth to be regarded as members of the armed forces of the German Reich and were therefore amenable to military law. This order seemed to have emanated from Jonas Lie, the Minister of Police. But it was, no doubt, inspired by the Germans in the hope that they might thus buttress their declining strength in the event of an invasion, and of the insurrection which would accompany it.

The Germans followed up this move by another attempt to draw the teeth of Norwegian resistance. General Falkenhorst, their Commander-in-Chief in Norway, issued a proclamation that all Norwegian ex-officers save those who had actively identified themselves with the Quisling Government must return to Germany as prisoners of war. The Führer, said the proclamation, had withdrawn his "magnanimous order" of May 10, 1940, allowing them their freedom. The officers had abused the Führer's confidence. Some had fled abroad to serve against the Germans, while others had been concerned in illegal activities. Some officers were warned in time and escaped. A large majority were caught. Among those sent to Germany were many reserve medical officers whose capture was the more deeply felt since public health had been widely undermined by underfeeding.

News which reached this country from Sweden in mid-September gave the impression that the Germans were the more anxious as to the possibilities of invasion and/or insurrection because they had reduced their garrison. Troops had been withdrawn for the Eastern Front to the number, according to some authorities, of 50,000 men, though whether they were drafted from formations garrisoning the country, or whether they were moved as units, was not too clear. Meanwhile the activities of Norwegian light naval forces off the coast continued. They made several attacks on German shipping and in

¹ The "Germanic S.S." units may have numbered 1,200 men. They were composed of Norwegian sympathizers with the New Order trained on the lines of the German S.S.

one engagement off Kristiansund North, during the night of September 11-12, they sank a 4,000-ton merchant ship.

Bohemia What little news reached this country from Bohemia and Moravia during the quarter was confined to reports, often enough verified by announcements by the German-controlled "Czechoslovak Press Bureau" in Prague, of exactions, deportations for labour in Germany, and executions of patriots for sabotage, espionage and "communism." The common misfortunes of all Czechoslovak patriots made it the more regrettable that some of the followers of the exiled Government both in London and in the U.S.A. should have pursued or revived old political feuds, dating from before the German attack on the nation's liberties, e.g. the rivalry between the mainly Slovak Agrarians of Dr. Hodzha's party and the supporters of Dr. Benesh. The exhumation of these out-of-date quarrels appeared to onlookers as unseemly as it was unseasonable. Thus imputations of anti-patriotic behaviour on the part of Slovaks who had shown themselves as hostile to the Germans as Dr. Benesh himself were made in a newspaper published in this country apparently with the exiled Government's approval. They seemed likely to lead to libel actions for which the British taxpayer would probably have to pay.

Poland Oppressed and dismembered Poland suffered a cruel blow through the tragic death of General Wladyslaw Sikorski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army and Prime Minister of the exiled Government of Poland. He was killed with his daughter and the members of his military and naval staff on July 4, when the aeroplane in which they were returning from the Middle East crashed into the sea just after taking off from Gibraltar. Lieut.-Colonel Victor Cazalet, M.P., a good friend of Poland, died with them. General Sikorski's death was described by *The Times* (*loc. cit.* July 6) as a disaster to his country and a grave loss to the United Nations. The leading article continued :

"He was the epitome of the courage, self-sacrifice, and patriotism of a nation which, though defeated by overwhelming mechanized attack and subjected to the cruellest material and moral oppression that a malignant tyranny could devise, has never lost faith and courage. His offer of the surviving Polish forces to Mr. Churchill at their meeting on June 19, 1940, in the darkest hour for European democracy, was no mere gesture. No Pole did more than General Sikorski to extricate the Polish soldiers and airmen from France and Syria and to build up a fighting force . . . under the British flag. For the magnificent services of the Polish squadrons of the R.A.F. during and after the Battle of Britain; for the efficient gallantry of the . . . Polish Navy; for the reconstitution of the Polish Army which in Britain and the Middle East awaits the signal for attack—for all these things the United Nations are his and Poland's debtors."

To his political qualities *The Times* paid a high tribute. "A democrat by nature as well as by nurture, a statesman who never permitted emotion, however justifiable, to colour his own appraisal of events or to warp his judgment in matters of high policy, he played a conspicuously useful part in inter-Allied diplomacy. His hatred of dictatorship was innate. . . . His dislike of the materialistic political philosophies of modern times was profound. But he was never in sympathy with those of his own countrymen who believed in meeting dictatorship by its imitation, nor would he encourage aspirations irrespective of political and geographical fact. . . . High hopes had been attached to his visit to the strong Polish forces and the Allied commanders in the Middle East. During his visit he lost no opportunity of explaining his policy of seeking and maintaining an honourable agreement with the Soviet Union. . . ."¹

¹ A reference to his last speech on Russo-Polish relations has been made in Chapter II of this volume.

Many tributes were paid to the dead leader. Mr. Churchill in the Commons described him as "the symbol and the embodiment of that spirit which has borne the Polish nation through centuries of sorrow and is unquenchable by agony." Of his personal relations with General Sikorski he said: "I admired his poise and calm dignity amid so many trials and baffling problems. He was a man of remarkable pre-eminence both as a statesman and as a soldier. His agreement with Marshal Stalin . . . was an outstanding example of political wisdom." His death, said the Prime Minister, was "one of the heaviest strokes we have sustained."

Mr. Churchill also broadcast a message to the Polish people on the night of July 14. In a characteristically eloquent passage he said: "I knew him well. He was a statesman, a soldier, a comrade, an ally and, above all, a Pole. He is gone, but if he were at my side he would wish me to say this—and I say it from my heart—soldiers must die, but by their death they nourish the nation that gave them birth."

The body of the dead leader was brought to England. On July 14 the President of the Republic laid the insignia of the Order of the White Eagle, the highest Polish State decoration, on the coffin at a moving ceremony. A message reached the Polish Government from the head of the "underground army" in Poland asking that there should be a wreath from them and one was included in the bank of flowers brought in the dead General's honour.

Next day there was a solemn Requiem Mass at Westminster Cathedral, after which the coffin was laid in the portion of Newark cemetery which is dedicated to Polish airmen, until peace should come.

After the death of General Sikorski, the Acting Prime Minister, M. Mikolajczyk¹ offered his resignation to President Raczkiewicz. Differences had arisen between the Cabinet and the President on the subject of the prerogatives of appointment. The Ministers pointed out that the 13th Article of the Constitution which gives the President these rights dates from the time of Marshal Pilsudski, very much of a dictator though a Socialist and that this was no time for a reversion to the Marshal's policy. The President in fact had already appointed General Sosnkowski as Commander-in-Chief and had also designated him as his successor. Eventually an arrangement appears to have been reached on the basis that certain Presidential prerogatives of appointment should not be invoked and that the Commander-in-Chief should be subordinated to civilian authority. M. Mikolajczyk was then appointed Prime Minister by the President and formed a Ministry composed of three members of the Peasant Party, to which he belonged; three Socialists including the Deputy Prime Minister; two members of the National Labour Party, two Nationalists and three non-party members. The following were his principal colleagues:

M. Jan Kwapinski (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry, Commerce and Shipping); M. Tadeusz Romer (Foreign Affairs); General M. Kukiel (National Defence); M. Wladyslaw Banaczuk (Home Affairs); Dr. Ludwig Grosfeld (Finance); M. Marjan Seyda (Minister of State), in charge of preparations for the Peace Conference; M. Henry Strassburger (Minister of State, in charge of Polish Affairs in the Middle East). The most important new-comer, M. Romer, took the place of Count Raczynski, who remained Polish Ambassador to Great Britain. M. Romer had been Ambassador in Moscow until relations were broken off, and his personal relations with the Soviet Government had been good.

In Poland the Germans continued to lay about them. Thus in July the Gestapo murdered the members of the well-known Horodynski family; the head of the household, his wife, three children with their governess, 11 guests

¹ Pronounce "Mickolaychik."

and four women servants; who were celebrating their wedding anniversary. The Gestapo committed the murders because the German "trustee" of a neighbouring estate, one Fuldner, had accused the family of hiding two partisans. Fuldner then became trustee of the Horodynski estate. News from Poland reported by the correspondent of *The Times* at Stockholm (*loc. cit.* August 26) showed that the German authorities, while still massacring and oppressing the Poles, were beginning to fear defeat and vengeance and were attempting to conceal evidence against themselves by obliterating the traces of their crimes or by diverting the blame on others, notably by spreading stories that Ukrainians, Czechs, Latvians and other foreigners in their service had committed these horrors.

On August 30 the Foreign Office issued a warning of which the following are the most important passages. "Trustworthy information has reached H.M.'s Government . . . regarding crimes committed by the German invaders against the population of Poland. Since the autumn of 1942 a belt of territory extending from the province of Bialystok southwards along the line of the River Bug has been systematically emptied of its inhabitants. In July, 1943, these measures were extended to practically the whole of the province of Lublin where hundreds of thousands of persons have been deported from their homes or exterminated.

. . . Many of the victims are killed on the spot. The rest are segregated. Men from 14 to 50 are taken away to work in Germany. Some children are killed on the spot, others are separated from their parents and either sent to Germany to be brought up as Germans or sold to German settlers or dispatched with women or old men to the concentration camps."

The warning concluded with the reaffirmation of the Government's resolve to punish the instigators and perpetrators of these crimes, and declared that as long as such atrocities continued to be committed by the representatives and in the name of Germany, they must be taken into account against the final settlement. The Department issued a similar warning in Washington on the same day. Meanwhile the Poles, when they could, took vengeance on their oppressors. Early in October news reached London that on September 7 Polish "underground" fighters killed Buerckel, the Governor of the notorious Pawiak prison in Warsaw.

NOTE.—The affairs of Greece and Yugoslavia have been dealt with in Section 4b of the first chapter of this volume.

2 : THE ACCOMPLICES

Finland The Finns remained militarily quiescent and politically uneasy. On August 20 President Ryti received an appeal signed by 33 prominent citizens of all parties except the Conservatives and the Fascist "Patriotic People's Movement," demanding an investigation into the possibilities of a separate peace with Russia. On September 3 Parliament held a secret session and next day the Government published an appeal made by the Prime Minister on that occasion. He urged the deputies to be calm and informed them that the Government were making every effort to maintain good relations with all countries and were neglecting no effort to obtain peace for their country.

On September 11 a Government spokesman told foreign journalists that Finland had no ties with Germany, regretted the state of war with Great Britain and desired improved relations with the U.S.A. Russia was the only enemy; the Russian war was entirely separate from the world war and Finland had full liberty of action. He admitted the anxiety caused in Finland by the retreat of the Germans, but there could be no question of unconditional surrender. "Peace without freedom and security would be worse than war." Later, M. Tanner, the Finance Minister, emphasized the need for the Finns to become accustomed to the idea of living as neighbours of a strong Soviet State, and added that Finland could reach an understanding with Russia if peace would guarantee the country's independence and security. But he spoiled the effect of these observations when he criticized the Swedish Press for urging the Finnish Government to come to terms with Russia, and said that all this discussion of peace with Russia was dangerous and ought to be stopped. If Russia wished to communicate peace proposals to Finland she could surely find appropriate channels. An unhelpful performance.

Hungary Nothing of importance was recorded from Slovakia. In Hungary the Government's chief preoccupation was to avoid slipping into complete subordination to Germany. A new Foreign Minister, Dr. Ghyczy, was appointed in July, and on September 9 Budapest Radio broadcast a speech by the Prime Minister thanking Italy for her support of Hungary, and pointing out that this support was not confined to Mussolini and his Party. The Italian people had stood by Hungary for the past 20 years.

Later in September it was reported that Hitler's demands for Hungarian troops on the Eastern Front had assumed a more peremptory tone. The Führer was also understood to have demanded unrestricted military control of the national railways for the duration of the war and to have insisted that

German industry must be allowed to make full use of Hungarian territory. This German pressure may have been in some sort a counter-demonstration to a movement recorded from Hungary in August and September. Demonstrations in favour of peace seem to have been held at Budapest University early in August. On August 11 the *Pester Lloyd* commented on Allied warnings of air raids on Central Europe, taking the line that neither Hungarian railways nor Hungarian industrial plants were at the disposition of the *Luftwaffe*, that the railways did not carry German troops and that Hungarian industry, when workers or materials were available, was working on normal lines. From these surprising premises the *Pester Lloyd* deduced that Budapest was an open city, and should be treated as one. This did not prevent the American bomber pilots who raided Wiener Neustadt on August 13 from dropping leaflets warning the Magyars that as large war industries working for Germany were concentrated around Budapest, the city was liable to attack. Swiss newspapers reported later that the Hungarian Government were proposing to declare their capital an open city, and to divert military traffic to secondary railway lines in Western Hungary, which would not have suited the Germans at all.

Late in July Bulgarian troops occupied a zone outside **Bulgaria** Salonika up to the Vardar River, and it became known that Bulgarian units were occupying districts in Yugoslav Macedonia which the Italians had once marked for their own. But while these military movements seemed to bind Bulgaria more closely to the Axis, reports were current in well-informed quarters that King Boris had been in communication with his former Prime Minister, the experienced and moderate Kiossévanoff, still Minister at Berne and, stranger still, with Colonel Velcheff, an able officer who had been tried and convicted on a charge of treasonable conspiracy against the throne in 1936, but had seemingly been pardoned during the war. The King was summoned to Berchtesgaden, perhaps to explain these reports to the suspicious Führer, about August 22. On August 26 the German News Agency announced that he was seriously ill. He died at Sofia on August 30. An official bulletin ascribed his death to the blocking of an artery. There were also rumours of assassination. So died a ruler of undoubted talents who would have gone down to history with a good record had he departed in 1940. While he might have pleaded that his subsequent policy had conformed to the national demand for the recovery of the territories lost to Greece and Yugoslavia, the cynical opportunism with which he had consented to the breach of his country's pacts with those

countries ruined his reputation for honest political dealing. Nor did his discourteous treatment by Mr. Chamberlain in 1938¹ excuse his gross ingratitude in making war on the British Government who had assisted him in difficult situations in the past.

He was succeeded by his six-year-old son under the style of Tsar Simeon II. After some delays a Council of Regency was formed.

The senior Regent was the late King's brother, Prince Kyril, whose colleagues were Professor Filov and the War Minister, General Michov. The late King's widow, Queen Joanna, was excluded, perhaps by the Germans because of her Italian origin, perhaps by reason of Prince Kyril's known hostility to her. On becoming a Regent, Professor Filov had to resign the Premiership. Prince Kyril appointed Dr. Bojilov, an economist without party attachments, in his stead.

Dr. Bojilov formed a Cabinet in which he was also Minister of Finance. The Foreign Minister was M. Sava Kirov, who had been Minister at Angora. General Russev was War Minister, and M. Gabrovski, the unpopular Germanophile Home Minister, gave place to M. Docho Christov. The new Ministry was deemed less Germanophile than its predecessor, but the withdrawal of Gabrovski to the background did not mean that his influence had been seriously weakened. The best that could be said of the new Government was that its composition suggested that some prominent Bulgarian politicians had unbolted a back door through which they might hope to escape the worst consequences of their treacheries.

Rumania In spite of the enormous losses of the Rumanian Army, the Germans insisted on the formation of a number of new divisions which they agreed to equip. On August 25 Marshal Antonescu left Bucarest to visit the Führer at his Headquarters, apparently to discuss questions of supply as well as plans of campaign. German demands for cereals and fruit continued to be heavy.

On September 26 an official statement announced the arrest of 37 leading citizens, including several of King Carol's former counsellors, on a charge of plotting to organize partisan bands like those operating in Greece and Yugoslavia. Sabotage increased and the losses in Russia left public opinion alarmed and depressed.

Siam On July 5 the Japanese official wireless announced that the Prime Minister, General Tojo, had ceded four of the Malay States and two of the Shan States in Burma to Siam as a reward for its military aid.

¹ Cf. *The Sixth Quarter*, pp. 108-14.

The Malay States ceded are Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu. They are rich in rubber, tin and rice. Their population was estimated at about 1,175,000 in 1940. It included more than 10 per cent of Chinese. The four states had been transferred from Siam to Great Britain by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The Shan States ceded are Kentung and Mong Pan on the borders of China, Siam and French Indo-China.

Broadcasts from Tokyo disclosed that General Tojo had visited Bangkok on July 3 and 4 and had announced his decision in a joint statement issued by him and the Siamese Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Luang Bipul Songgram. He then went to Singapore to confer with Field-Marshal Count Hiseichi, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in the "Southern area," which presumably comprised Malaya and most of the Netherlands East Indies.

3 : NEUTRALS AND NON-BELLIGERENTS

Swedish popular dislike of the Germans had grown so vigorously with the increasing oppression of Denmark and the cruelties practised in Norway, that the Government's cancellation of their transit agreement with Germany caused general satisfaction.

It was on July 6, 1940 that the Swedish Government, under extreme German pressure, announced that former restrictions on the transport of war material through Swedish territory by belligerents had been abolished and that a limited number of German soldiers "mostly on leave" would be allowed to pass through Sweden to and from Norway. The Norwegian Government then lodged a protest to which the Swedish Government replied that since the Allied forces had left Norway, as had King Haakon and his Government, the Norwegian campaign was at an end. Their real reason for their concession was their inability to resist German attack. Their cancelation of it indicated their conviction that the Axis would not win the war.

Official relations with the Reich were not improved by other incidents. One was the sinking with the loss of 12 lives of two Swedish fishing boats by German destroyers which fired on them at point-blank range. This provoked an official protest. A military and technical commission which had examined the raised hull of the sunken submarine *Ulven* reported on August 4 that she had been sunk by the explosion of one out of a number of German mines laid in Swedish territorial waters. Swedish sympathy for Denmark was generally manifested and provoked long and emphatic protests by the German semi-official Press.

Two British bombers crashed in the Swiss mountains early on July 13 and all their crews perished. The Swiss Government protested to the British Government against the violation of Swiss neutrality by British aircraft on the night of July 12-13, and the dropping of bombs in four different cantons. Two Flying Fortresses made a forced landing on Swiss territory on August 17 and their crews were interned. Four more had to land on September 6 and one came down in Lake Constance from which its crew were rescued.

The Swiss Schwarzenburg wireless station on September 16 described

the position of Switzerland since the Italian armistice in a broadcast to America as "one of the most peculiar situations in her history. From a certain point of view she is surrounded by one Power only, and from another point of view she is surrounded by, among others, three defeated Powers, France, Austria and Italy. . . . Now that Italy has capitulated and the northern Italian territories have been occupied by German troops the Swiss situation has become very difficult. Switzerland is dealing not with just one coalition but with just one country. The Customs officers of that one country control all possible openings with the outside world. Switzerland must therefore suffer from the effects of the counter-blockade and stop all economic exchange with America. It is not yet possible to measure fully all the consequences of the new situation. In any case just one word describes it: Encirclement."

Spain There were signs that the relations between Royalists and Falangists were becoming more strained. Although General Franco continued to denounce Communism, Freemasonry, Liberalism and all elements that were plotting, he averred, to change the regime in Spain and to express his full confidence in the Falangist movement, it was noticed that his references to the international situation in his speeches were more discreet than his earlier utterances. Early in July four Falangist Councilors were dismissed, apparently for taking part in a royalist demonstration staged by a group of members of the Cortes. Events in Italy caused interesting reactions in the Falangist Press, which showed a politeness in its references to British and American military operations and prospects that had not been marked a few months earlier.

Before paying a brief visit to London for consultations with the Government, our Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, had a long conversation (August 21) with General Franco. On September 22 Mr. Eden in answer to questions in Parliament said that the Ambassador had drawn the attention of the head of the Spanish State to complaints "which His Majesty's Government had been forced to make from time to time of discrimination against British interests. While some . . . had been remedied my right hon. friend drew attention to cases that still required to be dealt with, if General Franco's proclaimed policy of equal treatment of the belligerents by Spain was to be effectively carried out. Among other questions specifically referred to was the position of the Blue Division, and it was made clear to General Franco that so long as it remained in the Soviet Union it was a serious obstacle to the development of cordial Anglo-Spanish relations." Mr. Eden added that the Spanish Government had undertaken to look into our complaints. In reply to questions about the Spanish occupation of Tangier he said that the British Government had always made it clear that the *modus vivendi* reached between them and the Spanish Government early in 1941 was of a provisional nature, pending the possibility of a final settlement, and without prejudice to our own

rights and those of third parties. They had always maintained their protest against the original unilateral action of the Spanish Government in the Tangier zone.¹

Poor crops of cereals and potatoes had their effect^{Portugal} on food prices in Portugal. Bread grew dearer, and when the two months' drought broke in early July, rainstorms did further damage to the late crops. Strikes caused by the lack of food were marked by sporadic acts of violence in Lisbon and northern Portugal. Several hundred arrests were made, but food restrictions on hotels and restaurants and the promise of the rationing of sugar, olive oil and soap were more effective.

Relations with Japan were unsatisfactory. The treatment of the people of Portuguese Timor was so bad that 500 of them asked to be removed to Australia and were brought there by Allied warships. They included many priests, nuns and Government officials. On August 18 the Japanese forcibly seized the British steamer *Sian* anchored in the Portuguese port of Macao near Hong Kong and were reported to have killed a number of Portuguese policemen and guards who tried to prevent the seizure. About 100 Chinese and Filipino refugees were seized with the ship. According to reports from Chungking in early September, the negotiations between the Japanese military authorities and Portuguese colonial authorities on the matter failed since the Japanese insisted that the steamer was "intercepted on the high seas" !

On September 14 it was announced that the Duke of Palmella had been appointed Ambassador to London in succession to Dr. Armino Monteiro, who had held the post with conspicuous success since 1936. On September 27 the King received the retiring Ambassador in farewell audience and invested him with the insignia of the G.C.C. At the end of September it became known that large-scale manœuvres would shortly be held in various parts of Portugal.

The fall of Mussolini, the Italian capitulation and the^{Turkey} defeats of the Germans in Russia aroused great interest

¹ Spanish troops had occupied Tangier on June 14, 1940.

in Turkey, and satisfaction would have been general but for anxieties as to the future policy of the U.S.S.R. Russian official hostility to any and every project for closer union between the Danubian or Balkan States was noted with concern, and articles published in the presumably inspired review, *War and the Working Class*,¹ early in September provoked spirited rejoinders in the principal Turkish newspapers.

The Russian review criticized Turkish neutrality as being contrary to Allied interests, blamed Turkey for signing an agreement with Germany a few days before Germany attacked Russia, deprecated the idea of a Balkan federation on the ground that it must be directed against Russia and even made veiled hints about the future of the Straits. The Turkish Press retorted that Turkish neutrality (or more accurately non-belligerency) had rendered great services to the Allies, including Russia; that when Turkey signed the pact with Germany her Government did not imagine that Germany was about to attack Russia; and that a Balkan federation if brought into being would not be directed against any nation, but would simply serve the interest of political stability in south-eastern Europe.²

In fact the Turks for more than twenty years had shown their desire to maintain good relations with Russia, and when signing diplomatic instruments with other countries, e.g. the Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain, they had inserted special clauses providing that Turkey should in no circumstances be compelled to adopt an attitude antagonistic to Russia. Much of the trouble arose from the enigmatic silence of the Russian Government as to their wishes and intentions, and it was felt in Turkey and elsewhere that frank discussions could alone allay suspicions on both sides.

¹ In a State governed by the dictatorship of a single party exercising a close censorship of the Press, it must be presumed, until proof to the contrary, that political articles are not published without official encouragement, approval and permission, especially in time of war.

² Summarized from an Istanbul message published in *The Times*, September 21.

CHAPTER IX

KING, MINISTERS AND PARLIAMENT

I : THE KING

The King in August paid another visit to the Home Fleet. This was the fifth such visit since the war began and the occasion was made memorable by his leading the Fleet to sea for battle practice in the flagship, H.M.S. *Duke of York*. In this battleship the King accompanied the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, on Fleet exercises in the North Sea. He saw salvos fired from the 14-in. guns of the *Duke of York* and other capital ships as they engaged two cruisers ; and also an air battle, in which tactical demonstrations were given by torpedo-bombers and Beaufighters of the Fleet Air Arm. In the van of the Fleet as it left its anchorage was the sloop *Godaveri*, of the Royal Indian Navy, with an all-Indian crew, from which the flagship received the signal : "Long live the King-Emperor." On a later occasion the King went aboard this sloop and for the first time in British waters an Indian ship hoisted the Royal Standard from her mast-head.

Among other ships of the Fleet which the King visited was the battleship *Malaya*, in which he served as a naval officer in the last war, and the Greek destroyer *Themistocles*. He also saw the destroyer *Huron*, Canada's latest warship, which was among the escorting vessels when he arrived to join the Fleet. He spent some time examining with interest one of our newest submarines and its devices ; and in a depot-ship he met detachments from five destroyers. At a Fleet concert in a new theatre built by Royal Marines the King joined in community singing with "Wrens" and naval ratings, and appeared to enjoy himself greatly. On this visit the King invested the Commander-in-Chief, in the cabin of the flagship, with the insignia of a Knight Commander of the Bath.

On taking leave of the Home Fleet the King sent a signal to the Commander-in-Chief expressing his pleasure at having had the opportunity of inspecting so many of the ships operating in those waters and of witnessing the Fleet exercises. He added that he was greatly impressed by all that he had seen. The Commander-in-Chief in his reply said : "... We have deeply appreciated your Majesty's presence in our midst, not only as our Sovereign, but as a sailor."

Late in July the Queen accompanied the King on a two-days' tour in Scotland which enabled them to see much of the war work being done in factories and ship-yards north of the Tweed. In the Thistle Chapel of the cathedral of St. Giles in Edinburgh the King installed Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, and Lord Airlie, as Knights of the Thistle. The King also unveiled in the Thistle Chapel a communion table and ornaments which Knights of the Order have given as a memorial to King George V. Their Majesties extended their journey to visit the Gleneagles Hotel, part of which is being used as a centre for the treatment of miners who are convalescing from sickness or accidents. Earlier in July the King presented colours to the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Saskatchewan Regiment, which both took part with distinction in the Dieppe raid. The Queen accompanied the King and the High Commissioner for Canada, Mr. Vincent Massey, was also present. After presenting the colours the King addressed the two regiments and spoke of the pride that it gave him thus to honour two such distinguished units of his Canadian Army.

On a late summer visit to Sandringham their Majesties saw the harvest being gathered from 539 acres of former grass on the estate—more than half the total acreage before the war—which has been ploughed to raise grain and root crops. They saw crops growing in the park and on the golf course and on some hundreds of acres of drained marsh. The Sandringham wheat yielded 60 to 70 bushels to the acre.

The King during these months received many distinguished visitors at Buckingham Palace. Among these were Colonel Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary for War, Colonel W. Franklin Knox, Secretary of the U.S. Navy, and Mr. Donald Nelson, chairman of the United States Production Board, all of whom came here on war missions. He also received Dr. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs and Attorney-General of the Commonwealth

of Australia, who took part in the meetings of the War Cabinet as his country's representative during a mission to London. So, too, he received the five Senators of the United States who came on a visit to England. These were Senator Richard B. Russell, Senator James M. Mead, Senator Henry C. Lodge, junr., Senator Ralph C. Brewster, and Senator Albert B. Chandler. Towards the end of September, immediately after his return with the Queen to London from a holiday in Scotland, the King received in audience the Prime Minister and heard from him a full account of the proceedings at the Quebec Conference and of his subsequent discussions with President Roosevelt at Washington. Field-Marshal Lord Wavell was received in audience on his appointment as Viceroy and Governor-General Designate of India. The King also held a number of investitures and on separate occasions he decorated with the Victoria Cross Capt. Robert Sherbrooke, R.N., and Lieut.-Col. Victor Turner of the Rifle Brigade. Lieut.-General Sir Bernard Freyberg, V.C., was also received and had conferred upon him the honour of knighthood.

When Italy collapsed and the Italian Fleet surrendered the King sent to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, a message congratulating him and all under his command "on this triumphant result of three years of war in the Mediterranean in which the Navy, in conjunction with other Services, has played so distinguished a part." The message concluded: "You may be sure that throughout the Empire we are proud of this glorious chapter in the history of the British Navy."

On September 3 the King and Queen, with the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester, attended divine service on a day of National Prayer and Thanksgiving to mark the surrender of Italy. Their Majesties also attended on September 26 a service of thanksgiving at St. Paul's Cathedral on "Battle of Britain Sunday," appointed to commemorate the valour of the Royal Air Force and other branches of the Forces, as well as the fortitude of the civil defence services and workers in the factories in

resisting and beating the great air onslaught on Britain after the fall of France.

An event of special interest was a Message addressed by the King to both Houses of Parliament on September 22 recommending an amendment of the Regency Act, 1937, to permit Princess Elizabeth, the Heir-Presumptive, to act as a Counsellor of State on appropriate occasions after she reaches the age of 18. This Royal Message was presented to the House of Commons by the Prime Minister. The Regency Act, as was recalled in the King's Message, makes permanent provision not only for the circumstance of the minority of a Sovereign on accession to the Throne, but also for the uninterrupted exercise of the Royal authority during any incapacity of the Sovereign and during his absence from the realm.

In the event of the Sovereign's illness, or of his absence or intended absence from the United Kingdom, certain of the Royal functions may be delegated to persons nominated as Counsellors of State. The Act provided that these persons must be the Queen and a specified number of those in the line of succession to the Crown, excluding any who were not "of full age." This led to the curious anomaly that while Princess Elizabeth would be eligible to accede to the Throne and become Sovereign without a Regent at the age of 18—which she will attain on April 21, 1944—she was not eligible to act as a Counsellor of State during the King's incapacity or absence from the country until she had attained the age of 21.

The King, in the course of his message to the Commons, said :

"The earnest desire of the Queen and myself that our beloved daughter, the Princess Elizabeth, should have every opportunity of gaining experience in the duties which would fall upon her in the event of her accession to the Throne, leads me to recommend that you should take into consideration the amendment of the Act mentioned in such manner as to provide for including among the Counsellors of State the person who is Heir Apparent or Heir Presumptive to the Throne if over the age at which the accession of a Sovereign does not necessitate a Regency, namely, the age of eighteen."

The Message drew attention to the further anomaly that when in 1939 the Queen accompanied the King when he was absent from the United Kingdom (on his visit to Canada and the United States) it was none the less necessary under the terms of the Act to appoint the Queen to be one of the Counsellors of State who were nominated to carry out certain of the Royal functions in the King's absence. It was recommended, therefore, that the House should consider the amendment of the Act so as "to enable persons who are absent or intend to be absent from the United Kingdom to be excepted from among the number of Counsellors of State."

The two Houses voted Addresses in reply to the Royal Message giving the assurance that they would adopt "such measures as may appear necessary or expedient" for securing the purposes of the communication. Towards

the end of the month a Regency Bill, to amend the law in the particulars referred to, was introduced in the House of Lords and given a first reading.

2 : MINISTERS, PARLIAMENT AND THE T.U.C.

Of the war developments reported to Parliament during these months none was heard with more satisfaction than the Prime Minister's statement to the House of Commons on July 27 about the downfall of Mussolini two days before, the prelude to Italy's unconditional surrender. Mr. Churchill referred to Mussolini as "one of the principal criminals of this desolating war," and said that the crumbling of the keystone of the Fascist arch undoubtedly marked the close of an epoch in the life of Italy. He took the view that the Italian people's main wish was to be quit of their German taskmasters ; to be spared a further and perfectly futile ordeal of destruction, and to revive their former democratic and parliamentary institutions. These they could have and the choice lay in their hands, although the Germans naturally wished that Italy should become a battleground so as to keep the war as far away as possible from the Fatherland.

The only thing to do, Mr. Churchill continued, was to "let the Italians stew in their own juice for a bit. . . ." The Allies would continue to wage relentless war upon Italy from every quarter until we obtained from her government the indispensable requirements we demanded for carrying on the war against our prime and capital foe, which was not Italy but Germany. He also gave a warning against undue optimism and reminded the country that Italy as a war unit was equivalent to only about one-tenth of the power of Germany. Hitler, he said, still had under his orders 300 German divisions, excluding those of the satellite States, and Germany still had a massive national strength.

Soon afterwards Mr. Churchill left England to attend the Quebec Conference, from which he went to Washington for further discussions with President Roosevelt. Mr. Eden also took part in the Quebec Conference. The Prime Minister arrived in Canada on August 10 and he did not return to London until September 19. This was the longest of his absences abroad up to that time. The Italians surrendered while he was still in Washington, but this circumstance, as he afterwards explained to the

House of Commons, was not entirely accidental. It was convenient that the Prime Minister at that time should be in close personal contact with President Roosevelt. Mr. Churchill made the return journey across the Atlantic in the battle-cruiser *H.M.S. Renown*. While he was away Parliament was in recess for some weeks and there was no full debate on the war situation until he returned. But on August 3 there was a short debate in the Commons on some political aspects of the war with Italy.

This debate was opened by Mr. Aneurin Bevan and Mr. Greenwood also spoke for the Labour Party. Mr. Bevan was particularly suspicious and critical of the reported contacts between the Allies and the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio and he said that if we decided to recognize an Italian Government under these leaders we should be committed to its support, and we should sacrifice millions of potential allies in Europe. The King and Marshal Badoglio, it was argued, had been so closely identified with Mussolini's Fascist régime or its acts of war and policy that any association with them must bring into question the avowed intention of the Allies to destroy Fascism. With varying degrees of emphasis this was the theme of most of the Labour Members who took part in the debate; and they also stressed the importance of mobilizing in support of the Allies all the anti-Fascist elements in Italy. There was criticism, too, of A.M.G.O.T. (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories) on the ground that in Sicily this organization was thought to be less sternly anti-Fascist than it might be and that it was prohibiting political activities on the part of the civil population in liberated territory.

Mr. Eden in reply pointed out that no recognition of the Badoglio Government would be implied in accepting unconditional surrender from that government. He reminded the House of what Mr. Churchill had said a few days before—that in all these affairs we were acting in close concert with the United States; and that in the present fluid condition of affairs in Italy it would be a grave mistake so to act as to break down the whole structure and expression of the Italian State, thus reducing Italy to a state of chaos and anarchy in which we should find ourselves without any authorities with whom to deal. With regard to A.M.G.O.T., Mr. Eden said that this was a military organization under political authority and direction which was made responsible for civil administration immediately in the wake of the Allied armies. Political activities in Sicily had been prohibited

because this was still a battle area ; but A.M.G.O.T. was working under directives from General Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief, and its broad purpose was, to the best of its ability, to deliver the Sicilians from the Fascist regime and restore their freedom.

Mr. Churchill made his report to the House of Commons on the Quebec Conference on September 21. He also made this the occasion of a long review of the progress of the war on all fronts at what was for Britain the beginning of the fifth year of the struggle. References are made in Chapters I and IV to the Prime Minister's comments on the surrender of Italy, the invasion of the mainland after the conquest of Sicily and at Salerno, and about the progressive success of the war against the U-boats. Mr. Churchill described the year as one of almost unbroken success, by land, by sea and in the air, for us and our Allies. In passing he commented that he had never regarded the operations in North Africa—now successfully concluded—as a substitute for a direct attack across the Channel upon the Germans in France or the Low Countries. On the contrary, the opening of this new front in the Mediterranean was always intended to be an essential preliminary to the main attack upon Germany and her ring of subjugated and satellite States. He later referred to "this front we have opened, first in Africa, next in Sicily and now in Italy" as "the third front." Mr. Churchill proceeded to answer by implication revived criticism of the delay of the Anglo-American forces in opening a second front in Western Europe.

"The second front," he said, "which already exists potentially and which is rapidly gathering weight, has not yet been engaged, but it is here, holding forces on its front. No one can tell—and certainly I am not going to hint at the moment—when it will be engaged. But the second front exists and is a main preoccupation already of the enemy. . . . At what we and our American allies judge to be the right time this front will be thrown open and the mass invasion of the Continent from the west, in combination with the invasion from the south, will begin.

Mr. Churchill emphasized that it was quite impossible for those who did not know the facts of all the military considerations involved to pronounce a useful opinion upon this operation. He continued :

"The House may be absolutely certain that His Majesty's present Government will never be swayed or overborne by any uninstructed agitation, however natural, or pressure, however well meant, in matters of this kind. We shall not be forced or cajoled into undertaking vast operations of war against our better judgment in order to gain political unanimity or a cheer from any quarter. The bloodiest portion—make no mistake about it—of this war for Great Britain and the United States lies ahead of us. Neither the House nor the Government will shrink from that ordeal. We shall not grudge any sacrifice for the common cause. I myself regard it as a matter of personal honour to act only with the conviction of success, founded upon the highest professional advice at our disposal, in operations of the first magnitude. I decline, therefore, to discuss at all the questions when, where, how, and on what scale the main assault from the west will be launched. . . ."

With regard to the air war, Mr. Churchill said that this year of victory on land had been accompanied by an ever-increasing mastery of the air by the British, Americans and Russians in Europe. The Royal Air Force alone was at this time maintaining in action throughout all theatres of war nearly 50 per cent more first-line aircraft than Germany. In the past twelve months the R.A.F. had discharged on Germany three times the weight of bombs discharged in the preceding year, and the increase was progressive. The systematic destruction of many of the centres of German war industry continued on a greater scale and at a greater pace. The German air force had been driven increasingly on to the defensive.

He spoke of the rapidly expanding United States Air Forces in this country and of their daring daylight bombing raids. The British and American Air Forces, he said, were fed by an ever-broadening supply of new aircraft which together exceeded the German supply by more than four to one. The continued progress of Anglo-American air preponderance opened the possibility of "saturating" the German defences, both on the ground and in the air. If a certain degree of "saturation" could be reached, though this would be won only after a hard-fought and bitter struggle, far-reaching reactions would be produced. We should, in fact, have created conditions in which, with very small loss to ourselves, the methodical destruction of every building of military significance in enemy territory would become possible. Complete strategic air domination of Germany by the Anglo-American Air Forces was not necessarily beyond our reach even in 1944; with consequences, if it were attained, which could not be measured, but must certainly be profound. All this must be considered in relation to what was happening on the 2,000-mile Russian front, where the Russian Air Force was already at many points superior in strength to what the Germans had been able to leave there in face of the pressure from west and south.

He also warned the House that the Germans would make frenzied efforts to retaliate, and that the possibility

of new methods of attack could not be ruled out. On this subject Mr. Churchill said :

"The speeches of the German leaders, from Hitler downwards, contain mysterious allusions to new methods and new weapons which will presently be tried against us. It would, of course, be natural for the enemy to spread such rumours in order to encourage his own people, but there is probably more to it than that. For example, we now have experience of a new type of aerial bomb which the enemy has begun to use in attacks on our shipping, when at close quarters with the coast. This bomb, which may be described as a sort of rocket-assisted glider, is released from a considerable height and is then apparently guided towards its target by the parent aircraft. It may be that the Germans are developing other weapons on novel lines with which they may hope to do us damage and to compensate to some extent for the injury which they are daily receiving from us."

He added an assurance that unceasing vigilance and intense study were being given to these possibilities of novel forms of attack, and a reminder that we had always hitherto found the answer to any of the problems of warfare that had been presented to us.

Mr. Churchill next reviewed the progress of the war against Japan. He said that the main strength of the United States was deployed in the Pacific and that at Quebec much attention was given to the prosecution of the Japanese war. He noted as "the fundamental fact" of the Pacific war situation the steady diminution of the enemy's shipping in relation to the tasks which their war policy had imposed on them.

The wasting process was most marked. Japan's widely dispersed conquests depended upon a certain minimum shipping supply. Her losses, however, exceeded her actual or possible means of replacement. This was also true of the Japanese air force, which could scarcely keep its initial strength and which had been long ago overtaken by the enormous United States expansion. So that in both these vital respects upon which the Japanese conquests depended for their maintenance a steady process of attrition was at work. Mr. Churchill said that the setting-up of the South-East Asia Command¹ and the appointment of Admiral Mountbatten had been warmly welcomed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and were in full accord with the views of our American allies.

In his references to the surrender of Italy Mr. Churchill referred to our invasion as an act of liberation of the Italian people from the state of servitude and dégradation into which they had been plunged by the Fascist regime. This led him to the question whether we should apply

¹ q.v., Chapter V, Section 1.

this line of argument to the German people. His answer was that the case was different, since the German people combined in the most deadly manner the qualities of the warrior and the slave. Twice within our lifetime and three times in that of our fathers, they had plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression. The core of Germany was Prussia and here was the source of the recurring pestilence. Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism were the two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed and rooted out if Europe and the world were to be spared a third and still more frightful conflict. He added: "Satellite States, suborned or overawed, may, perhaps, if they can help to shorten the war, be allowed to work their passage home."

There had been criticism at home of the decision of the Anglo-American Allies after Italy's surrender to enter into relations with Marshal Badoglio, and the Prime Minister gave his answer on that point.

It was necessary, he said, in the general interest as well as that of Italy that all surviving forces of Italian national life should be rallied together around their lawful government and that the King and Marshal Badoglio should be supported by whatever Liberal and Left-Wing elements could make head against the Fascist-Quisling combination, thus creating conditions which would help to drive this villainous combination from Italian soil, or annihilate it on the spot. When some Labour Members interrupted to question the rightness of the policy of working with Marshal Badoglio, Mr. Churchill reiterated that the Government intended to pursue a policy of engaging all the forces they could to make head against the Germans and drive them out of Italy. They would not be put off that policy, he said, by fear that it might not command unanimity at home. He more than once insisted that such a policy was calculated to diminish the difficulties and dangers which our troops had to face in Italy. He made it plain, however, that this was without prejudice to the right of the Italian people at the proper time to choose freely what form of government they wished to have.

Mr. Churchill spoke of the arrangements made at Quebec for closer collaboration between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States. He referred to the decision to set up an Inter-Allied Commission for the Mediterranean and of the arrangements made for a conference of the Foreign Secretaries of the three Powers. At this conference, he said, the whole ground would be surveyed and no question would be barred from discussion. Where there were differences these would be set

aside for consideration at the subsequent meeting to which he looked forward before the end of the year between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and himself. Of this proposed conference of the leaders of the three nations Mr. Churchill said :

"No meeting during this war would carry with it so much significance for the future of the world as a meeting between the heads of the three Governments, for without the close, cordial and lasting association between Soviet Russia and the other great Allies we might find ourselves at the end of the war only to have entered upon a period of deepening confusion."

In a reference to the Quebec Conference decision on recognition of the French National Committee of Liberation, Mr. Churchill said that while he had not hesitated to express his differences with the various sections of the Committee from time to time he wished to make it clear that he regarded the restoration of France as one of the great Powers of Europe as a sacred duty from which Great Britain would never turn. It was one of the most enduring interests of Great Britain that there should be a strong France and a strong French Army. The speech contained several references to the great military achievements of the Russian Armies. Mr. Churchill said that in the United States he had become conscious of friendliness towards Great Britain and towards the British Commonwealth and Empire such as he had never known before.

The Prime Minister's statement opened a two-days' debate on the war in the Commons. Before the debate there had been some public criticism of the delay in invading the mainland of Italy, of the handling of the political situation before and after the Italian surrender and of the circumstances in which the Germans succeeded in rescuing Mussolini. But the Prime Minister dealt with most of these matters in his speech, and the general impression was that he had given a reasonably good answer to most criticisms. For this reason the debate that followed his statement was not very exciting.

Mr. Pethick-Lawrence, who recognized that some of the criticism during Mr. Churchill's absence had been uninformed if not misinformed, gave the Prime Minister the opportunity of answering the question most commonly asked : whether the Anglo-American strategic plans were so rigid as to be incapable of rapid adaptation to meet new military opportunities as they

arose. Mr. Churchill replied with an assurance that the Allied plans were flexible enough to make rapid adaptations possible and he said that in connection with the Italian campaign many things had been done on the spur of the moment, including the operations against Sardinia and Corsica. Still it must be borne in mind that when we were dealing with a number of Allies and had to consult a number of Governments, including Dominion Governments, we had not the same freedom that we should have were we simply dealing with our own troops. He added that it must not be forgotten, in spite of some disadvantages attaching to alliances, how superior were the advantages.

Criticism of our relations with Marshal Badoglio was more persistent; and the Government were urged to insist that all anti-Fascist elements in Italy should be allowed to associate themselves with the Italian Government. Some Labour members also asked more critical questions about A.M.G.O.T. It was asked why this should be entirely an Anglo-American organization; why A.M.G.O.T. had made use of former Fascist officials in Sicily; why political activities were not allowed to the population in liberated Sicily; and how A.M.G.O.T. officers were selected and trained.

When Mr. Eden replied to the debate he again explained that the function of A.M.G.O.T. was to restore and maintain normal civil life immediately behind the Armies, so that the military authorities might be relieved of this task. He praised the work of A.M.G.O.T. in Sicily and denied that Fascist officials had been kept in office. All the Fascist prefects had been got rid of; half the local mayors had been changed; and 1,000 prominent Fascists had been interned. While the island was being used as a military base it was impossible to give free rein to all its political parties, but freedom of the press had been restored.

Mr. Eden emphasized that A.M.G.O.T. was not intended to be permanent and that the sooner we could find an Italian administration to take these burdens off our hands the better we should be pleased. When friendly countries were liberated this method of military government would not be employed. From the earliest practicable moment the administration would be turned over to the liberated Government with whom we were in relation, or to some authority representing that country. This matter was already being discussed with the Governments concerned and would be considered further at the prospective Anglo-Soviet-American conference of Foreign Secretaries. Of the political situation in Italy, Mr. Eden said that we wished to see a broadly based government including all the anti-Fascist parties. He pointed out that although hard words had been said

about Marshal Badoglio and the King of Italy, the delivery of the Italian Fleet was honestly and even courageously carried out.

As to Russia, Mr. Eden assured the House that we should seek the closest collaboration with our ally. But, he continued, while it was true that there could be no co-operation if it was not based on confidence, that confidence could not be created by one side alone. Each had to make its contribution. He felt that we had nothing to reproach ourselves with in our efforts to give effect to the Treaty with Russia signed the year before. There was constant consultation ; and if there had not been as much personal exchange between the leading persons of the two Governments as we would have liked it was fair to say that we had made more than our share of travel to meet our Allies.

Mr. Eden said that his Russian friends sometimes told him that we did not understand their point of view ; but there were occasions when we felt that they did not understand ours. He affirmed his belief that the closest and most intimate relations between this country and Russia were essential both to the defeat of the enemy and to a lasting peace. Mr. Eden also said that he would go to the forthcoming conference of Foreign Secretaries determined to do his utmost to reach a generous measure of understanding of all the problems confronting them, so as to prepare the way for the greater event of the meeting of Marshal Stalin with President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister. One interesting feature of this debate was a maiden speech by Commander Prior, R.N., Conservative Member for the Aston division of Birmingham, who described some of his experiences in Occupied France, from which he escaped after a hazardous journey on foot through that country after having taken part in one of the coast raids.

Among the domestic affairs which occupied Parliament was the establishment of a "pay-as-you-earn" income-tax scheme for weekly wage-earners. This event was unhappily associated with the death of Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer. In response to persistent demands that weekly wage-earners at least should be freed of the hardship to many of them of paying income-tax in arrear on past earnings, Sir Kingsley Wood undertook to see whether such a scheme could be devised. In spite of difficulties his advisers at last worked out a scheme which he regarded as satisfactory and he was to have announced it to the House of Commons on September 21, just before the Prime Minister's review of the war. About an hour before he was due to attend at the House

the Chancellor died suddenly at his flat. He was 62 years old and had held important Ministerial offices continuously since 1931, having been successively Postmaster-General, Minister of Health and Secretary of State for Air; and as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1940 onwards he was for part of that time a member of the War Cabinet. As Secretary of State for Air from 1938 to 1940 he played a big part in the development and expansion of the Royal Air Force. In particular he was responsible for founding and developing the Empire Training Scheme for R.A.F. pilots which has proved outstandingly successful. As Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Kingsley Wood produced three war Budgets and his later handling of war finance—combined as it was with the use of budgetary methods to help in keeping a tight control of the whole economic life of the nation for war purposes—won high praise. On September 22 the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, paid a cordial tribute to the memory of the late Chancellor, as did Mr. Arthur Greenwood, Sir Percy Harris and other members.

The postponed statement about the introduction of the "pay-as-you-earn" tax scheme for weekly wage-earners was also made on September 22 by Mr. Ralph Assheton, Financial Secretary to the Treasury. A White Paper was issued to explain the scheme in detail.

The deduction of tax from current earnings was to begin on April 6, 1944, and the scheme affected some 10,000,000 taxpayers. It involved the wiping out of liability for income-tax payable in arrear on past earnings remaining unpaid on April 6, 1944. The aggregate amount of tax liability to be discharged in this way was estimated at £250,000,000. It was explained, however, that about half of this would have been ultimately repayable to taxpayers in the shape of post-war credits, and that since there would be no interruption of tax payments there could be no immediate loss to the Exchequer. There were immediate demands that the benefits of this scheme of tax payment on current earnings, with the accompanying discharge of a portion of one year's tax liability should be extended to other taxpayers, particularly to monthly salary earners. The Government at the time frowned on this demand.

An event which attracted wide interest was the presentation to Parliament by Mr. R. A. Butler, President of the Board of Education, of the Government's plan for reforming and recasting the education service of England

and Wales after the war. This plan was the subject of a White Paper issued on July 16. It was the first of the Government's schemes for post-war social reconstruction and it proposed a bold programme of education reform which was generally welcomed. Among other things the education plan proposes the raising of the school-leaving age to 15 without exemptions as soon as possible after the war, with provision for a later raising of the age to 16; the introduction of compulsory part-time education in working hours for young persons up to the age of 18 at young people's colleges; the improvement of facilities for the training of children below compulsory school age by the provision of nursery schools wherever needed; and the provision of adequate and properly co-ordinated facilities for adult education.

The scheme further proposes that to complete the reorganization of the present public elementary schools so that well-designed and equipped primary schools are available for all children up to the age of 11, and secondary schools, with varied facilities for advanced work, for all children over that age. The secondary schools will be of three main types: grammar schools, modern schools and technical schools. These will all be conducted under a single code of regulations and in all local authority secondary schools fees will be abolished. The grammar schools will be the present secondary schools, which will continue to provide an education mainly academic in character. The modern schools will combine literary education with practical instruction; and the technical schools will provide for the student with a practical bent. From the primary schools children will pass at the age of 11 to one or other of these various secondary schools, not as the result of a competitive test, but on an assessment of individual aptitudes and with due regard to the wishes of their parents and the careers they have in mind. The old system by which children in the elementary schools competed by examination for special places in the secondary schools will be abolished. Power will also be given to local authorities to provide, maintain and assist boarding schools and hostels where these are found necessary or desirable. To emphasize the importance of religion provision is made for the school day in all primary and secondary schools to begin with a corporate act of worship, and for religious instruction to be given. This is the practice in most schools and it will be made statutory and universal. It will remain open to a parent on grounds of conscience to withdraw his child from any form of religious worship or instruction.

An important part of the scheme is the provision made for integrating the voluntary denominational schools more closely with the national education system. This part of the plan represents a compromise reached after long negotiations between the President of the Board of

Education and the denominational and other interests concerned.

When the war began there were 10,553 of these voluntary (or non-provided) schools with an average attendance of 1,374,000 pupils; as compared with 10,363 council schools with an average attendance of 3,151,000. Most voluntary schools are in old buildings and much capital expenditure will be necessary to bring them into line with present and prospective educational requirements and aspirations. The Government decided that the denominational schools should be allowed to continue and play their part in the reforms and that to make this possible more assistance should be given them from public funds. The choice of two alternatives was offered them. If they are unable or unwilling to meet half the cost of the alterations and improvements needed to bring the buildings up to standard, and of the continuing external repair of the fabric, all financial obligation will pass to the local authority. The power of appointing and dismissing teachers will also pass to the local authority, subject to the right of the managers to be consulted as to the appointment of the head teacher, and to the right of the foundation managers to be satisfied as to the appointment of reserved teachers to give denominational instruction for not more than two periods a week to those children whose parents desire it. Schools whose managers elect for this alternative will be named "Controlled Schools." Where the managers of voluntary schools are able and willing to meet half the cost of alterations, improvements and external repairs, the remaining half will be met by a direct grant from the Exchequer. The powers and duties of managers in regard to the appointment and dismissal of teachers and the giving of denominational religious instruction will remain substantially unaltered. Schools in this category will be known as "Aided Schools."

The schools at which young people between 15 and 18 will be required to attend for compulsory part-time instruction if they have previously left school will be known as Young People's Colleges. At first the hours of attendance will be limited to one day a week or its equivalent. The scheme also envisages improved facilities for technical, commercial and art education; an extension of the school medical service and the provision of meals at school; easier access to the universities for poor scholars; more and better training facilities for more teachers; the inspection and registration of all private schools, with power to close those that remain unsatisfactory after a specified period; and a revision of the present system of local education administration. It was estimated that the ultimate additional cost, when all the proposed reforms are in full operation, will be about £67,000,000 a year, thus increasing the annual educational expenditure in England and Wales from the present figure of £123,000,000 to £190,000,000. Of the additional cost £44,000,000 will be borne by the Exchequer and the balance by local authorities from rates.

The House of Commons debated the education White Paper for two days, on July 29 and 30, and adopted a motion welcoming the Government's intention to proceed with educational reform on the lines proposed. Mr. Butler submitted the proposals in an able and persuasive speech and the debate showed a wide measure of approval.

for his plan. The main criticism was that the proposed pace of the reforms seemed too slow. To this the Government replied that the full development of the scheme must be spread over a period of years because of the necessary provision of new buildings and the training of a largely increased number of teachers ; and because the expenditure involved would have to be considered in the light of other urgent post-war commitments. The proposed compromise affecting the voluntary schools was not seriously challenged on grounds of fairness, but representatives of the Churches criticized some of its details. Spokesmen of the Roman Catholic Church complained that the scheme would impose on that denomination an unreasonably heavy financial burden as the price of retaining its own schools. A two-days' debate in the House of Lords on August 4 and 5 proceeded on similar lines and resulted in the adoption of the same motion as that agreed to by the Commons.

After a good deal of pressure from the House of Commons, which reflected opinion in the country, the Government decided to increase war pension rates and to modify some of the conditions governing awards which had been the subject of much complaint. The new proposals, which removed many grievances, were detailed in a White Paper published on July 14.

The pension for a private soldier totally disabled and awarded pension at the full rate was increased from 37s. 6d. to 40s. a week. This brought the full disability pension to the same amount as the similar pension being paid to a disabled soldier of the last war. Pensions of the last war were stabilized on the basis of a cost-of-living figure higher than has yet been reached in this war, but the Government could not resist the argument that a man disabled in this war should receive at least as high a pension as the man disabled in the war of 1914-18. There were corresponding increases in the allowances for wives and children of pensioners and for the widows of those killed. Under the new rates a totally disabled man on full pension, with a wife and two children, will receive £3 3s. 6d. a week. If a disabled man is quite unemployable because of his disablement he will receive 10s. a week in addition to the standard pension ; and if his condition is such as to make it necessary for him to have constant attendance a further sum of £1 is paid as an allowance to his wife or some other person. Another exception made in favour of completely disabled men is that they are now entitled to draw allowances for their wives and children whether they were married before or after their disablement. The general rule that no allowances are payable in respect of wife or children when a man marries after receiving a pensionable war injury, had previously applied to the

severely disabled as to all other ex-service men. A further new provision is that the widows of "other ranks" are to receive an allowance of up to 12s. a week to supplement their pensions where they are paying more than 8s. a week in rent and rates. There were corresponding increases in the pension rates for officers and their dependants—including officers of the women's Services—and the "need qualification" for the award of family allowances with officers' disability retired pay was abolished.

The Government also swept away a number of conditions governing the award of pensions under which many applications had been formerly refused. An important modification was one which removed from the claimant for a pension the onus of proving his entitlement, and assured him of the benefit of any reasonable doubt.

In previous Royal Warrants dealing with pensions it had been laid down that disablement, to be pensionable, must be "directly attributable to," or "materially aggravated by," his service. The words "directly" and "materially" were now removed from these phrases, which meant that many border-line cases would become eligible for pension. It was also laid down that a man's acceptance for service in a certain medical category must be taken as presumptive evidence that at the time of acceptance he was fit for that kind of service; and that in the event of his being subsequently discharged on medical grounds any deterioration in his health which had taken place was due to his service. It was further decided that under war conditions injuries suffered by a Service man through accident—except when he is actually at home on leave—must in general be regarded as attributable to war service and acceptable for pension.

These proposals were generally approved by the House of Commons on July 20. Sir John Anderson, who was the principal speaker for the Government, claimed that all reasonable demands had been substantially met. The House did not entirely agree and made further criticisms and suggestions; but everybody recognized that the new rates and conditions immensely improved the prospects of war pensioners and their dependants. Before these decisions were reached by the Government there had been persistent criticism of Sir Walter Womersley, the Minister of Pensions. Since he was the responsible Minister this was natural; but the House recognized that the Minister of Pensions had administered pensions in a liberal spirit within the terms of his authority. It was also well known that he had played a prominent part in shaping the new rates and conditions and recommending them to the War Cabinet, with whom

the ultimate decision rested. The Prime Minister also took a keen personal interest in this matter and the solution reached owed a good deal to his influence. The House of Commons had declined to proceed with a Bill for the establishment of war pension appeal tribunals until the Government's new proposals regarding the award of pensions were known. After the White Paper had been issued and approved this Bill—under which independent tribunals will decide appeals against decisions of the Minister of Pensions—was passed without further difficulty and was generally welcomed.

By the middle of 1943 the mobilization of the nation's man-power (and woman-power) for war purposes had been carried very far and Mr. Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service, began to find it difficult to meet further demands. But the rapidly changing war situation resulted in fresh calls for man-power and the Minister had to do his best to carry out the decisions of the War Cabinet as modified from time to time by considerations of strategy. On July 29 Mr. Bevin informed the Commons that it had been decided to increase still further the labour force of the aircraft industry.

He explained that the additional labour for the aircraft factories could only be found by an extra recruitment of women. It would be necessary to suspend the intake of women to the Auxiliary Services and the Women's Land Army; to register for employment women between the ages of 46 and 50; and to consider the possibility of sending to the aircraft industry more juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18. He warned the House that if it proved impossible to recruit the number of men needed in the coal industry by the method of giving young men the option of serving in the mines instead of in the Forces he would have to "direct" men between 18 and 25 to the industry. He hinted that the age for "direction" to the mines might have to be reduced below 18. This statement showed that the man-power shortage was now becoming acute. Its significance was not misunderstood, but there was much concern at the possibility of conscripting youths under 18 for the mines; and there was at first much criticism of the decision to register for employment women up to 50. A motion was tabled in the House of Commons by Mr. Craik Henderson expressing alarm at the Minister's proposal because of the effect it was likely to have upon home life and upon the health of women of that age. This motion, which was eventually supported by about 200 Members, suggested that the need for registering these middle-aged women could be avoided by a better utilization of the personnel of the Civil Service and the women's Services.

On September 23 and 24 the Commons debated the whole subject of man-power and Mr. Bevin gave a very

frank review of the situation. He stated that we must face the prospect of a titanic struggle in 1944, that we must be prepared for heavy casualties, and that the shortage of man-power was becoming such that the War Cabinet had decided that there must be this further turn of the screw.

He claimed that mobilization had reached a stage in this country not exceeded by any other nation at war. Every man between 18 and 51 and every woman between 18 and 47 had been registered; and there had also been special registrations of persons with special skill. When the war started we had a population of 33,000,000 between the ages of 14 and 64. Of that number 22,750,000, 15,000,000 out of 16,000,000 males and 7,750,000 out of 17,000,000 women of the ages mentioned were now in the Services, the Civil Defence forces, the war industries, or in other paid employment essential to the needs of the civil population. There were 750,000 women doing part-time work and 1,000,000 more doing unpaid, voluntary war work. Of single women between 18 and 40, 91 per cent were serving the country in some capacity; and of married women of the same ages 80 per cent of those without children were engaged in the war effort. In addition to maintaining an Army on the continental scale and a very large Air Force and Navy, we were employing 2,250,000 more persons in the war industries than in 1918. For these reasons our mobilization must be regarded as virtually complete. Apart from a small number to be made available by a review of present occupations and the new entrants from the younger age classes there could be little addition to our man-power.

The Minister explained, however, that in view of the War Cabinet's decision to increase the labour force of the aircraft industry and to maintain the labour force in the mines at 720,000 men and youths, it was necessary for him to find during the last nine months of 1943 700,000 more persons from the residue that remained. It was for that reason that the new measures—which also included a rearrangement of the labour force already engaged in the munitions industry—had become necessary. He mentioned that the special demand being made upon the aircraft industry was to increase the production of bombers. The more we increased our bomber force the more targets we could attack simultaneously and the lower would be the rate of loss. His view that the agitation against the registration of women from 47 to 50 was a political “stunt” of the Conservative Party was strongly resented by Conservative Members, and he asked why no word of complaint had been uttered when he ordered the registration of women up to 55 for the cotton industry and women up to 60 who had been nurses or midwives. He said that there were over 500,000 women between 46 and 50 at present in employment. He said he was not impressed by the medical arguments against employing women of this age; but he promised that they would be dealt with most sympathetically. Mr. Bevin undertook that these women between 47 and 50 should be interviewed at the employment exchanges by women of their own age; that they would have a right of appeal to a women's panel; that they would not be called upon to go out to work if they had heavy domestic responsibilities or if they were plainly unsuited for employment; and that they would be employed only within the neighbourhood of their own homes. With regard to the coal industry Mr. Bevin said that to repair the normal wastage in man-power 30,000 men must be found for the mines as soon as possible, and 20,000

more in 1944. If enough volunteers could not be obtained men between 18 and 25 would have to be "directed" to the mines, whether they had previous mining experience or not.

In the debate that followed the suggestion made by some Labour members that the resistance to registration of women up to 50 was coming only from the middle and upper classes was indignantly denied by Conservatives and others. Other Labour Members joined in the criticism of the Minister's decision in this matter, although a large majority supported Mr. Bevin. Members of all parties expressed doubts whether the most efficient use was being made of all the young women in the Auxiliary Services and the Civil Service, and even of some of the men at present engaged in aircraft and other war factories. The Government were strongly urged to see that all waste in the utilization of man-power and woman-power was eliminated before the older women were called up for war work. The assurances given by the Government as to the conditions under which these older women were to be employed and the information that emerged about the relatively small number likely to be found available for employment—possibly less than 50,000 out of 231,000 registered—removed many objections to the course proposed by the Minister. In concluding the debate Mr. Bevin commented on some references that had been made to strikes which were not recognized or supported by the Trade Unions.

Some of these unofficial strikes, he said, were being organized for political reasons by persons who wished to impede the war effort. He gave a warning that this would not be tolerated and that the Government were considering new methods of dealing with such strikes. Mr. Bevin also replied to suggestions that man-power might be economized by curtailing the demands upon the Civil Defence forces, fire watchers and Home Guard. He said that many of full-time members of the Civil Defence forces had been set free to go to industry and that it would be imprudent to relax precautions further, particularly in view of what the Prime Minister had said about the possible use of new air inventions by the enemy. Home Guard training had been somewhat curtailed; but a time might come when most of the Regular Army would be abroad and home defence precautions would be more than ever necessary.

On July 6 Mr. Eden made a statement to the House of Commons about the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia, where

the British delegation had been led by Mr. Richard Law. The Foreign Secretary congratulated the United States Government on its initiative in convening this conference and on the successful outcome of the first experiment in comprehensive international discussion of post-war matters.

The British Government, he said, were much impressed by the fact that in the midst of war representatives of more than 40 nations could meet and achieve general agreement on so many fundamental principles. On behalf of the Government he said that we accepted the resolutions of the conference and the obligation to give effect to them in so far as they applied to British conditions. We should gladly co-operate with other Governments in seeking to give effect to those resolutions which called for concerted action. On the same day the House of Lords debated the same subject on a motion by Lord Addison. Except Lord Beaverbrook, who suggested that it would be better to concentrate on immediate war problems—including Russia's present shortage of food—rather than to discuss "vast and splendid projects which invariably come to nothing," the peers who took part praised the achievements of the conference.

In a House of Commons debate on agriculture on July 28 Mr. R. S. Hudson, Minister of Agriculture, referred to the resolutions passed at the Hot Springs conference as being of the greatest significance for agriculture throughout the world.

One of the most striking facts that had emerged was the general agreement that immediately after the war the world would be faced with an acute shortage of food. It showed a lack of a sense of proportion that the Beveridge Report was receiving so much attention in this country and the Hot Springs conference resolutions so little. The Beveridge Report, much as he sympathized with it, would only affect at any given time a few millions in this country, whereas the resolutions of the United Nations Food Conference would affect all the time tens of millions here and hundreds of millions in the world. Unless the Food Conference resolutions were implemented, said the Minister, the Beveridge proposals would prove still-born. Mr. Hudson was much pressed in this debate to say something about the Government's post-war policy for agriculture. It appeared that he had not yet the War Cabinet's authority to say anything about this subject, whatever his own ideas were.

Mr. Churchill announced to the Commons on August 3 arrangements, outlined in a letter to himself from President Roosevelt, for the transfer to the British flag for temporary war-time duty of American merchant ships, at the rate of from 15 to 20 a month for the next ten months. An interesting debate, opened by Mr. Shinwell, on post-war shipping policy took place on

July 14. Members expressed concern as to the future of our merchant shipping after the war in view of the huge merchant fleet which would be at the disposal of the United States. The Government were not prepared to say much at this stage about post-war policy.

Mr. Noel Baker, one of the Joint Parliamentary Secretaries to the Ministry of War Transport, indicated that Government policy broadly was that this country must continue to serve the world with a large and efficient mercantile marine. We should be prepared to collaborate with like-minded governments in establishing conditions under which the world's shipping could be efficiently and economically carried on. The Government included in the term "efficiency" the best attainable conditions of employment for the merchant officers and seamen now serving their country so well. He spoke of the deep gratitude we owed to America for having undertaken a shipbuilding programme without which the war could not have been won.

Sir Arthur Salter, the other Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry, at the time on leave from Washington—where he has done most valuable work as head of the British Shipping Mission—also took part in the debate. He said that we were too near the times when we had been in grave danger for the American shipbuilding output to arouse in him any feelings but gratitude and joy. There had been two periods when the shipping situation was so serious as to threaten the whole issue of the war. On each occasion America saved us.

The first was in the spring of 1941, when America was still neutral. Our shipping losses were then very heavy, our imports were falling rapidly, and our stocks were dangerously low. We were in imminent danger of famine conditions here, or of having to close our factories through lack of raw materials, or of being unable to supply and strengthen our Middle Eastern Armies. America was then producing ships at the rate of only 1,000,000 tons a year. She raised her production programme to 8,000,000 tons, and our necessity was relieved by the early autumn. There came another crisis when Japan entered the war and American as well as British ships were being sunk in great numbers. We were losing several times as much shipping as we were building; America was losing more than she was building; and from a diminishing fleet America had to meet the needs of the Pacific war. By the summer of 1942 we were again in a period of crisis. America raised her ship production programme to 14,000,000 tons and later to 20,000,000 tons. She also made her shipping available to assist the war effort of all the United Nations and Britain was allotted a schedule to meet her needs up to the end of the year. America's great effort, which exceeded what the chief experts believed possible, had been of crucial importance to our fortunes.

America's motive in creating this great mercantile marine, Sir Arthur

Salter said, had been to fashion a vitally needed instrument of war. After the war the shipbuilding capacity of America and other countries would be probably ten times the normal capacity required for peace-time replacement of obsolescent ships. He thought that since we should have the advantage of lower costs of production and operation, other countries, and certainly America, would have an interest in coming to some arrangement with us.

Some other important debates in the Commons were those on a post-war afforestation programme (July 6); economic warfare (July 8); colonial affairs (July 13); the declining birthrate and the trend of population (July 16); and post-war housing and building costs (July 23). Mr. Herbert Morrison, the Home Secretary, announced in the Commons on July 22 the Government's decision to introduce legislation to provide for the redistribution of Parliamentary seats. This has been rendered necessary by changes in the distribution of the population which have led to strange inequalities of representation since the last demarcation of constituencies took place in 1918.

Mr. Morrison also said that in accordance with the recommendations of a Departmental Committee on Electoral Machinery it was proposed to appoint Boundary Commissioners to prepare redistribution schemes for submission to Parliament. Such a measure would, he hoped, secure that the scheme of redistribution would take effect before the first post-war general election was held. It soon became evident that proposals for the redistribution of seats under the abnormal conditions of war-time raised differences of opinion among the political parties as to the procedure to be adopted and the introduction of this measure was delayed.

On July 28 Mr. Morrison introduced in the Commons a Bill to increase the rates payable to injured workpeople under the Workmen's Compensation Acts. This was described as a temporary measure and the Home Secretary explained that the increases were made without prejudice to the introduction of a revised scheme of compensation which the Government had under consideration in connection with the Beveridge social security plan. The Bill was introduced after long discussions between Mr. Morrison and the Trades Union Congress and the British Employers' Federation. Employers estimated that the increased rates would mean an increase in the aggregate cost of compensation over all industries from £16,000,000 to £20,000,000 a year. The increases proposed did not satisfy many of the Labour M.P.s and the Bill made no progress till later in the year.

The threatened clash between the Government and the trade unions concerning the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927 was averted. It will be recalled that the General Council of the Trades Union Congress had shown growing irritation at the failure of its efforts

to persuade the Government to agree to limited amendments of this Act. The demand for amendment had been narrowed down to two points, the more important of which was the deletion of that section of the Act which forbids established civil servants to belong to trade unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress. The civil service trade unions at present are not so affiliated. The Union of Post Office Workers, however, had stated its intention of applying to the T.U.C. for affiliation in September; and the General Council of the T.U.C. had announced in advance that it would recommend acceptance of the application. This attempt to bring pressure to bear upon the Government by a threat of unconstitutional action raised a serious issue. The Government reminded civil servants of the penalties they would incur under the Act if they remained members of a trade union which became affiliated to the T.U.C. Before this representatives of several civil service unions—not including the Union of Post Office Workers—had been received by the Prime Minister on a deputation to discuss the matter. The political side of the Labour movement exerted its influence to avoid the threatened collision between the trade unions and the Government. On August 19 the situation was discussed at a joint meeting of the executive bodies of the T.U.C., the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party. It was decided to set up a joint committee which was instructed to make a fresh effort to find a settlement of the question of the relations of the civil service unions with the T.U.C. To clear the way for this new approach the Union of Post Office Workers next day withdrew its application for affiliation. This removed the threat of unconstitutional action and the situation was eased. A special meeting of Labour M.P.s was held in London during the Parliamentary summer recess to hear and discuss a report from Mr. Greenwood on this train of events.

An interesting and unusual conference of women was held at the Albert Hall, London, on September 28 to hear speeches from the Prime Minister and several other

of his principal colleagues in the Government. This conference was arranged by Mr. Bevin and it was attended by 6,000 women from all parts of the United Kingdom. Its purpose was to thank women for the part they were playing in the nation's war effort, to explain to them the need of recent measures involving further calls upon the national man-power and woman-power, and to answer their questions.

Mr. Bevin, who first took the chair, vacated it for two periods during which two women Ministers, Miss Ellen Wilkinson and Miss Florence Horsburgh, presided. Mr. Bevin explained the difficulties with which he was faced in meeting the further demands for man-power, and he told the women that the last great effort must now be made. Mr. Churchill dwelt on the same theme. He said that we were fully extended now in our mobilization. What we had to do was "to hold it" and maintain the effort through the fifth year of war—and through the sixth year if need be, for we should never stop until we had achieved our purpose. In all this effort, he said, the women of Britain were bearing a part which excited the admiration of our Allies and which would prove to have definitely altered those social and sex balances which years of convention had established. Mr. Eden spoke on foreign policy; Lord Woolton about food rationing, Mr. Hugh Dalton about the rationing of clothes and footwear, and Mr. Brown about the nation's health. The conference was held in private but a report of the speeches was issued afterwards. The Ministers also answered a large number of questions put to them by their audience.

The death of Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, caused a vacancy in one of the key posts in the Government. This was filled by the appointment of Sir John Anderson, a member of the War Cabinet who had been previously Lord President of the Council. On all grounds his succession to the Chancellorship at a time when important decisions must be taken about post-war policies was regarded as a good appointment. Other Ministerial changes were made at the same time. The least expected of these was Lord Beaverbrook's return to the Government as Lord Privy Seal. In the preceding months he had been a vigorous and persistent critic of the Government in House of Lords debates on subjects ranging from the "second front" to milk prices. There was much curiosity as to what he would do in this sinecure office. So active a man as the former Minister of Aircraft Production would not be content with having little or nothing to do and it was assumed that the Prime Minister had some special tasks for him to

undertake. Later it became known that Lord Beaverbrook was to concern himself first with the co-ordination of British policy for civil air transport development after the war ; and he played a prominent part in an Imperial conference held with the object of working out an agreed Empire policy in preparation for wider discussions with the United States and other countries. Mr. Attlee, who had been Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, was now appointed Lord President of the Council, while retaining the office of Deputy Prime Minister.. Lord Cranborne, formerly Lord Privy Seal, succeeded him as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs ; and Mr. Richard Law, who had been Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was given Cabinet rank and the office of Minister of State. With this added status he continued to assist Mr. Eden. Mr. R. G. Casey, who had hitherto been Minister of State, continued to represent the War Cabinet in Cairo but was now described as Minister of State Resident in the Middle East.

These changes in the higher ranks of the Administration left the membership of the War Cabinet unchanged. The only difference was that the former Chancellor of the Exchequer had not been a member of the War Cabinet. Of the changes among junior Ministers the most interesting was the appointment of Mr. George Hall, Labour Member for Aberdare, who had been Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in succession to Mr. Law.

At the Trades Union Congress, held at Southport in September, it was reported that the membership of the affiliated trades unions was 6,024,000, including 1,219,000 women. The total was an increase of 592,000 over the membership of the previous year. For the first time the president was a woman, Dame Anne Loughlin.

Mr. Bevin, in an address to the Congress, expressed the hope that one result of the war would be a development in the trade union movement of a willingness to accept greater responsibility and, at times, to impose a little more discipline. He spoke of some of the advantages which the unions had obtained and recommended them to weave the guaranteed week into their collective agreements rather than to rely upon the Government maintaining it for them. The Minister also suggested that the unions should work for new agreements based on the assumption that the school-leaving age was to be raised and compulsory part-time education up to the age of 18 was to be introduced, in accordance with the Government's promise, after the war. Of plans for demobilization after the war

he said that one principle accepted by the Government was that length of service should be the test of a man's claim to priority of release. Mr. Bevin also mentioned that he proposed to revise the National Service Act by strengthening the guarantee given to men called up that they will be reinstated in their civil employment. He explained that this guarantee would also be extended to volunteers, who had been previously omitted.

A feature of the Congress was the attendance among fraternal delegates of ten trade unionists from Russia, headed by Mr. N. M. Shvernik, who had a very cordial reception. When their leader addressed the Congress he made a strong plea for the opening of a "second front" in the west against Germany in 1943, and said that if this were not done it would mean a protraction of the war. Mr. Shvernik said that if Hitler was obliged to put on a western front one-third, or at least one-quarter, of his forces this would change the balance in favour of Russia in the east and would radically affect the duration of the war. This topic figured prominently in the proceedings. Sir Walter Citrine, the general secretary, submitted on behalf of the General Council a report on the visit of a delegation which he accompanied to a meeting in Moscow of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. It appeared that the British delegates had been put under very strong pressure to agree to a formula insisting that the "second front" in the west must be opened in 1943, and asserting that if this were put off it would inevitably lead to enormous losses and the prolongation of the war. In a speech which did great credit to his sense of responsibility, Sir Walter Citrine explained how, in spite of their deep sympathy with the Russian claim, he and his colleagues had felt bound to demur.

They had told their Russian friends that they were not well enough informed of the military problems involved to justify them in undertaking to bring pressure on the British Government in such a matter. They joined in hoping that it would be possible to open a "second front" in 1943, but they declined to press for such an operation irrespective of what the Government's case might be. Sir Walter Citrine gave the reminder that we were fighting one more enemy than Russia; we were fighting Japan as well. What, he asked, would the Russians have said if the British delegates had gone to them and said: "We believe that the war can be shortened by your giving us and the Americans territory from which we can attack Japan"? Would they have been prepared to conduct a public agitation to force the Soviet Government into such a course? The question had only to be asked for the answer to be obvious. He took the view that

a Committee formed primarily for trade union purposes could not be expected to get into a realm of discussion which might easily lead to serious divergencies between their Governments and peoples. Except on this and one other major point—which related to a Russian proposal for an extension of the scope and membership of the Committee—the British delegation reached a large measure of agreement with the Russians on the Committee.

This report was adopted. The Congress later adopted an emergency resolution submitted by the General Council, which expressed a "strong conviction that the expeditious development of a concerted effort to establish an additional front of battle by a further invasion of the European continent should be taken at every point where Allied forces can strike with good prospects of military success." This, the resolution added, would bring much-needed relief to our Russian ally and hasten the enemy's defeat.

Another debate on international affairs arose on a motion relating to the post-war treatment of Germany. The resolution called for the trial and punishment of those guilty of atrocities; it asserted that the German people could not escape their responsibility for the acts of their Government before and since the war started; and it called for the occupation of Germany for a long period after the war until by unilateral disarmament and re-education the German people had learned to fit themselves under a democratic system of government to co-operate again with the free nations of Europe. This resolution, moved by Mr. Charles Dukes on behalf of the General and Municipal Workers' Union, led to a lively debate. Mr. J. Haworth (Railway Clerks' Association) moved an amendment to delete certain parts of the motion and to substitute "Nazis" for "the German people" in the remainder of the text. The issue was whether the whole German people or only the Nazi Party should be blamed for the crimes of Hitler's Government. The latter view prevailed and the amendment was carried by a large majority.

In a statement on the Government proposals for education reform the General Council expressed its general approval of the scheme, but criticized the Government's proposed time-table as being a too leisurely approach to reform. A resolution was carried welcoming the Beveridge report as a constructive contribution to the establishment of social security, but deploring what was described as the hesitant attitude of the Government. The

Government's proposed new rates of compensation for injured workmen were strongly criticized by spokesmen of the miners.

A section of the General Council's report envisaged the maintenance of war-time controls over prices, production, distribution and consumption for as long as circumstances required after the war. The report added that it would be difficult to do this without some measure of control over labour itself and suggested that trade unions, too, must be prepared to accept restraints. Another resolution adopted asked the Congress to draw up a plan for industrial reconstruction after the war, with special regard to the maintenance of full employment. The Congress also passed a resolution pledging itself to fight for "the four decencies" of a decent job, a decent home, a decent social security scheme and decent educational opportunity for all children. A secret session was held at which Sir Walter Citrine explained the situation reached in the dispute with the Government about the demand of the T.U.C. for a partial amendment of the Trades Unions and Trades Disputes Act of 1927 and the circumstances in which the Union of Post Office Workers had withdrawn its application for affiliation with the T.U.C. In a public debate later a resolution was carried registering strong opposition to the Government's attitude in refusing to amend the Act and urging the General Council to continue to press for such an amendment as an immediate measure.

News of the surrender of Italy was received while the Congress was in session and a message of warm congratulation was sent to General Eisenhower and the Allied forces under his command.

CHAPTER X

LABOUR AND FOOD

There were many strikes during the period under review, generally illegal and contrary to the advice or instructions of the Trade Unions to which the strikers belonged. They were particularly frequent in the coal-mining industry. Much public attention was focussed on a strike in Nottinghamshire where 15,000 men ceased work in September because a youth employed at a pithead had been imprisoned for refusing to work underground, a demonstration which cost the nation 50,000 tons of coal. A greater loss was being recorded in the Scottish coal-fields where the output in each week of June, July and August averaged 25,000 tons below what it had been during the same weeks in 1942.

On August 23 an announcement by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, after stating that during the coming months it would be necessary to make certain adjustments between the intakes for the three Services in order to strike the necessary balance between these requirements, added that "the greatest need for recruits will be in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, and men are also needed in the air crew branches of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm. Men are also needed for underground service in coalmining in order to prevent a falling off in the supplies of coal."

The Government, in the words of the Labour Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* August 27) were working on two lines to secure an increased output. "One is by stimulation of voluntary enlistment with all the persuasiveness which the Minister of Labour and National Service and the Minister of Fuel and Power can jointly employ and the other is by the installation of more mining machinery." The Government's plan was to recruit 50,000 men by next April, three-fifths of them during the present year. Mr. Bevin speaking at the annual conference of the Mineworkers at Blackpool on July 20 had emphasized the serious shortage of manpower in the coalmining industry and said that he must apply "desperate remedies" in the coming year to make the deficiency good. The option given to youths to take mining instead of military service had not been popular and had brought in only 3,000 recruits. They would have to direct people to the mines at younger ages than hitherto—perhaps below 18 and even down to 16.

On September 5 Mr. Bevin called for volunteers "to build up the mining army from all walks of life." He said that the minimum to keep up coal supplies was 720,000. Wastage from age—many of the men working

would have taken their old-age pensions under normal conditions—ill-health and death was likely to force the number down by 30,000 before the year was out. So the 30,000 must be found as soon as possible.

By an unfortunate coincidence, just as Mr. W. Lawther, President of the Mineworkers' Federation, had arranged to broadcast an appeal for recruits for the mines, the Independent National Tribunal published its award on the wages of boys and youths employed in the industry. The wages which it awarded were in fact lower than the rates of pay which the coal-owners had offered in their discussions with the miners' leaders. The miners were deeply disappointed, and Mr. Lawther cancelled his engagement with the B.B.C.

As regards the strikes, they were due in some cases to the resentment felt by large sections of the miners at the "direction" of young pithead workers to underground work. They felt that the young pithead worker should be given the same opportunity as any other young man to work below ground or join the services. There were other causes, the feeling that if there was to be compulsion all classes and not miners' sons only should be sent down the pits, memories of past disputes with the coal owners, the increasing tendency of miners to discourage their boys from following their father's profession. Over and above there was the too widespread view that the war was going so well that the national effort might be relaxed. This was not confined to miners. It accounted for many strikes in other industries, especially in those into which great numbers of new workers had been "directed". The black-out, short holidays and continued long hours had their effect and production managements sometimes seemed to forget that adding to working time did not increase production in equal proportion. Out of a population of some 45,000,000 persons nearly 25,000,000 were engaged in some form or other of national service. Many of these, especially among the women, had had no previous industrial experience; their sense of responsibility was not always well developed, and so far from being surprised at the tendency to take a short holiday by means of an "unofficial strike," the writer finds it remarkable

that so many tired but conscientious workers refused to yield to the temptation.

There was talk of the promotion of strikes in Scotland by "outside influences," whatever that cryptic phrase meant. The Communists spoke more specifically of "Trotzkyists," in whom the public found it hard to believe. In some labour circles Communist appeals to the workers to do their duty and abstain from strikes were taken amiss by men and women who remembered the attitude of the Communist Party before Hitler attacked Russia. The Communists continued their demand for affiliation to the Labour Party, but their prospects were not improved by the condemnation to seven years' imprisonment on a charge of espionage of Mr. D. F. Springhall, National Organizer of the Communist Party, a member of its Central Committee since 1932 and of its Political Bureau since 1939.

The Communists

On returning from Canada and the U.S.A. in July Sir William Beveridge began a private inquiry into possible methods of maintaining employment and avoiding mass unemployment after the war. He said on July 21, that there were two distinct problems: the transition from war to peace and how to stabilize employment on a peace basis. The Government were paying particular attention to the first. They were also studying the second, but the conclusions which he hoped to reach in a six months' inquiry would, he believed, be helpful. Speaking of his own scheme, he said that on reflection he thought it did not do enough for the old and that, so far from costing too much, it cost too little. "He believes," wrote the Parliamentary Correspondent of *The Times*, "that no Chancellor of the Exchequer will ever again have a chance of adopting anything so cheap. He hopes to see the social security plan adopted and got out of the way, so that attention may be concentrated on the much harder problems of maintaining employment and redistributing industry to get rid of slums." (*The Times*, July 22.)

Social Security

At the beginning of July the issue of new ration books was reported to be progressing satisfactorily. On July 6 Lord Woolton stated that from July 25 every expectant mother would be entitled to two ration books, and the second, a modified child's ration book (R.B.2), would enable her to obtain supplies of food additional to her normal adult rations. When making this announcement Lord Woolton said that there was an enormous tempta-

Food

tion in time of war or economic distress for women to sacrifice themselves for their menfolk or their children.

"But," he continued, "I am interested in trying to get healthy babies, and to the women I say : We are providing these extra rations for you and your babies, and not for the family pot. R.B. stands for ration book, but also in this instance for robust babies."

The Food Ministry stated that under the new plan an expectant mother would be entitled to a priority supply of seven pints a week of milk plus her non-priority supply ; two shell eggs at each allocation ; three packets of dried egg at each allocation ; a ration and a half of meat ; oranges as available ; and orange juice and cod-liver oil compound. These rations would be issued from the time a woman should have been certified pregnant by a doctor or midwife : and on her visit to the food office to obtain her second ration book she would also be able to obtain the 60 supplementary clothing coupons instead of having to make a second visit elsewhere with the necessary second certificate. When the baby was born the normal child ration would be available save for chocolate and sweets. No chocolate or sweet ration would be issued to a child under six months of age. In lieu there would be an extra packet of dried egg.

Lord Woolton, it was understood, had decided upon these changes in consequence of his scientific advisers' advocacy. This they supported by the observation that an expectant mother was "a person who gets one ration book but has two lives to look after."

To take different items of food in succession, it was announced on July 19 that the *milk* ration for non-priority consumers would be reduced from three pints to two and a half pints a week from August 1. The reduction was to meet demands for manufactured (i.e. dried or condensed) milk from the fighting forces. Supplies of dried milk would be available for civilians during the winter. In this connexion mention must be made of the proposals made by the Government and announced by the Minister of Agriculture on July 8.

He said that since a large number of dairy herds were still not inspected the Government proposed to arrange in future for a minimum of one inspection a year for every such herd and to inspect more frequently within the limits of the available veterinary personnel those herds with a bad disease record. Various proposals were to be made for the breeding of better stock by farmers. The Government wished to increase the production of T.T. (tuberculin-tested) milk. They would guarantee an additional price for all such milk produced whether it were sold to the public or not. To safeguard supplies for the larger towns, the Minister would ask Parliament for powers to require that milk sold in any area which he might schedule should be heat-treated by an approved process unless the milk came from a licensed and tuberculin-tested herd or was accredited milk from a single herd.

At the end of August it was announced that the *meat* ration, which since April had contained two pennyworth of corned beef, would again consist entirely of butchers' meat from September 18. Zoning in the *fish* industry had produced a saving of approaching 300,000 train-miles since its introduction, but there were still irregularities in distribution. Disputes between wholesalers and retailers were said to have prevented the Ministry from obtaining information as to retailers' requirements. The Ministry, however, stated that there had been further rationalization of fish supplies, e.g. a larger proportion of the needs of the Yorkshire cities would be supplied from Hull instead of from Fleetwood on the Irish Sea (Lancashire). Fish rationing to consumers had been contemplated, but there were difficulties in the way.

On July 21 Mr. Mabane, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, stated that the Government had decided to release for consumption in the winter a quantity of imported canned *jam* which had been held as a measure of security.¹ When the new rationing year began (July 25) new maximum prices for *apples* were announced to come into force on August 1. The Ministry fixed the price of superior varieties at 1s. a pound. For other varieties prices were fixed at 4d. to 9½d. a pound according to qualities and dates of purchase. The Allied victory in North Africa enabled the Food Ministry to purchase between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000 tins of *sardines* for consumption in this country. It was hoped that *lemons* would be imported from Sicily, but while the lemons would be available the Sicilians had no wood for boxes, which would have to be imported. The purchase of the 1943 *tea* crops by the Ministry of Food guaranteed the supply for 1943 subject to the accidents of war.

The *sugar* ration was doubled for the fortnight ending July 25 and the concession whereby consumers might take sugar instead of fruit preserves, which was to have run to June 26, was continued until August 21 for the benefit

¹ The additional jam ration was made available for 12 weeks from September 19. Of the additional jam available, a third had been imported, mostly from South Africa.

of jam makers. The price of sugar was raised by 1d. per pound on September 19.

Retail prices of *tomatoes* were reduced from a maximum of 1s. 4d. a pound to 1s. per pound for the period September 18–October 17. In the north of England, Scotland and the west of Wales the maximum was a penny higher. The supply of *vegetables* in August and September was rather short. Although the Ministries of Food and Agriculture praised the small growers who had done much to make small areas of land produce relatively large quantities of food, nothing was done to help them by allowing groups of such smallholders as had many public and private duties to perform or had not the physique to do constant spade work to obtain the services of Italian prisoners of war. Only large or medium farmers could get them.¹ One explanation given the writer was that the military authorities feared the result of meetings between the supposedly hot-blooded southerners and the wives or daughters of smallholders! One was reminded of Mr. Belloc's lines about "Mediterranean" man whose

"hair is black and often curls
And he is saucy with the girls."

But the real objection seemed to be based on the idea of many Socialists in officialdom and in the Labour Party that voluntary work should not be encouraged. Another example of this attitude was the singular refusal of the authorities to allow separation allowances to married men who volunteered for work in the Civil Defence Reserve away from their homes, though such allowances were granted to men who were "directed" into this organization. Was Labour mindful of the part that voluntary effort had played in the defeat of the General Strike of 1926 and therefore disposed to discourage it?

¹Jobbing-gardeners were not to be found for even a few hours. The experiment of turning over a small holding to be cultivated by men provided by a County Agricultural Committee might fail. In one case known to the writer the men were proud fellows who thought nothing under 50 acres worth care, with the result that the crop was ruined and the owner had no redress.

CHAPTER XI

STATE FINANCE

The following amounts were subscribed and invested during the period July 1 to September 30, 1943, in (a) War Bonds, 1951-53, and, from September 1, 1952-54, in Savings Bonds, 1960-70, Series "B" and "C" and in loans free of interest; and in (b) in National Savings Certificates, Defence Bonds and deposits in the Post Office and Trustee Savings Banks.

| <i>Week ending:</i> | (a) | (b) |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|
| July 6 .. | £23,898,413 | £15,900,910 |
| „ 13 .. | £13,890,736 | £14,405,407 |
| „ 20 .. | £18,420,474 | £10,025,983 |
| „ 27 .. | £15,178,161 | £9,025,434 |
| Aug. 3 .. | £10,796,848 | £7,759,853 |
| „ 10 .. | £13,574,624 | £10,915,274 |
| „ 17 .. | £24,783,637 | £12,156,552 |
| „ 24 .. | £21,371,320 | £11,751,461 |
| „ 31 .. | £36,294,251 | £11,830,671 |
| Sept. 7 .. | £12,774,096 | £12,048,294 |
| „ 14 .. | £13,121,916 | £12,366,940 |
| „ 21 ... | £22,072,193 | £11,016,502 |
| „ 28 .. | £19,024,256 | £11,279,964 |

The sudden rise in the figures of "large savings" in the week ending August 31 was caused by last-minute purchases of the old (1951-53) issue of National War Bonds in view of the new issue on September 1. The end of the Wings for Victory campaign and the imminence of the holidays reduced small savings markedly during the fortnight ending on August 3, but they rose again quickly and were generally higher than during the corresponding periods in 1942. The number of Savings Groups formed in England and Wales increased steadily and had reached the impressive total of 292,710 since the beginning of the war by the end of the quarter.

On August 18 Lord Kindersley, president of the National Savings Committee, announced that complete certified figures for the "Wings for Victory" Weeks showed that the total result of the campaign amounted to £615,945,000, an increase of £70,300,000 over the

Warships Weeks total of the previous year. More than 29 per cent of this sum represented small savings. The figures were the more striking since the Wings for Victory campaign was compressed into the period March-June, while War Weapons Weeks and Warships Weeks had each covered six months of 1940-41 and of 1941-42 respectively. A correspondent of *The Times* observed in this connexion (*loc. cit.* August 21) :

"Wings Weeks were especially fortunate in that so many young airmen, constantly in action over enemy territory, were able to address meetings and to do as much in arousing enthusiasm and understanding as officers of the highest rank. Invaluable assistance was rendered by the Canadian and American Forces in this country, as well as by many units of the other Allied nations. Monetary targets were usually overshoot . . . sometimes within the first three or four days. In such cases the target was frequently raised and the number of aircraft aimed at promptly increased. . . . *Vires acquirit eundo*,¹ wrote Virgil of rumour ; in exactly the same way did enthusiasm gather strength as the success of a Wings Week grew and became known. The schools of England and Wales, for instance, were set a collective "Wings" target of £3,000,000 ; they achieved a final figure some four times as great."

On August 26 the Treasury announced that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had invited Sir Theodore Chambers to become a vice-president of the National Savings Committee, and that Sir Theodore Chambers had accepted the invitation. Lord Kennet had resigned the chairmanship of the Committee, Sir Harold Mackintosh, Bart., had accepted the Chancellor's invitation to be chairman of the Committee.

On August 25 it was announced that the current issue of 2½ per cent National War Bonds, 1951-53, was to be discontinued at the end of the month. Its place would be taken by a new issue of bonds bearing the same interest but with a longer currency, 1952-54.

The new bonds would be repaid at par on March 1, 1954, at the latest, but there would be an option to the Treasury to redeem them on or after March 1, 1952. The maximum currency of the bonds would therefore be 10 years, six months, as against 10 years, three months for the 1951-53 bonds from their first issue in December, 1942. No change, it was added, would be made in the rate or date of the issue of 3 per cent Savings Bonds, 1960-70. The issue would be continued until further notice, except that for technical reasons the bonds issued on or after September 1 would be designated "C" instead of "B" series.

¹ i.e. "It gathers strength as it goes."

CHAPTER XII

THE DOMINIONS

The new Dail met on July 1 and elected Mr. de Valera ^{Eire} Prime Minister by 67 votes to 37. After his election he submitted the names of his Cabinet. It included all the outgoing Ministers with Mr. Moyland, of Cork, who became Minister of Lands. Mr. Frank Fahy was re-elected speaker. On July 2 Mr. de Valera expressed his dissatisfaction at the result of the election when he wound up the debate in the Dail on the Government motion seeking the approval of the House for the new Cabinet. The motion was passed by 67 votes to 51. It was opposed by the Fine Gaedheal and Labour Parties. The Farmers, as on the previous day, did not vote.

In his speech Mr. de Valera referred to the "unbalanced" character of the House, and said that if there were to be a good Government it would be necessary to appeal to the people again. The Government would carry on and would not deviate a hair's breadth from the path which it would have followed had it obtained an overall majority. "If a combination of parties vote us out," he added, "let them do so. We propose to carry out our programme as we have announced it to the people."

On July 14 Mr. H. Morrison, the British Home Secretary, in a speech at a lunch given to Sir Basil Brooke by the Thirty Club in London, followed up the reference made by the North of Ireland Premier to the respective attitudes of Northern Ireland and Eire, with a speech on the same theme. He said that the contrast had greatly, perhaps permanently, modified British opinion on the Irish question.

After describing the "positive and courageous loyalty" of the North "to the cause of human freedom," he continued: "Southern Ireland, exercising its undoubted rights, has preferred to remain neutral, and, while I do not wish to exaggerate that aspect . . . nevertheless . . . we shall be unable to forget that that not only indicated a state of mind between Eire and Britain which we had known . . . and understood, but the tragic thing is that Eire, a country which has fought many battles for what it conceived to be the cause of liberty, should have stood aside, neutral and indifferent to this, one of the most dramatic and fateful struggles in the history of all mankind. . . ."

Next day Mr. de Valera replied to the British Home Secretary. Those who had read his reference to the many battles for what Eire conceived to be the cause of liberty would go on to ask the question against what country "in one way or another" had most of these battles been fought. They would also ask: "What country is responsible for the continuing crime of partitioning the ancient nation of Ireland? Whose is the force . . . that compels almost half a million of our people to endure the denial of the freedom and liberties for which this war in the cause of human freedom, to quote Mr. Morrison, is being fought."

The elections to the Seanad (Senate) were completed by August 26. There were some surprises, but in general the new Upper House differed little from its predecessor. The Labour Party secured only eight seats. Ignorance of the complicated electoral system prevented the Farmers' Party from being represented at all. Mr. Cosgrave's Fine Gael came best out of the election of 49 Senators, but Mr. de Valera, by exercising his right to nominate 11 members, could repair any decline in Republican strength.

A flying-boat of the British Overseas Airways Company crashed on a mountain near Tralee on July 28. Of 25 persons on board 10 were killed and all the rest injured, some seriously. On September 20 it was announced that the National Stud, hitherto conducted by the United Kingdom at Tully, Kildare, should henceforth be carried on in the United Kingdom, to which the bloodstock had been transferred. The transfer had been the subject of an agreement between the two Governments.

Northern
Ireland

A by-election for the Carrick Division on August 26 resulted in a Unionist victory over the Labour candidate. An improvement in the internal situation was perhaps indicated by the Government's revocation of orders banning processions which had been imposed after the outbreak of war. Arms were discovered by the police in the roof of a hall in East Belfast on August 21. Heavy sentences were imposed on men of the I.R.A. charged with firearms offences by Lord Justice Murphy on August 3.

Newfound-
land

On July 16 Mr. King, the Canadian Prime Minister, replying in Parliament to a suggestion that Newfoundland should be invited to enter the Dominion as a tenth province, said that any such proposal should be initiated by the Newfoundlanders rather than by members of the Canadian Parliament. Canadians were interested in the defence of Newfoundland and hoped that its people would find some wholly satisfactory solution of their political and economic problems. Should they ever decide in favour of entry into the Canadian federation and made that decision clear, Canada would give the most sympathetic consideration to the proposal.

On September 21 the Dominions Office announced the Royal approval of the extension for a further year from January, 1944, of the term of office of Vice-Admiral Sir Humphrey Walwyn as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Newfoundland.

The news that Canadian troops had been fighting and Canada fighting well in Sicily caused great satisfaction in Canada where the long defensive of the Canadian forces in Great Britain, only broken by the costly raid on Dieppe, had caused some impatience. On July 18 Mr. King described the part played by the 1st Canadian Division in Sicily and said that it was fitting that this unit which had waited longest for action and was the most seasoned formation should have the honour of taking part in the first major Canadian land operation of the war. It had already been announced that this Division was commanded by Major-General G. G. Simonds. Large Canadian contingents crossed the Atlantic during the quarter. They included a large number of parachute troops. On August 9 it was announced that Mosquito bombers built in the Canadian De Havilland factory had flown the Atlantic to a British airfield. The first Canadian women of the W.R.N.S. to serve in Britain reached London in early September to join the establishment of the senior Canadian naval officer in the United Kingdom.

On September 13 Colonel J. L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, announced important changes in the organization of the Canadian Army. The improvement in the general military situation had made these possible. The Minister gave the following details of the reorganization :

The 7th and 8th Divisions now serving in Canada would be disbanded and the 6th Division partly disbanded. In substitution for these there would be new formations with a much smaller total establishment. The rearrangement particularly affected that part of the Canadian Army allotted to operational tasks and would result in a reduction of the troops needed for these services and also the number of their ancillary troops.

"The general effect of the reorganization would be to provide a reduced but thoroughly efficient body of operational troops in Canada ; to introduce an additional phase of advanced training which will be given to reinforcements before going oversea ; and to release many men of lower category, who will be able to take up civilian occupations and thus supplement the available man-power. . . . The necessary number of units will be retained to undertake the required coast defence and other operational duties."

The reorganization, the Minister added, would reduce the establishment for operational troops in North America by about 20,000 men. These would not go out of the Army; many would be drafted into remaining units and be kept for potential reinforcement. The reduction of the need for operational troops in Canada did not mean that the demand for oversea troops was lessened. The flow of reinforcements to provide for oversea needs would be steadily maintained.¹

It was unfortunate that American critics should have taken the view that the Canadian authorities were disbanding combat troops at a time when the U.S. Government were contemplating the enlistment of American fathers of military age. On September 15 Colonel Ralston had to issue a further statement that the proposed reorganization involved "no let-up or modification" in the oversea programme of the Dominion. He emphasized that every man whose medical category was suitable for operational duty would be retained. This had been made clear in the original statement, which had shown that the reduction in the operational force stationed in Canada did not mean any reduction in the demand for oversea service.²

The wide expansion of shipbuilding in Canada was dramatically exemplified on September 18 when twelve naval and merchant vessels were launched at Atlantic and Pacific ports. These included the destroyer *Micmac*, of the tribal class, named after a Nova Scotian Indian tribe and the largest warship yet constructed in a Dominion yard. Other ships launched that day included two frigates, a corvette, a minesweeper, a patrol vessel, a tanker and two 10,000-ton merchantmen. Another important branch of production approved during the quarter was the establishment of plants and equipment for the production of penicillin, the new bactericide, a British discovery which had been most effective in curing pneumonia, septic wounds and injuries, blood poisoning and other diseases.

Canadian politics were to some extent obscured during this period by the Quebec Conference which is chronicled

¹ Summarized from an Ottawa message to *The Times*, *loc.cit.* September 14.

² Clearly the American critics had not read the original statement carefully or understandingly.

in Chapter II of this volume. There were interesting developments, notably the breaching of what had seemed strongly established Liberal citadels, both in Provincial and Federal elections.

The Province of Ontario held a general election on August 4. The Liberal Government were soundly defeated, emerging with only 14 seats against 38 won by the Progressive Conservatives, and 33 which fell to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. This was a party with a distinctly Socialist programme which had shown its strength in the Western Provinces where it already held the balance of power in British Columbia and formed the official opposition in Saskatchewan. Its first bid for power in the east had revealed that it had much support especially in the industrial constituencies there. True, the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives obtained a larger combined vote, but the Federation won enough support to justify the belief that the field previously dominated by two parties had now been successfully invaded by a third.

The Progressive Conservatives were delighted by the result of the election, which was "the first real test of power for the Party since it was reorganized under the Federal leadership of Mr. John Bracken."¹ They were sufficiently confident to form a Ministry, headed by Mr. George Drew, without the aid of any of the rival groups. They counted upon enough Liberal support in Parliament to keep control. In the Province of Prince Edward Island the election held in mid-September resulted in the return of the Liberals led by Mr. J. Walter Jones, with a substantial but reduced majority. The Progressive Conservatives gained ground. The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation² failed to win a single seat of the nine which it contested in this predominantly rural Province.

There were four Federal by-elections. The Liberals lost them all, two to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, one to a Communist and one (in Quebec) to a representative of the *Bloc Populaire*, a party accused by its enemies of sub-Fascist tendencies. Although these losses did not seriously affect the Liberal majority in the Federal Parliament they aroused much disquiet in leading Liberal circles, and in late September two important Conferences met. At the first, held at Ottawa on September 24 and 26, the Parliamentary supporters of the Dominion Government discussed measures for integrating the political organization of the Liberal Party. On September 27 and 28 the advisory council of the National Liberal Federation decided to revise the party constitution in such a way as to foster the study of social, economic, financial and political affairs, particularly in their bearing on the post-war period, and to broaden the influence of the federation especially among the young. Provincial Liberal associations were to be given increased representation on the advisory council, which must henceforth meet once a year.

The National Council of the C.C.F. met at Calgary in September. There it rejected an offer of affiliation made by the so-called Labour-Progressive Party which had been organized at Toronto by Mr. Tim Buck, the former leader of the now disbanded Communists. This decision supported the attitude of these leaders of the C.C.F. who maintained that in changing its name the Communist Party had not changed its policy,

¹ *The Times*, August 6.

² Henceforth described as "the C.C.F."

and that it hoped to infiltrate into and finally to control the C.C.F. The Catholic Church, which had at one time seemed to look askance at the C.C.F., now grew more friendly.

Besides the representatives of Great Britain and the United States who took part in the Quebec Conference Canada received other important visitors during the period, among them General Giraud, Sir John Anderson, and Mr. Mabane. Colonel Ralston visited the United Kingdom in late July to confer with leading Army and Government authorities, and Colonel C. W. Gibson, Minister of Internal Revenue, followed in August. Hr. Wilkman was appointed the first Swedish Minister in Canada and Mr. Ray Atherton assumed the post of U.S. Minister in the place of the late Mr. J. Pierrepont Moffat. Señor Eduardo Vivot was appointed Argentine Minister in Canada.

New
Zealand

A general election was held in New Zealand on September 25. The issues were mainly domestic. All parties made the prosecution of the war their principal aim, but the National Party desired to form an all-party Government on British lines and accused the Labour Government of inefficient handling of the problem of food production. As regards post-war issues the National Party desired the removal of more war controls than Labour was prepared to abolish, but, generally speaking, it was ready to accept such forms of State control as were clearly in the public interest. The Labour Party, while still advocating State control of credit and currency, had followed traditional methods of raising loans. Its National rivals, while vesting the final control of currency in Parliament, preferred to entrust its management to an impartial commission.

The final results of the election were not known until October 13, owing to close voting, recounts and the time required to obtain the votes of the Services. Even then a recount had been demanded in one constituency. The results were then, Labour 45 seats (against 50 before the election); National Party 33 (against 25); Independent National 1; Independent 1. Two Ministers were defeated, and several Labour members only held their seats through the service men's votes. Suggestions in favour of a united National Government were rejected by Mr. Fraser in a speech on September 30.

On September 1 the Government published figures showing the expansion of the armed forces since the outbreak of war. At that time there were 355,000 men of military age in the country.

The statement showed that so far 95,340 men had been sent oversea, while the total enrolled in the three fighting Services was 189,000. The Home Guard numbered 124,000 at full strength. About 260,000 men and women had been enrolled for civil defence. It was announced on July 11 that the Third Liberty Loan of £35,000,000 had been oversubscribed by more than £4,000,000. On the following day a great number of New Zealand soldiers arrived on extended furlough after three years' service abroad and were enthusiastically greeted. The Dominion had another pleasant surprise on August 27 when Mrs. Roosevelt arrived on an unheralded visit. It was announced in July that Air Vice-Marshal Goddard, Chief of the New Zealand Air Staff and Air Officer Commanding the Dominion's Air Forces, would be succeeded on the expiry of his command by Air Commodore Isitt, himself a New Zealander, with the temporary rank of Air Vice-Marshal.

The chief event in Australia during the quarter was the Australia General Election of August 21 which gave Mr. Curtin and the Labour Party a complete victory in both Houses. The electorate had been called upon to decide whether the conduct of the war should remain in the hands of the Labour Government led by Mr. Curtin and Dr. Evatt, or be entrusted to a Coalition of the United Australia Party and the Country Party. Mr. Fadden, the leader of the former party, and Mr. Menzies, whom he had displaced, had urged the setting up of a National Government, but the Labour Party refused to agree and its spokesmen observed that since the two leaders of the United Australia Party could not even collaborate in an election campaign they were not likely to co-operate usefully in a National Government.

The first figures published showed that in the House of Representatives Labour had secured 49 seats (36 in the previous Parliament), the Opposition 23 (against 36), of which the United Australia Party had 14 and the Country Party 9, and Independents 2 (no change). The Government won all the 19 vacancies in the Senate. The reduction of the Opposition vote was extraordinary. Mr. Menzies was said to have observed "The steam-roller has passed over us and now we know what it is like."

Internal dissensions played their part in the defeat of the Opposition parties. But the cause lay deeper. The Canberra correspondent of *The Times* wrote (*loc. cit.* August 23): "An explanation of the present *débâcle* will probably be found in the fact that the Opposition candidates in the recent campaign even including the leaders hopelessly over-reached them-

selves in unreasonable abuse of the Government and caused an inevitable reaction towards Labour among detached voters. Many others had no faith in the Opposition's ability to form a stable Government because of the personal antagonisms that clove its ranks. One reason for the rapid decline of the United Australia Party . . . in recent years, especially since the death of Mr. Lyons, its first leader, is its lack of democratic organization in the constituencies, and the conviction thus arising in many minds that the selection of its candidates is dictated by an exclusive organization dominated by city and business interests."

On September 20 the Labour Caucus re-elected the Federal Cabinet with one exception, the substitution of Mr. A. Calwell, M.P. for Melbourne, for Mr. G. Lawson, who had been Minister of Transport. Mr. Curtin was unanimously elected leader of the Party, and Mr. Forde deputy leader. Next day Mr. Curtin announced the distribution of portfolios. Mr. Ward, who had been under suspension pending the reassembly of Parliament since June for reasons which were set forth in the last volume of this series (*The Fifteenth Quarter*, Chapter XII), was transferred from the Ministry of Labour and National Service to the posts of Minister of Transport and Minister for External Territories, "a change which has diminished his administrative and political importance."¹ Mr. Holloway became Minister of Labour and National Service and his former charge (Health and Social Services) passed to Senator Fraser. The Postmaster-General, Senator Ashley, relinquished his second portfolio as Minister of Information to Mr. Calwell. Senator Ashley became Vice-President of the Executive Council, a nominal post.

The Commonwealth's seventeenth Parliament met on September 23. Mr. Rosevear was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. Senator Gordon Brown was elected President of the Senate.

The Governor-General's speech announced that the Government would comprehensively reconsider the balance of the war effort, since, with the improvement of the Commonwealth's strategical position, it was necessary to review the position of those branches of production which had been decreased by the paramount urgency of other demands. This review was particularly needed for agriculture, which comprised a most important part of the Australian contribution to the war effort of the United Nations. Lord Gowrie added that the Budget to be presented

¹ *The Times*, September 22.

would be the heaviest in the history of Australia, imposing a grievous financial burden, which, it was not doubted, would be cheerfully accepted. Proposals would be submitted for post-war reconstruction which must be approached from a national standpoint.

Commenting on the speech, the Canberra Correspondent of *The Times* (*loc. cit.* September 24) observed:

Now that the immediate danger of invasion has passed, the strength at which Australia's own garrison should be maintained is bound up with the problem of production and service behind the lines for Allied forces using Australia and New Guinea as their base. The Food Controller has represented the urgent necessity for releasing man-power for food production on a scale exceeding any previous demand. Australia has to feed not only her home front but also all the forces in the south-west Pacific and part of those in the south Pacific areas. Simultaneously she must maintain supplies to the United Kingdom and prepare to do her part in the feeding of the starving peoples of Europe and Asia as they are released from the enemy yoke.

On September 29 Mr. Chifley introduced the Budget for 1943-44. He began by announcing that the Government intended to review the whole war programme too ensure that first needs should come first and that the best use should be made of the national resources.

The total working population had increased by 620,000, of whom only 150,000 were accounted for by natural increase. More than 48 per cent of this working population, i.e. 1,370,000 persons, were engaged in the fighting services, in defence construction or in the munition factories. Many others were employed in producing food, clothing and other essentials for the Australian and Allied forces. But the drain on agricultural workers, 30 per cent of whom had joined the forces or the factories, had been heavy and shortages of man-power and transport were marked and were receiving the Government's special attention.

Up to June 30 the war had cost Australia £A1,107,000,000. Of this £A363,000,000 had been provided from taxation, £A474,000,000 from loans and the balance by discounting Treasury Bills with the Commonwealth Bank, and from the temporary use of Treasury funds. The estimated total revenue for 1943-44 was £A312,087,000, an increase of £A44,634,000 on the preceding year. Taxation was expected to bring in £A272,767,000, an increase of £A42,630,000. The estimated expenditure for the current year was £A570,000,000 for war and £A144,526,000 for other purposes, totalling £A714,526,000. The deficit was to be met by loans. The debt incurred in the present war totalled £A731,000,000 on June 30. But as all the loans had been raised in the Commonwealth their service in interest charges and sinking fund did not reduce the income of Australia as a whole. Speaking of the inflationary danger arising from the new money created especially by the discounting of Treasury Bills with the Commonwealth Bank, he assured the House that the Government would take resolute measures to control the excess purchasing power in the hands of the public, to prevent a progressive rise in prices and to ensure the equitable distribution of goods available to the civilian public. The Government had put a

ceiling on prices in April, which was to be enforced in the last resort by subsidies. So far the scheme had worked better than had been expected.

Financial circles which had feared unorthodox methods on the part of victorious Labour were agreeably relieved, notably by the Government's decision to reduce its dependence on Central Bank credit by £A118,000,000 during the financial year. There was a widespread desire for a "pay-as-you-earn" system of taxation on Canadian lines. Australian credits from reverse lend-lease were becoming substantial and were helping to lighten the burden on the Australian taxpayer.

Mrs. Roosevelt left Australia by air on September 14 after a visit of 11 days.

South Africa

The South African General Election was held on July 7. Counting the soldiers' votes took time, but by July 28 it was known that General Smuts had already secured a clear majority, and that the Union Party which he led had every reason to anticipate a great triumph. The final figures were published on July 30. The state of parties in the new House of Assembly would be: United Party 89, Labour 9, Dominion Party 7, Independents 2, Native representatives 3, giving a total of 110 for the "pro-war" Government Coalition. The Nationalists who formed the Opposition won 43 seats. The Afrikaner Party was eliminated and the Communists made no sort of showing. The total number of votes cast for the Coalition was 610,143 against 347,057 polled by the Opposition. It was a most encouraging success.

On August 13 the Government announced the formation of three new Ministries as part of a regrouping of existing departments. These were a Ministry of Transport, a Ministry of Welfare and Demobilization, and a Ministry of Economic Development. The heads of the new Ministries were respectively Mr. F. C. Sturrock, Mr. H. G. Lawrence and Mr. S. F. Waterson.

On September 4, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the war, General Smuts broadcast his views on the European outlook and the policy to be followed when victory was won. He believed the fortress of Europe would disappear physically under the onslaught from the air. Hitler was already using up his reserves, internal agitation was growing and was all the more dangerous because it was suppressed and driven underground by the iron hand of Himmler.

The Germans were not all Nazi monsters, moral perverts or devil worshippers. There was another and a better Germany which must have passed through hell in witnessing the lawless inhumanity of its people.

Deep revolt was brewing in the Reich and of all the forces gathering for the Nazis' doom not the least would be the Fifth Column within Germany.

While the end was now certain, it would demand greater efforts than ever before. The hardest fighting lay ahead and it would probably take another year to win final victory. There was now no time to lose. If the war was not to drag on until the world was exhausted they would have to force it to a conclusion "this year by a concentration of all the means within our power. Time has now become of the essence of victory."

The victors would then be faced by the colossal task of rescuing what is left from the destruction. A broken, destitute and starving old world would call for relief and restitution. "Let that be our reparation policy." Unless that policy were followed our Western society might dissolve in a chaos of suffering and despair. If it were followed in the Samaritan spirit, the self-inflicted wounds of our mother continent of Europe would be healed and a new atmosphere would be created internationally in which a new world order could be planned.

In another speech on September 7 General Smuts warned the country against any slackening of the war effort. This would prove the decisive year. "The call to-day, at the opening of the fifth year, is more urgent and insistent than ever." There was a danger of the world falling into a state of endless exhaustion which would mean as great a defeat as if we had lost the war outright. South Africa must put all its resources into the final effort.

Sir Patrick Duncan, Governor-General of South Africa, died on July 17 greatly regretted. The Government of the Union was administered by Chief Justice de Wet. An announcement from Buckingham Palace on the night of August 19 stated that the King, on the recommendation of the Union Government, had approved that he should continue to administer that Government at his Majesty's pleasure after relinquishing the Chief Justiceship on September 10.

On September 6 Mr. Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, through the correspondent of *The Times* in Canberra, outlined proposals for setting up a permanent Empire Council to ensure a closely united front for Britain and the Dominions after the war. He had already broached the subject of an Imperial consultative body in a speech at Adelaide on August 15 where he said that he did not think that the Mother-Country could manage the Empire through a government sitting in London.

He now proposed that a council should meet from time to time in Ottawa, Canberra, Pretoria and Wellington as well as in London. It should have a permanent secretariat of men as expert in the problems of peace as those now advising the British Commonwealth and the United

An Imperial Council

Nations were expert in those of war. He suggested that the Dominions should be represented by their High Commissioners and that the structure of the Council should resemble that of the Pacific War Council, through which representatives of the Dominions could regularly consult those of the United Kingdom.

The proposal was discussed with friendly interest by the British Press. It was welcomed in Australia and it secured the support of Mr. Fraser, the Prime Minister of New Zealand.

In South Africa, however, the *Cape Times*, which was reputed to interpret public opinion accurately and to be well-informed of the Government's views, opposed it. It pointed out that the consensus of opinion among the statesmen of the Empire had been against the establishment of any organic union such as the formation of an Imperial Council would necessarily imply. There should admittedly be the highest degree of consultation between Britain and the Dominions. But to establish a formal council of Empire might well accentuate rather than narrow down differences of opinion. It might even "result rather in centrifugal than centripetal tendencies."

CHAPTER XIII

INDIA

By Sir Frank Brown

The quarter was marked by a notable lull in the wordy political conflict in India as Lord Linlithgow's seven and a half years' Viceroyalty drew to a close. Interest quickened in the personality and outlook of his eminent successor, who early in the quarter was raised to the peerage under the title of Viscount Wavell of Cyrenaica and Winchester. His many farewell speeches in Britain were marked by clear and courageous vision of his mission and by happy turns of phrase. His repeated testimony that without India's aid in men and materials the victories of North Africa could not have been achieved was noted with much satisfaction.

Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, at a reception by the East India Association, justly said that the Field Marshal, while realizing fully the greatness and difficulty of his task, was not the least afraid of facing it, and was doing so with the hope and confidence that he would handle it successfully. To Mr. Amery's reminder that the very sagacious Indian elephant always carefully tested its bridges before crossing them, and that they might be sure the Viceroy-designate would test his ground very carefully, Lord Wavell pertinently replied: "*This sagacious elephant has first got to find his bridge.*"

Little progress towards the discovery of the bridge was made in India. There were repeated pleas from various quarters that Mr. Gandhi and the other Congress leaders should be set free, or that at least interviews with them by would-be conciliators should be permitted, with a view to discussion of means of ending the deadlock. To all these pleas the reply of Lord Linlithgow, carrying the full support of his predominantly Indian Executive Council, was that the withdrawal of the policy of mass civil disobedience—"open rebellion" as Mr. Gandhi has termed it—was the path by which the detained leaders could secure release and re-enter the political field.

Authority had at least the negative satisfaction that August 9, the first anniversary of the arrests, passed off with less trouble than had been feared. There were two or three minor bomb outrages, but appeals to the people by leaders of underground revolutionary movements to mark the occasion by renewal of disorder and sabotage had little effect. Much of the credit for this quietude was due to anticipatory precautions by the police, but it was noted that leading members of the Congress Party in various parts of the country discouraged adherents from creating trouble, and also that the strongly Nationalist Press refrained from direct or indirect incitement.

Not only was there general recognition that with the near advent of a new Viceroy the period must be regarded as transitional; but public attention was also largely turned to the food situation, referred to in the *Fifteenth Quarter*, which now grew steadily worse. For the first time for more than forty years the word "famine" came into use. Since the beginning of the century that condition had been exorcised by the cumulative effect of improved communications, the normal working of the law of supply and demand, the spread of irrigation, notably of a "protective" character with the assistance of the Famine Insurance Fund, and the increasing application of science to agricultural production. Now the elaborate system of prevention and relief laid down by the Famine Code, as last revised early in the century, failed to function because scarcity arose from universal war conditions and the great constitutional change under which British India is now organized on the basis of provincial autonomy.

It has been argued that the rise of such conditions should have been foreseen and as far as possible forestalled at a time when almost all countries directly involved in war, and indeed their neutral neighbours, were increasingly subjected to short supplies of food and other commodities.

It was evident that the rapid growth of population—by 15 per cent to 400,000,000 in the decennium 1931-41—had not been accompanied by a corresponding rise in production, and that the ordinary channels of external supply would be choked by war requirements and by shortage of shipping.

The loss of imports of rice from Burma, representing a supplement of about 4 per cent of the normal grain production in India, and the great increase in India's fighting men—and an army always eats more than a civil population—were among the warning lights to which at first apparently little attention was paid. On the other hand account must be taken of the great strain on the Central Government of providing war supplies on a vast scale, and of countering the civil disobedience movement. Moreover, the Central Government found itself, owing to the devolution of authority to the provinces, far less completely in control than formerly and with little or no direct agency in the districts for its exercise. Food and famine are in the statutory list of "provincial subjects." The reluctance of the Government of India to reassume, under war emergency powers, subjects which have been transferred was natural, but a stage was now reached when drastic remedies were necessary.

Harrowing accounts of conditions in Bengal, and especially in Calcutta, now grown to well over two million inhabitants, were reaching the Press. Towards the end of the quarter it was stated that some 4,000 deaths due to starvation had been recorded in the capital city during the previous six weeks. More than 2,400 relief centres were opened in various parts of Bengal, and afforded relief for more than a quarter of a million people. The war supply effort in Calcutta and other centres was in large degree protected from the impact of scarcity by the fact that employers supplied their workers with subsidized food. But the spectacle of thousands of people dying from starvation in the province destined to be the operational base on which the liberation of Burma from the Japanese yoke might be attempted was, apart from humanitarian considerations, a matter of grave concern to the Government and the military authorities. Recognition at the Centre of the vital importance of the subject was marked in the middle of August by transfer of the food portfolio from the Commerce Member of the Viceroy's Executive, Sir Aziz-ul Huque, to the less occupied Civil Defence Member, Sir J. P. Srivastava. Further, using its special war-time powers, the Central Government, without invading the primary responsibility of the provincial Governments, established in all the areas most affected its own regional Food Commissioners to report, advise and convey instructions.

The situation was diagnosed by Mr. Amery in the House of Commons on September 23.

Among the causes of inadequate supplies in certain parts of the country he mentioned poor rice crops in Bengal, loss of imports of Burma rice, withholding of some portion of their crops from sale by 50 million peasant producers, some merchant hoarding, some clashes between provincial and national interests and some local failures of administration. In addition to Bengal, the areas mainly affected were part of Bombay and Madras, where crops are always precarious; and Cochin and Travancore in the south, which were mainly dependent on import by sea. Bombay, by establishing a rationing system in the city in May and by co-operating with the Central Government, had held its own so far. While in other parts of India the position generally was not so serious, heavy concentrations of population, such as those in the coalfields and Jamshedpur (the seat of the Tata Steel Works), Indore, Mysore and Bangalore, were all a constant source of anxiety. Bengal was unquestionably the centre of trouble, and the task before its autonomous Government was to obtain sufficient supplies and to distribute them adequately. Measures of control had brought prices of rice down to Rs. 24 (£1 16s.) per maund, after being as high as Rs. 37 [as against a normal pre-war figure of Rs. 4 (6s.)], and it would be further reduced by successive stages of control. Elsewhere wholesale prices were lower, ranging from Rs. 18 in the Punjab down to Rs. 8 in Madras. Mr. Amery added that 1,700 tons of wheat per day were being sent to Calcutta by the Central Government. This was more than enough to feed the city itself on a tolerable ration basis, but supplies had to cover some of the country districts also.

The complexities of the situation did not save the Administration and, in a measure, the Home Government from criticism for not having prevented famine by timely action such as rigorous measures against mercantile hoarding. The *Statesman* (Calcutta) wrote of the shortage as a "man-made famine." Government now prohibited loans or advances on the security of stocks of grain except to licensed dealers or producers. The demand for large-scale assistance from outside grew. In his statement on September 23 Mr. Amery pointed out that in relation to the shipping position, consideration must be given to the extent to which supplies could be sent to India without serious repercussions on the war effort. Mr. William Scully, Minister of Commerce in Australia, announced on September 28 that the Commonwealth could supply all the wheat needed for the starving people of Bengal if the United Kingdom could provide the ships. Some weeks earlier he stated that 50,000 tons had already been despatched to India and more would be sent as shipping became available. At the close of the quarter the situation was eased by Lord Woolton's welcome announcement that supplies were being sent from Britain.

Meantime, a Food Grains Policy Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Theodor Gregory, Economic Adviser to the Government of India, issued a report on long-term planning. The report made the following recommendations:

For the duration of the war India should cease to be a net exporting country and become a net importing country. The constitution of a central food grain reserve was urged. To bring food grain from the small cultivator to the market an effort must be made to increase the supply of goods he needed ; and the problem must rank next that of the supply of munitions. Failing such an increase of commodity goods it would be advisable to secure supplies of precious metals for sale to the cultivators. Rationing of cereals in all the larger cities of India (those of 100,000 or more inhabitants) on the basis of 1 lb. per head was recommended. The report recognized the impossibility of rationing in rural areas, where there might be serious malnutrition and shortage. The majority of the committee favoured statutory price control. It was urged that the Centre should have the last words in regard to food price changes, the allocation of supplies and the management of the central food grains reserve.

The decision announced in June to relieve the Commander-in-Chief in India of the responsibility for the conduct of the operations against Japan, and to set up a separate East Asia command for the purpose, was not carried into effect until August 26, when the Quebec Conference between the Prime Minister and Mr. Roosevelt was nearing its end. Lord Louis Mountbatten's appointment has been mentioned in Chapter V, section 1, of this volume. He reached Delhi just after the close of the quarter. His arrival aroused hopes that the coming campaigning season would see at least the beginnings of decisive action against the Japanese in Burma ; but it was realized that the food shortage in Bengal was disadvantageous.

Meanwhile India's contribution to the war effort continued to expand. The Prime Minister, with his sure emphasis, had said in a tribute to the soldiers of India in his Guildhall speech on June 30 :

"All the great countries engaged in this war count their armies by millions, but the Indian Army has a peculiar characteristic not found in the armies of Britain or of the United States or of Russia or France, or in the armies of our foes, in that it is entirely composed of volunteers. No one has been conscripted or compelled."

This consideration added to the warmth of the reception of a batch of more than 30 officers and men under

the command of Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Scott, representative of the 4th Indian Division, who spent some weeks in this country from early September, and were entertained and fêted in recognition of the distinguished share of the Division in the North African victories. Both to Lord Wavell's delight and their own, they were present at some of the farewell functions to him and Lady Wavell in London.

A review of India's war effort to the end of September, given by Major-General G. N. Molesworth, late Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, India, showed that India's Defence Forces now number nearly 2,000,000, and that since the outbreak of war half a million troops have served overseas. Recruitment of all arms is being maintained at an average monthly rate of 55,000. The Royal Indian Navy has grown from five small vessels to a fleet of 90 ships, and with a personnel of some 30,000. The number of members of the Indian Air Force has increased fifty times, while that of aircraft has risen by 600 per cent. At the beginning of the quarter under review the casualties sustained by the Indian fighting services reached a total of 103,880, including 5,618 killed and no less than 85,178 missing and prisoners. General Molesworth also gave impressive facts on what he termed the prodigious supply effort of India.

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